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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:
TOWARDS A THEORY OF DEFENCE PLANNING
The aim of this thesis is to develop a theory of defence planning—the making of
. . . I  . Tdecisions regarding the procurement of military capabilities over time. There is a vast 
literature on defence planning, but little has been written on the subject in the form of a 
general theoretical framework that does not relate to specific countries and times. This 
thesis will, therefore, provide such a ‘meta-concept’ of defence planning that can 
highlight the differences and similarities between concepts applied at specific times, and 
provide criteria to evaluate the appropriateness of such concepts for a situation at hand. 
Although historical treatises as well as theoretical writings on strategy*1 23 abound, they 
do not easily translate into answers on how to define capability requirements or develop 
force structures, which is the topic of defence planning. In the absence of such a meta­
framework, defence establishments are therefore often at a loss on how to deal with a 
new environment when long-established approaches become inadequate as conditions 
change. Indeed, defence decisionmakers more often than not profess to confront 
unprecedented uncertainty and complexity when it comes to planning decisions with 
long-term implications.
There is, however, more to the latter claim than a misguided belief in the exceptionality 
of the present. Uncertainty is pervasive in the problem of national defence. It affects all 
aspects of current and future threats, of the effectiveness of forces and concepts in 
battle, of the goals of the political leadership, and the resources available. But not all 
uncertainties are of an equal type or consequence. For example, whether and when the 
Soviets would move into the Fulda Gap was uncertain, and so are the consequences of 
the rise of new centres of power further into the twenty-first century. Perfect and 
assured prescience in either case would make the task of the defence planner and 
strategist incomparably easier. But because these uncertainties are of a very different 
type, capabilities and force structures suited for one are unlikely to be suitable for the 
other.
In the following chapters, a general theory of defence planning will thus be developed 
on the basis of a study of the role of uncertainty. This leads into a risk management 
perspective on the task, and to the definition of four ideal defence planning concepts.
1 Capabilities being the result o f the combination of force structure, readiness and sustainability.
2 Unfortunately, however, there are no commonly accepted definitions of ‘defence policy’, ‘defence 
management’, ‘defence planning’, or ‘defence decisions’, nor is there a commonly held view on the 
literature on how to delineate them from each other. For a short discussion of this point, see John C. 
Garnett, ‘Some Constraints on Defence Policy Makers,’ in The Management of Defence, ed. Laurence 
Martin (London: The Macmillan Press, 1976), pp. 29-32. For a similar delineation of defence planning to 
that developed below, see David S.C. Chu and Nurith Bernstein, ‘Decisionmaking for Defense,’ in New 
Challenges & New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking, eds. Stuart E. Johnson, Martin C. Libicki and 
Gregory F. Treverton (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), pp. 13-32.
3 Stars mark the first time terms are used that are included in the Glossary. Please note that they will all 
be introduced in the main part of the thesis.
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As there is currently little literature that looks at a general theory of defence planning, 
the theoretical argument in this thesis will rest on several strands of literature that have 
not been brought together in this way before: First, literature on uncertainty and risk, as 
well as risk management—some of which relates to specific applications. Over the last 
two decades, however, these topics have also become a field of study in their own right, 
with concepts being developed that are more readily transferable to defence planning. 
Second, literature on strategic theory is used to elucidate the strategic nature of defence 
planning. Third, literature on the nature of planning and its relationship with strategy 
formation will be discussed. Fourth, uncertainty is closely related with surprise, and 
literature on strategic surprise is thus relevant for the argument here—in particular, 
works on tactical and strategic warning, as well on the consequences of surprise for 
defence planning. Fifth, a number of prominent planning methods to come to terms 
with uncertainty and to control for possibly weak assumptions will be discussed to 
demonstrate their relationship to the view of defence planning as a risk management 
process. Sixth, defence planning literature discussing specific concepts for specific 
countries and times will be drawn upon throughout the thesis—but as the theory herein 
is developed in an axiomatic rather than empirical fashion, it serves to illustrate rather 
than make the argument.4
1.1 The Scope o f the Argument
This thesis will describe how decisions should be taken regarding the procurement of 
military capabilities to deal with strategic risks. It is a study of the material preparation 
for the possibility of war, but not of war itself. Several important implications for the 
scope of the argument flow from this approach:
First, the approach is normative in nature. The aim is not to discuss how defence 
planning is done in reality, but how it should be done. The introduction to Part II will 
discuss this aspect in further detail, as it has important implications for the 
methodological function of the case studies in Chapters 6 to 9.
Second, it does not matter whether the wafts) to be prepared for are of the ‘traditional’ 
kind, emphasizing decisive battle between regular conventional forces, or fought against 
more shadowy non-state actors, emphasizing the importance of ‘hearts and minds’.5 
The type of war and the strategy being used to achieve victory, however the latter may 
be defined, is less important for the argument made herein than the question whether 
such a strategy can be defined in advance or not, and be used as a basis for the defence 
preparations.6 7Also, operational art as well as foreign policy in the wider sense will not 
be considered—they fall outside the scope of this thesis, as they do not relate to the 
material preparation for war.
4 Many o f the works related to point five and six come from the RAND Corporation.
5 Rupert Smith, The Utility o f  Force: The Art o f  War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
6 The concept o f strategy is thus central to the thesis, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
7 These are what Huntington calls the ‘use decisions’: Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: 
Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 3. See also 
Snow’s discussion of the ‘development and deployment strategy’ in Donald M. Snow, ‘Levels o f Strategy 
and American Strategic Nuclear Policy,’ Air University Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (November-December 
1983, pp. 63-73).
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o
Third, when a state is confronted with an existential threat during (total) war, the
questions relating to the procurement of new capabilities are reduced to a (relatively)
straightforward analysis of operational priorities and industrial and financial
capabilities. These lie outside the scope of this thesis, as they are not directly affected
by uncertainty regarding strategic risk. However, we have to be thankful that the
problem of defence planning rarely presents itself as such a clear-cut issue as it does in a
fight for national survival. Even when one major threat dominates all others,
uncertainty will usually prevail as to the timing of when war might break out, and other
circumstances. At a minimum, the procurement of capability for use in the present will
thus have to be weighed against that for the future, and decisions have to be taken
*  9
whether the marginal dollar will be spent on readiness , increased force structure or the 
development of new technologies and systems for future use.
Fourth, the thesis will concentrate on discussing those dimensions of strategy that relate 
to some form of material preparation, such as the provision and training of personnel, 
the development and production of weapons systems and supplies, or the use geography 
through the construction of bases. Other dimensions that are not of a material kind will 
be disregarded unless they directly relate to military capability, as training and doctrine 
do. Other intangibles, like the strengthening of national identity and will through the 
education system are excluded from the discussion, although the preparation and 
nourishment of these dimensions can be equally important to strategic success.
Fifth, the thesis will not be concerned with the complicated relationship between 
defence planning on the one hand, and domestic policy on the other hand. Since the 
nature of the argument herein is normative, not positive or descriptive, it is helpful to 
approach the topic from a single-actor perspective. This thesis is about deciding, under 
uncertainty, what military capability to develop. How to achieve this in the context of 
bureaucratic politics is a question of implementation rather than conception, and not 
further considered.8 9
1.2 Clausewitzian and Jominian Strategic Theory
Two theoretical traditions can be distinguished in the area of strategic studies, which are 
often referred to as ‘Jominian’ and ‘Clausewitzian’. 10 Each has distinct views on 
uncertainty and chance in war, as well as the function of strategic theory. While it is 
helpful for illustrative purposes to distinguish the two approaches, the concepts 
developed in this thesis straddle both.
The Clausewitzian tradition sees the practice of war from a non-linear perspective. 
Therefore, similar inputs, or similar strategies, are seen as often not producing similar 
outputs, or desired end-states. The uncertainty inherent in war makes it impossible to 
guarantee that what worked yesterday will work tomorrow. This unpredictability
8 The theory developed herein is also applicable to non-state actors that conduct planning on military 
capabilities over time— which will probably be states in all but legal status. However, the single-actor 
paradigm on which it is based does not make it directly applicable to combined force planning in NATO.
9 Graham T. Allison, The Essence o f Decision (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 10-38. A 
single actor approach is also defended in Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 145-146.
10 For a good comparison o f these two and other strategic theorists, see Michael I. Handel, Masters of 
War (London: Frank Cass, 3rd revised and expanded edition, 2001).
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demands that any theory of war be more heuristic than prescriptive. 11 Clausewitz 
himself wrote that
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the 
narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of 
principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of 
phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of 
action.12
Clausewitz stresses the importance of uncertainty, friction and the adaptive enemy in 
strategy, which, in his eyes, make it impossible to formulate timeless recipes for 
success. His theory therefore centres on the role of intangibles, like morale and will, on 
the relationship between the use of military force and the political goal, and the 
importance of (subjective) military ‘genius’.
1 ^Antoine Henri de Jomini, who like Clausewitz fought in the Napoleonic wars, 
developed a theory of war that was shaped by his experience in the French general staff. 
In his view, a commander should and could apply (objective) scientific principles to 
wage war in a way similar to a game of chess:
There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war, and if they are found 
sometimes modified according to circumstances, they can nevertheless serve in general 
as a compass to the chief of an army.14
It is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should 
do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors 
which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules 
thus become, in the hands of skilful generals commanding brave troops, means of 
almost certain success.15
David S. Fadok writes that
The Jominian tradition believes that the practice of war (i.e., its strategy) can be 
reduced to a set of general principles or rules which can be scientifically derived and 
universally applied. It recognises that the nature of war may change due to political 
and/or moral variables, but that the conduct of war is constant and governed by
11 David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell 
AFB, AL: Air University, 1994), <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/fadok.htm> (24 January 2005). See 
also Barry D. Watts, ‘Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies,’ Security 
Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 115-171, which addresses the difference between both schools 
in the context of a particular debate, and cites other major articles doing the same.
12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Everyman’s Library, 1993), p. 698.
13 For a short biography of Jomini, see John Shy, ‘Jomini,’ in Makers o f Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 146-182.
14 Antoine Henri de Jomini, Treatise on Grand Military Operations (New York, 1865), p. 18, quoted in 
Azar Gat, The Origins o f Military Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 112.
15 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art o f War (London: Reprint of 1862 edition, 1992), p. 323, quoted in 
Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 95.
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principles. For Jominians, the duty of theory is to uncover these immutable truths and 
to advocate their adoption and use.16
In three important respects, the theory developed in this thesis is distinctly 
Clausewitzian: First, the ideal nature—discussed in more detail below—of the defence 
planning methods developed in Chapter 5 means that they provide “insight in the great
17mass of phenomena”, rather than the “narrow path on which the solution is to lie”. 
Second, as this thesis examines the effect of uncertainty on defence planning, its 
paradigm regarding the nature of strategy is the Clausewitzian one—Chapter 2 
discusses sources of uncertainty in strategy, and makes the case that it is in principle 
impossible to eliminate uncertainty, or to confidently rely on enduring cause-effect 
relationships which are assumed to exist by Jominian theorists. Third, the theory will 
repeatedly highlight the importance of professional and value judgement in strategy and 
defence planning, which cannot be replaced by objective analysis based on Jominian 
principles. Paul K. Davis, by no means a stranger to the use of analytical methods in 
the area, writes in this respect that
Bluntness is appropriate ... about a controversial matter: Those who reject subjectivity 
in methodology have no place in higher-level planning, since the most important 
decisions are inherently subjective. ... The challenge is not to make things “objective”, 
but to structure subjective judgments so that they are well defined and meaningful as 
part of an analysis.18
Yet, the arguement also takes a more Jominian approach in many respects, as defence 
planning necessarily involves many, usually very expensive decisions on force sizes and 
capabilities. Those who draft and take these decisions not only have to make judgments 
between numerous competing demands, but also consider a multitude of technical and 
financial repercussions and justify their actions to those who ultimately pay for them. 
Reference to strategic genius alone, however justified in theory, will not invite much 
understanding in this context, and is unlikely to save any weapons program from a 
treasurer’s wrath. The inevitability of the influence of subjectivity and professional 
judgement does not mean that rigorous and, if possible and where appropriate, even 
quantitative analysis can be dispensed with. Throughout the thesis, there will therefore 
be a tendency to quantify strategic problems and to find ‘optimised’ solutions, an 
approach that is much closer in nature to Jomini’s application of a “small number of 
fundamental principles of war” than to the teachings of Clausewitz. The aim is, 
however, not to replace the latter with the former, but to discuss the proper place of both 
in the overall effort that is defence planning.
1.3 The Theory o f Managing Strategic Risk: An Outline o f the Argument
All readers interested in the intricacies of social science methodologies are kindly 
referred to the two introductory sections at the beginning of Part I and Part II, which 
place the approach of this thesis in the context of theoretical considerations regarding 
the building and testing of theory, respectively. Those readers who are not can,
16 Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis.
17 See also Peter Paret, ‘Clausewitz,’ in Makers o f Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, pp. 193, 198.
18 Paul K. Davis, ‘Uncertainty-sensitive planning,’ in New Challenges & New Tools for Defense 
Decisionmaking, eds. Johnson, Libicki and Treverton, p. 152.
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however, safely skip these sections, and it is out of considerations for them that the 
remainder of this introductory chapter only outlines gist of the main argument.
Chapter 2 will introduce strategy as a system of causal relationships that links the steps 
and actions of countless individuals to the achievement or otherwise of the political goal 
of the state. In practice, it has numerous dimensions, and is subject to irreducible 
sources of uncertainty originating from aleatory uncertainty, complex systems, 
cognitive, mental and physiological limits, and the enemy, all of which will be 
discussed below. We can never be certain that our forecasts regarding the international 
system are correct, that the technological, tactical and operational ways of war do not 
fundamentally change, that our information about the state of the world is not severely 
incomplete or wilfully distorted, that friction will not affect an issue that looks 
deceptively simple ‘on paper,’ or how the enemy will react to any of our moves. 
Notwithstanding the ease with which a strategic problem can be analysed in hindsight, 
doing strategy by creating a workable theory of victory will always remain an art more 
than a science.19 And since that theory of victory needs to be translated into rules that 
can guide a bureaucratic effort, the way in which it is thus ‘codified’ must be analysed 
in context with that uncertainty as well. As far as the day-to-day business of defence is 
concerned, codification and uncertainty are nowhere more relevant than in the area of 
force structure planning: Here, the consequences of decisions will often remain assets or 
constraints for decades to come.
Chapter 3 discusses that the combination of uncertainty and potential harm are integral 
components of the concept of risk, and that strategic risk is thus intrinsic to the problem 
of strategy making and execution. Given the uncertainty prevalent in anything that 
relates to strategy, it is seemingly straightforward to think about defence planning as 
risk management. But risk and uncertainty are multi-dimensional concepts, and 
describing them is far from easy. (Political) judgment is inherent in comparing and 
ordering risk into orders of priority. Different kinds and degrees of uncertainty, both 
epistemic and ontological , have to be compared and weighted. In doing so, it is 
helpful and necessary to assess whether the available information suffices to define
]|c j|c
risks in the narrow sense, or whether one is faced with indeterminacy or even
j(C  #
ignorance . Failure to do so creates institutional risk , and is not uncommon in the area 
of strategy.
If defence planning is analysed as risk management, the concept of strategic risk that is 
used to do so is pivotal to the whole discussion. Existing concepts of strategic risk 
largely fail to capture the scope of the problem of dealing with uncertainty—some even 
imply that risks can be eliminated, and thereby ignore the inherent uncertainty involved 
in ‘doing’ strategy. In order to describe and manage strategic risk, it is necessary to 
distinguish more dimensions than just probability and consequences—the ‘risk’ side of 
the problem—and to include other dimensions from the ‘strategic’ side, such as 
information regarding the enemy and his theory of victory . Since strategy is
19 John Whitman writes: “It is uncanny how the choice o f a level o f detail will influence ... the seeming 
wisdom of the proposed policy. A proposal may appear to bloom with fair prospects when viewed in a 
general way, yet prove to be studded with thorns when examined in detail. Surely everyone can 
understand this; how many bright ideas have we all had which might survive one or at most two levels o f  
detailed criticism but fell apart at the third? And when that third level is reached, do we not insist that it’s 
a good idea “in principle” and plead for a reconsideration at the higher, more favourable level o f 
generalization?” John Whitman, ‘On Estimating Reactions,’ Studies in Intelligence, vol. 9, no. 3 
(Summer 1965), p. 3.
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intrinsically linked to politics, strategic risk itself is also inseparable from political 
judgment.
Chapter 4 shows that risk management is based on the assumption that future cause- 
effect relationships can be identified today and be used to reduce future risk. This 
assumption can make it quite demanding to correctly use risk management processes, 
despite the deceptively simple structure that they often have on paper. This is especially 
the case if concurrent risks have very different qualities, so that some well-defined risks 
can be treated with a limited number of well-specified steps, while particularly 
uncertain risks that are addressed on the basis of the precautionary principle might only 
be treatable by measures with a very broad scope.
In the strategic context, the co-existence of such different risks is the norm rather than 
the exception, since the information available on specific risks varies greatly. Herein 
lies a first general difficulty of the task of defence planning. It is compounded by the 
fact that the management of strategic risk involves both the formation of strategy and its 
execution, which are by their nature very different processes. Codification of political 
guidance into strategic guidance is thus a pivotal step in the overall defence planning 
process.
Looking at defence planning as a risk management problem provides a framework that 
can describe the basic tasks of defence planners independent of the specific problems 
and challenges that they face at any point in time. Depending on the nature of the risk 
pattern that a defence organization faces, many parts of this framework will be 
implemented through different and sometimes idiosyncratic methods. The basic 
function of each part, however, remains the same. Using such a framework to think 
about defence planning can help to avoid the need to ‘reinvent the wheel" each time that 
significant geopolitical shifts make adjustments necessary, and to evaluate the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of different planning and analysis methods. However, it is 
important that they must be implemented in consistent ways, taking account of the 
particular patterns of strategic risk.
Chapter 5 will therefore define four ideal defence planning concepts that show an 
internal configurational fit between the risk pattern to be treated, the way in which 
political guidance is codified into strategic guidance that determines requirements, and 
the force structure concepts used to fulfil these requirements. It is important to 
remember that these frameworks are not strategies, are not meant to replace strategies, 
and cannot do so. A coherent theory of victory is created in a creative process of 
strategy formation. There is little that this analysis could recommend on this point, 
given the paramount importance of specific geographies, political goals, historical path 
dependence, technology and the like that must be considered, as well as the creative and 
synthetic nature of that process. Rearmament Planning, Threat-based Planning, Multi- 
Threat Planning, and Task-based Planning as defined here thus cannot be directly 
applied, without the definition of a theory of victory appropriate and distinct to the 
situation, but they can describe the way in which political guidance must be codified 
into strategic guidance, and how uncertain requirements can be met.
20 Some might argue that a willingness and capability to shed blood can compensate for informational 
uncertainties about enemies known and unknown— the armies that conquered one new Roman colony 
after another under the Republic and the Empire certainly performed impressively against known enemies
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1.4 The Practice o f Managing Strategic Risk: Choice o f Case Studies
In the second part of this thesis, eight example case studies will be used to demonstrate 
the implementation of the four ideal defence planning concepts in practice. Readers 
interested in the methodological issues involved in using case studies in a normative 
framework are again referred to the short section at the beginning of Part II. The choice 
of the case studies itself has been guided by four main considerations:
First, the goal is to highlight the importance of the risk pattern for the way in which 
defence planning is done. To the extent possible, other influences should thus be held 
constant, in particular long-term factors such as geography or strategic traditions. 
Therefore, case studies for each defence planning concept should be drawn from one 
country that, throughout time, used defence planning frameworks that are similar to all 
four ideal concepts described in this thesis.
Second, it was desirable to demonstrate the validity of the theory for large powers that 
need to carry strategic weight globally, as well as middle- and small powers who only 
carry strategic weight locally, if at all.
Third, sufficient material had to be available on the defence planning process in the 
country, as it is not sufficient for the purpose here to merely demonstrate the outcome of 
the process in terms of capability decisions. In addition, information had to be available 
in the public domain to outline, at least in general terms, the pattern of strategic risk that 
the government saw itself faced with, and the way in which requirements had been 
derived from that risk pattern and the general theory of victory.
Fourth, the case studies should draw on major policy documents, such as White Papers 
(in the British tradition) or Policy Reviews (in the United States), which give an 
authoritative statement regarding the questions under consideration here. As they 
provide a ‘snapshot’ in time, these documents should, in theory, discuss the risk pattern, 
the definition of requirements, and capability concepts in the most coherent and 
internally consistent manner possible, and will thus be taken at face value. Since they 
reflect policy intent, such documents are also most congruent with the normative 
approach of the argument. In that context, the focus will be on the configurational fit 
within the document. The question of whether a particular risk pattern was correct (or, 
rather, appropriate) at the time will not be discussed, nor will the extent to which the 
policy outlined in the document has actually been implemented in later years. Of 
course, White Papers and Policy Reviews have functions in the domestic policy context 
that extend beyond the mere objective summary of a government’s intentions in the area 
of defence planning. However, a similar problem of the interference of domestic
as well as previously unknown ones. It is, however, also true that everything starts to look like nails to 
those who only have a hammer, and the traditional method of quick conquest, administration and 
assimilation of new territories ultimately led to the annihilation of three full legions, when it was pushed 
too far into the seemingly endless European hinterland. For a discussion of that strategic surprise, see 
Rose Mary Sheldon, ‘Slaughter in the Forest: Roman Intelligence Mistakes in Germany,’ Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, vol. 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 1-38. Although several punitive expeditions ventured out 
from Roman-controlled territory into the areas that were lost in 9 AD, the Empire never made another 
attempt at expanding into the Germanic forests.
21 This has important consequences for the extent to which secondary literature is relevant for the 
discussion in this thesis— most discussions of major policy reviews either provide partisan or relatively 
unconstructive criticism at the time, or critique its main elements with the benefit of hindsight.
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politics on the questions under consideration here would pose itself in an even greater 
way if realized, as opposed to intended, policy was studied.
Not all four conditions could be fulfilled at the same time and to the same extent, so 
compromises had to be made. Four of the case studies are drawn from major episodes 
of the defence planning history of the United States between the 1920s and the year 
2001. Rearmament Planning will be illustrated by a discussion of defence planning in 
the interwar years, and Threat-based Planning by that during the years after the 
Vietnam War. For these two case studies, no White Paper-type documents are 
available, and intended policy needs to be partly extrapolated from realized policy. The 
example of Multi-Threat Planning is based on the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the 
first review of an administration that begun its time in office after the Cold War. 
Following the BUR, Congress introduced a requirement by law for a regular defence 
review to be submitted to it every four years—the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR). The first of these documents, produced by the Clinton administration in 1997, 
confirmed the broad outlines of the BUR's strategy and force planning framework. The 
second one, submitted by the Bush Administation in 2001, will be used here to illustrate 
Task-based Planning.
The second set of examples is drawn from Australia and New Zealand between the 
years 1976 and 2000. Both countries share a common history as far-flung outposts of 
the British Empire, which has also been reflected in a historically parallel strategic 
outlook, and joint military deployments from early settlement until the Vietnam War. 
Both countries’ militaries and defence communities are also very similar in sociological 
terms.24 All but one of the Australian defence White Papers since Vietnam will be 
discussed: The 1976 White Paper as an example for Rearmament Planning, the 1987 
one for Threat-based Planning, and the 2000 one to illustrate Multi-Threat Planning— 
the White Paper of 1994 had largely confirmed and updated the main conclusions of its 
predecessor. As there is thus no suitable Australian Paper for Task-based Planning, the 
antipodean example will be the 1991 New Zealand White Paper.
22 See Jeffrey D. Brake, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues,’ 
Congressional Research Sendee Report RL20771 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
2001), p. 2.
23 For a concise overview o f early New Zealand military history, see James Rolfe, The Armed Forces o f  
New Zealand (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999), pp. 1-19.
24 Cathy Downes, ‘Australia and New Zealand: Contingent and Concordant Militaries,’ in The 
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams 
and David R. Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 182-204.
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PART I: 
THEORY
INTRODUCTION TO 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH
From a methodological point of view, the quality of a theory as a logical edifice can be 
assessed according to a number of ideal criteria: Axioms have to be used economically, 
and they must to be logically independent. Both axioms and the statements derived 
from them have to be consistent. Theories should have general validity, i.e. be 
applicable to the largest possible number of cases, yet be specific in the statements that 
result—the combination of which gives them informational value. At the same time, 
statements derived from the theory should also allow the least number of possible 
logical outcomes, and must be falsifiable. Most theories in reality do not fulfil all of 
these criteria, which nevertheless set an ideal as a point of reference.
Strategy itself is an art rather than a science, but theories about strategy and war must 
relate to these ideal criteria if they are to claim informative value. In this thesis, 
Chapter 2 defines basic terms relating to strategy and its implementation, and discusses 
uncertainty in strategy. The chapter thus introduces axioms relating to the nature of 
strategy, and constitutes the first conceptual pillar of the theory developed herein. 
Chapter 3 defines risk and associated notions, which constitute the second axiomatic 
pillar and are then applied to strategy. Chapter 4 builds on the first two chapters and 
develops a framework of defence planning as a risk management process that flows 
from the basic axioms on strategy and risk introduced in the preceding chapters. With 
regards to the methodology, Chapters 2 to 4 thus form one logical edifice whose quality 
is related, firstly, to the validity of the axioms used, secondly, to the completeness of the 
deductive chain of logic that the theory derives from them, and, thirdly, to the absence 
of contradictions and tautologies among axioms and derived statements.
The most common theoretical method in natural and social science is the contingency 
approach, which analyses causal relationships by determining the influence of 
independent variables on the dependent ones. However, a non-causal relationship, for 
example whether two colours ‘clash’ or not, defies such a framework. It must be 
analysed in a configurational approach, which originally arose out of the study of 
human perceptions in psychology, and the philosophy of science, and will also be used 
in Chapter 5. In the social sciences, the configurational approach
represents a holistic stance, an assertion that the parts of a social entity take their
meaning from the whole and cannot be understood in isolation. Rather than trying to
25 Joachim Wolf, Organisation, Management, Unternehmensführung: Theorien und Kritik (Wiesbaden: 
Gabler, 2003), pp. 8-13.
26 Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, ‘Mach and Ehrenfels: The Foundations o f Gestalt Theory,’ in 
Foundations o f Gestalt Theory, ed. Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 1988), pp. 124-157.
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explain how order is designed into the parts of an organization, configurational theorists 
try to explain how order emerges from the interaction of those parts as a whole.27
How to measure performance is thus, for example, seen as part of the configuration 
itself, and not as external. In the field of defence planning, it is thus not possible to 
compare, for example, the contribution of intelligence to the success of defence 
planning across different situations in isolation: When decisionmakers define the goals 
they try to achieve, they will take into account how much information about threats is 
available to them, of which intelligence is an important part. Trade-offs between 
different dimensions of success must thus be seen in context with the configuration 
itself. The framework developed in Chapter 4 inherently fulfils this demand, since 
performance is measured in the form of the subjective evaluation of the reduction of 
strategic risk achieved by the defence effort (see Sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.5).
A central issue developed in Chapter 4 is the need for a conceptual fit between, first, the 
pattern of strategic risk, second, the methods of defining military requirements from that 
pattern, and, third, the capability planning tools that can be used to meet these 
requirements. In other words, the methods that are used to define requirements, and the 
capabilities developed to fulfil them, must be compatible with, and appropriate for, the 
nature of the strategic risk that is to be reduced. Different situations of strategic risk 
will require different ways of going about defence planning. Policy implications 
directly flow from this analysis, as the conceptual fit must be maintained when 
circumstances change over time.
In order to describe the varied nature of reality, the configurational approach uses 
systems of classification. In general, classifications can be theoretically deduced 
(typologies) or empirically found (taxonomies), but both approaches are mixed in 
reality since theoretical deductions are usually based on empirical knowledge.30 In the 
social sciences, Max Weber’s discussion of legal, traditional and charismatic 
leadership and Mintzberg’s definition of different types of organization are two 
famous examples of classifications. Both describe different versions of organization 
and leadership that show an internal configurational fit. Such configurations are often 
referred to as Gestalten (after the German word for form or shape).
Chapter 5 thus discusses four ideal defence planning Gestalten that are coherent 
implementations of the process developed in Chapter 4. This typology is based on a 
special form of Gestalt, as they are ideal cases. Such a (platonic) ideal or Weber’s 
Idealtypus is:
27 Alan D. Meyer, Anne S. Tsui and C.R. Hinings, ‘Configurational Approaches to Organizational 
Management,’ Academy of Management Journal, vol. 36, no. 6 (December 1993), p. 1178.
28 Rajaram Veliyath and T.C. Srinivasan, ‘Gestalt Approaches to Assessing Strategic Coalignment: A 
Conceptual Integration,’ British Journal of Management, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 205-219.
29 In contrast, the contingency approach deals with the varied nature of reality by describing the influence 
of different values of independent variables on the dependent ones.
30 Wolf, Organisation, Management, Unternehmensführung: Theorien und Kritik, pp. 338-359.
31 Max Weber, The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1947), pp. 
329-366.
32 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World o f Organizations (New York: 
The Free Press, 1989).
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created by a one-sided accentuation of one or more parts and the combination of a 
multitude of diffuse and discrete, more or less or sometimes not at all present, 
individual phenomena, which fit with the singularly accentuated parts and form a 
coherent thought.33
Care must be taken not to confuse the classification itself, and the ideal cases in 
particular, with a causal explanation. Whatever the conceptual beauty of an Idealtypus, 
it does not in of itself contain any proof that nature coincides with it, nor any reason or 
cause why it should.34 A Gestalt in general is merely a means to describe reality, and an 
Idealtypus not even a direct representation of it—it is an ideal benchmark that can be 
used to measure and compare real cases. Any real country’s planning will fall short of 
the typology’s conceptual purity, and usually combine aspects of two or more of them.
33 Emphasis in original, translation by author. Max Weber, ‘Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher 
und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,’ Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 19 (1904), pp. 22- 
87. Reproduced in E. Flitner, ed., Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre von Max Weber 
(Potsdam: Institut für Pädagogik der Universität Potsdam, 1999), p. 191.
34 Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, ‘Configurational Approaches to Organizational Management,’ p. 1180.
35 Weber, ‘Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,’ pp. 190-194.
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CHAPTER 2:
STRATEGY AND UNCERTAINTY36
This chapter will discuss the concept of strategy in more detail. It will begin by looking 
at the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the US Department of 
Defense (DoD). This will serve to illustrate the difference between the formation of 
strategy on the one hand, and its codification on the other. Finally, it will analyse the 
ways in which strategy is inevitably affected by uncertainty.
2.1 Strategy and Theories of Victory
2.1.1 The Failure o f the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
During the early 1960s, the PPBS was introduced by Secretary McNamara to the 
Pentagon and later extended by President Johnson to the rest of the federal 
government. Charles J. Hitch claimed that the PPBS
provided for the Secretary of Defense ... a system which brings together at one place 
and at one time all of the relevant information that they need to make sound decisions 
on the forward program and to control the execution o f that program.38
Its most ardent supporters claimed that the PPBS, in conjunction with the use of 
methods of systems analysis, could formalize and optimise the whole process of both 
strategy and defence planning. Had this been the case, PPBS as originally conceived 
would have eliminated the need to develop a normative theory of defence planning in 
this thesis. A short overview on the reasons for its failure in its original form—Aaron 
Wildavsky concludes in a famous study that PPBS-type systems have failed 
“everywhere and at all times” —is instructive as it demonstrates the limits of Jominian 
approaches, as well as the important difference between strategic planning and the 
making of strategy.
At its core, the PPBS was a capital budgeting system in which different programs that 
contributed to the same categories of output, such as ‘Strategic Forces’, ‘General 
Purpose Forces’ or ‘Intelligence and Communications’ were evaluated against each 
other, regardless of the service they belonged to. In order to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of each program, systems analysis was used to quantify both in monetary terms. 
Herein lay a first reason for the failure of this planning system, since the analysts who
36 A shorter version of this chapter has been published as: Stephan C. Frühling, ‘Uncertainty, Forecasting 
and the Difficulty o f Strategy,’ Comparative Strategy, vol. 25, no. 1 (January-March 2006), pp. 1-13.
37 For critical appraisals of PPBS-type systems in the US and British defence departments, see Martin, 
ed., The Management o f Defence, and Michael D. Hobkirk, The Politics o f Defence Budgeting (London: 
The Macmillan Press, 1983). PPBS was later revised into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE) System.
38 Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 25.
39 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics o f the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 4th 
edition, 1984), p. 198.
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conducted these studies disregarded characteristics of programs if they were not readily 
quantifiable or directly related to the performance measure (usually related to the cost of 
generated firepower) defined by the analyst, regardless of their relevance from a 
military point of view. For example, in the decision whether to procure nuclear or 
conventional carriers, the operational advantages of nuclear propelled vessels from 
longer endurance, higher speed and the capacity to carry fuel for other ships in the battle 
group were not considered.40 A first important lesson that can be drawn from the 
experience of the PPBS is thus that those who disregard professional judgment and rely 
solely on formal analysis do so at their own peril.41
While a capital budgeting system like the PPBS can in principle provide a basis for 
choices between programs within categories, it does not do so for choices between 
categories. This is one of the reasons why the British never implemented the system to 
the extent that the Pentagon did, despite adopting output budgeting shortly after the 
introduction of the PPBS on the other side of the Atlantic.42 In the United States, the 
McNamara Pentagon tried to overcome this shortcoming by extending the use of 
systems analysis, economic cost-benefit calculus and marginal utility analysis to 
strategy making itself, and ‘computing’, for example, the required amount of strategic 
nuclear forces. Enthoven and Smith explain that
US strategic offensive forces were sized according to their ability to destroy the Soviet 
Union as a viable nation in a retaliatory strike. The level of destruction required— 20 to 
25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of Soviet industry— was based on a 
judgment ... [that] was influenced by the fact of strongly diminishing marginal returns 
... [BJeyond the level o f around 400 1-megaton-equivalent delivered warheads, 
delivering more warheads would not significantly change the amount of damage 
inflicted. ... Thus, the main reason for [not procuring additional forces] is that having 
more would not be worth the additional cost43
However, this kind of reasoning was based on a fundamental confusion between (fiscal) 
efficiency and (strategic) effectiveness. In other words, 400-megaton-equivalents might 
be the point where the ‘marginal cost’ in dollars of producing dead Soviet civilians was 
sharply rising. But this does demonstrate why killing “20 to 25 percent” of the Soviet 
population was enough to impose the will of the United States on the Soviet leaders 
(who had all personally experienced losses of such scale in the Great Patriotic War), or 
why that ‘sufficient’ number of dead Soviets was not 10, 50 or 80%. The game 
theoretical perspective44 on which such ‘strategy’ was ultimately based reduced friction
40 For a good critique of systems analysis in the making of strategy, see Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Guessing Game: 
A Reappraisal o f Systems Analysis,’ in The Strategic Imperative: New Policies fo r  American Security, ed. 
Samuel P. Huntington (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1982), pp. 163-192. For a discussion 
from a historical point of view, see Robert J. Leonard, ‘War as a “Simple Economic Problem”: The Rise 
of an Economics o f Defense,’ in Economics and National Security, ed. Craufurd D. Goodwin (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 261-283.
41 A point that will be discussed in more detail and with reference to the theoretical literature o f risk 
management in Chapters 3 and 4.
42 Hobkirk, The Politics o f  Defence Budgeting, p. 85.
43 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 
pp. 207-208.
44 Philip Mirowski, ‘When Games Grow Deadly Serious: The Military Influence on the Evolution of 
Game Theory,’ in Economics and National Security, ed. Goodwin, pp. 227-256. See also the discussion
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and uncertainty to communication problems that could be overcome by technical means 
such as red telephones or nuclear command and control systems.45 The danger of such 
an, in the end Jominian, approach became readily apparent in Vietnam, 46 where the 
Johnson administration used military force to ‘communicate’ to the enemy that
the costs of fighting to him outweighed the costs to the United States, and consequently 
that the advantages of terminating the conflict were greater than the advantages of 
continuing it.47
The second lesson that can be drawn from this episode is thus that detailed, quantified 
planning alone, in spite of its analytical rigour, was insufficient to formulate a workable 
strategy that could force US will on the enemy. PPBS failed to strike the right balance 
between Clausewitzian genius on the one hand and ‘Jominian’ analysis on the other. As 
the following section will explain, that failure was not an accident but inherent in the 
purely analytical approach that its inventors took to strategic problems.
2.1.2 Strategy Formation, Planning, Plans and Planners
What planning is and what it can and cannot achieve is a question that goes to the heart 
of the topic of this thesis. Mintzberg defines
the noun planning to mean a formalized procedure to produce [an] articulated result, in 
the form of an integrated system of decisions. As for planners, we shall take them to be 
people with that title (or something similar) but without line (operating) responsibilities 
and so with time on their hands to worry about the future of the organization that 
employs them. ... We shall take the noun plan to mean an explicit statement of 
intentions ..., usually ... specific, elaborated, and documented. We shall use the verb
of game theory in Martin Shubik, ‘Game Theory: The Language of Strategy?’, in Mathematics of 
Conflict, ed. Martin Shubik (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983), pp. 1-28. The main problem here is that 
the applicability of game theory to any situation is based on a number of very restrictive conditions and 
assumptions (Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1996) and Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies o f Cold War Deterrence and a New 
Direction (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001) and a specific way of framing a 
situation (Frederic Schick, Ambiguity and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 21- 
36.). Although nuclear strategy has left the centre stage of Western policy making since the end of the 
Cold War, the same ideas that shaped Western thinking then live on in the form of ‘action-reaction- 
metaphysics’ in the debates on ballistic missile defences and the ‘militarization’ of space. (Keith B. 
Payne, ‘Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence,’ Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 
2001), pp. 109-121.).
45 Ashton B. Carter, for example, wrote that both type I and type II errors could be reduced in strategic 
warning systems by better use of technology, and that “adding too many ‘redundant’ sensors, ... may 
make things worse for both error types. More sensors increase the odds of conflicting information.” 
Ashton B. Carter, ‘Sources of Error and Uncertainty,’ in Managing Nuclear Operations, eds. Ashton B. 
Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 
p. 630.
46 For a good discussion of the role of economic models in American ‘strategy’ in that war, see Meghnad 
Desai, ‘Social Science Goes to War: Economic Theory and the Pentagon Papers,’ Survival, vol. 14, no. 2 
(March-April 1972), pp. 62-67.
47 William Kaufman, quoted in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards o f Armageddon (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1983), p. 330.
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plan, however, to mean simply taking the future into account, whether formally or 
informally.48
The PPBS was introduced to the Pentagon at a time when ‘strategic planning’, the 
definition and implementation of strategy through highly formalized analytical methods, 
was becoming fashionable in major US companies. ‘Strategic planning’ is ultimately 
based on decision theory and thus on the conceptual separation of planning from action. 
It entails the analysis, in a highly formalized manner, of an organization’s external and 
internal environment, to define objectives, develop strategies to attain these, choose a 
strategy, develop it in detail, and then finally implement it. However, formalized 
‘strategic planning’ ultimately failed both in business as well as in government since
the structure o f orthodox planning is such that it is inherently unable to cope with 
contingencies like organizational rigidity and ‘disobedience’, turbulent change, 
inadequate information, time constraints, political bargaining etc.49
Two main aspects account for this failure: First, the use of ‘rationality’ as the sole basis 
for strategy making—ignoring other legitimate and proven approaches, such as 
incremental learning or political bargaining. Second, the assumption that analytical 
methods alone can be sufficient to formulate strategy (a concept discussed in detail in 
the following sections) and that the synthesis that underlies creativity is either 
unnecessary or not fundamentally different from analysis.50 However, analytical and 
intuitive thinking have been found to complement each other in experimental studies,51 
and both differ fundamentally in the amount of time they require to arrive at a decision 
and the kind of data that they can use. In the defence context, both are enshrined in 
military doctrine and essential for strategic decisions. Mintzberg explains that in 
general,
Formal systems could certainly process more information, at least hard information; 
they could consolidate it, aggregate it, move it about. But they could never internalise 
it, comprehend it, synthesize it. ... Planning by its very nature defines and preserves
48 Emphasis in original. Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles 
for Planning, Plans, Planners (New York: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 31-32.
49 Emphasis in original. Herman R. van Gunsteren, The Quest for Control: A critique o f the rational- 
central-rule approach in public affairs (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 75.
50 Both o f these points are excellently developed in detail in Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic 
Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners, which surveys the extensive literature on 
strategic planning of the preceding three decades. Section 5.1.2 will discuss the difference between 
deduction, induction and abduction. Formalized processes can only deal with the first two kinds of 
inference, although the third is at the core of creativity.
51 J.T. Peters, K.R. Hammond, and D.A. Summers, ‘A note on intuitive vs analytical thinking,’ 
Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance, vol. 12 (1974), pp. 125-131. Quoted in Mintzberg, 
The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners, pp. 327-328.
52 For a discussion of analytical and intutitive decisionmaking in US Army doctrine, see William Duggan, 
Coup d ’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2005).
Richard N. Haass, ‘A Premium on Good Judgment,’ U.S. Naval War College Review, vol. LVII, no. 3/4 
(Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 11-15.
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categories. Creativity, by its very nature, creates categories, or rearranges established
54ones.
FIGURE 1: STRATEGY FORMATION, PLANNING, PLANS AND PLANNERS
Source: Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, 
Plans, Planners (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 392.
By its very nature, a new strategy is an idea, an often at first quite blurred image in 
people’s heads, which still has to be elaborated and converted into day-to-day 
operations through budgets and programs. Operationalising a strategy can thus, under 
specific conditions, require formal planning. In general, this will be the case in 
Mintzberg’s ‘machine organization’, defined by stable internal and external 
environments, a large size with an elaborated structure, capital intensive operations that 
are tightly coupled yet fairly simple, and relatively important external control.55 But 
between the strategy, an idea, and the activity of planning stands codification, the 
translation of the strategy into detailed methodologies, defined analytical categories, 
procedures and decision criteria that guide the planning effort.
In modem day defence bureaucracies, which are typical examples of machine 
organizations, (formal) planning systems are thus indispensable to achieve 
accountability, transparency, and coherence in the administration of strategy. However, 
it would be wrong to replace Clausewitzian genius in the formation of strategy with 
similar principles, as was tried during the heyday of the PPBS and the Vietnam War. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the respective roles of planners, planning and plans in 
relation to strategy formation. Planning can operationalise and implement a strategy but 
not create one—a planning system is inevitably bound by pre-defined categories and
54 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners, 
p. 299.
55 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners, 
pp. 333-350. Mintzberg’s typology of organizations is now a classic of organizational literature. For a 
discussion of the machine organization, see Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange 
World o f Organizations, pp. 131-152.
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rules, while strategy making deals with changing and re-defining these boundaries and 
rules within which planning operates.
Plans that result from formal planning can be used for internal and external 
communication and control, and they provide a feedback loop by serving as inputs into 
the strategy formation process. In this context, planners have two distinct broad roles: 
First, as strategic programmers, they do planning. Second, as strategic analysts, they 
support the strategy formation process. In this latter role, planners cannot use the 
formalized and standardized methods that characterize strategic programming, but must 
work largely ad-hoc and in close conjunction with those managers or officials who are 
developing the strategy. Planners can provide input for the strategy formation in the 
form of focused analysis (which in this role is valuable more for highlighting questions 
than for providing answers), by catalysing the process, finding strategies that are already 
used in the organization, or scrutinizing rough ideas in order to prepare them for 
codification.
2.1.3 The Dimensions o f Strategy
So what exactly is strategy? For Clausewitz, it is “the use of engagements for the object 
of the war,” 56 the latter being “not merely an act of policy but a true political
57instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” 
Strategy is, in the words of Colin S. Gray “the bridge that relates military power to
C O
political purpose.” Since realization of the political goal is the benchmark for 
measuring the value of a nation’s armed forces, the metric for doing so is strategic 
effectiveness, defined as “net impact upon the course and outcome of a conflict.”59 In 
general, it is not always necessary for combat to occur to achieve strategic effectiveness. 
Both sides can in certain situations anticipate the likely result. Deterring an enemy’s 
action through the threat of punishment, for example, is another way of arms to be 
strategically effective. But, as Clausewitz remarks in On War, “Combat is the only 
effective force in war.”60 Strategic effectiveness in any form is dependent on the 
capability to enforce one’s demands, since
the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be 
destroyed. It follows that the destruction of the enemy’s force underlies all military 
actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. ...
If a decision by fighting is the basis o f all plans and operations, it follows that the 
enemy can frustrate everything through a successful battle ... Thus it is evident that 
destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with 
which others cannot compete.61
Strategy is always conducted within a physical world, whose restrictions limit the 
possibilities to prepare for and to prevail in combat. Strategy is also always conducted 
by real and living persons, who depend on others to support them in positions of power,
56 Clausewitz, On War, p. 146.
57 Ibid., p. 99.
58 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 17.
59 Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don V Make War (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 10.
60 Clausewitz, On War, p. 110.
61 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
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and whose beliefs and feelings influence how they react to the enemy’s physical moves. 
Hence adversaries must take into account numerous dimensions of strategy, 
accommodate the limits these dimensions impose, compensate for their relative 
disadvantages and exploit their relative advantages over the enemy. Determining the 
exact number and definition of the dimensions of strategy is less important than 
realizing that strategy touches on all of them at once, even if some have more influence 
than others on the final outcome in specific conflicts. Gray, for example, identifies the 
following seventeen such dimensions: People; society; culture; politics; ethics;
economics and logistics; organization; military administration; information and 
intelligence; strategic theory and doctrine; technology; military operations; command; 
geography; friction, chance and uncertainty; adversary; and time. “ Since innumerable 
factors from the physical as well as human side come into play if one is to compel the 
enemy to do one’s will, strategy is at the same time a multifaceted task and a unified 
whole: Multifaceted, since the act of compelling touches on and is influenced by the 
whole range of the dimensions of strategy, all of which are important for the overall
ZL T
outcome. Unified, since it is a purposeful act directed at achieving a political goal.
2.1.4 Strategy as Causal Relationships: The Strategic Pyramid
The strategic effect of combat—or the threat thereof—rests on several levels of conflict 
that support each other,64 in what can be called a strategic pyramid (see Figure 2). At 
the first level, capabilities have to be created by combining men, materiel, training, 
doctrine and planning. At the second level, these capabilities can be used to seek 
tactical success. At the third level, tactical successes can lead to operational success, 
which is a prerequisite for achieving strategic success itself on the fourth level. At each 
level, however, each adversary will try to achieve success while preventing success o f 
the other—conflict and interaction is inherent in the levels o f strategy, and only one (or 
neither) of the adversaries will be successful in achieving strategic success.
The dimensions of strategy relate to both the layers themselves, and to the relationship 
between them. Combat on the smallest scale rests on the physical interaction of 
weapons systems, but the tactical outcome of an engagement is also influenced by 
terrain and intangibles like doctrine, information and morale, only some of which can be 
prepared in advance. Operational success rests on the combination of many tactical 
engagements, the overall relative disposition of forces and the addition of other factors 
like available logistics support and the quality of intelligence, command and control. 
But operational success is also only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for strategic 
success in achieving political goals. One of the main additional factors that intervene 
here is the capacity and willingness of the society and economy to bear the cost of even 
an operationally successful campaign.65
62 Gray, Modern Strategy, pp. 26-44.
63 See Glenn A. Kent and William E. Simons, ‘Objective-Based Planning,’ in New Challenges for  
Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 
pp. 59-71.
64 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic o f  War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, revised and enlarged edition, 2001), pp. 87-91.
65 See, for example: Lawrence E. Key, ‘Cultivating National Will,’ Maxwell Paper no. 5 (Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air War College, 1996) and Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,’ Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109-122.
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Historic examples of failures to translate superiority at one level into success at a higher 
one abound: Despite inferior capabilities, Chadian troops on jeeps and trucks destroyed 
Libyan armoured units in December 1986 and early 1987, and in September 1987 even 
conquered and destroyed an airbase on Libyan soil. Eight US servicemen died in the 
Desert One fiasco of 1980, failing even to make contact with Iranian forces.66 Nor does 
tactical excellence automatically translate into operational success, as the German 
leadership in the Second World War (WWII) discovered, for example, when it ignored 
hopelessly overstretched supply lines in North Africa and Russia.
FIGURE 2: THE STRATEGIC PYRAMID
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To transform operational into strategic success is very straightforward, although bloody, 
for a state willing and able to impose a Carthaginian peace on its enemy. For all others, 
this last step of the strategic pyramid is perhaps the most difficult part. Pyrrhus’ 
failure to derive lasting gains from his numerous battlefield victories in Southern Italy is 
only one of many similar examples: Germany, again, failed twice in the 20th century, 
between 1914 and the summer of 1918 and between 1939 and the winter of 1941, as did 
the United States first after the defeat of the Tet offensive in Vietnam and, arguably, 
again after the eviction of Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait. Unless the outcome 
of preparation and planning, tactical action and operations leads to strategic success in
66 Desert One was the codename for the attempt by US special forces to rescue the hostages in the US 
embassy in Tehran.
67 Unless they have both very limited objectives and such a superiority in material and numbers that they 
can physically control the whole population of the enemy until they are achieved. Such was, for example, 
the situation of the United States in Grenada in 1983.
68 See Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends & Means, (New York: Basic Books, Edition with a 
preface on the Gulf War, 1990), pp. vii-xxviii, for a lucid discussion of the first round o f that 1990-2003 
war.
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achieving the political goal, the whole effort was usually for naught—whatever 
brilliance has been displayed at a lower level.69
Strategy can thus be thought of as the ever-changing system of causal relationships that 
constitutes the dynamic strategic pyramid in a particular conflict, which is its first 
nature. The term ‘strategy’ will thus in the following be reserved to denote this aspect 
of the relationship between military force and political goals. Strategy as such is, 
therefore, at work in success and failure alike, and it is usually easy in hindsight to 
identify the causes for either.
2.1.5 Strategy as a Course o f Action: The Theory o f Victory
Unfortunately, this ease of explanation ex-post stands in stark contrast to the difficulty 
of ‘doing’ strategy. In the here and now, it is necessary to develop a specific course of 
action ex-ante that provides a coherent, credible and realistic way to achieve the 
political goal with the available resources. This is the second nature of strategy, where 
it denotes an intended or realized course of action. Since strategy is inevitably 
directed at the future, practitioners must forecast the cause-effect relationships that will 
underlie the strategic effect—a fundamentally different and much more difficult 
problem than identifying them after the fact.
It is thus helpful to conceive of ‘doing’ strategy as the testing of a theory: Reality will 
(nearly) always falsify the predicted cause-effect relationships and the parameters 
underlying it, or, as the elder Moltke said, ‘no plan for battle survives contact with the 
enemy’. In the following, this second nature of strategy will thus be referred to as a 
‘theory of victory’, a term that can also more easily capture the fact that the possibility 
of conflict not only leads to interaction with the enemy (i.e. strategy itself), but also to 
the preparation for such interaction at a future point in time. In that context, theories of 
victory can achieve strategic effect through direct military impact on the enemy, if a 
country carries ‘strategic weight’, or indirectly through the military efforts of allies if it 
does not. In the latter case, the core of the theory of victory will then relate to the 
problem of how to enlist the support of these allies.
The execution of strategy produces information that is specific to the situation, and 
which has to be used to validate and change the forecasts that the original plan was 
based on. Implementations of policy in general are based on a policy or program 
theory, and
69 Samuel J. Newland, Victories Are Not Enough: Limitations o f The German Way o f War (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).
70 As part o f a coherent theory o f victory, the material requirements for the operational outcome necessary 
to achieve strategic effect can actually be quite minimal. Asian land powers, for example, have a habit of 
wearing down the national will o f their overseas enemies by just preserving enough stamina to keep on 
fighting.
71 For a general discussion o f strategy as a course of action, see Jenny Stewart, ‘The meaning of strategy 
in the public sector,’ Australian Journal o f Public Administration, vol. 63, no. 4 (December 2004), pp. 
16-21.
72 S. Blume, ‘Policy as Theory: A framework for understanding the contribution o f social science to 
welfare policy,’ Acta Sociologica, vol. 20, no. 3 (1977), pp. 247-262.
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If this theory is fundamentally incorrect, the policy will fail no matter how well it is 
implemented. Indeed it is not exactly clear what ‘good’ implementation o f a basically 
misconceived policy would mean.73
FIGURE 3: STRATEGY AS A COURSE OF ACTION
Source: Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f  Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles fo r Planning, 
Plans, Planners (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 24.
While a theory of victory, or ‘Intended Strategy’ in Figure 3, must always be 
complemented with largely ad-hoc adjustments during its implementation, the challenge 
is to recognize when ‘negative feedback’ signifies that the theory itself is flawed. It is 
at this stage that leadership often fails: Especially in peacetime, when no battle
provides ‘hard data’ on how good one’s forces can really perform, it is easy for 
policymakers to use ambiguity to avoid facing uncomfortable truths,74 and thus to stick 
to old paradigms. And it is often difficult to identify the causes of failure—was it an 
error in the ‘data’, which can be corrected by throwing even more men and material into 
the battle? Or is the ‘model’ that is used to predict strategic effect itself incorrect or 
incomplete—such as was the case in the First World War (WWI), when the German 
High Command predicted the physical and economic effects of unlimited submarine
73 E. Bardach, The Implementation Game (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 251-252.
74 Roberta Wohlstetter, ‘Slow Pearl Harbours and the Pleasures of Deception,’ in Intelligence and 
National Security, eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Uri Ra’anan and Warren Milberg (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1981), pp. 23-34.
75 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1962).
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warfare with surprising accuracy, but never questioned its assumption that this would 
force England to sue for peace? 76
Criticizing inductive reasoning, David Hume demonstrated long ago that all forecasts— 
“predictions on the basis of past behaviour” —are inherently unreliable: If one was to 
show that the knowledge of the past can be transferred into the future, it would only be 
possible to do so by referring to the experience of the past itself, which is exactly the 
reasoning in question. “The lesson of epistemology is thus a harsh one: there is no ... 
way in which predictions can be known in advance to he true or false.” In science, it 
is uncommon (though not unheard of) that a wrong hypothesis can cost someone’s life. 
That this is usually the case in strategy, and often on a scale incomparably larger than in 
any other area of human activity, does not change the basic problem that hypotheses and
on
forecasts can be, and often are, wrong. There is an inherent conflict between the need 
to ‘test’ and validate a theory of victory on the one hand and the need to achieve results 
with limited resources on the other hand. It is this tension between the requirement for 
a coherent conception of future effects on which to base one’s action, and the sheer 
impossibility of finding all expectations fulfilled, that makes ‘doing’ strategy so 
difficult.81
2.2 Sources of Uncertainty in Strategy
This section introduces four basic sources of uncertainty that equate the practice of 
strategy to a leap into the dark. Partly, these are uncertainties of the ontological kind, 
inherent to the nature of strategy as a system of cause-effect relationships. Partly, they 
are also epistemic, affecting the extent to which it is possible to gain information about 
the strategic problem at hand.
2.2.1 Aleatory Uncertainty
83Aleatory uncertainty is the first principal source of (ontological) uncertainty in 
strategy and refers to “the uncertainty inherent in a nondeterministic (stochastic,
76 Ikle, Every War Must End, pp. 42-50.
77 Charles F. Doran, ‘Why Forecasts Fail,’ International Studies Review, vol 1, no. 2 (1999), p. 11.
78 Nicholas Rescher, Predicting the Future (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1998), p. 64.
79 Woodrow J. Kuhns, ‘Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology,’ in 
Paradoxes o f Strategic Intelligence, eds. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (London: Frank Cass, 
2003), p. 93.
80 Wayne G. Jackson, ‘Scientific Estimating,’ Studies in Intelligence, vol. 9, no. 3 (Summer 1965), pp. 8- 
9.
81 Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, ‘Political Conjecture in Military Planning,’ Policy Memorandum, 
no 35 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1968), pp. 8-19. Other, related 
causes such as the difficulty in training strategists are outlined in Colin S. Gray, ‘Why Strategy is 
Difficult,’ Joint Force Quarterly, no. 22 (Summer 1999), pp. 6-12.
82 Distinguishing by sources o f uncertainty seems a more useful starting point than merely describing it, 
such as in the Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA) framework used at the U.S. 
Army War College. See Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21s' Century: A Little Book on Big 
Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), pp. 17-29.
83 From the Latin word for a game of dice, alea.
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random) phenomenon”.84 Commonly called randomness, it pervades life and can be 
found in quantum mechanics in physics, mechanical faults in engineering, stochastic 
‘white noise’ in economic estimations, cancer and other illnesses in medicine, and even 
in the form of social indeterminacy—the voting paradox of de Condorcet, for example. 
The human tendency to think in terms of averages eliminates aleatory uncertainty from 
many daily problems, but there can be little consolation in the fact that one’s 
expectation is right in the mean, if all stakes depend on one draw.
2.2.2 Complex Systems
The second major cause of uncertainty in strategy is the existence of dynamic systems 
characterized by non-linearity and complexity. Non-linearity means that cause-effect 
relationships are not proportional, a growing imbalance might, for example, remain 
without effect for some time before leading to a sudden system change. Complexity 
refers to the intermeshing of individual sub-systems, with the overall system state being 
the result not only of the individual components, but also of their relationships. In a 
complex system, the analysis of the individual sub-systems alone is not sufficient to
o  r
understand the overall outcome. The behaviour of even fairly simple examples of 
such systems is often unpredictable over the long term, a phenomenon referred to as 
chaotic dynamics. Complex systems can undergo sudden changes of their state, so- 
called bifurcations, and show self-organized formation of structures in space or time. 
Information in a complex physical system is processed in a mechanical fashion— 
planetary movements or technological systems are examples for this—while complex 
adaptive systems observe patterns, form schemata and act upon these—as is the case in,
0*7
for example, human minds and stock markets.
Patterns in a complex system show ‘retrospective coherence’: they can be identified ex­
post, but cannot be predicted. Since the pattern is just one among several that are 
possible ex-ante, the possibility of purposefully acting upon a complex system is 
fundamentally limited. It is usually impossible to direct complex organizations or to 
control events in complex systems, but it is possible to stabilize beneficial, and de­
stabilize unwanted, patterns. Information can be gained by probing the system and 
observing its reactions. In the truly chaotic domain, however, which shows neither 
perceivable cause-effect relations, nor behavioural patterns, analytical approaches and
oo
pattern management will both fail.
84 National Research Council, Review of Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: 
Guidance on Uncertainty and Use o f Experts Society (Washington D.C.: The National Academy Press, 
1997), p. 31.
85 Complexity does not fall neatly into either the epistemic or the ontological category, as it is related to 
the observer’s ability to gain knowledge, but at the same time a characteristic o f the matter under 
investigation itself, not of the observer or the process o f gaining knowledge.
86 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks (Berlin: Springer, 2000), pp. 194-196.
87 For an introduction to complex adaptive systems, see for example Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The 
Emerging Science at the Edge o f Order and Chaos (New York: Touchstone, 1992).
88 C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden, ‘The new dynamics o f strategy: Sense-making in a complex and 
complicated world,’ IBM Systems Journal, vol. 42, no. 3 (2003), pp. 462-483.
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2.2.3 Cognitive, Mental and Physiological Limits
Humans are limited in their cognitive, mental and physiological abilities to process 
information, which is a third and epistemic source of uncertainty. Lawrence Freedman 
writes that “whatever the possibilities for ‘real-time’ military decision and action, policy
o n
formulation and political persuasion tend to take time.” But time is always a limited 
resource: At an individual level, time is required to fulfil certain basic physiological 
needs, sleeping at the very least. This causes an opportunity cost of using time for the 
processing of information that can become overwhelmingly high. Using time for 
deliberation also inevitably delays action, causing an important opportunity cost in the 
strategic context, as John R. Boyd pointed out in his theory of the OODA (observation, 
orientation, decision, action) loop.90 The opportunity cost of reducing uncertainty thus 
makes it rational to stop gathering information before the theoretical limits of 
knowledge are reached.91
Other limits on reducing uncertainty are caused by imperfect human sensory 
information storage, short- and long-term memory. The human mind forms mind-sets 
or schemata of the real world to make use of the mind’s limited resources. Humans use 
such schemata to interpret, order and store pieces of information. Problems are only 
perceived once certain observations violate the model of normalcy, and it takes longer 
to recognize unexpected phenomena than expected ones. Human nature thus leads to 
cognitive traps (blunders and lapses) as well as errors, which are purposeful acts on the 
basis of wrong assumptions or faulty reasoning.93 In a social context, human nature 
leads to translational uncertainty if information has to be exchanged between 
individuals, 94 and the reinforcement of incorrect mental models through ‘groupthink’ 
and similar processes. 95 Experimental studies have also established that the human 
mind is biased in its perception of risk and uncertainty.96
89 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,’ Adelphi Paper, no. 318 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 44.
90 Boyd never wrote a comprehensive summary of his ideas and mostly relayed them through briefings. 
For a good summary, see Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis.
91 George J. Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information,’ Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 69, no. 3 (June 
1961), pp. 213-225.
Paul R. Kleindorfer, Howard C. Kunreuther, and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Decision Sciences: An 
Integrative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 24-44; Richards J. Heuer, 
The Psychology o f Intelligence Analysis (Langley: Center for the Study o f Intelligence, Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1999).
93 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks, pp. 279-282.
94 Thomas Hellstöm and Merle Jacob, Policy Uncertainty and Risk: Conceptual Developments and 
Approaches (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), p. 16-19.
95 Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study o f Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 
(Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972).
96 For a discussion of these results in a military context, see R. J. Knighton, ‘The Psychology of Risk and 
its Role in Military Decision-Making,’ Defence Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 309-334.
31
Managing Strategic Risk
2.2.4 The Enemy
“War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale,” Clausewitz writes, “an act of force to
97compel our enemy to do our will.” General Beaufre’s definition of strategy as “the art 
o f the dialectic o f two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute" expresses 
the same idea in perhaps more sophisticated language. The adversary himself is a 
fourth major, ontological source of uncertainty in strategy. Both sides in the struggle 
use violence and the threat thereof to bring the enemy into a situation in which he 
accepts what the other side has in mind for him. In the words of J.C. Wylie, the 
common aim of both adversaries is to achieve “some measure of control over the 
enemy.”99 Each side has to try to exercise control at the same time as prevent the 
enemy from doing likewise, leading to a dynamic process vividly described by General 
Beauffe in the following words:
In this battle of wills two broadly similar systems will confront each other; each will try 
to reach the other’s vitals by a preparatory process, the object of which will be to strike 
terror, to paralyse and to surprise ... Since each of the opposing sides will be doing the 
same thing, there will be a clash between the two preparatory manoeuvres. Victory will 
go to the side which succeeds in blocking his enemy’s manoeuvre and carrying his own 
through to its objective... The battle of wills therefore comes down to a struggle for 
freedom of action, each side trying to preserve freedom of action for itself and deny it 
to the enemy.100
In this contest, it can obviously be advantageous to mislead the enemy of one’s true 
capabilities and intentions (both in strategic, operational and tactical terms).101 In 
general, the effect of surprise is a powerful force multiplier, since it suspends the 
dialectic logic of strategy while the enemy has to re-orient himself and adapt to the new
107situation.
The adversary’s expectations are thus a major factor in each side’s decisions in war, as 
they determine which moves the enemy guards against. A seemingly unfavourable 
option—a narrow and winding road, for example—can be preferred to a seemingly 
better one—the straight highway—exactly because the enemy will expect his opponent 
to use the latter one. This “paradoxical logic” lies in the nature of strategy, which, as 
Luttwak writes, entails “the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites.”103 Since 
it is in the interest of each side to surprise the other in order to delay its reaction, the 
nature of strategy causes an important epistemic paradox: Our mere knowledge of the
97 Clausewitz, On War, p. 83.
98 Emphasis in original. Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 
22.
99 Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, p. 66.
100 Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, pp. 34-35.
101 For a discussion of deception, intelligence and surprise in classic strategic theory, see Handel, Masters 
of War, pp. 215-254.
102 James J. Wirtz, ‘Theory of Surprise,’ in Paradoxes o f Strategic Intelligence, eds. Betts and Mahnken,
pp. 101-116.
103 Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic o f War and Peace, p. 16. The perhaps best demonstration o f the 
paradoxical logic of strategy can be found in the challenge of the poisoned chalice in the 1987 movie The 
Princess Bride.
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state of the world can invalidate itself. If, in Luttwak’s famous example, the defending 
side gains knowledge of the enemy’s plan to advance along the narrow, winding road 
and takes preparations accordingly, the expected attack might not materialize exactly 
because it was expected. Far from being of mere academic and theoretical interest, this 
effect probably contributed to the cancellation of an Egyptian attack on Israel in May 
1973.104
2.3 Uncertainty in a Theory of Victory
Strategy in practice requires the forecasting of future cause-effect relationships— 
otherwise, it would be impossible to undertake any purposeful activity in war. But the 
four kinds of uncertainty outlined above lead to the fact that it is impossible to be 
certain that expectations will be fulfilled, if they can be formed with any confidence at 
all. This last section will thus outline the impact of the four first-order kinds of 
uncertainty discussed above on different aspects of the process of making and executing 
strategy, as summarized in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: UNCERTAINTIES IN STRATEGY
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2.3.1 The International System
Strategy is always conducted in the context of a wider international system. In the short 
term, both sides of a conflict have to take into account not only the enemy, but also 
other powers that are not directly party to the dispute. The international system is the 
arena that sets the conditions for the struggle between two adversaries. In the longer 
term, the international system is also the source of new enemies that have to be met with 
the threat or use of military force—which requires states to make a decision on the level 
of military preparation that they deem sufficient to meet these future threats. In order to 
do strategy in practice, it is therefore necessary to form expectations on how the 
international system ‘works’. In his classic Man, the State and War, Kenneth N. Waltz 
introduces three levels of analysis that are necessary to do so: The influence of
individuals, the domestic politics within states, and the anarchical relationship between
104 Janice Gross Stein, ‘The 1973 Intelligence Failure: A Reconsideration,’ The Jerusalem Quarterly, vol. 
24, no. 7 (Summer 1982), pp. 51-52.
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states.105 All three levels influence each other and interact, and in doing so form a 
complex system par excellence.106 It is possible to identify political, social, economic, 
technological and other trends in the system ex-post, but the future will be determined 
more by their interaction and the way that future governments and societies react to 
them than the trends themselves. ‘Expert’ forecasts, inevitably based on part 
experience, regularly turn out to be wide off the mark, and the historical record 
regarding the prediction of major events—the end of the Cold War, for example—or of 
qualitatively new ‘super threats’ that have not been encountered for generations—such 
as the Huns, Mongols or Third Reich—is quite poor.108
Besides the complexity of the international system, which is the primary reason for the 
difficulty of forecasting at that level, aleatory uncertainty is also important in as far as it 
can decisively affect the lives of important individuals: Had Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
survived in Sarajevo in 1918 or Hitler been killed by the bomb that exploded only 
minutes after he had left Munich’s Bürgerbräukeller in 1939, for example, history could 
easily have taken a very different turn. The enemy can also play a role in bringing 
about unexpected events and trends in the international arena. It is, for example, 
somewhat counterintuitive that Cuba should be engaged in warfare on the African 
continent in a major way. A forecast to that effect by a Western expert would, probably 
rightly so, have been regarded with some scepticism. In any case, would this have been 
a specialist in Cuban, African or Soviet affairs?
2.3.2 Intelligence and Deception
The difficulty in predicting non-linear changes is compounded by the fact that the 
process of gaining information about the current state of the international system, which 
might give indications of impending change, is inevitably fallible. Many realignments 
of alliances, such as the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact or Sadat’s peace offer, were major 
diplomatic surprises—due to the inherent limitations of intelligence.109 Obtaining 
information requires time,110 and perceiving and processing it is inevitably affected by 
the cognitive and mental limitations of the human mind.* 111 During the Cold War in 
particular, the tendency of analysts to use mirror-imaging in assessments of the Soviet 
Union highlighted the role of mind-sets in intelligence. Since mind-sets are both the 
key to correct judgments and a cause of possible failure, occasional intelligence surprise
l0:> Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
106 For a collection of good essays on this perspective, see David S. Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski, eds., 
Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1998).
107 For examples, see Steven Rieber, ‘Intelligence Analysis and Judgmental Calibration’, International 
Journal o f Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 97-112; Richard 
Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), pp. 43-44. For a 
theoretical discussion of the problem o f non-linearities in forecasting, see Doran, ‘Why Forecasts Fail’.
108 Gray, Weapons Don 7 Make War, pp. 92-99.
1 Michael I. Handel, ‘Surprise in Diplomacy,’ in Intelligence and National Security, eds. Pfaltzgraff, 
Ra’anan and Milberg, pp. 187-211.
110 Angelo D. Codevilla, Informing Statecraft (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 5-6.
111 Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception,’ World Politics, vol. 20, no. 3 (April 1968), pp. 454- 
479.
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I 1 9is inevitable. Individual cognitive limitations are to some extent replicated and
reinforced by the institutional context of intelligence: Tasking orders for intelligence 
collection require some previous conception of what will or can be found, for example, 
and the necessary compartmentalization of classified material forces analysts to make
• • • i i *3forecasts on the basis of less information than could be available to them.
Besides human cognitive and mental limitations, the enemy is a second, complementary 
source of uncertainty regarding forecasts based on intelligence information, since mind­
sets and biases can be used for successful deception.114 A first type of deception aims at 
changing observable data and can, for example, lead the enemy to believe in the 
existence of a phantom army, or conceal an existing one from his collection effort. To 
unravel and detect either scheme, it is necessary to collect more data over more 
channels and to subject it to inductive reasoning, trying to discover the correct pattern 
from the observations. A second type of deception aims at distorting the adversary’s 
interpretation of observable events, misleading him to believe that preparations for an 
attack are mere exercises, for example. Collection of additional information here will 
merely reinforce the false conception, but the deductive reasoning that can unveil this 
kind of deception—taking a pattern as valid and asking what it signifies—would
112 The record of the US National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) in predicting Soviet Strategic Nuclear 
forces during the Cold War was very mixed, as a significant overestimation of Soviet capabilities during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s was followed by a consistent underestimation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Racing Forward or Ambling Back?’ in Defending America, ed. James 
Schlesinger (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1977), pp. 110-168.). The 1976 B-team on Soviet intentions, 
an external penal set up to produce an alternative analysis to the internal Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) team, found that the assumptions that these estimates were based on were at fault. It pointed out 
that the intelligence community had concentrated on ‘hard data’ on Soviet deployments, and interpreted 
these with concepts that mirrored those of the United States but did not take into account the ‘soft’ data 
available on Soviet doctrine regarding, for example, the relationship between nuclear deterrence and 
warfighting (‘B-Team’, Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View: Reproduced in Donald P. 
Steury, ed., Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Langley, VA: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), pp. 365-390.). In the context of 
the 1970s, such mindsets directly led to politically contested judgements in the NIEs regarding, for 
example, instances of Soviet arms control deception (David S. Sullivan, ‘Evaluating US Intelligence 
Estimates,’ in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Analysis and Estimates, ed. Roy Godson (New 
Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980),pp. 49-73.), or upgrades to the Soviet air defence 
system that may have given it an improved capability to intercept ballistic missiles (Sayre Stevens, ‘The 
SAM Upgrade Blues,’ Studies in Intelligence, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 21-35.). The Jeremiah 
and Rumsfeld commissions of the late 1990s both criticized continuing mirror-imaging and a lack of 
empathy in the intelligence community’s analysis. In the following years, more emphasis was therefore 
placed on alternative analysis—methods such as key assumptions checks, devil’s advocacy, Team 
A/Team B, Red Cells, Contingency ‘What If  Analysis, High Impact/Low Probability analysis, and 
Scenario Development—which, however, did not prevent the failure in assessments of Iraq before the 
invasion in 2003. (Jack Davis, ‘Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning,’ Occasional 
Paper, vol. 1, no. 1 (Langley: Sherman Kent Centre for Intelligence Analysis, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2002); Roger Z. George, ‘Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis,’ 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 17, no. 3 (July-September 2004), pp. 
393-398.).
113 Bruce Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
114 Richards J. Heuer, ‘Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,’ in Strategic Military 
Deception, eds. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 31- 
69.
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reinforce a deception of the first kind.115 Since it is impossible to know ex-ante what 
kind of deception to expect, the uncertainty in intelligence caused by the existence of 
the enemy cannot be eliminated.
2.3.3 Friction
The outcome of any action in war is subject to the uncertainty caused by friction—a 
phenomenon that has also been implicated in accidents in complex technological 
systems.116 “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors 
that distinguish real war from war on paper,” Clausewitz himself explained, and it 
should thus indeed be part of any theoretical writing on strategy and war.118 Clausewitz 
further writes that
Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower 
the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal 
... The military machine—the army and everything related to it—is basically very 
simple and therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of 
its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of 
whom retains his potential of friction... The dangers inseparable from war and the 
physical exertions war demands can aggravate the problem... This tremendous friction, 
which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact 
with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are 
largely due to chance.119
The sources of friction are thus the complex nature of military forces (“none of its 
components is of one piece”), human limitations (“dangers inseparable from war and 
the physical exertions war demands”) and the aleatory uncertainty that is inherent 
stochastic processes (“chance”).
2.3.4 Strategic Interaction or General Friction
Friction in a narrow sense is complemented in Clausewitz’s work by a concept of 
general friction—allowing for some overlap between the concepts of friction on the one 
hand and the psychological ‘fog of war,’ the clouding of thought due to emotions
115 Edward J. Epstein, ‘Incorporating Analysis of Foreign Government’s Deception into the US Analytical 
System,’ in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Analysis and Estimates, ed. Godson, pp.127-129; 
Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, ‘Propositions on Military Deception,’ in Strategic Military 
Deception, eds. Daniel and Herbig, pp. 3-30.
116 C. Perrow, Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), esp. pp. 62-100.
117 Clausewitz, On War, p. 138.
118 Paret, ‘Clausewitz,’ p. 199.
119 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 138-139.
120 Alan Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,’ International Security, 
vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 59-90; Barry D. Watts, ‘Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,’ 
McNair Paper, no. 68 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, Revised Edition, 2004), pp. 67-76.
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aroused by danger and stress, on the other hand. Barry D. Watts identifies eight 
elements in On War that combine to form general friction:
1. danger’s impact on the ability to think clearly and act effectively in war
2. the effects on thought and action of combat’s demands for exertion
3. uncertainties and imperfections in the information on which action in war is 
unavoidably based
4. friction in the narrow sense of the internal resistance to effective action stemming 
from the interactions between the many men and machines making up one’s own 
forces
5. the play of chance, of good luck and bad, whose consequences combatants can 
never fully foresee
6. physical and political limits to the use of military force
7. unpredictability stemming from interaction with the enemy
8. disconnects between ends and means in war.122
In his study—the most detailed of the concept yet—Watts reformulates Clausewitz’s 
eight sources of friction into a more modem typology of three contributing factors:
• constraints imposed by human physical and cognitive limits, whose magnitude and 
effects are inevitably magnified by the intense stresses, pressures, and 
responsibilities of actual combat
• informational uncertainties and unforeseeable differences between perceived and 
actual reality stemming, ultimately, from the spatial-temporal dispersion of 
information in the external environment, in friendly and enemy military 
organizations, and in the mental constructs of individual participants on both sides
• the structural nonlinearity of combat processes which can give rise to the long-term 
unpredictability of results and emergent phenomena by magnifying the effects of 
unknowable small differences and unforeseen events (or, conversely, producing 
negligible results from large differences in inputs).123
General friction thus applies to strategy as a whole and not only to combat in a more 
limited, technical sense. It affects activity ‘within’ the levels of the strategic pyramid, 
for example the results of tactical engagements or the success of operational concepts. 
But it also affects the strategic effect of any activity, the extent to which it contributes to 
success at a higher level. General friction stems from the fact that the strategic pyramid 
itself is a complex system—notwithstanding the writings of Jominian theorists.
121 Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy (Westport: Praeger, 
2001), pp. 3-4, 10-11.
122 Watts, ‘Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,’ pp. 19, 21.
123 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
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There is never only one possible pattern that could develop in reaction to one’s moves: 
Each side will try to prevent the other from being strategically effective, and its reaction 
can occur at the same level of the pyramid as the original action. A new capability to 
destroy tanks in the desert from standoff distances can, for example, be made less 
effective by camouflage to prevent detection, or the introduction of better air defences. 
Patterns of this kind are relatively easy to predict and accommodate, since the same 
people who developed the original action—in this case, primarily the engineers and 
scientists who built the new sensors, missiles and related equipment—are also best 
equipped to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of countermeasures in kind. But 
the strategic effectiveness of one’s actions can also be reduced or neutralized if the 
enemy changes patterns on other steps of the strategic pyramid. Reactions of this kind 
are much more difficult to forecast and accommodate since to do so requires an 
understanding and consideration of not a limited technical or tactical question, but of all 
parts of the theory of victory and the strategic pyramid that stands behind it. If the 
enemy, in the above example, gives up the desert and, instead, fights in densely built-up 
cities, the performance of the systems that can detect and destroy tanks in open terrain is 
not impeded in any way, but their utility in the pursuit of strategic effectiveness is 
nevertheless severely reduced.124 It is impossible to determine which of these, or any of 
the countless other possible patterns, will materialize in the end—all that is possible is 
to use, in a never ending cycle, another counter-action to ‘destabilize’ the enemy’s 
reaction. Success in strategy breeds uncertainty precisely because the adversary will be 
alert to any attempt to repeat the formula.
2.3.5 Technology and Revolutions in Military Affairs
Throughout the history of warfare, periods of technological and tactical continuity have 
been broken by periods of fundamental change, after which post-adaptation forces were 
significantly more militarily effective than those before that change. Richard Hundley 
defines such Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) as
a paradigm shift in the ... conduct of military operations
• which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies o f a 
dominant player
• or creates one or more new core competencies, in some ... dimension of warfare
• or both125
It is the magnitude of these changes rather than the speed with which they have been 
introduced that distinguishes RMAs from ordinary improvements.126 RMAs change the 
grammar or character of war—the way that military force is used to neutralize or 
destroy the enemy’s forces (but not its logic or nature, the fact that war is an activity 
aimed at the achievement of political goals, and that it is comprised of the
124 Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic o f War and Peace.
125 Emphasis in original. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, p. 9.
126 James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs,’ Joint Force Quarterly 
(Spring 1994), p. 25.
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127Clausewitzian trinity of blind emotion, chance and politics). Military core 
competencies are ‘core’ since they are necessary to prevail in war—they are part of the 
system of causal relationships that underlies the strategic pyramid and thus transforms 
tactical effort into tactical and operational success. A change of the core competencies 
of war is synonymous with a change in the system of causal relationships that underlies 
that part of the strategic pyramid, so that the same way of war that might have led to 
operational success before the RMA now fails. RMAs change the relative importance 
of the dimensions of strategy and make it possible to compensate for weaknesses in one 
with strengths in others in new ways, but they cannot change the fact that war is a multi-
1 o
dimensional phenomenon.
Warfare itself is a complex system: Methods of war that ‘work’ are only patterns of 
past experience, and expecting them to continue into the future invites unpleasant 
surprise. Their complex nature makes it difficult, if not impossible to predict the way in 
which ways of war will evolve: Military change of a significant kind—whether it is an 
RMA or not—can be caused by changing cultural norms, the adoption of new political 
goals or of a new strategy, or the emergence of a new technology. Nor do RMAs 
themselves originate from changes in one dimension of strategy alone: They usually 
combine technological developments, doctrinal innovation and organizational 
adaptation. Sometimes, new technologies were available to military forces for 
decades before they were used in new ways to revolutionary effect—such was, for 
example, the case with the English longbow. 131 In other instances, for example the 
development of amphibious landings by the US Marine Corps and the use of tanks for 
Blitzkrieg operations by the German army, doctrines and organizations were adapted
119before the necessary technology was fully developed.
Non-linearities in the ways of war can be caused by a number of changes along a scale 
that, at one end, includes minor technological or tactical changes that can nevertheless 
have important consequences for the outcome of tactical engagements. At the other end 
stand not RMAs but military revolutions, which are characterized by changes in the
127 Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘War, Politics and RMA—The Legacy of Clausewitz,’ Joint Force Quarterly 
(Winter 1995-96), pp. 76-80. Clausewitz has been severely attacked for his insistence on the importance 
o f the political goal in war, for example in John Keegan, A History o f Warfare (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993). None of his critics can convince on this point, however, since they define politics far too 
narrowly in the context o f European nation states of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
128 And that some minimum strength along all dimensions is necessary for success in it. Colin S. Gray, 
‘RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy,’ Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1997-98), pp. 50-54. 
Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Affairs,’ Joint Force 
Quarterly (Spring 1997), pp. 29-36 even argues that the central feature o f the current RMA does not lie in 
the technological sphere, but in the fact that the dimensions o f strategy become more closely intertwined 
through the growing interdependence and quick reaction o f the global economy and media to political 
events, and the possibility to use weapons to more discriminating effect.
129 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’, in The Sources o f Military Change, 
eds. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 3-20.
130 FitzSimonds and van Tol, ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs,’ pp. 25-26.
131 Clifford J. Rodgers, ‘”As if a new sun had arisen”: England’s fourteenth-century RMA,’ in The 
Dynamics o f Military Revolution, 1300-2050, eds. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 15-34.
132 For case studies from this very interesting time, see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds, 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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political, social, and cultural arenas—such as, for example, the industrial revolution. 
They are “largely uncontrollable, unpredictable, and above all unforeseeable”, and
recast the nature of society and the state as well as of military organizations. By so 
doing they altered the capacity of states to project military power and allowed the 
military to kill people and break things ever more effectively.133
Williamson Murray draws the analogy of military revolutions as earthquakes, and 
compares RMAs to pre- and aftershocks:
During the process of developing RMAs military organizations must come to grips with 
fundamental changes in the political, social and military landscape [caused by military 
revolutions]; they innovate and adapt to—in some cases foreshadow—revolutionary 
changes. RMAs involve putting together the complex pieces of tactical, societal, 
political, organizational, or even technological changes in new conceptual approaches
134to war.
Both RMAs and military revolutions thus make it necessary to develop new concepts 
and models to evaluate the usefulness of military forces for some, if not all tasks that 
they might be called upon to do. This loss of knowledge, and the need to develop new 
heuristics and ideas of how to use forces effectively, affects those who ‘develop’ the 
RMA, those who suffer its effect for the first time, and those who stand at the sidelines 
and watch the spectacle unfold: The only difference between the three is that the first 
have a (temporary) knowledge advantage over the others. 135 Cognitive limitations thus 
contribute to the uncertainty that affects the use of technology and tactics to achieve 
operational effect, and they are a second major source of uncertainty, besides 
complexity, affecting the causal relationships that underlie the strategic pyramid. 
Thomas G. Mahnken writes that
expectations about the character and conduct of war drawn from combat experience and 
organizational culture, combined with incomplete and often inaccurate information, 
often prevent intelligence organizations from recognizing the emergence of new ways 
of war. Intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor the development of 
established weapons than to search for new military systems. It is also easier for them 
to detect technology and doctrine that have been demonstrated in war than weapons and 
concepts that have not seen combat. As a result, intelligence agencies readily identify 
incremental changes to weapons whose value has been demonstrated in war. They 
experience greater difficulty identifying new or unique systems. Finally, intelligence 
organizations often pay greater attention to innovations in areas that their own services 
are exploring than to those that they have not examined, are not interested in, or have 
rejected.136
133 Williamson Murray, ‘Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs,’ Joint Force Quarterly 
(Summer 1997), p. 71.
134 Ibid., p. 73.
135 See the case studies in Murray and Millet, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.
136 Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways o f War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 
1918-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002), p. 6.
40
Strategy and Uncertainty
Unlike military revolutions, which affect military organizations through the change that 
they bring to society as a whole, the driving impetus behind RMAs is not external to the 
military and strategic community of a nation. RMAs do not happen, they are made: 
“The conduct of an RMA, pre-planned or not, is an exercise in strategy; it is strategic 
behaviour/’ The enemy thus enters as a third major source of uncertainty. Both 
adversaries do not only benefit from defying the other’s expectations within a set of 
causal relationships—pushing tanks through the Ardennes, for example. An even 
greater benefit lies in defying the other's expectations about the causal relationships in 
the strategic pyramid—such as the belief that tanks are most effectively employed in 
support of infantry.
In summary, this chapter has discussed strategy as the system of cause-effect 
relationships that underlies the strategic pyramid. Achieving purposeful strategic effect 
requires a theory of victory to make use of these cause-effect relationships. Coming out 
of a creative process of strategy formation, that theory is at first a mere idea, which 
needs to be codified into categories and criteria that can be applied by the defence 
bureaucracy, and thus guide planning. However, strategy is inevitably affected by 
aleatory uncertainty, complexity, the limitations of human nature, and the enemy. 
Therefore, no theory of victory can escape uncertainties regarding the international 
system and intelligence information, as well as friction, strategic interaction and RMAs.
137 Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 120. This is a central point of  
Gray’s book on RMAs.
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CHAPTER 3: 
STRATEGIC RISK
Uncertainty and threats are both constituent elements of risk. Since the uncertainty 
inherent in dealing with an adversary cannot be eliminated, strategic risk is inherent to 
the problem of strategy making and execution. This chapter will examine the concept 
of strategic risk more closely, and develop a framework on which the theory in the 
following two chapters will build.
3.1 Perspectives on Risk
Risk is an inherent part of human existence where hazards, vulnerabilities and exposure 
to danger create the risk of bodily injury and physical damage. But most definitions 
of risk are oriented towards certain risk management methods and thus limited in their 
general applicability—e.g. “we understand risks as uncertainties that may result in 
financial loss and affect the ability to make repayments.” 139 The word ‘risk’ itself 
comes from the Italian ‘risicare,’ meaning ‘to dare,’ which betrays the close historic 
relationship between the concept of risk and gambling. 140 Risk always refers to a 
difference between reality and possibility: Although it is clear ex post what has
happened, we can identify several possible outcomes ex ante. In general,
Risk arises out of uncertainty. It is the exposure to the possibility of such things as 
economic or financial loss or gain, physical damage, injury or delay, as a consequence 
of pursuing a particular course of action. The concept of risk has two elements, the 
likelihood of something happening and the consequences if it happens.141
The consequences of an event are the result of a threat, and a corresponding 
vulnerability of valued material or immaterial goods. Threat, vulnerability and 
uncertainty are thus the defining elements of risk. In many areas, the former two 
components are combined into a measure of damage or loss, but risk management 
strategies can aim at reducing any of the three elements. Uncertainty, for example, 
surrounds future prices, but it is only a risk if an economic agent holds assets that are 
affected by these changes.
138 David Alexander, Principles o f emergency planning and management (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 55.
139 Alexander Melnikov, Risk Analysis in Finance and Insurance (Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & 
Hall/CRC, 2004), Preface. Indeed, there is general lack of common understanding of the term: Of 100 
students at the UK’s Advanced Command and Staff Course, no two gave the same definition of the term. 
Knighton, ‘The Psychology of Risk and its Role in Military Decision-Making,’ p. 310
140 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f Risk (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1996), p. 8.
141 Emphasis in original. Management Advisory Board, Guidelines for managing risk in the Australian 
Public Senice (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 1995), p. 3.
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Not all uncertain threats are manageable: Unless there is a belief of a scientific,
anecdotal or religious nature that the future can be influenced, the notion of risk 
management is meaningless, and risk becomes synonymous with fate.142 In order to 
manage risk, it has to be possible to make a positive outcome more likely than would 
otherwise have been the case143—which seems, for example, impossible in the case of a 
(cosmologically) close gamma-ray outburst that could well lead to the end of multi-cell 
life on earth. The choice of a course of action to influence the future, which can also be 
to do nothing and accept the risk, and the risk that is to be managed are thus two sides 
of the same coin, and do not exist independent of each other.
3.1.1 Definitions, Sources o f Surprise and Institutional Risk
Uncertain consequences can be mathematically described by random variables.144 
Historically, the concept of risk has therefore been closely related to the mathematical 
concept of probability. In 1921, Frank Knight criticized this association in his famous 
book Risk, Uncertainty and Profit and wrote that:
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk 
[Probability], from which it has never been properly separated. ... It will appear that a 
measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, ... is so far different from an unmeasurable 
one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.145
Following Knight, the term (objective) risk has often been reserved for those situations 
in which the probabilities of different outcomes are known.146 Various other names— 
subjective risk, ambiguity, uncertainty, or ignorance, for example—have been given to 
those cases in which there are only subjective estimates, ordinal rankings, or no 
information at all on probabilities.147 Authors often differ in the exact use of these
142 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks, pp. 56-64.
143 This fact should not, however, justify rigid plans and decisions based on a false assumption of pre­
determinism and predictability, however much such behaviour might coincide with human nature. 
Remaining purposefully flexible in one’s ability to react to uncertain changes, or to commit to a course of 
action in spite of uncertainty and accept risks are also ways of influencing the future. See Martin L. 
Gimpl and Stephen R. Dakin, ‘Management and Magic,’ California Management Review, vol. 27, no. 1 
(Fall 1984), pp. 125-136.
144 The very general introduction given here can be found in any introductory textbook on statistics. The 
author regularly consulted Ludwig Fahrmeir, Rita Künstler, Iris Pigeot, and Gerhard Tutz, Statistik: Der 
Weg zur Datenanalyse (Berlin: Springer, 1999).
145 Emphasis in original. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty & Profit (New York: Century Press, 1964, 
originally published in 1921), p. 205, quoted in Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable 
Story of Risk, p. 219.
146 For a modem discussion of risk and uncertainty, see Marjolein B. A. Van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox,’ Journal of Risk Research, vol. 9, no. 4 (June 2006), 
pp. 313-318.
147 For a good overview on different typologies of uncertainty, see Stephen H. Schneider, B.L. Turner and 
Holly Morehouse Garriga, ‘Imaginable Surprise in Global Change Science,’ Journal of Risk Research, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (1998), pp. 167-171.
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terms, and often only define extreme cases. The following terms will thus be used 
herein: 148
♦ . . .• Objective risk refers to an ideal concept, whose materialization can only be
ascertained ex post, after the expiry of a source of risk. Objective risk can, for 
example, be defined by the relative frequency of an event over the whole time in 
which it can occur at all. In practice, ‘risk’ usually refers to the band of 
probability and consequence into which the objective risk is known, or expected, 
to fall.
• Ignorance means the complete absence of knowledge of both the possible 
consequences and their probability of occurrence.
• Indeterminacy refers to a situation in which possible outcomes are largely 
known, but no reliable statement can be made regarding probabilities (or vice 
versa) . 149
*  • •
• Certainty o f Assessment describes the reliability of the determination of 
probability and outcomes. If the probability function (defined over the spectrum 
of outcomes) is known, the certainty of assessment is high. If it is only vaguely 
known and subject to large error corridors, the certainty of assessment is low. 150
• Statistical Uncertainty describes the situation in which the certainty of 
assessment can be quantified by a statistical technique, for example a confidence 
interval.
• Incertitude describes the general fact that all risk assessments are uncertain, and 
cannot be used to make a deterministic forecast of events.
When one is confronted with uncertainty, surprise is never far away. Unfortunately, 
‘surprise’ is a very general term that can refer to several types of a mismatch between 
expectation and reality. Faber, Manstetten and Proops distinguish three ways in which 
it is possible to be surprised: First, when all outcomes and (subjective) probabilities are 
known, the outcome can still be different from the expectations—such as a person 
betting at a race course cannot, for example, be certain to see his expectations fulfilled, 
even if he correctly anticipates each horse’s probability of winning. This kind of 
surprise is equivalent to risk in the strict, mathematical sense. Second, some outcomes 
can be known, but have no subjective probability assigned to them. The person at the 
race-course may, for example, not have listened to the weather report, and thus— 
knowingly—faces the possibility of a cancellation of the race due to inclement weather, 
without having any information as to the likelihood of this event. In the terminology 
adopted here, this is a case of surprise due to indeterminacy. Third, in a situation of 
ignorance, an event surprises since the outcome itself has never been contemplated— 
the racegoer could, for example, find the course tom down and replaced by a shopping 
mall.
148 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks, pp. 37-38.
149 In the area of engineering, it is for example possible that a failure probability for a specific part is 
known, but the consequences o f a failure are uncertain due to the complexity of a system.
150 For a discussion of this problem, see Matthew Herbert, ‘The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist,’ 
International Journal o f Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 19, no. 4 (October 2006), esp. pp. 670- 
671.
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Ignorance can be separated into situations in which expectations are ‘open’, when the 
individual or society is conscious of its state of ignorance, and into those where 
expectations are ‘closed’, in which unawareness, false knowledge or judgments, or a 
social taboo prevent recognition of that fact. When expectations are open, ignorance is 
partly reducible, through learning in the case of individuals or research in the case of a 
community, and partly irreducible due to ontological or epistemic limits to 
knowledge.151 The five sources of uncertainty in strategy discussed in Chapter 2 can 
quite easily be located within this framework (see Figure 5): Aleatory uncertainty or 
stochasticity is equivalent to risk. The enemy makes it impossible to assign 
unambiguous probabilities to known outcomes, and his desire to surprise, together with 
complexity, is an ontological impediment to reduce ignorance about all possible 
outcomes. Human cognitive, mental and physiological limitations lead to ignorance of 
the epistemic kind.
FIGURE 5: TYPOLOGY OF SURPRISE
Sources of Surprise
Quasi-Surprise: 
Outcomes All Known
Risk Indeterminacy
(Probabilities Known) (Probabilities Not Known) 
Aleatory Uncertainty Enemy
Ignorance:
Outcomes Not All Known
'Open' Expectations ’Closed’ Expectations
Research,
Intelligence,
Planning Reducible Ignorance Irreducible Ignorance
Ontological Epistemic
Complexity; Enemy Human Cognitive, Mental and
Physiological Limits
Adapted from: Stephen H. Schneider, B.L. Turner and Holly Morehouse Garriga, ‘Imaginable Surprise in 
Global Change Science,’ Journal o f Risk Research, vol. 1, no. 2 (1998), p. 46; Malte Faber, Reiner 
Manstetten and John L.R. Proops, ‘Humankind and the Environment: An Anatomy o f Surprise and 
Ignorance,’ Environmental Values, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 235.
In all three main categories of the above framework (risk, indeterminacy and 
ignorance), knowledge about the future is limited in one way or another. Risk 
management methods will be discussed in the following chapter, but it is important to 
point out here already that it is, of course, critical to correctly locate a problem in the 
above framework in order to successfully manage it. Mistakes in assigning probabilities 
to known outcomes and, in particular, closed expectations are of concern here. 
Hellström and Jacob highlight “the potentially adverse consequences and the cultural 
and value-laden significance of too large amounts of trust being placed in [the ability to
151 Malte Faber, Reiner Manstetten and John L.R. Proops, ‘Humankind and the Environment: An 
Anatomy of Surprise and Ignorance,’ Environmental Values, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 221-232.
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deal with limited knowledge],” and refer to this possibility “as reflexive risk, since it is 
our limited ability to reflect on the limits of our knowledge that is a threat, not the limit 
to knowledge itself.” They go on to explain that
Reflexive risk is in a strong sense conditioned by the capacity of institutions to respond 
to risks and threats. This conditioning dimension o f reflexive risk may be labelled 
institutional risk. Institutional risk evolves out a situation [sic!] where the risk 
assessing and managing body does not possess, on account of uncertainties, SOPs 
[Standard Operating Procedures] and secondary power and institutional structure, the 
political/economic resources, coordinating capacity or simply the inclination to assess 
and mitigate risk successfully.152
Institutional risk and reflexive risk are thus closely interrelated: The ignorance,
indeterminacy, or human fallibility that cause reflexive risk reduce the scope for 
unambiguous support of action to address a risk, and therefore raise institutional risk. A 
lack of institutional incentives to deal with risks can also feed reflexive risk by reducing 
material and political support for research to reduce uncertainty.153
3.1.2 Dimensions o f Risk, Assessment and Evaluation
Risk is multidimensional: Consequence and likelihood, the elements of the ‘classic’, 
mathematical concept of risk, are only two among many dimensions of uncertain 
hazards. At a minimum, the certainties of assessment regarding both have to be 
considered, as they can vary anywhere from complete ignorance to a negligible 
statistical uncertainty. Other dimensions of risk relate to spatial, temporal and social 
aspects. Damage (and the associated risk) can be ubiquitous or local in nature, and it 
can show itself immediately or with a considerable delay. It can be persistent, 
reversible or compensatable. Risks can be borne equally by an overall population or be 
concentrated in geographically, socially, politically or otherwise defined sub-sets. 
Some risks can also have a potential for social mobilization that is disproportionate to 
the physical damage involved.
The multi-dimensionality of risk not only influences the appropriate risk treatment that 
should be adopted, but also has important consequences for the structure of the overall 
risk management process.154 Usually, risk management processes are structured in a 
sequential fashion, beginning with the establishment of the context and followed by risk 
identification, risk assessment , risk evaluation, risk treatment and monitoring and 
review.155 From a methodological point of view, risk assessment and risk evaluation are 
the core of the risk management process and directly relate to the multidimensionality 
of risk.
152 Emphasis in original. Hellstöm and Jacob, Policy Uncertainty and Risk: Conceptual Developments 
and Approaches, p. 47
153 Ibid., p. 48.
154 For a comparison o f the Australian Standard’s risk management framework with major ones from 
Canada and the United States, see J.H. Shortreed, L. Craig and S. McColl, Benchmark Framework for 
Risk Management (Waterloo, ON: Institute for Risk Research, University of Waterloo, 2000).
155 Council o f Standards Australia and Council o f Standards New Zealand, Risk Management, AS/NZ 
4360:2004 (Sydney: Standards Australia, 2004), p. 13.
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In the risk assessment stage, quantitative and qualitative information156 about the risk is 
generated, using historical data or expert estimations. The use of fault- and event-trees 
in probabilistic risk assessment has, for example, become a standard tool for risk 
assessment in the nuclear and other high-technology industries. Risk assessment 
aims at generating, summarizing and presenting information. At this stage, risks thus 
have to be comprehensively described along all their dimensions.
In the risk evaluation stage, risks are then compared to criteria that reflect the 
decisionmakers’ preferences, in order to establish priorities and make judgments as to 
the acceptability of risks and costs. There are three major approaches to risk evaluation: 
professional judgment, ‘bootstrapping’—comparing new risks with existing ones—and
I C O
formal analysis. None of these approaches is without problem as the first raises 
questions about legitimacy and accountability, the second presumes the conscious 
acceptance of risks, and the third requires simplification and combination of the various 
dimensions of risk into a mathematical formula.
Risk evaluation thus reduces the information provided by the risk assessment about a 
multitude of dimensions of the risk into a one-dimensional order of priority. While risk 
assessment should by its nature be objective, risk evaluation is inherently subjective. It 
is however an indispensable part of risk management since individual or collective 
preferences are ultimately the basis of any choice. Indeed, risk itself is a concept devoid 
of meaning if potential harm does not threaten a valued good, which by definition 
involves the decisionmaker’s preferences and judgement.
3.1.3 Typologies o f Risk
At a broad level of abstraction, two complementary approaches to a general typology of 
risks can be distinguished.159 The first relates to the risk evaluation stage and reflects 
the fact that most humans are risk averse. Some risks will therefore be deemed 
acceptable or normal, if they have a small catastrophic potential and the certainty of 
assessment regarding the probability and damage tends to be high. The damage also 
tends to be localized and reversible or at least compensatable. Other risks are 
unacceptable or prohibitive, if the damage potential and probability are high, the 
certainty of assessment is low, damage tends to be ubiquitous and irreversible, and there 
is a high potential for social mobilization. When only some of these conditions are met, 
risks can be transitional and call for special regulatory attention (Typologies of this 
kind are often used in the approval process of risk-prone activities). The exact 
boundaries between all three areas are subjective, as is the classification of risks that
150 See, for example, the short discussion in John Shortreed, John Hicks, and Lorraine Craig, Basic 
Frameworks for Risk Management, Final Report (Waterloo, ON: Institute for Risk Research, University 
of Waterloo, 2003), pp. 31-37.
157 NASA Scientific and Technical Information Office, Probabilitistic Risk Assessment: A Bibliography, 
NASA/SP-2000-6112 (Hanover, MD: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2000).
158 Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Stephen L. Derby, and Ralph L. Keeny, Acceptable 
Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
159 Since typologies can to a large degree be defined to suit the topic of interest, a large variety of types of 
risk can be distinguished. The absence o f a generally accepted and applicable typology o f risks has 
indeed been identified as a major shortcoming that is impeding the development of best practices in risk 
management across a wide spectrum of social, technological and natural hazards. International Risk 
Governance Council, Fact Sheet: Taxonomy of Risks and Risk Governance Approaches (Geneva: 
International Risk Governance Council, June 2004).
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have such a small extent of damage or such a low probability that they are neglected as 
de minimis. 160 While the typology is thus not a scientific-theoretical one, it is 
nevertheless essential for risk management in practice and can help to standardize 
procedures for the management of risks of various kinds. Similar typologies are thus 
used in, for example, Great Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland, for the 
regulation of industrial and technological risks.161
FIGURE 6: ‘MYTHOLOGICAL’ RISK CLASSES
Normal Transition I Prohibited
area area I area
Beyond
definition
Classes 
of risk
Pandora risk class:
Only assumptions are possible as to probability 
of occurrence P and extent of damage E
Source: German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing 
Global Environmental Risks (Berlin: Springer, 2000), p. 9.
The second approach relates to the risk assessment stage and orders risks into groups 
according to the dimensions that distinguish them. The German Advisory Council on 
Global Change has defined several classes of risk in this way, which is complementary 
to the approach outlined above and applicable to a wide range of areas. The next 
chapter will discuss how different risk management methods are appropriate for 
different classes, whose location in a space of normal, transitional and prohibitive risk is
160 A term borrowed from the language of jurisprudence.
161 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks, pp. 42-45
162 Ibid., pp. 56-64.
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shown in Figure 6. The size of each risk class indicates the area in which the True’, 
objective risk is known to fall:
• The Damocles class, named after the Greek hero who had to dine with his king 
under a sword suspended on a strong but very thin thread, includes those risks 
that have an extremely high level of damage, but low probability. Both of these 
dimensions are known with a high certainty of assessment. Examples are large 
meteorite strikes on earth, or global nuclear war.
• The Cyclops class includes those risks whose associated damage is large and 
known with a relatively high certainty of assessment, but whose probability is 
uncertain to the point of indeterminacy. In Greek mythology, Cyclopes were 
giants that could only see one side of things since they only have one eye. 
Examples are volcanic eruptions, or a North Korean invasion of the South.
• Pythia was a blind seeress at the oracle in Delphi, who made predictions that 
were highly ambiguous relating to the probability and extent of damage that was 
impending. Although there is reason to believe catastrophic damage is possible, 
risks in this class are therefore characterized by a very low certainty of 
assessment regarding both primary dimensions of risk. Examples are many 
issues related to climate change, or the use of WMD in terrorist attacks.
• Pandora's box contained evils that, once unleashed, plagued the earth 
ubiquitously, irreversibly and persistently. The extent of damage and its 
probability are usually not known with any certainty. Examples are the release 
of possibly harmful persistent organic pollutants into the food chain, or the
1 A3growing dependency of Western forces on networked data-exchanges.
• Cassandra warned the Trojans of a Greek victory but was not taken seriously. 
Risks in this class have a high probability and extent of damage, which are 
known with moderate certainties of assessment. But they only materialize with 
such a large delay effect that they are not acknowledged or hope is placed in 
new, not yet discovered remedies. Examples include the effect of smoking, or 
the need for a defence-build up in peacetime in the absence of a present and 
unequivocal threat.
• Some risks, finally, are neither very likely nor associated with a large damage, 
but nevertheless cause people to be petrified by danger as if they had seen the 
Gorgon sister Medusa. Examples are various scares surrounding 
electromagnetic radiation, or—arguably—the threat of terrorism.
3.2 Existing Concepts of Strategic Risk
This section discusses four concepts of strategic risk as they can be found in the 
academic and practical literature on strategy and defence planning. In general, a 
coherent and consistent use of the term is lacking.164 Strategic and operational risks are 
also often not conceptually separated.
163 Richard J. Harknett and the JCISS Study Group, ‘The Risks o f a Networked Military,’ Orbis 44, no. 1 
(Winter 2000), pp. 127-143.
164 Even by the same author— see, for example, M. Page, ‘Risk in Defence,’ in Risk and Decisions, eds. 
W.T. Singleton and Jan Hovden (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), pp. 191-205.
50
Strategie Risk
3.2.1 Risk as a Mismatch Between Ends and Means
Walter Lippmann famously wrote that the role of foreign policy “consists in bringing 
into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments 
and the nation’s power,"165 and similarly the purpose of strategy is often seen as to 
reconcile ends with means. In this context, John Collins writes that “Discrepancies 
between ends, which we have identified as interests and objectives, and means— 
available resources—create risks, which can rarely be quantified.”166 The view of risk 
as a mismatch between ends and means is intuitive and well established in the literature 
on the subject. Ends, means and ways are recurring themes in strategic theory, and 
methods to deal with a mismatch between them can be interpreted as risk management 
under this concept of risk. Liotta and Lloyd, for example, write that
Both qualitative and quantitative assessments o f objectives, strategy, forces, and threats 
help identify deficiencies in our strategy or force posture. The net result of such 
deficiencies is that risks must be assumed to arise from them until improvements can be 
made. ... In the broadest of terms, risk is the ability or willingness to expose oneself to 
damage during a period of change [sic!].169
But the main deficiency of this concept is that, although it implicitly assumes that the 
ends of strategy are something valuable, it does not identify threats to these ends, nor 
uncertainties relating to these threats or one’s ability to respond to them. It does not 
consider the intrinsic uncertainties of strategy, which make any calculation of what are 
‘sufficient’ means tenuous at best. Seen as a mismatch between ends and means, risk 
thus becomes synonymous with bad strategy, or with a necessary evil that could, in
1 70theory, be radically reduced or eliminated by an adjustment of ends, means or ways.
Risk as a mismatch between ends and means, or as a deficiency in the force structure, is 
a concept that can also be found in an operational level analysis. In preparation for the 
2001 QDR, a working group at the National Defense University, for example, 
developed a model to assess and evaluate strategic and operational risk. Their 
framework is centred on the quantification of force performances in major theatre wars 
in relation to a number of parameters. While the group defines force performance risk
165 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield o f the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p. 9.
166 John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 
5.
167 For a good discussion of this concept of risk in the strategic literature, see James F. Holcomb, 
‘Managing Strategic Risk’, in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, ed. 
J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute o f the U.S. Army War College, 2004), 
pp. 119-132. See also the discussions o f U.S. Force Planning Frameworks in: Richmond M. Lloyd, 
‘Strategy and Force Planning Framework,’ in Strategy and Force Planning, ed. The Strategy and Force 
Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 2000), pp. 1-17, as well as other essays in that book; P.H. Liotta and Richmond 
M. Lloyd, ‘From Here to There,’ Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 121-137; 
John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).
168 See for example Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, pp. 26-29.
169 Emphasis in original. Liotta and Lloyd, ‘From Here to There,’ pp. 133-134. See also Collins, U.S. 
Defense Planning: A Critique, pp. 7-8.
170 For a discussion of strategic risk in the means-ends-ways framework that does not make this mistake, 
see Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: A Little Book on Big Strategy, esp. pp. 63-64, 70-71.
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as “the probability of a given force structure’s failure to meet established objectives 
when executed against a given scenario,” their methodology neither reflects this 
definition, nor identifies the sources or extent of uncertainty inherent in either the 
outcome itself, or in the assessment thereof Instead, risk is defined on the basis of the 
simulated outcome of the war—casualties or delays above certain thresholds are, for 
example, defined as low, moderate, high or unacceptable risk. Again, risk is seen as de- 
facto synonymous with cost due to a mismatch between ends and means, and the 
implication is that providing additional forces or capabilities would be sufficient to
I '■j'j
reduce risk.
3.2.2 ‘Mathematical' Views o f Risk
After a US Army representative referred to ‘a calculated risk’ in a Congressional 
hearing, J.C. Wylie wrote a one-page article in 1953 in which he develops a 
mathematical model of strategic risk, consisting of payoffs in the case of success, failure 
and non-attempt, and the probability of success. He finishes the discussion of the 
framework with the remark that
To insure success in its use, there is only one condition that must be met: the factors 
involved must never be expressed in arithmetic quantities. That would blunt the fine 
edge of judgment and obscure the true balance o f intangibles.173
Like other complex risks, strategic risks are highly multi-dimensional and cannot easily 
be reduced to two dimensions. A single measure of probability cannot capture the 
various types of uncertainty that affect the subjective likelihood associated with a 
strategic risk.
On the one hand, it is difficult to apply the mathematical concept of probability to a 
singular event, since there is neither a set of identical situations (as in the case of lab 
mice) that can be used to narrow down the objective risk, nor does the same risk exist 
over a period of time that would make it possible to calculate a frequency for it (as in 
the case of earthquakes). This is especially so since free choice by human beings is 
always involved in the realization of strategic risk, which introduces an element of 
indeterminacy. In addition, if there was such a thing as an objective risk in defence, it 
would result from the interaction of the enemy’s intentions with one’s own preparations. 
Michael I. Handel reminds of the paradoxical logic of strategy: “The greater the risk, 
the less likely it seems to be, and the less risky it actually becomes. Thus, the greater 
the risk, the smaller it becomes. ”174
On the other hand, events have a geopolitical, social, historical, and economic 
background, they are influenced by humans with at least partly known values and
171 Kenneth F. McKenzie, ‘Assessing Risk: Enabling Sound Defense Decisions,’ in QDR 2001: Strategy- 
driven Choices fo r America’s Security, ed. Michele A. Flournoy (Washington D.C.: National Defense 
University, 2001), p. 198.
172 Ibid., pp. 193-216.
173 J.C. Wylie, ‘The Calculation of Risk,’ United States Naval Institute Proceedings (July 1953), p. 725, 
quoted in Holcomb, ‘Managing Strategic Risk’, pp. 123-124. See also the introduction to Wylie, Military 
Strategy, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
174 Emphasis in original. Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,’ in 
Paradoxes o f Strategic Intelligence, eds. Betts and Mahnken, p. 17.
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interests, and they are also subject to the laws of physics. It is therefore intuitively 
correct that some events are more likely than others, and that this fact might be 
captured in a quantitative measure. Abbott E. Smith comments on the problem of how 
to convey likelihood in the context of assessing the quality of National Intelligence 
Estimates (NIE):
Now suppose that the NIE says that something will “probably” occur, and it does not.
The estimate was strictly not 100 percent wrong, for it only gave the event about a 60 
percent change of occurring; perhaps it should be scored as 60 percent wrong. But 
pause a moment, and suppose that somehow we come to realize that there never had 
been any appreciable chance of the event occurring; then the estimate was really about 
100 percent wrong. Or suppose that we come to know that there was indeed a 60 
percent change of its occurring but that something happened— perhaps even an act of  
US policy taken as a consequence of the NIE— which prevented it from occurring; then 
the estimate was 100 percent right— or was it?176
If the notion of an objective risk for a singular event is accepted despite the theoretical 
problems associated with it, then it becomes necessary to express the certainty of 
assessment regarding the probability associated with that risk. In some situations, it 
might be possible to say that there is, for example, a fifty-fifty chance of war. In other 
situations, the information available will simply not allow one to confidently make that 
call, and that uncertainty could meaningfully be expressed by, for example, estimating a 
range or even a distribution over the probabilities (e.g. “We think that the chance of an 
attack is 50%, but it might be as likely as 80% or as unlikely as 20%).
A similar problem is associated with the estimation of consequences. There is rarely a 
situation in which it is possible to associate only one meaningful outcome with a 
strategic risk. More often, there are at least a few distinct outcomes, or a full range of 
outcomes imaginable. In some situations, this range of possible outcomes (e.g. from 
peace and full cooperation to all-out war) is so large to be meaningless. Ordered 
along a cardinal or ordinal scale, such as the number of casualties in an operation or the 
quality of international relations (however defined), it is possible to think of the 
objective risk as a probability distribution over that scale. There will, however usually 
be some judgment as to the ‘severity’ of outcomes involved in ordering them along that 
scale, since it is, for example, very difficult to account for distributional effects in a 
simple measurement. Israel is faced with such a problem where a certain number of 
random deaths from terrorism is ‘acceptable’ in the sense that it does not trigger a 
response. But the same number of deaths due to indirect fires from the Gaza strip or 
Southern Lebanon is not, since that risk is borne by only a small part of the overall 
population.
175 See Knorr and Morgenstern, ‘Political Conjecture in Military Planning,’ pp. 29-30.
176 Abbot E. Smith, ‘On the Accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates,’ Studies in Intelligence, vol. 13, 
no. 4 (Fall 1969), p. 28. Until now, the US intelligence community has not implemented a coherent 
system of describing the estimated likelihood of events, (Richards J. Heuer, ‘The Limits of Intelligence 
Analysis,’ Orbis, vol. 49, no. 1 (Winter 2005), esp. pp. 87-88.), nearly 40 years after Sherman Kent had 
first pointed out the need to do so. (Sherman Kent, ‘Words of Estimative Probability,’ Studies in 
Intelligence, vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1966), pp. 35-44.)
177 See the discussion of uncertainties in Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie, ‘Strategy 
under Uncertainty,’ Hansard Business Review, vol. 75, no. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 66-79.
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FIGURE 7: ADF CONCEPT OF EVOLVING THREATS
Evolving Threats
Irregular. Those seeking to erode Australian 
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• Terrorism
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Traditional. Those seeking to challenge 
Australian power by instigating traditional 
military operations such as:
• Conventional air, sea, land attacks
• Nuclear confrontation
A
Disruptive. Those seeking to usurp Australian 
power and influence by acquiring breakthrou^i 
capabilities, such as:
• Sensors
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• Miniaturisation on the 
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• Cyber-operations
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other emerging fields
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Catastrophic. Those seeking to paralyse 
Australian leadership and power by 
employing weapons of mass destruction or 
with WMD-like effects in surprise attacks on 
symbolic critical or other high-value targets, 
such as:
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Source: Air Commodore Mark Lax, ‘The ADF’s Approach to Joint Future Warfighting,’ Presentation at 
the Joint Future Warfighting Conference, Canberra, 20-21 April 2005.
In spite of these conceptual problems, probability and consequence are two parameters 
that are often used to describe a spectrum of conflict facing a nation with, for example, 
peacetime presence at one end of the scale and a probability of 100%, and strategic 
nuclear war at the other extreme. Since a two-dimensional graph can—at most— 
include three dimensions of risk, its advantage in terms of the visual presentation of 
information has to be weighed against the significant simplification that is necessary to
1 no
construct it. An example for this trade-off can be found in Figure 7, which classifies 
risks in four categories, orders them according to their probability and ‘vulnerability’, 
and gives an overview of the types of enemy activity subsumed under each.179 Since it 
is not possible in this framework to convey the gravity of a threat as well as the 
vulnerability to it, the curious result is that Australia should be ‘less vulnerable’ to the 
threat of a traditional nuclear confrontation than to, for example, enemy breakthroughs 
in sensor technology. Another, applied example is the US Department of Homeland 
Security’s formula for the distribution of funds for counterterrorism activities between
178 For a good overview on this type o f spectrum-of-conflict graphs, see Henry C. Barlett, G. Paul 
Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, ‘The Spectrum o f Conflict: What Can It Do for Force Planners?,’ in 
Strategy and Force Planning, ed. The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, pp. 435-447.
179 For similar graphs, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategy o f  the 
United States (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), pp. 2-3; Joint Chiefs o f Staff, The 
National Military Strategy o f  the United States o f  America (Washington D.C.: Department o f Defense, 
2004), pp. 4-5.
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different states and cities, which calculates values for probability and severity of 
consequences of terrorist attacks on the basis of various intelligence, population and 
infrastructure datasets.
3.2.3 Risk and Post-Cold War Security
A third broad view of strategic or security risk can be found in writings on the post-
Cold War security environment. According to the Copenhagen school, whether certain
problems are considered security issues is not primarily due to their intrinsic
1 8 1characteristics, but because they are consciously ‘securitised' in the political context. 
Threats to security are thus not only to a large degree constructed within society, but the 
concept is also extended beyond the traditional realm of national security, comprising 
internal subversion and external aggression. Framed as ‘human security’, security
1 89threats can, at the limit, include any potential source of harm to an individual.
In parallel with these largely academic concepts, the official discourse began to give 
greater emphasis to ‘non-military’ security issues as the growing cooperation and 
integration between ‘post-modern’ states, primarily in Europe, challenged the realist 
notion of state sovereignty. Traditional security concerns between the members of the 
‘post-modern’ sphere had disappeared, but remaining threats from ‘modem’ states, 
which were still willing to use armed force in the pursuit of the national interest, were 
complemented by new ones from ‘pre-modem’ zones of chaos, in which the state had 
lost the monopoly on violence. The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, for example, 
mentions that “[t]he security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of 
military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to 
predict.”184 These include
the appearance o f complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including 
oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the 
proliferation of weapons o f mass destruction.185
Furthermore,
Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks o f a wider nature, including 
acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption o f the flow of 
vital resources. The uncontrolled movement o f large numbers o f people, particularly as
180 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, ‘The Department o f Homeland Security’s Risk 
Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress,’ Congressional Research Service 
Report RL33858 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007).
181 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: 
Rienner, 1998).
182 For human security, see for example Dan Henk, ‘Human Security: Relevance and Implications,’ 
Parameters, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 91-106; Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or 
Hot Air?’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87-102.
183 Robert Cooper, The Postmodern State and the World Order (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2000).
184 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved at the Washington 
Summit 23-24 April 1999, para. 20.
185 Ibid., para. 3.
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a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability 
affecting the Alliance.186
In some regards, security policy thus seemed to fall in line with the post-modern Risk
187 188Society, organized in response to risks. In this line of thinking, the concept of risk
is contrasted with the more traditional one of threat:
Perhaps the best way to differentiate threats and risks is through their respective 
components. Both imply different ways o f conceptualising danger. Risk emphasises 
the probability and magnitude of consequences. In international relations under the Old 
Security Paradigm, the conventional notion of threat was usually defined narrowly in 
military terms o f composed of assessing an opponent’s intentions and military 
capabilities.189
Yee-Kuang Heng thus contrasts “a risk management perspective of proactively averting 
probabilistic scenarios, leading to preventive strategies”, with “a more orthodox 
understanding of war involving ‘net assessment’ and reacting to more ‘real’ or 
imminent material threats.” 190 In addition, the goal of security policy and warfare 
throughout the 1990s allegedly became “averting an array of possible adverse 
undesirable consequences that may or may not materialise”, rather than “the previous 
more direct linear ‘instrumental’ rationality, which emphasised calculating and 
matching means to attain desired goals.”191
The view of strategic risks as synonymous with post-Cold War security issues can thus 
be attributed to the confluence of a number of different factors, especially the increasing 
prominence of humanitarian goals pursued by military force, a subjectively greater 
volatility of the interconnected globalised world, and academic attention to the subject 
from political scientists working outside the strategic studies sphere. The practical 
value of this view is however limited: First, the alleged dichotomy between
‘traditional’ threats and ‘post-modern’ risks is based on a caricature of security policy 
during the Cold War (one just has to think, for example, of the uncertainty and risk 
management calculus underlying Western intervention in stopping Communist 
expansion in the third world). Second, much of the perceived change is attributable to 
the political willingness of Western democracies to contemplate the use of military 
force for purposes other than pure self-defence, such as in humanitarian interventions, 
and an alleged reduction in the likelihood of interstate warfare. But third, and most 
importantly, a distinction between risk, based on probability and consequence, from 
threat, based on capability and intention, ignores the fact that the use of armed force,
186 Ibid., para. 24.
187 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity (London: Sage, 1992).
188 See, for example, Christopher Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: 
NATO and the Management o f Risk,’ Adelphi Paper, no. 345 (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2002); Mikkel V. Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive security: NATO and International Risk 
Society,’ Millennium, vol. 30, no. 2 (June 2001), pp. 285-309.
189 Yee-Kuang Heng, War as Risk Management: Strategy and conflict in an age o f globalised risks 
(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 13.
190 Ibid., p. 2. See also p. 23.
191 Ibid., p. 49.
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even if it is in reaction to a security 'risk’, such as ethnic cleansing, must still coerce 
adversaries with specific capabilities and intentions.
3.2.4 Risk Management in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review
The fourth approach to risk in strategy relates to the management of the defence effort. 
In the United States, the 2001 QDR introduced a framework consisting of four risks:
• Force management—the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient 
numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while 
accomplishing its many operational tasks;
• Operational—the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or 
other contingency;
• Future challenges—the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new 
operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military 
challenges; and
• Institutional—the ability to develop management practices and controls that use 
resources efficiently and promote the effectiveness operation of the Defense 
establishment.192
The QDR goes on to say that
This framework allows the Department to consider tradeoffs among fundamental 
objectives and fundamental resource constraints, and it reflects DoD’s experiences over 
the last decade in attempting to balance strategy, force structure, and resources.193
Only in the subsequent Annual Report did the Department indirectly define what it 
understands as risk in this regard, when it wrote that
it is essential to create a framework to manage responses to the different sources of 
risk—that is, the issues and factors that can undermine the ability of the organization to 
achieve the goals of defence policy.194
Unfortunately, neither the report, nor any other publication details how the framework 
is applied in practice. The following Annual Report of 2003 introduced the likelihood 
and consequences of failure, and time, as the three dimensions that are used to measure 
operational risk,195 while the previous report had apparently applied the methodology 
outlined above to assess that risk.196 Probability and consequences are not mentioned in 
connection with any of the other four risk categories, and neither are uncertainties
192 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2001), pp. 57-58
193 Ibid., pp. 58.
194 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2002), pp. 22-23.
195 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2003), p.41. The 2004 report did not change in this regard: Secretary of Defense, Annual Report 
to the President and Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004).
196 See also Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (2002), p. 54.
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relating to any of them explicitly considered. By 2006, observers hence questioned
197whether the framework was ever fully developed and applied.
The Pentagon’s risk framework was less about risks—consisting of threat, vulnerability 
and uncertainty—than about harmonizing conflicting demands on limited resources in 
general. Concepts and methods to balance these are, of course, important management 
tools, but the term ‘risk’ is used here, again, more as a synonym for a failure to attain 
policy goals, or a mismatch between ends and means—although, this time, within 
different parts of the defence organization.
3.3 Strategic Risk: Surprise, Warning and Risk Characterisation
Based on the discussion of risk and uncertainty in this chapter, and of strategy in the 
previous one, this section will more closely define strategic risk. An introductory 
section is followed by a discussion of the relationship between strategic risk and 
surprise. The third section develops a more detailed and coherent framework of the 
concept, which will provide the basis for the development of a typology of defence 
planning concepts in Chapter 5.
3.3.1 Vulnerability, Threats, and Uncertainty
Most of the concepts of strategic risk discussed above lacked a clear identification of 
vulnerability, threat and uncertainty. In the strategic context, the first is given in the 
form of political goals, the second in the form of enemies, and the third include (but are 
not limited to) those that affect the strategic pyramid. This simple framework of the 
three constituting elements of strategic risk is summarized in Figure 8, which also 
introduces a number of other uncertainties that are relevant to defence planning. It can 
be used to develop an outline of the components of strategic risk, and to further define 
the scope of the argument.
A nation’s leaders’ foremost interest is usually to guarantee their state’s continuing 
existence by defending its population, territory, sovereignty, constitution, way of life 
and means to support it from outside attack—but like other interests, such as the 
prevention of genocide, the advancement of world communism, or the liberation of 
Jerusalem from the infidels—in the end reflects political preferences. In order to guide 
decisionmaking, such preferences have to be ‘operationalised’ in the form of policy 
goals.198 This step can be called foreign policy in a wider sense, and in practice 
primarily reflects the policy maker’s theory of international relations, as well as the 
particular strategic circumstances of the nation.199
197 Michele A. Flournoy, ‘Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defence Review Right?,’ Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 72.
198 See P.H. Liotta, ‘Still Worth Dying For, National Interests and the Nature o f Strategy,’ Naval War 
College Review, col. LVI, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 123-138 for more on this point. His article is an 
answer to James F. Miskel, ‘National Interests, Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?,’ Naval War College 
Review, vol. LV, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 96-104. For a study that severely suffers from a 
misinterpretation o f interests as directly useable guides to policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).
199 The prime example for the importance o f these two factors in transforming interests into goals is the 
United States, where the fundamental direction o f foreign policy has been widely discussed ever since the
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FIGURE 8: TREATING STRATEGIC RISK
Risk
Vulnerability 1 H azard ( ‘ Uncertainty
Topic of this Thesis
Foreign policy goals have to be pursued in an international system in which each state 
and non-state actor follows its own, potentially competing and conflicting goals. To the 
extent that these other actors are, or might be, willing to use force to resolve these 
differences, goals define vulnerabilities that are relevant to the topic of this thesis 
(preventing or allowing carbon dioxide emissions, for example, does not yet seem to be 
a goal that would lead states to threaten the use of military force). For the purpose of 
the argument herein, goals will be seen as given and defined by the political leadership. 
To do otherwise would both disregard the major role of political preferences, and 
necessitate a discussion of the merits of different schools of international relations 
theory that stand behind them: an undertaking both too large and only marginally 
relevant to the main topic of discussion. It is, however, necessary to consider that goals 
do not remain constant over time. Similarly, this thesis will regard enemies as given in
time o f the founding fathers. Examples of arguments that fall into this context are the ‘utopian-realist 
controversy’, the choice between isolationism and entering in foreign alliances, or the role o f values in 
foreign policy. The US debate on many o f these issues is alive and well to this day. See, for example, the 
recent exchange between Charles Krauthammer and Francis Fukuyama: Charles Krauthammer,
Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 
2004); Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Neoconservative Moment,’ The National Interest, no. 76 (Summer 2004), 
pp. 57-68; Charles Krauthammer, ‘In Defense o f Democratic Realism,’ The National Interest, no. 77 (Fall 
2004), pp. 15-25; Robert Cooper, ‘Liberal Imperialism,’ The National Interest, no. 79 (Spring 2005), pp. 
25-34. Examples for other recent controversies that are shaped or influenced by these two factors are 
those on the normative role o f the United Nations Security Council in authorizing preventive and 
preemptive action, or on the extent to which European states should engage in expeditionary operations.
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the sense that it does not consider policies outside the defence planning context that 
might lead to reconciliation of the differences that lead both sides to consider the use of 
force. But it is necessary to consider that threat assessments are affected by the 
uncertainties discussed in the previous chapter, and that one’s own and other states’ 
foreign policies can lead to the emergence of new enemies.
Vulnerable policy goals and threats by enemies create a risk, and the reduction or 
treatment of that risk is the purpose of a nation’s defence effort, guided by the theory of 
victory and implemented in the form of operational, as well as defence planning 
decisions. The defence effort is constrained by limited budgetary and personnel 
resources, as well as political and legal restrictions, which can relate to the way in 
which resources are made available (the choice between a conscript or volunteer force, 
for example), the way in which they are allowed to be spent (the prohibition of weapons 
systems such as non-conventional munitions or anti-personnel landmines, for example), 
or the way in which defence assets can be used to achieve strategic effect (through the 
political demand to respect international laws of war, for example) . 200 These constraints 
will be seen as given herein, but the influence of uncertainty regarding the future 
availability of resources, or regarding changes to political and legal constraints, will be 
considered.
3.3.2 Risk, Strategic Surprise and Warning
A first way to develop theoretical approaches to risk in strategy is to look at strategic 
surprise. The literature on that subject has mostly focused on surprise attacks, such 
as Pearl Harbour or the Yom Kippur War. Issues that have been highlighted in that 
context are signals and noise in the intelligence picture, mental conceptions, the 
roles of tactical indicators and strategic assumptions,204 the idiosyncratic behaviour of 
individuals, and the unwillingness of politicians to take action on the basis of an 
intelligence warning.206
200 These constraints can differ considerably between countries, whether they are consciously imposed or
not. See for example: Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).
201 Only Michael I Handel has explicitly focused on that connection in the large literature on the subject. 
See, for example, Handel, ‘Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,’ pp. 14-17; and the 
discussion o f his ideas in Wirtz, ‘Theory o f Surprise,’ pp. 105-108.
202 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1968).
203 Avi Shlaim, ‘Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,’ World 
Politics, vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 348-380.
204 Abraham Ben-Zvi, ‘Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis o f Surprise 
Attacks,’ World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 381-395.
205 Uri Bar-Joseph, ‘Israel’s Intelligence Failure of 1973: New Evidence, A New Interpretation, and 
Theoretical Implications,’ Strategic Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 584-609.
206 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982).
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9 0 7In the context of studies focused on the victims of surprise, Klaus Knorr identifies 
two types of surprise: ‘Technical surprise’, not incompatible with the prevalent set of 
expectations, but surprising because the enemy successfully concealed his intentions, 
and ‘behavioural surprise’, incompatible with the expectations held by the victim of 
surprise. His two types of surprise are thus equivalent to the distinction between the 
two main types of surprise in Figure 5, risk and indeterminacy on the one hand, where 
possible outcomes are known but which are surprising due to the general incertitude of 
dealing with the enemy, and ignorance on the other hand where outcomes are unknown.
Other studies of strategic surprise centre on the motivation of the attacker to achieve 
surprise, and the use of deception to do so.209 In addition, Michael I. Handel has studied 
technological surprise in war—looking at what was later to be called RMAs and 
surprise about the performance or existence of individual weapons systems— and 
surprise in diplomacy. Notwithstanding the different emphasis and perspectives of 
these works, their near-unanimous conclusion is that (tactical) surprise is inevitable, a 
judgment consistent with the discussion of unavoidable uncertainties in Chapter 2. 
Handel writes about efforts to escape this fact that
Problems generated by bureaucratic and organizational deficiencies have no perfect 
solution. What may be an advantage in one case may be a disadvantage in another.
While “post-failure” reforms may rectify one problem, they may create others. In the 
same way, bureaucracies and organizations are simultaneously helpful and damaging; 
but they are irreplaceable nonetheless.212
Given the wealth of literature on surprise attack, the number of works devoted to 
studying the consequences of inevitable surprise for defence planning is surprisingly 
small—Richard K. Betts’ study of the issue in the context of NATO’s Central Front in 
the 1980s stands out as the notable exception. There is, however, a larger literature 
on the consequences for intelligence analysis that flow from the impossibility of 
eliminating surprise,214 and which centres around the distinction between warning about
207 For overviews, see Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia 
University, 1987); Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988); Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning.
208 Klaus Knorr, ‘ Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles,’ World 
Politics, vol. 16, no. 3 (April 1964), pp. 462-463.
209 For good discussions o f historical deceptions, see for example Jon Latimer, Deception in War 
(London: John Murray, 2001); Reginald V. Jones, ‘Intelligence and Deception,’ in Intelligence and 
National Security, eds. Pfaltzgraff, Ra’anan and Milberg, pp. 3-22. For different theoretical perspectives 
on deception, see Daniel and Herbig, eds., Strategic Military Deception. See also Alex Roberto Hybel, 
The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986).
210 Michael I. Handel, ‘Technological Surprise in War,’ Intelligence and National Security, vol. 2, no. 1 
(January 1987), pp. 5-53. See also Mahnken, Uncovering Ways o f War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign 
Military Innovation, 1918-1941.
211 Handel, ‘Surprise in Diplomacy.’
212 Michael I. Handel, ‘Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980s,’ in Intelligence 
Requirements for the 1980 ’s: Analysis and Estimates, ed. Godson, p. 104.
213 Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning.
214 Stephen Marrin points out that some surprises, such as the end of the Cold War, are probably not due 
to ‘secrets that could be discovered, than to intelligence ‘mysteries’. Stephen Marrin, ‘Preventing
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impending enemy moves on a tactical and operational level on the one hand, and 
warning about longer-term, political and strategic adverse developments that could raise 
the probability of surprise on the other hand (Betts writes o f ‘factual-technical warning,’ 
concentrating on capabilities and facts, and ‘contingent-political warning,’ 
concentrating on intentions and probabilistic in nature).215
In the words of Jack Davis,
Tactical warning focuses on specific incidents that endanger US security interests ...
The goal is to deter and limit damage by identifying in advance when, where, and how a 
declared or potential adversary will forcefully strike the Untied States directly, mount a 
challenge to US forces, personnel, or interests abroad, or make a menacing weapons 
breakthrough.216
• ♦ . . .The aim of a tactical warning is thus announce an imminent danger or predict future 
events, i.e. to gain information about an issue that could a-priori be located in any of the 
sections of Figure 5 and to eliminate uncertainty about that issue altogether. Since it is 
usually very difficult, however, to discover something one is not looking for, tactical 
warning will in practice be about the realization of a particular strategic risk or 
indeterminacy.
Handel thus writes that
we should try to think ahead about areas that are of vital interest and that may include 
unpleasant surprises for us in the future. Thinking about these problems in advance 
may cushion the impact of the surprise. Surprise is then reduced from a surprise in 
subject and timing, to a surprise solely in terms of timing.217
In other words, possible outcomes should be defined to transform situations of open • • • •• . . ♦ expectations into indeterminacy. ‘Contingent-political’ or strategic warning , therefore,
does not aim at eliminating uncertainty per se. Instead,
Strategic warning aims for analytical perception and effective communication to policy 
officials of important changes in the character or level of security threats that require re- 
evaluation of US readiness to deter, avert, or limit damage—well in advance of 
incident-specific indicators. Thus, strategic warning is characterized by inferential 
evidence and general depiction of the danger. The issues addressed here are changes in 
the level o f likelihood that an enemy will strike or that a development harmful to US 
interests will take place and changes in enemy mechanisms for inflicting damage. The
Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,’ International Journal o f Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, vol. 17, no. 4 (October-December 2004), p.656.
215 Richard K. Betts, ‘Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas,’ Parameters, vol. 27, no. 1 
(Spring 1998), pp. 26-35.
216 Emphasis in original. Jack Davis, ‘Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for 
Analysis?,’ Occasional Paper, vol. 2, no. 1 (Langley: Sherman Kent Centre for Intelligence Analysis, 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2003), p. 3.
217 Handel, ‘Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980s,’ p. 105.
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goal is to assist policy decisions on defensive preparedness and contingency planning, 
including preemptive actions, to manage the risks of potential threats.218
In other words, the aim of strategic warning is to correctly assess possibilities and 
probabilities and to identify and assess future risks. In general, the aim of strategic 
warning is thus to reduce the quantity and quality of uncertainty by developing open 
expectations, defining outcomes in order to transform ignorance into indeterminacy, 
and assigning probabilities or consequences to change indeterminacy into risk. 
Thinking about surprise in these terms shifts the focus from trying to avoid surprise 
altogether: “We have to learn to live with ambiguity. The next best thing to avoiding a 
surprise is being able to cope with it once it has taken place.” Not surprise itself, but 
the effects of it are the main danger. In such a perspective, prudence dictates that 
predictive accuracy is less important than preventing severe consequences. Topics for 
strategic warning should thus be selected according to their damage potential, not 
necessarily their likelihood.
While the literature on surprise attack and strategic surprise focuses on enemy action, 
unexpected outcomes can also be due to a wide range of other factors. Any of the three 
constituting components of the strategic risk management task—political goals, enemies
and defence capabilities—can be the source of surprise. This includes intelligence
221failures to predict the emergence of new enemies, such as the Iranian revolution, 
unexpected budget cuts and the fact that “governments will consider using the ADF 
[Australian Defence Force] in circumstances that we have not envisaged,”222 as the 
Australian Defence 2000 White Paper states.
But one major, and generally underrated, source of surprise are the technical, 
psychological and social cause-effect relationships of the strategic pyramid that are used 
to predict strategic effect. Any of the assumptions that are part of that pyramid can, in 
principle, be a cause of surprise. At a technical level, for example, the US effort during 
World War II in the Pacific was severely hampered by closed expectations regarding the 
functioning of the Mark XIV submarine torpedo, which was plagued by deep running, 
defects in the magnetic exploders and faulty design of the contact exploders. “After 
twenty-one months of war, the three major defects of the Mark XIV torpedo had at last 
been isolated,” Craig Blair writes, “Each defect had been discovered and fixed in the 
field—always over the stubborn opposition of the Bureau of Ordnance." Surprise in 
the middle part of the pyramid occurs in the more familiar areas of tactical and 
operational art, as well as in the form of RMAs. But it can also, and often does, occur at
218 Emphasis in original. Jack Davis, ‘Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for 
Analysis?,’ p. 3.
219 Handel, ‘Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980s,’ p. 106.
220 Jack Davis, ‘Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?,’ p. 13.
221 William J. Daugherty, ‘Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran,’ International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 2001), pp. 449-484.
222 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), p. 54.
223 Craig Blair, Silent Victory, The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1975), p. 439.
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the highest step, if a military victory does not lead to the realization of the intended 
political goals.224
3.3.3 A Concept o f Strategic Risk
Knowledge about nearly everything in strategy is thus limited. Nearly all information 
that is available relates to possible, but not inevitable outcomes—situations of risk or 
indeterminacy—or is merely information about our lack of knowledge—situations of 
ignorance. But just as the effect of surprise is the problem rather than surprise itself, 
the limited knowledge on which strategy has to be formulated is in of itself a lesser 
source of danger than institutional risk, the threat that flows from the inability to 
correctly reflect and act upon the limitations in available information. Strategic risk 
also has to be assessed and evaluated in conjunction with one’s defence capability; 
measuring either without reference to the other is, in the end, a meaningless exercise. A 
number of characteristics flowing from the discussion so far should thus be reflected in 
a concept of strategic risk:
There are several types of uncertainty that affect strategic risk, due to the limited ability 
to forecast the international system, the complexity of the strategic pyramid, the 
limitations of intelligence, friction and, none the least, the actions of the enemy. Since 
these uncertainties are of different natures, but all are relevant to the treatment of 
strategic risk, it is not possible to summarize all of them in a meaningful way in the 
form of one probability measure. A framework of strategic risk must therefore be able 
to incorporate a large number of different uncertainties.
Assessment of strategic risks alone is therefore insufficient to establish a hierarchy 
between them. Only at the risk evaluation stage, on the basis of the information 
provided by the risk assessment, can this be done in a meaningful way, since it is 
necessary to consider the different dimensions of consequences, the relative likelihoods, 
the certainty of assessment, the costs of risk mitigation, and the political goals under 
threat. It is impossible to compress the judgment inherent in this step into a formula or 
algorithm of some kind—there is, after all, no algorithm for policymaking either—and 
in many cases, assessment and evaluation cannot be properly separated. Whether a 
risk that is considered prohibitive is unlikely but very destructive if it occurs— 
thermonuclear war, for example—or whether it has a low destructive potential but is 
very likely—such as the participation in stabilization operations—is in the end less
224 Colin S. Gray, Transformation and Strategic Surprise (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2005), p. 16.
225 After the end of the Cold War, the difference between the assessment of intelligence in US NIEs and 
its evaluation became, in some regards, even more politically sensitive than during the Cold War, for 
example. As clear-cut threats to national interests lessened during the 1990s, it became more difficult to 
estimate ‘implications for the United States’ while staying clear of (domestic) politics and value-laden 
judgments (Fulton T. Armstrong, ‘Ways to Make Analysis Relevant But Not Prescriptive,’ Studies in 
Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 3 (2002), <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article05.html> (23 June 
2005).). At the same time, a review in 1993-1994 found that policymakers were less interested in the CIA 
analysts’ opinion than in facts, or, as Paul Wolfowitz put it in a succinct discussion of the relationship 
between analysts and policymakers, “I frequently think I am as capable of coming up with an informed 
opinion about a matter as any number o f people within the Intelligence Community who feel that they 
have been uniquely anointed with this responsibility.” (Paul D. Wolfowitz, ‘Comment’, in U.S. 
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, eds. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt 
(Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), p. 76).
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important than the fact that both represent threats of a high priority that have to be 
addressed in one form or another.
Furthermore, threats to strategic effectiveness emanate not from an abstract discrepancy 
between ends and means, but from the actions of enemies—whether they are actual or 
potential ones. Strategy is inherently adversarial, and it is impossible to discuss 
strategic risk without discussing the role of the enemy. Strategic effectiveness in the 
achievement of a nation's goals is the value that is at risk. Weighing the extent of the 
danger to a political goal, and the likelihood of failure, against the uncertainty about the 
situation and the cost that is associated with reducing a risk is thus an inherently 
political decision, whether it is made by politicians or not. Just as strategy is 
inseparable from politics, so is strategic risk.
It is necessary to strike a balance between the main purpose of a framework of strategic 
risk—to summarize risks and to reduce information—and the need to distinguish 
between risks that are of the same priority to the decisionmaker, but differ in 
fundamental characteristics. The following framework is, therefore, based on grouping 
risks into categories that are distinguished along a number of limited dimensions. In the 
following, three dimensions are considered:
• Risks differ with regard to time since some relate to the present, and some only 
to the distant future. Time is an important dimension of strategic risk as the 
treatment of future risks will tend to generate lesser or different requirements 
from that of present risks. The certainty of assessment of the latter will also be 
generally less than that of the former. For the sake of simplicity, risks will be 
distinguished here into those of the present and those of the future.
• The identity of enemies is important since ultimately strategic risks are always 
caused by the deliberate actions of other actors on the international stage. But 
since it is not always possible to anticipate which actors have or will have 
intentions and interests that clash with one’s own, it is necessary to distinguish 
known or expected enemies from unknown or unexpected ones. Risk 
assessment will usually concentrate on the former category, where intentions 
and/or capabilities indicate a strategic risk. The latter category includes those 
actors who are not considered since their intentions are not correctly assessed, or 
since their intentions change unexpectedly. This category can also include 
enemies that have not emerged as actors on the international arena yet, for 
example new trans-national groups. It is, of course, by definition impossible to 
list specific enemies in the unknown or unexpected group. It is, however, 
necessary to consider this category in order to account for the overall confidence 
in one’s ability to forecast the emergence of new enemies in the international 
system, which can be greater at some times than in others. The likelihood of 
Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan falling under the control of a hostile 
regime, for instance, is relatively small in each individual case. Taken together, 
however, the risk of future conflict between Western powers and an unspecified, 
currently friendly major Middle Eastern state is probably far from negligible.
• The enemy ’s theory o f victory and capabilities can be analysed in parallel to the 
distinction between enemies of a known or unknown identity. It is thus possible 
to distinguish risks that involve enemy capabilities and ways of using them that 
are expected and understood on the one hand, or unexpected or not understood
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on the other hand. While the former conform with well understood cause-effect 
relationships in the strategic pyramid, the latter do not and thus make it 
impossible or very difficult to define a reliable theory of victory to counter them 
in advance. While it is, of course, again not possible to make a list of 
capabilities and ways of using them that one does not know of yet, it is 
nevertheless necessary to make a judgment about the confidence in one’s ability 
to predict the enemies’ strategy and capability. This judgment will reflect one’s
familiarity with their cultural, historical, social and technological traditions, as
226well as their propensity to innovate and change their behaviour.
FIGURE 9: STRATEGIC RISKS
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The binominal nature of the dimensions used here is too simplistic to be justified in any 
attempt to account for strategic risks in reality, but the framework can easily be enlarged 
to account for more categories. Similarly, the framework can include any number of 
dimensions. A fourth dimension that would probably be included in any practical 
application is, for example, the nature of warfare that is associated with the risk, with 
categories such as peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, conventional or nuclear war. The 
framework is limited to three dimensions here in order to be able to convey it
226 On the basis o f eleven case studies o f defence planning from the 19th and 20th century, Talbot Imlay 
and Monica Duffy Toft draw conclusions that are closely aligned with the theoretical framework 
developed herein. They write that “Uncertainty comes in many forms, but it can be usefully divided into 
three elements: (1) the difficulty of identifying friend and foe; (2) the difficulty of understanding the 
nature of future war; (3) the difficulty o f determining its timing.” Talbot Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft, 
‘Conclusion: Seven Lessons about the Fog o f Peace,’ in The Fog o f Peace and War Planning: Military 
and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty, eds. Talbot Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 249.
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graphically as a two-by-two cube (see Figure 9), and since that number is sufficient for 
the classification of defence planning concepts in Chapter 5. Eight categories of 
strategic risk result, each of which would include specific or generic risks and be 
evaluated to be negligible, normal, transitional or prohibitive:
• Present, known enemies, understood theory of victory: For example, the Soviet 
divisions on the Fulda Gap.
• Future, expected enemies, understood theory of victory: For example, the use 
that China could make of its future blue water surface navy.
• Present, known enemies, unexpected theory of victory: For example, the Iraqi 
insurgency was unexpected (but imaginable) before the invasion.
• Future, expected enemies, unexpected capabilities: For example, a future
Chinese submarine fleet that is much more effective than expected by its 
adversaries.
• Present, unknown enemies, understood theory of victory: The example
mentioned above of a major Middle Eastern state coming under the control of a 
hostile leadership.
• Future, unknown enemies, understood theory of victory: A category similar to 
the preceding one.
• Present, unexpected enemies, theory of victory not understood: For example, A1 
Qaeda and the use of hijacked aircraft as a cruise-missile were unexpected by 
many countries’ defence planners.
• Future, unknown enemies, theory of victory not understood: A category similar 
to the preceding one.
In summary, this chapter has introduced the concept or risk and described its multi­
dimensional nature. Since risk always deals with the difference between possibility and 
reality of future events, the concept of surprise is inseparable from that of risk. It is 
necessary to distinguish the different purpose behind a descriptive risk assessment, and 
a subjective and value-laden risk evaluation. Both are however necessary to establish 
an order of priority between risks.
Existing concepts do not capture the fact that different types of uncertainty are inherent 
to strategic risk. Therefore, this chapter has approached strategic risk from two angles: 
First, by showing its relation with different kinds of strategic surprise, which led into a 
discussion of the difference between tactical and strategic warning. Second, by 
developing a framework of strategic risk that can convey uncertainty along several 
dimensions (such as the identity and theory of victory of one’s adversaries), and which 
builds on an evaluation rather than mere assessment of threats.
As an analytical tool, this framework has several advantages over the existing concepts: 
First, it requires the strategist to make a judgment regarding risk categories that by 
definition go beyond his current state of knowledge, and to assess indeterminacy as well 
as ignorance. Second, the dimensions included in the framework already foreshadow 
some of the steps that have to be taken to treat different risks. Risks from unknown 
enemies and especially unknown theories of victory will, for example, call for 
precautionary strategies. Third, the framework can be used to evaluate risks in the 
context of different risk treatment programmes, a point further elaborated in Chapter 4. 
Fourth, it can help to manage expectations on the part of politicians and the public about 
what can reasonably be predicted and what cannot. Fifth, the relative importance of
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these risks can serve as the foundation of a general typology of defence planning 
concepts in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4:
DEFENCE PLANNING AS RISK MANAGEMENT
Since a useful concept of strategic risk must accommodate different kinds of 
uncertainty, so must the process to manage it. This chapter analyses the defence 
planning process as a risk management problem, with special regard to the role of risk 
assessment and evaluation, the information available regarding possible outcomes, and 
risk treatment strategies for specific risks.
4.1 Perspectives on Risk Management
While it is impossible to create risk-free environments, “it may be possible to avoid, 
reduce, eliminate or transfer some of the risks.” Processes that contribute to this are 
called risk management. In general, risk management tries to answer the following 
questions:
What can go wrong?
What is the likelihood that it will go wrong?
What are the consequences?
What can be done and what options are available?
What are the trade-offs in terms of all costs, benefits, and risks?
What are the impacts of current management decisions on future options?228
The idea behind risk management is thus a very simple one. 229 Risk management 
processes can be undertaken at various scales of effort—from an individual person 
sitting down for an hour with a sheet of paper to decisions about the construction of 
nuclear waste facilities that involve hundreds, if not thousands of persons, take decades 
and cost billions of dollars. They can follow standardized, even automated procedures 
or merely consist of loosely assigned management responsibilities. Similarly, risk 
management can be a one-off activity or a constant part of day-to-day business. The
227 Management Advisory Board, Guidelines for managing risk in the Australian Public Service, p. 3.
228 Stan Kaplan and B. John Garrick, ‘On the Quantitative Definition of Risk,’ Risk Analysis, vol. 1, no. 1 
(1981), pp. 11-27, quoted in Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, Making 
the Nation Safer: The Role o f Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington D.C.: The 
National Academies Press, 2002), pp. 306-307.
229 “You will discover that risk is something you manage continually and is common sense” states the 
introduction to risk management in an Australian Public Sector Handbook, for example. Purchasing 
Australia, Managing Risk in Procurement—A Handbook (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1996), p. v. See also Management Advisory Board, Guidelines for managing risk in the 
Australian Public Senhce. Martin Fone and Peter C. Young, Public Sector Risk Management (Oxford: 
Butterworth Heinemann, 2000) is a more detailed risk management handbook.
69
Managing Strategic Risk
specific form that a risk management process takes is thus, despite many similarities in 
the basic structure, highly dependent on the particularities of the situation.
Section 2.1.2 discussed the difference between strategy formation and subsequent 
planning. The design of a risk management process is part of the formation and 
codification of strategy under uncertainty, while its application is then part o f more 
detailed planning procedures. In order to analyse the defence planning process as a risk 
management problem, a more detailed theoretical discussion of risk management is thus 
essential. This first half o f the chapter will introduce the theory o f risk management, 
while the second part will discuss defence planning as such a process.
4.1.1 Prediction and Choice
Two main components underlie a risk management process: a system of cause-effect 
relationships that is used to identify, assess and predict risks, and a choice between 
alternative courses of action. Risk management can thus be compared and paralleled 
with other processes that develop systems of causal relationships, or use them to make 
decisions (See Figure 10). All of these processes are ultimately based on two 
assumptions: First, that there is some kind of order in the world, and, second, that this
9 T Iorder can be uncovered through logical argumentation.“
Section 2.1.5 discussed the structural similarity between scientific theory and the 
making of policy232 and strategy233— all produce knowledge and involve the ‘testing’ of 
hypothesis, although the respective goals and motivations are quite different.234. Flow 
to rationally choose optimum courses o f action among several alternatives is the study 
area of decision theory. ' Rational decisionmaking as prescribed by that theory can be 
separated into several consecutive steps: Identifying a problem and determining goals 
or objectives, identifying alternatives, predicting payoffs for different states o f the 
environment, using preferences to assign utility values to the payoffs, choosing one
230 Anthony Clark and Tim Brinkley, Risk Management for Climate, Agriculture and Policy (Canberra: 
Bureau of Rural Sciences, Department o f Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry, 2001), pp. 47-49.
231 Wolf, Organisation, Management, Unternehmensführung: Theorien und Kritik, p. 27.
232 Kugler situates policy as an intermediary between grand strategy and operational strategy (Richard L. 
Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 2006), p. 64). In general, however, the distinction between the terms of  
strategy and policy is fluid, but the latter usually emphasizes a course of action, rather than an ends-means 
relationship.
233 Also consider the following comment on strategy: “ Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge 
the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching 
objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favourable future 
outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands o f others.” Yarger, Strategic Theory 
fo r the 21s' Century: A Little Book on Big Strategy, p. 5.
234 Blume, ‘Policy as Theory: A framework for understanding the contribution o f social science to welfare 
policy’. Political science textbooks usually contain discussions o f policy cycles that are organized 
according to the procedural steps of policy making. Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davies, The Australian 
Policy Handbook (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 3rd edition, 2004), for example differenciates 
identifying issues, policy analysis, policy instruments, consultation, coordination, decision, 
implementation and evaluation, but also discusses “Policy as hypothesis” (pp. 5-6).
235 The author used the following two books for the discussion of decision theory: Franz Eisenftihr and 
Martin Weber, Rationales Entscheiden (Berlin: Springer, 3rd edition, 1999); Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and 
Schoemaker, Decision Sciences: An Integrative Perspective.
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alternative, and implementing the decision. Since the decision has to be based on 
expected payoffs, it again involves a conception of reality of some kind that can be 
correct or incorrect. Decision theory provides the conceptual underpinning to a host of 
applied risk identification, assessment and evaluation procedures, as well as rules to 
choose between alternatives under uncertainty. Indeed, risk management is a special 
case of decision theory that aims to devise “a strategy [to] reduce and cope with societal 
risks in some rational explicit way.”
FIGURE 10: PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE-ORIENTED DECISIONMAKING
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Even John R. Boyd's OODA loop can be paralleled with risk management. Boyd 
describes how success in combat and in strategy lies in presenting the enemy with a 
confusing picture of ambiguous and deceptive events, while attacking his physical 
capability to orient himself at the same time. Since the cognitive process of observation 
as well as orientation—which Boyd saw as consisting of analysis and synthesis within a 
framework of culture, experience and other factors—are influenced by mental images, 
inaccurate decisions will provide feedback that requires a reorientation, slowing down 
the cycle. In the end, the goal is to get ‘inside’ the enemy’s OODA-loop and to paralyse
o  1 0
his decisionmaking. Boyd deserves special credit for being the only modem strategic 
theorist to make the importance of time the centrepiece of his work. Since defence 
planning is part of the implementation of strategy, the time that it takes to adapt one’s 
capabilities, plans and concepts to a changing threat environment thus can have an 
importance quite unlike that in most civilian risk management processes.
The parallels between all of these processes can illuminate three main points. First, risk 
management is not limited to processes that are explicitly labelled as such. 
Policymakers routinely have to recommend and implement specific courses of action
236 David Alexander, Principles o f emergency planning and management, pp. 58-59.
237 1 am grateful to Bob Wylie for pointing this parallel out to me.
238 The roots of the OODA loop lie in the Korean War, where Boyd concluded that the reason for the 
vastly superior performance of US Sabre jets lay in the fact that its design permitted a quicker reaction 
than that of the opposing MIGs. Boyd never wrote a comprehensive summary of his ideas and mostly 
relayed them through briefings. For a summary, see Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s 
Quest for Strategic Paralysis. The OODA loop is usually associated with high-intensity warfare, but it is 
equally important to recognize in time the type of war that the enemy is waging against oneself—perhaps 
the main failure of US policy in Iraq.
239 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 172.
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FIGURE 11: RISK MANAGEMENT AS A SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
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Source: Council o f Standards Australia and Council o f Standards New Zealand, Risk Management, 
AS/NZ 4360:2004 (Sydney: Standards Australia, 2004), p. 13.
under uncertainty. Like scientific experiments, policymaking and risk management 
produce knowledge that can be used to continuously evaluate past decisions.240 Second, 
incertitude makes it impossible to formulate a reliable deterministic forecast in the risk
240 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (Washington D.C.: The National Academy Press, 1996), pp. 164-166.
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assessment stage and, as in an experiment, the final outcome cannot usually be known 
in advance. The risk treatment decision therefore can turn out to have been sub-optimal 
ex-post, although it was the correct one given the information that was available ex- 
ante. Third, in order to reduce the risk of decisions that turn out to be sub-optimal ex­
post, risk treatment can include the acquisition of knowledge as a goal in itself, in order 
to raise the certainty of assessment of previously not well defined risks.
4.1.2 Assessment and Evaluation in the Risk Management Process
Figure 11 shows the detailed process diagram of risk management as defined in the 
Australian Standard, which closely follows the definition of decision problems in 
decision theory and is meant to achieve “a more confident and rigorous basis for 
decision-making and planning.’’241 Yet, it is not always possible to implement the risk 
management process in this way if problems cannot be easily dissected into sequential 
steps, or if a major part of the process is to convince and gain acceptance of the process 
from third parties. The way a problem is formulated in the setting of the context, the 
first stage of the process, can predetermine many of the later risks and options that are 
considered. Complex problems can therefore sometimes only be formulated during the 
analysis stage.
The second stage of the process, risk identification, can aim to identify risks to 
something, for example to a project schedule. It can also identify risks from something, 
for example from a new technology. Either can be difficult in complex systems that, by 
definition, defy easy characterization due to the number of causal relationships, time 
lags and non-linear behaviour. In these cases, it might merely be possible to identify 
variables that can stabilize the system. Sometimes, all that is possible is to identify 
subsystems that are causes of changes (agents) and others that are affected by these 
changes (reagents), while the relationship between them remains unknown. 242 
Precautionary strategies to deal with such situations will be briefly surveyed in the 
following section.
The third and fourth stages, risk assessment (or analysis) and risk evaluation, are often 
referred to as risk characterisation. They can be difficult to separate, especially if 
uncertainty other than statistical uncertainty is important and data has to be synthesized, 
which will involve implicit value judgments. The US National Academy’s Committee 
on Risk Characterization thus sees risk characterization as a process that combines 
analysis and deliberation (see Figure 12):
Analysis uses rigorous, replicable methods developed by experts to arrive at answers to 
factual questions. Deliberation uses processes such as discussion, reflection, and 
persuasion to communicate, raise and collectively consider issues, increase 
understanding, and arrive at substantive decisions. Deliberation frames analysis and 
analysis informs deliberation. Thus, risk characterization is the output of a recursive 
process, not a linear one. Analysis brings new information into the process;
241 Council o f Standards Australia and Council o f Standards New Zealand, Risk Management, p. 1.
242 Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global 
Environmental Risks, pp. 194-198.
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deliberation brings new insights, questions, and problem formulations; and the two 
build on each other.243
FIGURE 12; ANALYSIS AND DELIBERATION IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Source: Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (Washington D.C.: The National Academy Press, 1996), p. 28.
Risk characterization must be a decision-driven activity that has to consider risks in the 
light of alternative courses of action:
The purpose of risk characterization is to enhance practical understanding and to 
illuminate practical choices. A carefully prepared summary of scientific information 
will not give the participants in a risk decision the understanding they need if that 
information is not relevant to the decision to be made. It is not sufficient to get the 
science right; an informed decision also requires getting the right science.244
Once causal relationships and sources of harm have been identified, it can be possible to 
estimate parameters and variables in a model to derive qualitative or quantitative 
information on the identified risks.245 In general, ignorance about a source of risk (i.e. 
modelling and completeness uncertainty) is a more common problem in reality than a 
wrong estimate of a considered parameter or variable (data uncertainty). Nevertheless, 
a “healthy dose of scepticism and humility is appropriate in interpreting any summary 
of information on risk and uncertainty,” since uncertainty-reducing techniques like 
simulations do not generate real information as scientific research does, but are 
nevertheless often presented in the same way.246 In practice, it is common to use 
‘conservative’ estimates in the analysis stage to account for uncertainty in the data. 
This implies a value judgment regarding the tolerable uncertainty, and it is possible to
243 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, p. 20.
244 Ibid., p. 16.
245 Qualitative and quantitative approaches are usually mixed in reality, since the former are often based 
on ordinal scales that rank risks and consequences in pre-defined categories. See the short discussion in 
Shortreed, Hicks, and Craig, Basic Frameworks for Risk Management, Final Report, pp. 31-37.
246 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, pp. 112-113.
74
Defence Planning as Risk Management
argue that this should properly be left to the decisionmaker.247 However, there is still no 
commonly accepted approach to characterize uncertainty in a quantitative way.
Formal evaluation and analysis methods always reduce the dimensions of risk, often 
into just one index. They can be a powerful tool to simplify complex problems and to 
make risks and alternatives comparable. But they also invariably embed value choices 
that are often highly contentious, yet remain hidden from uninformed decisionmakers in 
seemingly technical methodology. One commonly used method to which this 
especially applies is cost-benefit (or risk-benefit) analysis, which compares alternatives 
and risks by calculating the net present value of the (expected) costs and benefits 
associated with a risk and risk treatment alternatives. 249 The first important area in 
which significant value judgment enters this process lies in the determination of prices 
for such things as human life or a clean environment. Not only would some people be 
opposed to the idea that these can or should be measured in monetary terms, but the 
prices are also usually determined though ‘bootstrapping,’ with all the associated 
problems that affect this method. The second important value judgment lies in the fact 
that it is necessary in this method to discount future cost and benefits. Even with very 
low discount rates, deaths and destruction that occur a few decades in the future then 
hardly influence the overall result. In the word of an expert panel on the method, it 
should thus be noted that “[b]enefit-cost analysis is neither necessary nor sufficient for
9 SOdesigning sensible public policy.”
4.1.3 Decisionmaking and the Precautionary Principle
After the evaluation of a risk, a choice has to be made between different options to 
reduce it or doing nothing. Rational decisionmaking on the basis of information about 
future states of the environment, alternative courses of action and related payoffs is the 
question that lies at the centre of decision theory. There are numerous variants of
247 In nuclear power plant safety, conservative estimates were long prescribed by the licensing authorities 
to compensate for lack of knowledge. With advances in the understanding o f the underlying phenomena, 
these restrictions have later (in the year 1988 in the United States, for example) been relaxed and 
operators are now allowed to make more use o f ‘Best Estimates’. AEA Technology Ltd, 25 Years o f 
Community Activities towards Harmonization of Nuclear Safety Criteria and Requirements— 
Achievements and Prospects, Report for the European Commission AEAT/R/PSEG/0404 Issue 4 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2001), p. 72.
248 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, pp. 66-67; Richard H. Moss and Stephen H. Schneider, ‘Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: 
Recommendations to Lead Authors For More Consistent Assessment and Reporting,’ in Guidance Papers 
on the Cross Cutting Issues o f the Third Assessment Report o f the IPCC, eds. R. Pachauri, T. Taniguchi 
and K. Tanaka (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 2000), pp. 33-51. See also the following 
classic: Sherman Kent, ‘Words of Estimative Probability’.
249 Methods that are similar to cost-benefit analysis are cost effectiveness analysis, which identifies the 
least expensive method to achieve a given target, and socio-economic analysis, which includes 
macroeconomic and distributional effects.
250 K.J. Arrow, M.L. Cropper, G.C. Eads, R.W. Hahn, L.B. Lave, R.G. Noll, P.R. Portney, M. Russell, R. 
Schmalensee, V.K. Smith and R.N. Stavins, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation: A Statement o f Principles (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996), pp. 3, 7, 
10, quoted in Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a 
Democratic Society, p. 104.
251 Although the recommendations presented here are still very theoretical and abstract, they are already 
an ‘applied’ version of decision theory. Its basis are decision rules set down in the language of 
mathematical equations and formal logic. There are several versions, which mostly differ in view they
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decision problems, but the theoretical procedures for decisions under uncertainty can be 
roughly divided into those for situations in which probabilities and payoffs are known, 
and those where probabilities are unknown (i.e. risk and indeterminacy respectively). If 
both are known, decision theory prescribes a decision on the basis of mathematical 
optimisation of either the expected payoff (in the case of a risk neutral decisionmaker), 
or of a Von-Neumann-Morgenstem utility function that can incorporate risk 
preferences. For a situation in which probabilities are unknown, a variety of decision 
procedures has been developed over recent centuries from which a decisionmaker can 
choose the one that fits his or her (risk) preferences.
The scope for practical applications of these basic decision theory routines is however 
limited, not the least since all of them presume that possible outcomes are known (and 
thus cannot be easily applied to situations of ignorance). Due to the limited human 
cognitive and mental capabilities, decisionmakers often demonstrate satisficing rather
o n
than optimising behaviour. ~ The number of alternatives under consideration is 
therefore usually kept low, and complex problems are disaggregated and solved 
sequentially (with the use of heuristics rather than algorithms) .254 Policymakers also 
exhibit preferences for small, incremental decisions over far-reaching and irreversible 
choices.255
A particular difficulty presents itself when information about a risk is so limited that it 
cannot be assessed with any certainty, but indications are available that grave harm is at 
least a possibility. In these situations dominated by uncertainty, a decision to reduce 
(potential) risks on the basis of the Precautionary Principle can be called for. According 
to the British government,
take on the applicability of the dominance criterion in situations in which alternatives change the 
probability of different states of the environment. Since no risk management process of interest here can 
make use of such highly abstract decision rules, these differences are not relevant for this thesis. For a 
good overview on the different versions of mathematical decision theory, see James M. Joyce, The 
Foundations o f Causal Decision Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
252 The best known are maximin (select that alternative, usually the line of a payoff matrix, that
maximizes the minium payoff over all states of the environment, which are the columns of the payoff 
matrix) for risk averse decisionmaker, and maximax (maximize the maximum payoff over all states of the 
environment) for decisionmakers that have a preference for risk. Both are combined in the Hurwicz-rule, 
weighted by a factor chosen by the decisionmaker. Under the Savage rule, the ex-post regret of the 
decisionmaker is minimized: First, the highest maximum payoff of each state of the environment
(column) is subtracted from each payoffs in the column, then the modified payoffs are added up for each 
line and the alternative with the highest resulting sum is chosen. The Laplace rule is based on the 
assumption that, since no other information is (by definition) available, all states of the environment 
should be presumed equally probable, and an expected payoff on this basis be maximized. Wolf, 
Organisation, Management, Unternehmensführung: Theorien und Kritik, p. 110.
253 Under the Kepner-Tregoe approach, alternatives that do not fulfil minimum ‘must’ criteria are dropped 
from consideration, and the others are evaluated in a second step according to ‘want’ criteria, weighted 
according to previously defined importance. Peter G. Moore, The business o f risk (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 205-213.
254 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior—A Study o f Decision-making in Administrative 
Organizations (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 61-109.
255 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories o f International Relations (New 
York: Longman, 5th edition, 2001), p. 562.
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The purpose of the Precautionary Principle is to create an impetus to take a decision 
notwithstanding scientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of the risk, i.e. to 
avoid ‘paralysis by analysis’ by removing excuses for inaction on the grounds of 
scientific uncertainty.256
This principle should thus be distinguished from mere prudence, which equates to risk- 
averse decisionmaking and includes, for example, making conservative estimates, or 
using ALARA (‘as low as reasonably achievable’) decision routines. The Precautionary 
Principle is not uncontroversial and is widely discussed in such diverse areas as 
fisheries protection, international trade law and consumer protection. * It has, 
however, become formalised as a general policy framework in recent years, especially 
after the European Commission issued a landmark ‘Communication’ on the subject that 
puts it into the context of established risk assessment, evaluation and management 
processes. An example of the application of the precautionary principle at the global 
level is the widespread belief that it is necessary to address the emission of greenhouse 
gasses even in the face of significant uncertainty about their climatological effect. At 
the domestic level, the principle often entails the reversal of the burden of proof on, for 
example, pharmaceutical companies to show the absence of danger from new products.
Application of the principle implies that harmful effects could exist but that a 
knowledge deficit does not permit to use traditional risk management methods. The 
two main components of its application are a political decision regarding the acceptable 
level of risk that can be imposed on the society, and measures that are subsequently 
undertaken to reduce a potential risk. These measures should be proportional to the 
desired level of protection, and consistent with measures already undertaken in similar 
circumstances. If restrictions are imposed under the principle, scientific research should 
be undertaken to improve the risk assessment and re-evaluate the measures in the light 
of new evidence.260
A European Union research project on the application of the precautionary principle 
produced a framework that combines precautionary decisionmaking with other risk 
management processes. It begins with a screening phase in which fundamental
256 Inter-Departmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, The Precautionary Principle: Policy and 
Application (London: Health and Safety Executive, 2002), p. 6.
257 Per Sandin, Martin Peterson, Sven Ove Hansson, Christina Rüden and Andre Juthe, ‘Five charges 
against the precautionary principle,’ Journal of Risk Research, vol. 5, no. 4 (2002), pp. 287-299.
258 See, for example, the following bibliographies: Dayna Nadine Scott, ‘Bibliography: The
Precautionary Principle,’ Publication No. 452 (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 
2003); Williams C.G. Bums, Bibliography: The Precautionary Principle, University of Redlands 
Precautionary Principle Project (P3), <http://www.institute.redlands.edu/p3/bibliography.htm> (23 
September 2005).
259 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle, COM (2000) 1 (Brussels: European Union, 2000). For an (American) critique of 
that ‘Communication’, see John D. Graham and Susan Hsia, ‘Europe’s precautionary principle: promise 
and pitfalls,’ Journal of Risk Research, vol. 5, no. 4 (2002), pp. 371-390. See also Christine Noiville, 
Frederic-Yves Bois, Philippe Hubert, Reza Lahadiji, and Alain Grimfeld, ‘Opinion o f the Committtee for 
Prevention and Precaution about the Precautionary Principle,’ Journal o f Risk Research, vol. 9, no. 4 
(June 2006), pp. 287-296.
260 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle, pp. 13-21.
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characteristics of the risk are determined, such as its potential severity and the certainty 
with which it can be assessed. Depending on the outcome of this phase, the risk is then 
dealt with in an appraisal phase that takes different forms depending on the 
characteristics of the risk (Figure 13). Some of these appraisal methods can best be 
demonstrated in the light of the eight ‘mythological’ risk classes discussed in Section 
3.1.3:
FIGURE 13: PRECAUTIONARY RISK REGULATION
Source: Ortwin Renn, Marion Dreyer, Andreas Klinke, Christine Losert, Andrew Stirling, Patrick van 
Zwanenberg, Ulrich Müller-Herold, Marco Morosini, and Elizabeth Fisher, The Application o f the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Union, EU-Project ‘Regulatory Strategies and Research Needs 
to Compose and Specify a European Policy on the Application o f the Precautionary Principle’ 
(PRECAUPRI) (Stuttgart: Institut fur Technikfolgenabschätzung, 2002), p. 7.
• Preventive measures would be applied outright if a serious threat is found to 
definitely exist.
• Standard risk assessment methods would be used for risks that are neither large 
in scale, nor ambiguous or uncertain.
• Risks in the Cyclops and Damocles classes, which are known with a relatively 
high certainty of assessment, require an extended risk assessment process with 
additional scientific input and expert discourse.
• Pythia and Pandora risks, characterized by low certainties of assessment, require 
an appraisal on the basis of the precautionary principle.
61 See also Ortwin Renn, White Paper on Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach (Geneva: 
International Risk Governance Council, 2006).
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• In order to treat Cassandra and Medusa risks, characterized by long delay effects
and a high potential for social mobilization, respectively, discursive processes
9 6?aimed at raising public awareness are most appropriate.
4.1.4 Risk Treatment
Any measure that is purposefully taken before a risk materializes and that raises the
acceptability of the residual risk constitutes risk treatment. Since risk is usually
conceptualised in terms of likelihood and consequences, risk treatment activities are 
also often separated into those that reduce the probability of the risk, or its
consequences. But depending on the dimensions that were decisive for a risk’s 
evaluation as requiring attention, risk treatment can also, for example, reduce the risk 
through compensatory measures, if an uneven exposure of certain individuals made the 
risk unacceptably high (and the damage is compensatable). If a risk is characterized by 
a particularly low certainty of assessment, research alone, which leads to the
improvement of the model on which risk is assessed, can change the priority accorded 
to the risk. The exact content and combination of risk treatment strategies are thus 
specific to the context of each situation. The model that has been used to assess the risk 
in the first place can usually be used to assess the effect of the risk treatment program, 
as the resulting residual risk must again be evaluated together with the costs that the 
program incurs.
While this process is often straightforward for standard risk assessment processes, 
uncertainty usually prevents a similar method if action is taken on the basis of the 
precautionary principle. In practice, the principle therefore involves the making of 
assumptions to form a range of credible scenarios, which can then be analysed with 
standard risk assessment procedures.264 If it is being applied due to a lack of scientific 
information regarding the underlying cause-effect relationships, for example since the 
potential risk arises out of a complex system, it will usually not be possible to design 
measures to reduce the (unknown) consequences and likelihood of the risk. In these 
situations, indirect precautionary measures can be applied. These are commonly used in 
the form of safety design principles in engineering, such as functional diversity and 
redundancy of important systems, decoupling and separation of sub-units, modularity,
262 Ortwin Renn, Marion Dreyer, Andreas Klinke, Chistine Losert, Andrew Stirling, Patrick van 
Zwanenberg, Ulrich Müller-Herold, Marco Morosini, and Elizabeth Fisher, The Application o f the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Union, EU-Project ‘Regulatory Strategies and Research Needs 
to Compose and Specify a European Policy on the Application o f the Precautionary Principle’ 
(PRECAUPRI) (Stuttgart: Institut fur Technikfolgenabschätzung, 2002), pp.8-9. See also Klinke, 
Andreas, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Andrew Stirling and Patrick Van Zwangenberg, ‘Precautionary 
Risk Regulation in European Governance,’ Journal o f Risk Research, vol. 9, no. 4 (June 2006), pp. 373- 
392; Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, ‘Precautionary principle and discursive strategies: classifying and 
managing risks,’ Journal o f Risk Research, vol. 4, no. 2 (2001), pp. 159-173; Andreas Klinke and Ortwin 
Renn, ‘Promotheus Unbound: Challenges of Risk Evaluation, Risk Classification, and Risk 
Management,’ Working Paper, no. 153 (Stuttgart: Akademie fur Technikfolgenabschätzung, 1999). A 
short summary o f this paper is available in Ortwin Renn and Andreas Klinke, ‘Systemic risks: a new 
challenge for risk management,’ European Molecular Biology Organization Reports, vol. 5, special issue 
(2004), pp. 41-46.
263 Risk treatment thus includes the preparation of consequence management and damage control 
activities that can be undertaken as damage occurs.
264 Inter-Departmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, The Precautionary Principle: Policy and 
Application, pp. 9-10, 16-17.
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and elasticity and resilience to external disturbances. They can be distinguished into 
agent-, reagent-, and dynamic strategies:
• Agent management strategies include exclusion (the abstention from activities 
that could cause a risk), deflection (directing the effect and influence of the 
agent system away from the reagent), and containment (preventing effects from 
leaving the agent system). In general, agent management is thus characterized 
by attention being paid to reducing the sources of a risk.
• Reagent management strategies are exposure reduction (Avoiding the effects 
and influences of the agent by moving the reagent, or protecting the reagent 
from them), desensitation (Making the reagent system modular to prevent 
domino effects, or making it more elastic by promoting autonomous avoidance 
and self-healing), and substitution of the reagent system in order to compensate 
for a failure (This can be achieved through redundancy, i.e. the multiple 
availability of reagent systems, the diversity of reagent systems to reduce the 
impact of type-specific vulnerabilities, or compensation if reagent systems can 
be replaced). In general, reagent management is thus characterized by attention 
being paid to protecting the vulnerability threatened by a risk.
• Dynamic strategies combine agent management, reagent management and 
research: Adaptation is based on the step-wise introduction of the changes to the 
agent system, in par with the implementation of agent and reagent management 
strategies. Iteration combines agent and reagent management and research to 
reduce the scientific uncertainty by analysing and observing small, gradual 
changes to the overall system. Finally, fuzzy control aims at stabilizing the 
overall system by observing a few critical parameters and using agent and 
reagent management flexibly and with a high frequency. In general, dynamic 
strategies are thus characterized by the generation of general or specific 
knowledge.
• In contrast, direct risk treatment as discussed above entails using known cause- 
effect relationships between the agent and reagent systems to undertake targeted 
steps that directly influence the likelihood or consequences associated with the 
risk.
Finally, choosing a way of treating a risk is necessary, but not sufficient for risk 
reduction, if it has to be implemented in an institutional context. The risk treatment 
options need to include plans that detail not only the proposed actions, but also resource 
demands, responsibilities, timelines, performance measures and reporting and 
monitoring requirements. Especially if the monitoring phase of the risk management 
process is open-ended, it is important to collect, evaluate and disseminate lessons 
learned throughout the process. If the certainty of assessment of the risk (or of the 
effect of the risk treatment itself) is low, monitoring and review of the risk treatment 
have to be geared less to the mere control of performance parameters than to the 
production of new knowledge about the risk and its treatment. A regular review of the
263 Council o f Standards Australia and Council o f Standards New Zealand, Risk Management, pp. 286- 
292.
266 Ibid., pp. 21-23.
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risk treatment decision or even the use of a constant, cyclical risk management 
framework should therefore be considered as part of any risk treatment plan.
4.2 Defence Planning as a Risk Management Process
This section is pivotal in the sense that it draws on the concepts of risk and risk 
management developed so far, and lays the foundations for the definition of four ideal 
defence planning concepts in the following chapter. It will first discuss defence 
planning as codification of political guidance and show how the concept of certainty of 
assessment can be applied in that context. Then, it develops a framework of defence 
planning as risk management that includes three basic steps: The assessment and
evaluation of a risk pattern, the definition of requirements to treat that pattern, and the 
development of a force structure to meet these requirements.
4.2.1 Codification and Strategic Guidance
Defence planning in practice is done differently in every country, and the processes are 
usually undergoing constant change. More often than not they are highly obscure, 
heavily influenced by idiosyncrasies and traditions, and distorted by particular interests 
of military services, civilian bureaucracies and politicians who try to channel defence 
dollars into their local constituencies. Numerous committees, civilian and military 
officials are involved, who produce an even greater number of regular documents. To 
confuse the observer even more, the titles of these documents usually consist of 
seemingly random combinations of a very limited number of adjectives (‘National,’ 
‘Joint' or ‘Strategic’) and nouns (‘Strategy,’ Requirements,’ ‘Capability’, 
‘Contingency,’ ‘Guidance,’ and ‘Planning’ or ‘Plan’). But since the basis for decisions 
and the relationships between these documents are often different in reality from those 
on paper, this is not the place to discuss any existing defence planning system. 
Instead, some general remarks about the task and its relationship with strategy will be 
made.
Section 3.3.1 described how strategic risks are created by the combination of vulnerable 
political goals and threats from enemies in the international system. The definition of 
national goals that might be considered under threat, of priorities between strategic 
risks, and judgments about the use of limited resources for the defence or other tasks, 
are inherently subjective and political. The pattern of strategic risk that is to be treated 
by the defence effort is thus the first part of what might best be called political 
guidance.
The task and raison d’etre of military forces is to treat these politically defined strategic 
risks through strategic effect in peacetime, usually conceptualised as deterrence and 
dissuasion, as well as in war. If a country carries strategic weight, it will seek to 
directly influence the enemy. If it does not, it will seek strategic effect through support 
to its allies. Either way, the system of cause-effect relationships that transforms its
267 For a good and concise discussion of these issues in the US context o f the mid-1990s, see Douglas C. 
Lovelace and Thomas-Durrell Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing 
Nexus (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995).
268 Richard L. Kugler, ‘Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept,’ Strategic Forum, no. 196 (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 2002); Jonathan Hagood, ‘Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic 
Concept of Dissuasion and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,’ Comparative Strategy, vol. 24, no. 2 (April-June 
2005), pp. 173-184.
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effort into strategic effect is that of the strategic pyramid. These relationships are easier 
to identify ex-post than to predict ex-ante, but they must nevertheless be predicted to 
outline at least the very general outline of a theory of victory. This theory is usually 
quite rudimentary at its inception and limited to only the highest stages of the strategic 
pyramid, but it needs to explain in principle how activities by the defence organization 
can reduce current and future strategic risk. The development of this theory of victory 
amounts to strategy formation and is a process that relies on synthesis, experience, and 
creativity, and the scope for prescriptive theory and analytical approaches here is thus 
very limited. While defence planners can assist in their role as strategic analysts by 
drawing up supporting analysis and studies, these will be largely ad-hoc and not 
conducted within a formal framework. The theory of victory is the second part of 
political guidance.
In Australia, a public version of political guidance is summarized in the Defence and 
Foreign Policy White Papers, in the United States in the National Security Strategy and 
regular defence reviews. Political guidance gives purpose and direction to the defence 
effort, and explains in broad terms what it is trying to achieve (a priority order of 
strategic risks) and how it should go about doing so (a theory of victory). The shape of 
subsequent and more detailed decisions should thus logically flow from the political 
guidance, which implies that a top-down development of defence planning is the most
269consistent framework for the task.
Risk priorities and the theory of victory in the political guidance should, for example, 
ultimately drive the development of operational concepts. These
provide, in an operational sense, the specific military capabilities that will, in concert 
with other capabilities, allow us to implement the strategies set forth in the [guidance]
... These concepts of operations must ... describe the framework, ... the systems, 
equipment, and tactics that are required to provide the capability being sought.270
Operational concepts thus have five main functions: To guide planning and action in 
warfare; to provide a foundation for training; to be the conceptual basis of the 
organization of the armed forces; to influence the development of weapons systems; and 
to be used in broader political debates about security policy. They should address 
military tasks that can be derived from the political guidance, and their implementation 
can direct many other detailed decisions on procurement, training, doctrine and 
operational plans. In practice, however, the impetus to develop a new operational 
concept often comes from ‘below’, from a specific service, which then develops 
doctrine and new equipment based on the platforms specific to its environment. In 
order to compare these solutions to concepts based on platforms of other services or to
269 For a discussion of other methods, see Henry C. Barlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, ‘The 
Art of Strategy and Force Planning.’ in Strategy and Force Planning, ed. The Strategy and Force 
Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, pp. 18-33.
270 Glenn A. Kent, ‘Concepts o f Operations: A More Coherent Framework for Defense Planning,’ Rand 
Note N-2026-AF (Sandta Monica: RAND, 1983), p. 5. See also Glenn A. Kent, A Framework for 
Defense Planning (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989).
271 Philip J. Romero, A New Approach for the Design and Evaluation o f Land Defense Concepts (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1991), pp. 8-9.
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joint concepts, top-down decisionmaking, consistent with political guidance, is
'll'?essential.
Doctrine, defined as “[fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives,” is part of operational 
concepts but can also be drafted with only implicit reference to (existing) equipment.274 
It, too requires a significant degree of top-down guidance as
a bottom-up approach to the development of joint doctrine can result in nothing more 
than an imperfect synthesis o f the disparate doctrinal bents o f the services. A top-down 
approach, on the other hand, would set forth requisite unifying concepts at the outset.275
FIGURE 14: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
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Political guidance alone is too broad to directly derive more detailed decisions about 
doctrine, technology, force structure, and other issues relating to the lower ends of the 
strategic pyramid. Decisions in these areas will always be taken, since it is the job of 
defence bureaucracies to spend Research and Development (R&D) and procurement 
budgets, of military forces to train, and of operational commanders to plan for all kinds
272 John Birkler, C. Richard Neu, and Glenn Kent, Gaining New Military Capability: An Experiment in 
Concept Development (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), pp. 3-21.
273 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department o f Defense Dictionary o f Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, amended through 31 August 2005), p. 168.
274 The term doctrine is thus used in a more restricted sense than that of Posen, whose definition 
encompasses operational concepts as well as the theory o f victory as far as it relates directly to the 
employment of military force. See Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
275 Douglas C. Lovelace and Thomas-Durrell Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean 
Insights (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), p. 10.
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of eventualities. There is, however, a need for a comprehensive and coherent plan that 
ensures that these detailed decisions do not conflict with each other, and that they 
contribute coherently to the execution of the theory of victory. As discussed in Section 
2.1.2, in machine organizations like defence organizations such a plan must be produced 
through the formalized, analytical activity of planning or strategic programming—a 
fundamentally different process from the development of a theory of victory, although
9 7 Aboth steps are often not conceptually distinguished.
In order to execute the political guidance, it first needs to be transformed into a form 
that can be used to control the behemoth that a modem defence bureaucracy is. 
Strategic programming requires detailed methodologies, defined analytical categories, 
procedures and decision criteria, which are not directly part of political guidance as 
defined above. The transformation of political guidance into what might best be called 
strategic guidance is the codification mentioned in Figure 1 (See Figure 14). Strategic 
guidance must provide the conceptual nexus of operational concepts, procurement and
977contingency planning, and include a definite statement of strategic priorities. 
Successful codification is critical for the overall implementation of strategic guidance, 
but it is far from easy. Mintzberg warns that
Obviously this is not mechanical task, but one that can require a good deal of 
interpretation. The codification of strategy can cause all kinds of problems if done 
poorly or inappropriately—or prematurely. Perhaps the greatest danger, besides 
premature closure, is what can be lost in articulation—nuance, subtlety, qualification. 
Converting from general thoughts to specific directives is much like going from broad 
goals to precise objectives, or from soft data to hard: something is inevitably lost in the 
translation.278
Nevertheless, codification is essential as strategic guidance is the means to control the 
decisions coming out of strategic programming, which would otherwise be taken 
without a coherent and consistent consideration of the national objectives. Codification 
is thus pivotal to ensure the success of the overall effort, which would otherwise be tom 
apart between ineffectual political guidance at the top and a disoriented bureaucracy at 
the bottom. It is this level of codification that the discussion of defence planning in this 
thesis will focus on. The remaining part of this and the following chapter will 
demonstrate that a view of defence planning as a risk management process is well suited 
to that task.
4.2.2 Information and Uncertainty in Defence Planning
Defence planning inevitably involves making detailed decisions (on the lower level of 
Figure 14), such as on the number and specifications of new platforms and weapons 
systems that are to be acquired, on states of readiness or peacetime stocks of spares and 
consumables, and the content of training manuals and doctrine. These decisions should 
be derived from political guidance in its codified form, strategic guidance, which forms
276 See, for example, Liotta and Lloyd, ‘From Here to There.’ However, they mention both ‘strategists’ 
and ‘force planners’.
277 Lovelace and Young call refer to strategic guidance as ‘strategic plans’. Lovelace and Young, U.S. 
Department o f Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, esp. pp. 5, 9, 19-20.
278 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall o f Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, 
Planners, p. 338.
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a unified conceptual basis for the development of capability, concepts and operational 
plans. However, both parts of political guidance—the pattern of strategic risk, and the 
theory of victory—are affected by all the uncertainties that affect strategy at large, and 
future requirements are therefore, at least in principle, of a stochastic nature. But 
since it is impossible to buy a stochastic number of tanks, defence planning is always a 
risk management problem, and the strategic effectiveness of any defence planning 
process is inevitably subject to incertitude.
The dimensions of a threat to national security by state or non-state actors are those of 
strategy. The more is known about these dimensions, both regarding the enemy and 
one’s own nation, the better it is possible to assess the threat, and the lower will be the 
epistemic uncertainty affecting the certainty of assessment of the risk that is associated 
with it. Unfortunately, the information that is available on the identity of future 
enemies, i.e. the volatility of the international system, and the information that is 
available on enemies themselves can in principle vary from near-certainty and intimate 
familiarity to near -ignorance (Figure 15).
FIGURE 15: AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND RISK REDUCTION
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At one extreme, the identity of enemies is well known and the threat is well understood 
in terms of all those dimensions of strategy that can be known in advance—such as 
society, culture, politics, ethics, economics and logistics, organization, military 
administration, the quality of intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology, and 
geography. Based on the information regarding capabilities, terrain, doctrine and extent 
of available intelligence, it is possible to define possibilities or outcomes with a 
relatively high certainty of assessment, as far as operational art allows. Based on the 
information regarding leadership intentions, cultures, society and one’s own capabilities
279 Kugler highlights that requirements are always and inevitably a case o f judging risks, not of applying 
simple formulas. Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era, p.
228.
280 See Section 2.1.3.
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(which the enemy has to take into account), it is also possible to define respective 
probabilities with a relatively high certainty of assessment. Each side’s leadership 
motivations and value structures, and the expected battle outcomes for various 
scenarios, are thus reasonably well known and form cause-effect relationships in the 
strategic pyramid that can be used to identify specific risks and to develop specific 
countermeasures. In the extreme, the uncertainties involved are reduced to those 
relating to aleatory processes and human free will, i.e. genuine mysteries and not secrets 
in the intelligence jargon.“ Since risks are well defined in this situation and the cause- 
effect relationships that are necessary to form a theory of victory known, as far as that is 
possible ex-ante, defence planning and strategy can take the form of proper risk 
treatment. Deterrence threats, for example, take advantage of the known leadership 
motivations to reduce the probability of specific risks. Decisions on force structure, 
doctrine, force dislocation and battlefield terrain preparation can reduce the 
consequences of risks by making the outcome of a specific operation more favourable, 
or reduce the likelihood of a specific way of attack by the enemy. NATO’s defence of 
the Central Front is an illustrative example for this situation.
At the other extreme, the information about actual or possible enemies is more or less 
limited to that of the ‘inescapable geography.’ Possibilities are thus very wide, and 
only loosely defined by geography. Probabilities are unknown, since information on the 
enemy’s leadership intentions is not available—for example, since the risk lies years 
ahead in the future. When neither intentions nor capabilities are known, it is not 
possible to predict cause-effect relationships beyond the laws of physics in the context 
of geography (since the enemy has to project kinetic or electromagnetic energy), and the 
basic nature of war as a contest between two wills. It is thus not possible to assess risks 
with any degree of certainty, nor is it possible to form a theory of victory in advance. 
The information that serves as the ‘input’ to the planning process is less than that 
required for the ‘output’ decisions—one might say that in mathematical terms, the 
defence planning problem is highly underdetermined. In this situation, the 
precautionary principle applies also in defence planning and it becomes necessary to 
plan on the basis of illustrative rather than predictive scenarios. Planning over long 
time horizons is an example that lies close to this end of the knowledge spectrum, at 
which the results of defence planning—though not the process itself—necessarily lack 
the rigour that can be applied at the other extreme.
Since information on threats can fall anywhere between near-perfect knowledge and full 
ignorance, it is important for policymakers to be aware of the uncertainty associated 
with a particular risk in order to strike a balance between risk treatment—as far as 
possible—and precaution. A framework of defence planning as a risk management 
process that allows that balance to be struck will be developed in the remaining sections 
of this Chapter. Chapter 5 will then demonstrate the difference between risk treatment 
and precaution in the context of four ideal defence planning concepts.
281 Berkowitz and Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, pp. 85-109.
282 For a good overview on the information required for a credible deterrence strategy, see Payne, The 
Fallacies o f Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction.
283 Colin S. Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, in Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, eds. Colin S. Gray 
and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 161-177.
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4.2.3 The Defence Planning Process as Risk Management
A defence planning process based on risk management must be compatible with the 
bureaucratic environment in which it is to operate. However, this thesis will not 
explicitly assign responsibilities or design specific procedures—they would largely have 
to be specific to each country, given the vastly different national systems. But it will 
consider that the process must involve long time frames to balance risk, yet avoid 
locking decisionmakers into long-range plans that become irrelevant over time. The 
process must be able to provide decisionmakers with a basis for present choices, be 
regularly updated and reiterated, and set the direct framework for balancing 
requirements and resources over time, between missions and services. At the same 
time, the process must result in risk treatment programmes that link operational 
concepts, planning and the development of capabilities with each other, and with 
political guidance.
At this stage, it is now possible to develop a framework of defence planning as risk 
management, as summarized in Figure 16 (which foreshadows several issues that will 
be introduced in detail later). Overall, the process consists of three separate and distinct 
phases: The identification and characterisation of strategic risks, the definition of
requirements to treat these risks, and the development of capability and force structure 
concepts that can fulfil these requirements.
Section 3.3.1 showed that defence planning can be seen as the treatment of strategic 
risk. Defence planning concepts and the forces that are created and maintained in 
accordance with them are logically reactions to risk patterns that confront 
decisionmakers. Differences in actual or proposed defence planning concepts have to 
be seen in conjunction with differences in the risk pattern they are designed to treat. 
Indeed, a main point of contention in strategic discussions is often less the correct 
response to a risk than what the main risk is, even if this point is hidden behind 
contentions around the merits of different strategies or force structures. By separating 
the identification and characterisation of strategic risk from its treatment, the structure 
of the problem thus becomes much clearer. However, both aspects of the problem are 
affected by uncertainties:
On the one hand the policymaker can never be certain which bets to cover with military 
preparation. After all, the future is unknowable. On the other hand, the defense planner 
can never be certain just how much strategic effectiveness his chosen military forces 
can generate in support of policy choices.286
Both the first and the third stage thus involve iterative processes to deal with the 
assessment of uncertainties particular to their respective tasks. They can involve the use 
of distinct methods, such as assumption based planning or simulations and 
experimentation, which will be outlined in the following two sections. Both stages are
284 Perry M. Smith, ‘Long-Range Planning: A National Necessity,’ in Creating Strategic Vision: Long- 
Range Planning for National Security, Perry M. Smith, Jerrold P. Allen, John H. Steward and Douglas 
Whitehouse (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1987), pp. 3-22.
285 This sequence of defining risks, deriving requirements and structuring forces is similar to that in John 
G. McGinn, Gregory F. Treverton, Jeffrey A. Isaacson, David C. Gompert, and M. Elaine Bunn, A 
Framework for Strategy Development (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).
286 Gray, Weapons Don ’t Make War, pp. 71-72.
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linked by the two elements of political guidance: The theory of victory and the
evaluation of strategic risk.
FIGURE 16: DEFENCE PLANNING AS A RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
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A theory of victory is created in a process of strategy formation, for which it is neither 
possible nor helpful to define prescriptive steps. In this framework, it is equivalent to 
the choice of a way to treat strategic risk, as the theory of victory explains how the 
cause-effect relationships of the strategic pyramid will be used to reduce the risk 
pattern. In general, the generation and choice of ways to treat risks is a creative step 
that, like strategy formation and for the same reasons, receives scant attention in the 
literature on civilian risk management processes. Section 2.1.5, however, showed that 
any strategy as a course of action is only partly deliberate, and partly emergent during 
the execution (comprising of codification and implementation). Strategy formation, 
which leads to a theory of victory, and codification of political guidance are thus 
distinct, yet inseparable. The purpose of defence planning can be seen as to contribute 
to the execution of the theory of victory under uncertainty, even if the main parameters 
of that theory are laid down in the strategy formation stage.
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FIGURE 17: CODIFICATION AND REQUIREMENTS
Political Guidance
Risk Pattern Theory of Victory
Intelligence Assessments
Dimensions of Strategy
Methods of Inference
Strategic Guidance
Requirements
The codification of political into strategic guidance thus transforms a general theory of 
victory and risk pattern into a detailed risk treatment plan or programme. Strategic 
guidance defines the requirements that capability concepts and force structures need to 
fulfil if they are to treat the strategic risk pattern as desired by the decisionmakers. 
Figure 17 gives a summary of four main factors that influence this process of 
codification, and which relate to the enemy, one’s own forces, time, and logical 
inference, respectively. Since these either already have been discussed in detail above, 
or will be below, they are only briefly mentioned here:
• Intelligence Assessments of the risks along all relevant dimensions, which 
information can sometimes be very specific and reliable, sometimes vague and 
uncertain, but always relates to the possible challenges that defence planning 
needs to prepare for.
• Dimensions o f Strategy as they relate to one’s own side, including force 
structure and capabilities, society, ethics and legal restrictions, and, most 
importantly, geography, which influence and restrict the way in which these 
challenges could be met.
Judgments regarding the length of, and confidence placed in, available Warning 
Time (from hours in some cases to decades in others), which can serve to 
‘discount’ future requirements.
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• Inferential Methods such as deduction,* induction* or abduction*, which allow 
drawing conclusions of different nature and reliability.
The evaluation of strategic risk provides a second linkage between the first and third 
stages of the process. A reduction of all relevant dimensions of different risks into one 
comparable metric is only possible by using (political) judgment about the importance 
of goals under threat, the tolerance for risk, and the acceptability of costs. It must also 
take into account the confidence that can be placed into warning, and be based on an 
assessment of what might be unknown as much as on what is known, in order to deal 
with the possibility of strategic surprise. All of this applies to the evaluation of strategic 
risks on their own, as well as their evaluation in conjunction with the cost of the risk 
treatment.
The defence planning process must thus be able to deal with and make judgments on 
risks of vastly different qualities. The previous section showed that while some risks 
might at the limit be described in terms of a statistical uncertainty, in other situations the 
certainty of assessment of the likelihood or even the consequences can be close to 
negligible. Section 4.1.3 discussed how risks of such different qualities can call for risk 
management processes of different natures, complex risks requiring extended 
assessments, for example, and uncertain risks demanding precautionary appraisals. Yet 
while processes can to some degree be tailored to specific problems in the very 
structured and focused civilian areas of the protection of consumers or the environment, 
defence planning has to constantly deal with a range of considerably different risks at 
the same time.
If risks are sufficiently specific, the theory of victory can be fully developed in advance, 
treat each risk directly, and codification should be relatively straightforward. If 
certainties of assessment are low, the theory of victory can only aim at providing the 
forces and capabilities that are deemed sufficient or most appropriate to support a more 
detailed, specific theory that would be developed once risks become clearer, or a 
particular risk materializes. Codification of the general idea that the theory of victory is 
at that stage is thus more difficult. In either case, defence planning as risk management 
deals with the testing of assumed future cause-effect relationships. Risk treatment 
programmes in the form of capability and force structure concepts are by nature 
hypothesis derived from these. Any risk treatment or defence planning programme thus 
needs to be reviewed in the light of new evidence. But, again, there is also a need to 
specifically assess the confidence that decisionmakers have in their ability to treat a 
given risk, independent of the nature and quality of that risk itself. In order to do so, the 
process has to highlight the different qualities of risks under consideration, and at the 
same time allow for considerable judgment and discretion on the part of decisionmakers 
in terms of the design of the risk management process and programme.
This section has addressed the framework of Figure 16 in terms of what tasks are 
required to treat strategic risk. The following chapter will outline several ideal methods 
of implementing the framework, all of which show configurational fit between the risk 
pattern, the methods used to define requirements, and the treatment of strategic risk.
287 Paul K. Davis and Zalmay M. Khalilzad, A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1996) takes a similar approach, but in the specific context of the lead-up to the 1997 
QDR. Therefore, they do not identify the extent of uncertainty facing the decisionmaker as a central 
element in the choice o f methods (see p. 39).
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These ideal methods thus address the question of how said tasks are to be achieved, in 
the context of different risk patterns facing the decisionmaker. Before moving on, 
however, it is helpful to discuss the relationship of a number of popular analytical 
methods to the framework outlined above.
4.2.4 Assessing and Evaluating Risk Patterns
This section will thus discuss analytical methods suitable for use in the top third of the 
framework of Figure 16. Strategic risks are identified and characterized in a process of 
intertwined assessment and evaluation. Intelligence collection agencies, analysts and 
political decisionmakers are the main participants in this stage, which results in a risk 
pattern that is part of political guidance and the basis for subsequent steps. As the 
definition of this risk pattern is a process that does not directly relate to the planning of 
military capability, pertinent issues will be highlighted in this section but subsequent 
chapters will regard risk patterns as given, and not consider the exact process of how 
they are developed.
The process begins with an assessment of the available intelligence information (or 
‘known knowns’) regarding threats to national political goals. The extent to which such 
information is available will lie somewhere in the spectrum discussed in Figure 15. It 
can be assessed either directly, or in the form of analysis based on it, such as typing of
l O O
states and situations, alternative futures or trend analysis. The aim of the analysis is 
to identify future cause-effect relationships, based on intentions, capabilities and the 
dimensions of strategy, that permit an assessment of the consequences and likelihood of 
the associated risks. Since all relevant information is never available, this step will be 
associated with (sometimes considerable) uncertainty that can relate to the absence of 
data, as well as to the way in which it should be interpreted. If it is possible to identify 
at least some ‘known unknown’ pieces of information that, if they could be obtained, 
might make it possible to assess risks with a higher certainty of assessment, intelligence 
tasking orders can be adjusted to provide new information. On the basis of ‘known 
knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’, it is then possible to describe strategic risks along 
various dimensions, such as their likelihood, consequences, certainty of assessments, 
and geographical distribution. However, any uncertainty affecting the information 
about risks needs to be conveyed to the political decisionmakers, who have to be able to 
take it into account when making decisions regarding priorities based on their risk
289preference and, if appropriate, on the basis of the precautionary principle.
288 Knorr and Morgenstern, ‘Political Conjecture in Military Planning,’ pp. 22-35.
289 US NIEs on the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s were plagued by insufficient attention to this 
point, for example. Behind the estimated ranges for the predicted numbers of bombers, missiles and other 
Soviet equipment given in the NIEs stood several predictions, usually also in the form of ranges, that 
were made by individual intelligence agencies. In both periods, some agencies (especially the Army and 
Navy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Air Force during the late 1960s and early 1970s) correctly 
predicted the Soviet deployment, but these estimates were filtered out in the course o f the drafting of the 
NIEs. The ranges in the final documents tended to reflect median positions, and often lay between the 
highest point of the lowest range and the lowest point o f the highest range (Berkowitz and Goodman, 
Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, esp. pp. 125-131.). NIEs o f this period thus did 
include epistemic uncertainty in the form of a range prediction, but did not inform the policymakers o f the 
disagreement between the agencies regarding the correct model for prediction. The CIA’s assessment 
thus failed the principal rule of dealing with uncertainty: “[N]o matter what tool or set o f assumptions an 
analyst chooses [in dealing with uncertainty] to build solid judgments, it must be transparent to the policy 
consumer. If it is not, a decision leading to disastrous consequences or enormous waste may be taken
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Since they are derived from purposefully collected intelligence information, risks 
considered at this stage will usually concern ‘known enemies’ in the strategic risk cube 
in Figure 9.290 In a second step, this list then has to be complemented and refined to 
take account of the confidence that is placed in the comprehensiveness of the list 
assembled in the first step. First, since political goals represent the vulnerability that 
makes threats relevant, possible changes to these goals must have an influence on the 
relevance of strategic risks for the decisionmakers. The national interests of most 
countries, especially those for which they are willing to fight, are generally quite 
enduring. Nevertheless, they are subject to change and have to be operationalised 
through foreign policies over which there is often much less agreement than over the 
overall interest itself (see Section 3.3.1). Governments may of course be reluctant to 
take steps that facilitate actions that they themselves oppose or deem unnecessary, but 
this does not invalidate the reasoning behind this argument from a defence planner’s 
point of view.
Second, the overall confidence in the risk assessments based on intelligence information 
needs to be evaluated. ‘Known knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’ are logically 
complemented by ‘unknown unknowns’, the equivalent of situations of ignorance. 
While the analysis of intelligence information might provide a coherent picture of 
future risks, it does not logically follow from this that the picture needs to be 
comprehensive at the same time. In order to arrive at a full evaluation of future risks, a 
judgment has to be made as to the importance of prevailing ignorance, the importance 
of risks from unknown or unexpected enemies, or unknown or unexpected theories of 
victory. Such an inquiry is qualitatively different from the analysis of intelligence 
information itself, since the object of analysis is one’s own conception of the future,
291rather than any specific other country or organization.
There are several analytical techniques that can be used to assist in this step. The best 
known of these is probably ‘Assumption-Based Planning’ (ABP), which was developed 
by RAND after the end of the Cold War, in order to deal with a situation in which only 
low confidence could be placed in the extrapolation of existing trends. Its creator
because the consumer misunderstood or misinterpreted what was produced.” (Stephane Lefebvre, ‘A 
Look at Intelligence Analysis,’ International Journal o f Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 17, no. 
2 (Summer 2004), p. 248.) The NIE on Soviet objectives in 1977 therefore included two lines of  
argument, and was “intended to help the reader understand the argument, rather than to resolve it.” 
(George Bush, Memorandum for Recipients o f NIE 11-4-77, “Soviet Strategic Objectives”, 18 January 
1977, reproduced in Steury, ed., Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950- 
1983, p. 391.)
290 As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the limitation to three risk dimensions (Time, Strategic Pyramid and 
Enemies) of two categories each (Present and Future and Known or Expected and Unknown or 
Unexpected) is sufficient as an example and for the discussion the next chapter. For any application in 
real life, it would have to be extended to include other dimensions— such as the nature of the enemy’s 
strategy (maritime vs. continental, conventional vs. irregular) and geographic location— and more 
categories within each dimension.
291 For a criticism of this point on ideological as much as practical grounds, see Maria Ryan, ‘Filling in 
the ‘Unknowns’: Hypothesis-Based Intelligence and the Rumsfeld Commission,’ Intelligence and 
National Security, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2006), pp. 286-315.
292 This summary draws on James A. Dewar, Carl H. Builder, William M. Hix, and Morlie H. Levin, 
Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993).
92
Defence Planning as Risk Management
describes it as a ‘post-planning tool' to evaluate existing plans, but it can be applied to 
test the reliability and comprehensiveness of any prediction. The basic idea of ABP is 
to first identify assumptions that have been made in drawing up the system of future 
cause-effect relationships on which the prediction is based, especially those assumptions 
that are critical for the outcome and vulnerable to violation at the same time. In a 
second step, the certitude with which these assessments can be made is then assessed, 
and signpost events whose occurrence would signal a danger of assumptions breaking 
down are defined. Signposts are thus used to transform a situation of ignorance 
about a future development into one of indeterminacy or even risk, by providing 
strategic warning about a change in the risk pattern itself.294 Linking assumption 
failures with signpost events is very similar to the use of classic intelligence indicators 
and the concept of warning-reaction times. However, there is an important difference 
since indicators and warning-times are interpreted within, and compatible with, an 
existing cause-effect system. They serve to monitor risks and to provide tactical 
warning to predict harmful events.
In order to increase the rigor and transparency of its products, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) introduced a similar methodology under the term ‘linchpin analysis’ in 
the 1990s. Assessments were to be constructed along a number of steps that should 
convey assumptions and uncertainties to the intelligence user: First, the main uncertain 
factors or key variables (drivers) that will determine an outcome have to be identified. 
Second, working assumptions (or linchpin premises) about these key drivers are made. 
Third, evidence to support these assumptions is presented. Fourth, indicators or 
signposts that would render the linchpin premises unreliable are defined. Fifth, possible 
triggers that could lead to a violation of the premises are addressed.296
In a third method called ‘Uncertainty-Sensitive Planning’, Paul K. Davis proposes to 
first develop a ‘core’ environment without surprises. Second, uncertainties are 
identified that are associated with ‘branches’, which lead to different paths whose 
possible outcomes are, however, known in advance. Third, ‘shocks’—events whose 
realization would come fully unexpected, even if they were known to be theoretical 
possibilities in advance—are enumerated. These three categories correspond to the 
distinction between risks (in the core environment), indeterminacy (of branches) and
See also James A. Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
293 The internal stability of the regime of the Shah was, for example, an assumption that was central to the 
US threat perception in the Persian Gulf, and should have been monitored in order to reduce the highly 
consequential surprise that occurred in 1978. Daugherty, ‘Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran.’
294 There is also a superficial similarity between the identification o f vulnerable assumptions and the 
definition of signposts in Assumption-based Planning (ABP) on the one hand, and the ‘Analysis of 
Competing Hypothesis’ in the area of intelligence analysis methodologies. However, while both are used 
to identify and assess implicit assumptions, the former does so with regard to future events that have not 
happened yet, while the latter deals with the interpretation of available information about the past. See 
Heuer, The Psychology o f Intelligence Analysis.
295 See Diane M. Ramsey and Mark S. Boemer, ‘A Study in Indications Methodology,’ Studies in 
Intelligence, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 75-94.
296 Jack Davis, Changes in Analytic Tradecraft in CIA ’s Directorate o f Intelligence (Langley: Product 
Evaluation Staff Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, April 1995), p.8 .Quoted in 
George, ‘Fixing the Problem o f Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis,’ p. 391.)
93
Managing Strategic Risk
ignorance (of shocks) in Figure 5, but Davis admits that this methodology tends to lead
9Q7to lists that are “neither logically ‘tight’ nor comprehensive.”
All of these methodologies depend on the user’s ability to identify important implicit 
assumptions and, in the case of ABP and linchpin analysis, on the availability of 
observable and unequivocal signposts. They are therefore clearly not a panacea for the 
problem of surprise. Nevertheless, the basic idea—what James A. Dewar calls 
‘Assumption-based Thinking’299—that stands behind ABP and linchpin analysis can 
provide a coherent way of complementing an assessment of known risks, derived from 
intelligence information, with a list of risks defined on the basis of ‘known unknown’ 
pieces of information.300 It will, of course, not be possible to assess these risks in the 
categories of unknown or unexpected enemies and theories of victory in the strategic 
risk cube in the same detail as it is possible to assess intelligence information itself. But 
it is nevertheless necessary to evaluate their importance on the basis of available 
information, in order to make an informed judgment about the comprehensiveness of 
the risk perception on which the treatment of strategic risk will be based.
Risks that have been identified on the basis of intelligence information, and those 
derived from an analysis of the comprehensiveness and confidence in that information, 
then have to be combined into a comprehensive and coherent risk pattern that can be the 
basis for the development of defence planning concepts and capabilities to treat strategic 
risk. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, this step has to be based on an evaluation of 
strategic risks since they ultimately threaten political objectives, and the reduction of the 
various dimensions of risk into one order of overall importance requires political 
judgment. It is possible and necessary in this evaluation process to take account of 
different dimensions and qualities of risks, and to iterate the process for complex risks 
by, for example, adjusting intelligence tasking orders to gain more information. 
Potentially grave risks that are only known with a very low certainty of assessment can 
be regarded as important if the decisionmakers decide to act on the basis of the 
precautionary principle. Risk-averse decisionmakers will often accord a relatively high 
priority to risks that are very unlikely but have grave consequences. It is crucial to 
distinguish this third step of evaluation from the preceding steps of assessing 
intelligence information, and assessing the comprehensiveness of that information. 
Although the characteristics of strategic risks are important for the way in which they 
can be treated, the decision of whether they should be treated cannot be derived from an 
analysis of the data alone.
297 Paul K. Davis, ‘Protecting the Great Transition,’ in New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking 
How Much Is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis, p. 137.
298 Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘Tomorrow’s Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change,’ Parameters, vol. 28, 
no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 85-98 discusses the limitations of ABP.
299 Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises, pp. 178-183.
300 There are at least two additional methods, Alternative Futures and Gaming (see Davis and Khalilzad, A 
Composite Approach to Air Force Planning, pp. 19-23), that are not directly based on intelligence 
information at large but leave participating planners more scope for imagination. They can thus also be 
used to define risks that are abductively, not deductively defined (a distinction discussed in detail in 
Section 5.2.2 below).
94
Defence Planning as Risk Management
4.2.5 Assessing and Evaluating Capability Concepts
As mentioned above, codification of political into strategic guidance is central to the 
argument herein and discussed in the following chapter. But once requirements for the 
risk treatment are defined, they have to be met in the bottom part the framework 
summarized in Figure 16 by capability and force structure concepts, which need to be 
regularly reviewed as to their fit with the evolving risk pattern. Again, a number of 
established applied methods are relevant to these processes. Their relationship with the 
framework will be discussed in this section, but which the following chapters will 
assume to the reader to be familiar with them.
Evaluating force structure concepts entails uncertainties of two different kinds: First, 
uncertainties regarding the risks to be treated, which range from unknown details such 
as technical parameters of enemy weapon systems, to incertitude at the level of the 
international system. These uncertainties enter the process through the way that 
requirements are defined, and the following chapter will develop an appropriate 
methodology through the use of a combination of hedges , options , portfolios and 
flexibility*.
Second, the expected outcome of any military operation and of the direct or indirect 
strategic effect of military force is uncertain and should, therefore, best be described as 
a risk as well—there is always a risk of failure or high casualties.301 The expected result 
of combat is a prediction that is based on assumptions regarding the cause-effect 
relationships of the strategic pyramid, assumptions that may or may not be valid. In an 
analysis of the uncertainty regarding the possible outcomes of conflict situations, it is 
therefore not only necessary to consider uncertainty within the model used to predict the 
result—such as through sensitivity analysis or parametric analysis—but also to question 
the underlying assumptions about the overall structure and applicability of the reasoning 
that supports it. Again, the information that is available to assess capabilities may be 
consistent but does not need to be comprehensive, especially once higher steps of the 
strategic pyramid, i.e. the influence of tactical or operational success on strategic 
effectiveness, are considered. This step is parallel to the assessment of the overall 
confidence in the threat assessment discussed above, and ABP or similar techniques can 
also be used here to uncover vulnerable and critical assumptions.
301 See also the discussion of existing conceptions of strategic risk in Section 3.2.1 For (applied) 
discussions that go further than most in the consideration of both the need to define a range of scenarios 
and the uncertainty associated with the expected outcome, see Paul K. Davis, ‘Institutionalizing Planning 
for Adaptiveness,’ in New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough, ed. Paul 
K. Davis, pp. 73-100; Paul K. Davis, ‘Uncertainty-sensitive planning.’
302 It is also worth recalling the complexity o f the cause-effect relationships of the strategic pyramid 
discussed in the treatment of RMAs in Section 2.3.4 and the nature o f strategic surprise as discussed in 
Section 3.3.2. For criticism o f a whole range of assumptions that underlie current Western defence forces 
and defence planning, see for example: Stephen D. Wolthusen, ‘Self-Inflicted Vulnerabilities,’ Naval 
War College Review, vol. LVII, no. 3/4 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 102-113 on the use of commercial 
IT technology in military systems; Michael I. Handel, ‘Numbers Do Count: The Question o f Quality 
versus Quantity,’ in The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security, ed. Huntington, pp. 
193-228 on the use of reduced numbers of platforms of higher individual capability; Donald Chisholm, 
‘The Risk o f Optimism in the Conduct o f War,’ Parameters, vol. XXXIII, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04), pp. 
114-131 and Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen, ‘Chaos versus Predictability,’ Australian Army Journal, 
vol. II, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 87-98 on Effects-based Operations; Harknett and JCISS Study Group, 
‘The Risks o f a Networked Military’ on relying on networked forces; John E. Peters, ‘A Potential
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In this context, it is important to understand the nature of the method that is used to 
assess the uncertainty of this second kind. These methods can include professional 
judgment, possibly through the use of Delphi techniques or similar methods to access
i n i
expert knowledge. They can also include an element of experimentation through 
exercises or games, or red-teaming. 304 Large scale, real-life test-runs of aspects of 
likely contingencies, as they were used by NATO during the Cold War, can both be 
educational for the participants and have a research purpose to discover yet unknown 
shortcomings. Smaller table-top games can be used to research strategic interactions, 305 
while controlled physical experiments have a role in the development of new 
operational or tactical concepts and capabilities, and were used by various countries in 
the inter-war period with particular success.306 Modelling and simulation of combat on
^07computers is another method to assess a large number of scenarios at the same time. 
However, it is important to remember that models can only rearrange and recalculate 
available information, and only in accordance with rules that have been set before by 
the authors of the model (although these rules can, of course, be varied, for example in 
parametric analysis). Models do not generate new data the way that experiments do,
i n o
despite all the artificiality that also affects that latter methodology. Much more than 
(good) experiments, good models are therefore subject to the danger of ‘garbage in­
garbage out’ results, or, as Bracken and Shubik comment on the development of
Vulnerability of Precision-Strike Warfare?, Orbis, vol. 48, no. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 479-487 and Robert 
Mandel, ‘The wartime utility of precision versus brute force in weaponry,’ Armed Forces and Society, 
vol. 30, no. 2 (Winter 2004), pp. 171-201 on the reliance on precision guided munitions; and a whole 
library of literature on asymmetric warfare regarding possible enemy adaptations to Western 
(conventional) military supremacy.
303 For a discussion of strategic judgment in defence decisionmaking, see Duggan, Coup d ’Oeil: Strategic 
Intuition in Army Planning.
304 See, for example, Defense Science Board, The Role and Status o f DoD Red Teaming Activities 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003).
305 For an interesting discussion of the lessons drawn from major historic tabletop exercises, see for 
example Robert H. Grave, ‘Global War Game: Second Series, 1984-1988,’ Newport Paper, no. 20 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004). On the more recent famous ‘Dark Winter’ smallpox game, see 
Donald A. Hendersen, Thomas V. Inglesby, Jr. and Tara O’Toole, ‘Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter’,’ 
Clinical Infectious Diseases, vol.34, no. 1(1 April 2002), pp. 972-983; Peter J. Roman, ‘The Dark Winter 
of Biological Terrorism,’ Orbis, vol. 46, no. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 469-482. See also Thomas C. 
Schelling, ‘The Role of War Games and Exercises,’ in Managing Nuclear Operations, eds. Carter, 
Steinbruner, and Zraket, pp. 426-444; Stuart H. Starr, “‘Good Games’” , Naval War College Review, vol. 
LIV, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 89-97 on NATO’s Code of Best Practice for Wargaming; David 
Mussington, ‘The “Day After” Methodology and National Security Analysis,’ in New Challenges & New 
Tools for Defense Decisionmaking, eds. Johnson, Libicki and Treverton, pp. 323-338 on a table-top 
exercise methodology that emphasizes the identification of lessons learned.
306 See for example Murray and Millet, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period', Arthur J. 
Alexander, The Linkage Between Technology, Doctrine, and Weapons Innovation: Experimentation for 
Use (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981).
307 For good overviews, see Paul K. Davis, ‘Exploratory Analysis and Implications for Modeling,’ in New 
Challenges & New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking, eds. Johnson, Libicki and Treverton, pp. 255-283; 
Paul K. Davis and Robert H. Anderson, Improving the Composability o f Department o f Defense Models 
and Simulations (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).
308 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, pp. 112-113.
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strategic modelling in the last decades: “Modeling has become more complex, but 
thinking has not.” 309
Once a specific force structure has been tested regarding its estimated ability to reduce a 
specific risk pattern, the expected result has to be evaluated in light of the residual 
strategic risk and the cost associated with the risk treatment. Again, the political nature 
of war and the need to weigh political, financial, economic and human costs of various 
outcomes make it necessary to use political judgment. The difference between the 
various methods of assessing force structures discussed above is important here, since 
the confidence that can be placed in the predicted success of a risk treatment will be one 
of the dimensions that have to be considered. Philip Romero writes that
Because we do not know— and cannot know, short o f war (if then)— the “true” value of 
these variables [that will determine success in combat], it is necessary to evaluate 
concepts ... to determine how sensitive their estimated performance is to our 
assumptions. The preferred concepts should be those that are less sensitive and 
therefore more robust.310
At this stage, it is also necessary to take account of uncertainties and characteristics of 
the risk treatment programmes that are related to their sustainability in the domestic 
context: Some programmes will, for example, depend on the availability of financial 
resources in the future that do not seem assured, while others might carry risks since 
they could possibly conflict with political or legal limitations and obligations that have 
been placed upon the defence establishment. Also considered here should be the 
reliance on allied assistance that is assumed in a risk treatment programme. A decision 
about the confidence that can be placed in that assistance actually forthcoming is 
inherently political, since it will depend on the direction of the overall foreign policy of 
the country's leadership, which is a factor that lies outside the scope of defence 
planning itself.
If a strategic risk treatment programme is found to leave significant residual risks, it 
should then be changed and re-assessed again in an iterative process. Since defence 
planning is a continuous process, any programme that is accepted must always be 
continuously rolled over and updated. The notion of a ‘final’ force structure, although 
part of many force structure plans, is therefore only meaningful as a theoretical concept.
In summary, this chapter has discussed that risk management is similar to decision­
making processes, and those oriented towards the generation of new knowledge. The 
management of complex risks can require interwoven analysis and evaluation. Risk 
treatment must take the dimensions of a risk into account, and can be done on the basis 
of the precautionary principle if uncertainty is dominant.
In defence planning, codification of political into strategic guidance is a pivotal step, 
which must accommodate risks whose understanding ranges from near-completeness, to 
near-ignorance. The defence planning process can thus be described as a three-stage 
risk management process: First, complex risks are assessed and evaluated; second, a
309 Paul Bracken and Martin Shubik, ‘War Gaming in the Information Age,’ Naval War College Review, 
vol. LIV, no. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 49. See this article for a critical overview on the modem history of 
wargaming and modeling.
310 Romero, A New Approach for the Design and Evaluation o f Land Defense Concepts, p. viii.
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theory of victory to treat these risks is developed and codified into strategic guidance; 
and, third, force structure concepts to treat the risk pattern determined and evaluated in 
conjunction with the residual risk.
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CHAPTER 5:
FOUR IDEAL DEFENCE PLANNING CONCEPTS
This chapter will discuss in further detail the codification of political into strategic 
guidance within the framework discussed in the previous chapter. Defence planning 
concepts to treat risk patterns consist of methods to determine requirements, as well as 
capability concepts to fulfil them. Basic issues regarding the former are outlined in the 
first part of this chapter, those relating to the latter in the second part. All parts of the 
process must, of course, be coherent with each other—inconsistencies here can be an 
important source of institutional risk. The last part will introduce four ideal defence 
planning concepts that show the required internal configurational fit.
5.1 Codification and Requirements
Once strategic risks have been assessed and evaluated, requirements for a risk treatment 
plan need to be defined. This involves the codification of political guidance into 
strategic guidance, which comprises the methodologies, analytical categories, 
procedures and decision criteria used to guide the defence bureaucracy (see Figure 17). 
As intelligence information and dimensions of strategy have already been discussed, 
this section introduces two additional aspects of codification, warning and action times 
and inferential methods, which directly relate to the accommodation of uncertainty.
5.1.1 Warning and Reaction Times
The treatment of a given risk pattern always combines specific requirements over time, 
which must be matched to the predicted amount of available resources over the same 
period. Defence planning can thus be seen as an economic problem of maximizing 
utility over time, which requires a way to discount both future risks and future 
capability. In the strategic context, the mechanism that can be used to deal both with 
the contingent nature of risk treatment, and to discount future risks and requirements, is 
that of warning and reaction times. Their interplay determines what strategic effect in 
the future can be expected from investment in capability today. However, the 
confidence that can be placed into this discounting method is affected by the adversarial 
nature of the interaction between both sides, as strategic advantage can be gained from 
surprising the enemy. The amount and reliability of information that is available on a 
risk pattern thus has direct implications for the reliability with which both the enemy’s 
likely moves, and the steps that are necessary to counter them, can be assessed.
There is a qualitative difference between the prediction of events in tactical warning,
*5 I 1
and of risks in strategic warning. Also, not all information is alike as a basis for or 
subject of warning. Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern write that
We infer from experience the propositions that, among [events, predispositions and 
capabilities], the class o f events is less conjecturable than the classes of predispositions 
and capabilities; and that, within the class o f capabilities, tangibles are more
311 See Section 3.3.2.
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conjecturable than intangibles, and also more conjecturable than predispositions, which 
are also intangibles. Two supporting hypotheses are, first, that tangible objects are 
more easily observed (and often measurable) than are intangibles; and second, that 
events— in the genesis o f which predispositions and capabilities play a part—are more 
unpredictably contingent than either predispositions or capabilities.312
FIGURE 18: WARNING AND REACTION TIMES
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PREPARATIONS 
FOR WAR 
HALF WAY
Notes:
A. Attacker starts preparations for war.
B. Defender issues initial warning, but is uncertain of the real probability of war.
C. Due to uncertainty the initial phase of preparation proceeds relatively slowly.
D. As the probability of war increases and becomes more certain the defender accel­
erates preparations.
E. War breaks out (e g. surprise attack). Defender’s preparations incomplete and lag 
behind the attacker.
F. The readiness gap favoring the attacker.
G. The degree of mobilization completed by the defenders at the time of attack (F)
H. At this point the defender may have reached his highest level of preparations. Line 
A 4 4 B represents the attacker's lead time; line B4 4 E represents the defender's actual 
warning time; line B4 4 H represents the time the defender needs to complete his 
preparations. The greater is B4 4 H minus B ^ E  the more intense is the impact of 
the surprise attack.
Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and the Problem o f Strategic Surprise,’ in Paradoxes o f Strategic 
Intelligence, eds. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 7.
However, tactical warning (of events) and strategic warning (of capabilities or 
intentions) can both be analysed in terms of Figure 18, which summarizes the 
interaction over time that results from the collision of both side’s actions and reactions
312 Emphasis in original. Knorr and Morgenstern, ‘Political Conjecture in Military Planning,’ p. 20.
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over timescales that can measure days or years.313 There are three different timelines 
that need to be considered: First, the enemy’s lead time between the initiation of a 
build-up or the development of hostile intentions, and the defender’s decision to begin a 
reaction. Second, the defender’s warning time between the initiation of that reaction, 
and the point at which the enemy will be able to draw most benefits from his lead (by 
initiating war on favourable terms, for example, or by exerting political and military 
pressure on the basis of his superiority). Third, the defender’s reaction time that is 
required to neutralize the enemy’s head start.
In very similar ways, the relative length of these three timelines is important in 
situations of risk and indeterminacy, in which the primary concern is tactical warning 
and the prediction of surprise attacks, and in situations of ignorance, in which they are 
applicable to the emergence of new threats and strategic warning. In both cases, the 
confidence with which short lead times for the enemy can be assumed reduces the 
premium on requirements to deal with unexpected developments. Tactical and strategic 
warning are both topics that are well covered in the literature, and the warning time in 
general depends on all the factors mentioned in the beginning of Section 3.3.2, such as 
noise in the intelligence picture, strategic assumptions or analytic mindsets. 
Unfortunately for those who find themselves in a situation in which they do not have 
much information or understanding of the threat environment that they face, one of the 
common themes throughout that literature is that it is important for successful warning, 
whether it is strategic or tactical, to have some idea of what to expect.314
In a situation of risk, threats are well defined and probabilities can be assigned to them. 
On the basis of this information, intelligence indicators can be specified to predict 
events. Tactical surprise is nevertheless generally possible, and the enemy’s lead time 
can never be expected to be fully eliminated. It will, however, tend to be shorter, and 
more reliably so, since the amount of information available about the enemy’s 
intentions, capabilities, worldview, culture and doctrine is relatively high. Also, the 
information that is available on the enemy in these situations gives reasonable certitude 
regarding way in which he might try to achieve surprise effect. It is, therefore, possible 
in these situations to define fairly precise and specific requirements for the defender’s 
force structure that shorten the defence’s reaction time or vulnerability to surprise, and 
thereby reduce temporary windows of vulnerability.315
In a situation of indeterminacy, sufficient information is available to define the specific 
kinds of existing and new threats, but there is no information as to their relative 
probability. If it applies to threats in the future, it would be reasonable to expect that 
strategic warning could be achieved with a high degree of reliability, as it would be 
possible to monitor the emergence of strategic risks (through changes in the likelihood 
of developments that are known to be possible). The warning times and associated 
enemy lead times that are expected for threats that could emerge thus provide a basis for 
planning defence reaction programmes (or rearmament programmes) that can be 
accomplished within the available defence reaction time. Measures that sufficiently
313 See also Bruce W. Bennett, ‘Responding to Asymmetric Threats,’ in New Challenges & New Tools for 
Defense Decisionmaking, eds. Johnson, Libicki and Treverton, pp. 45-47.
314 Richard Brody, ‘Warning and Response,’ in On Not Confusing Ourselves, eds. Andrew W. Marshall, 
J.J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 94-113.
315 Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning.
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shorten the defence reaction time to deal with future risk are thus requirements that need 
to be fulfilled by the present force structure, beyond those necessary to deal with present 
risk.316
Indeterminacy can, however, also apply to present threats that are not well known in 
terms of the enemy’s intentions, capabilities or theory of victory. It is then not possible 
to define the clear intelligence indicators for tactical warning, but the considerations 
regarding enemy lead time, warning time and reaction time still apply. The 
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (“Rumsfeld- 
Commission”) discussed this problem in relation to the threat from rogue state ballistic 
missile programs. It concluded that:
Deception and denial efforts are intense and often successful, and US collection and 
analysis assets are limited. Together they create a high risk of continued surprise. ...
[T]he fact that there are delays in discovery of those activities provides a sharp warning 
that a great deal of activity goes undetected.317
The Commission thus thought that enemy lead times would be considerable, and that 
warning times might be too short to avoid serious disadvantages. It therefore 
concentrated on an analysis of the available information on rogue state missile programs 
in the context of an assessment of the technological challenges of missile development, 
the known history of trade in missile technology between rogue states, the scope of 
inputs that a country devotes to its programs, and its general level of technological 
expertise. By taking account of the principal technological problems in building a 
missile and rogue state scientific and manufacturing capabilities, the commission 
estimated the time that a country needed to develop a missile capable of reaching the 
United States, even if a decision to do so was a ‘known unknown’ and had not been 
detected. Acknowledging that “[t]his approach requires that analysts extrapolate a 
program's scope, scale, pace and direction beyond what the hard evidence at hand 
unequivocally supports,” the Commission insisted that
When strategically significant programs were assessed by narrowly focusing on what is 
known, the assessments lagged the actual state of the programs by two to eight years 
and in some cases missed significant programs.319
Translated into a risk management context, the commission thus decided that action was 
required on the basis of the precautionary principle. In order to overcome the lack of 
precise information, its calculation of (potential) enemy lead-times defined a scenario 
that was not meant as a prediction or representation of known reality, but nevertheless 
allowed to define present requirements to address the risk. In general, the distinction
316 See the general discussion in Paul Dibb, Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996).
317 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary of the 
Report o f the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998, 
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat.htm> (7 May 2003).
318 For an open source study with a similar methodology, see David R. Tanks, Exploring U.S. Missile 
Defense Requirements in 2010: What are the Policy and Technology Challenges? (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997).
319 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary o f the 
Report o f the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
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between short-, mid- and long term thus must not be taken to relate to the time that it 
takes the enemy, beginning in the present, to generate new threats. Instead, it is always 
the reaction time that is the relevant one for the definition of requirements, from the 
decision to initiate a reaction to the time of the enemy’s greatest advantage.
5.1.2 Inferential Methods
The information regarding the risk pattern, the theory of victory, dimensions of strategy 
related to one’s own side, and warning and reaction time considerations ultimately must 
be combined into one set of requirements to treat strategic risk. The logical basis of this 
codification are inferential methods, which generate statements regarding requirements 
even if the information on which they are based is incomplete. Knorr and Morgenstern 
use the term conjecture in this regard, and write that
The claim o f conjecture is more modest than the claim of prediction. Conjecture is 
reasoned inference from admittedly defective evidence. That is to say, to conjecture is 
to form an opinion or judgment on what is recognized as inadequate information. It is 
distinguished from tacit intuitive judgement by two essential elements: competent use 
of such evidence as there is, and the use of explicit reasoning. ... To sum up, conjecture 
about the future involves what the Germans call Vorausdenken (literally, “thinking 
ahead”) rather than Voraussagen, which is prediction.320
In the late 19th and early 20th century, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce wrote 
extensively on three different methods of inference or reasoning: Deduction,
->99
induction and abduction. In general, he writes, “The object of reasoning is to find 
out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not 
know.” All three methods of inference can best be discussed in terms of a 
precondition, a rule with an applicability that extends beyond this specific case, and the 
result. Deduction, induction and abduction are the logical relationships that infer the 
result, the rule or the precondition from the other two elements (see Figure 19).
Deduction uses a given rule or causal chain and a precondition to infer a result. If rule 
and precondition are true, the inferred result logically has to be true as well. Deduction 
is therefore the method of inference with the highest associated confidence and must be 
used if predictions are to be made. At the same time, it is purely analytical and does not 
generate truly new information.
Induction uses the known precondition and result to infer a rule, usually on the basis of 
a number of precondition-result pairs. The confidence placed in inductive reasoning 
cannot be as great as that placed in deduction, since it is based on the assumption
320 Emphasis in original. Knorr and Morgenstern, ‘Political Conjecture in Military Planning,’ pp. 19, 21.
321 The idea of applying these three methods o f inference to strategic problems is contained in P.H. Liotta, 
‘Strategy and the Curse o f Intended Outcomes,’ Strategic Review, vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 47-54. 
However, he mistakenly assumes that all three methods infer a result from precodition and a rule.
322 Peirce also referred to abduction as ‘hypothesis’ in his earlier writings.
323 Charles S. Peirce, ‘The Fixation o f Belief,’ Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (November 1877), pp. 1- 
15. Reprinted in Christian J. W. Kloesel, ed., Writings o f Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, 
vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 244.
103
Managing Strategic Risk
FIGURE 19: METHODS OF INFERENCE
Deduction Induction Abduction
Given
R u le:
All the beans from this 
bag are white.
P r e c o n d itio n :
These beans are from this bag.
R u le:
All the beans from this bag 
are white.
Given
P r e c o n d it io n :
These beans are from this 
bag.
R esu lt:
These beans are white.
R esu lt:
These beans are white.
R esu lt: R u le: P r e c o n d it io n :
Inferred These beans are All the beans from this bag are These beans are (possibly)
(definitely) white. (probably) white. from this bag.
Basic Logical transformation of Inferring the probable from Discovering possible
Nature the facts observations explanations
Example from: Charles S. Peirce, ‘Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis,’ Popular Science Monthly, vol. 
13 (August 1878), pp. 470-482. Reprinted in Christian J. W. Kloesel, ed., Writings o f  Charles S. Peirce: 
A Chronological Edition, vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 323-338.
that a number of facts obtained in a given way will in general more or less resemble 
other facts obtained the same way; or, experiences whose conditions are the same will 
have the same general characters. 324
As discussed above in connection with the danger of making forecasts, those who do 
not question this assumption do so at their own peril. However, under certain 
assumptions, induction can lead to robust conclusions that can sometimes even be 
described in terms of statistical uncertainty—induction is the logical basis of statistical 
inference.
Abduction concludes from a rule and result to the precondition that might have caused 
the observation. It is the method of inference that underlies the formation of hypothesis 
and creativity, but at the same time that in whose conclusions least confidence can be 
placed. Peirce writes that
By induction, we conclude that facts, similar to observed facts, are true in cases not 
examined. By [abduction], we conclude the existence of a fact quite different from 
anything observed, from which, according to known laws, something observed would 
necessarily result. The former, is reasoning from particulars to the general law; the 
latter, from effect to cause. The former classifies, the latter explains.326
Nevertheless, induction and abduction are closely related since any induction is 
implicitly based on the abductive inference that the observed precondition and result are
324 Emphasis in original. Charles S. Peirce, ‘The Probability of Induction,’ Popular Science Monthly, vol. 
12 (April 1878), pp. 705-718. Reprinted in Kloesel, ed., Writings o f Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological 
Edition, p. 305.
325 Also see the discussion in Herbert, ‘The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist,’ pp. 666-684.
326 Charles S. Peirce, ‘Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis,’ Popular Science Monthly, vol. 13 (August 
1878), pp. 470-482. Reprinted in Kloesel, ed., Writings o f  Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, p. 
332.
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representative samples of a larger whole. In a strict sense, induction itself is thus 
reduced to the inference of a probability. All three methods of reasoning can thus also 
be interpreted in the light of the scientific method: Abduction generates a hypothesis to 
explain any kind of phenomenon. Deduction elaborates on this hypothesis and thereby 
infers observable consequences that must flow if it was true. Inductive reasoning is 
then used to statistically test the hypothesis on the basis of a large number of observed
328cases.
FIGURE 20: INFERENCE IN DEFENCE PLANNING
Deduction Induction Abduction
Given
R u le /M o d e l  o f  W a r fa r e :
Attacks on refineries cause 
severe disruptions in 
logistics and wider 
economic activity.
P r e c o n d it io n :
Enemies often prepare to 
attack refineries.
R u le /M o d e l  o f  W a r fa r e :
Attacks on refineries cause 
severe disruptions in 
logistics and wider 
economic activity.
Given
P r e c o n d it io n :
The enemy prepares to 
attack refineries.
R e s u l t /B a t t l e  O u t c o m e :
(Scenarios and experience 
show that) logistic and 
economic disruptions during 
wartime have to be 
expected.
R e s u l t /B a t t l e  O u t c o m e :
(We think that) logistical and 
economic disruptions during 
wartime have to be 
expected.
Inferred
R e s u l t /B a t t l e  O u t c o m e :
Logistic and economic 
disruptions during wartime 
(definitely) have to be 
expected.
R u le /M o d e l  o f  W a r f a r e :
Attacks on refineries will 
(probably) cause severe 
disruptions in logistics and 
wider economic activity.
P r e c o n d it io n :
The enemy (possibly) 
prepares to attack refineries.
Since deduction is the only method where the validity of the inferred element is not in 
doubt if the same is true for the existing information on which it was inferred, it is 
obviously the preferred method of constructing the logical edifice on which a defence 
planning construct must rest. However, deduction can only be used if precondition 
and rule are known, which means that it requires a situation in which there are no 
significant informational deficits regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual and 
potential enemies, and the numerous strategic cause-effect relationships which influence 
the way they would seek strategic effect (See Figure 20). Defence planners are thus 
rarely in a situation in which they are at liberty to choose the method of inference on 
which they can base their plans. Instead, this decision is dictated by the type of 
information that is available about strategic risks: If it is not known what the enemy’s 
capabilities and intentions are, it is logically impossible to deduce requirements directly.
327 For a good overview on the three concepts, and this close relationship between induction and 
abduction in particular, see William H. Davis, Peirce’s Epistemology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972), pp. 22-49.
328 For a discussion of this perspective, see William Paul Haas, The Conception o f Law and the Unity o f  
Peirce’s Philosophy (Fribourg: The University Press, 1964), pp. 69-83.
329 Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era, pp. 50-51. See 
also the discussion of the ‘root method’ in Ray Sunderland, ‘A Methodology for Mobilization Planning,’ 
in Problems o f Mobilization in Defence o f Australia, eds. Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (Canberra: 
Phoenix Defence Publications, 1980), pp. 125-138.
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Instead, it is necessary to recur to abductive reasoning, on the basis of results that are 
assessed as a precautionary measure.
In a defence planning context, it is thus helpful to distinguish induction from deduction 
and abduction. Since the latter two both infer pieces of information that are specific to a 
situation—the result in deduction and the precondition in abduction—they are both 
suited to directly analyse specific risks. The nature of induction is different, as it infers 
a rule whose validity by definition extends beyond a specific precondition. Its nature is 
to find patterns in observed data, deriving rules that can be used to reduce the 
complexity of a problem under consideration. Induction is thus the inferential basis of 
the use of scenarios for the purposes of strategy development: By playing out various
constellations, it is possible to gain a more general understanding of the situations one 
might face. However, the rules thus derived must then be used to derive requirements 
for specific situations on the basis of deductive or abductive reasoning.
5.1.3 Applied Inference: ‘Net Assessment ’ and ‘Asymmetry ’
Writing in the early 1990s, Gray distinguished “threat-driven” planning in the Cold War
' i ' i j
from “uncertainty-pulled” planning for the future. " Arguably, this dichotomy is 
reflected in the difference between net assessment and the analysis of ‘asymmetric 
threats’. A short discussion of these two concepts can help to elucidate the inferential 
difference between the four ideal defence planning methods developed below.
Michael Pillsbury writes that
strategic [or net] assessment is an analysis o f the interaction o f two or more national 
security establishments in both peacetime and in war, usually ourselves and a potential 
enemy. It is the interaction of the two belligerents that is the central concept, not an 
assessment of one side alone.333
Intricate analytical tools are not necessarily required for net assessment,334 although it 
grew out of the use of wargames for analytical purposes during the Cold War.333 In
330 See the discussion of the application o f the precautionary principle in Inter-Departmental Liaison 
Group on Risk Assessment, The Precautionary Principle: Policy and Application, p. 9-10, 16-17. The 
analysis o f critical infrastructure is a good example for the area of strategy, see for example Paul W. 
Parfomak, ‘Vulnerability o f Concentrated Critical Infrastructure: Background and Policy Options,’ 
Congressional Research Sendee Report RL33206 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2005).
331 Peter Schwartz, The Art o f the Long View (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1991). See also P.H. 
Liotta and Timothy E. Somes, ‘The Art o f Reperceiving,’ Naval War College Review, vol. LVI, no. 4 
(Autumn 2003), pp. 120-132 and, for an application of the method to a strategic problem, Richard Weitz, 
‘Meeting the China Challenge: Some Insights from Scenario-Based Planning,’ Journal o f Strategic 
Studies, vol. 24, no. 3 (September 2001), pp. 19-48.
332 Gray, Weapons Don 7 Make War, p. 112.
333 Emphasis in original. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2000), p. 355.
334 A point forcefully made in Paul Bracken, ‘Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,’ Parameters, vol. 36, 
no. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100.
335 Andrew W. Marshall, ‘A Program to Improve Analytic Methods related to Strategic Forces,’ Policy 
Sciences, vol. 15, no. 1 (November 1982), pp. 47-50. For a historical overview, see George E. Pickett,
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order to make a robust conclusion about the outcome of a conflict analysed by net 
assessment, quantitative and qualitative information about both sides’ armed forces and 
society has to be complemented with information about how their forces would most 
likely be used in tactical, operational or even strategic terms, which requires knowledge 
about the enemy’s theory of victory. In the words of Stephen Peter Rosen, net 
assessment
is concerned with the question of what the war will look like and what the character of 
our long-term military competitions may be. Given what we know o f our own political 
goals and those of the enemy, given the obser\>able behavior o f the enemy as he 
prepares for war, and given our own plans, what will be the general character of the 
war? How can our peacetime military programs affect those o f the enemy?336
Net assessment is thus the closest practical approximation in the study of strategy to a 
prediction of the future, on the basis of available knowledge about the past and present 
of both adversaries and the environment in which they compete. It deduces from each 
side’s capabilities and intentions (the ‘precondition’) and theories of victory as well as 
physical, psychological, social and political cause-effect relationships (the ‘rules’) to the 
most likely outcome of a particular conflict (the ‘result’). The established methods of 
net assessment can thus be a powerful tool to define requirements for strategic 
success. However, the fact that net assessment is based on the analysis of all relevant 
information is its strength and weakness at the same time, since its applicability is 
limited to those situations in which there are no substantial knowledge deficits
' I ' lQ
regarding the enemy.
After four decades of Cold War in which the Western security community was faced 
with an adversary that it had become quite familiar with, it was confronted with threats 
of a different nature than those it had become accustomed to—‘crazy’ and failed states, 
ethnic violence, terrorism as well as the distant possibility of emerging ‘regional’ peer 
competitors. While the United States solidified its unrivalled status in traditional 
military capability, it dawned on the US security community that new threats would be 
unlikely to play to US strengths, and that “Every security community is the prisoner
James G. Roche, and Barry D. Watts, ‘Net Assessment: A Historical Overview,’ in On Not Confusing 
Ourselves, eds. Marshall, Martin, and Rowen, pp. 158-188.
336 Emphasis added. Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept,’ in On Not 
Confusing Ourselves, eds. Marshall, Martin, and Rowen, p. 291.
337 For a discussion of this role in the Australian context, see Brice Pacey, ‘The Potential Role o f Net 
Assessment in Australian Defence Planning,’ Working Paper, no. 148 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988).
338 See Robert P. Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1988), Paul K. Davis, ‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: 
Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging,’ in New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How 
Much Is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis, pp. 15-58.
339 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Transformation of Strategic Affairs,’ Adelphi Paper, no. 379 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), pp. 49-60.
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of its own strategic expectations.” 340 Future enemies would be using ‘asymmetric 
warfare’, which Metz and Johnson defined as
acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s 
own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weakness, attain the initiative, or gain greater 
freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a 
combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, 
organizations, time perspectives, or some combination o f these.341
A RAND study further remarked that
Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the “target” (victim) or 
capitalize on the victim’s limited preparation against the threat. These strategies rely 
(primarily, but not exclusively) on CONOPs (concepts of operations) that are 
fundamentally different from the victim’s and/or from those of recent history. They 
often employ new or different weapons.342
A flurry of writing ensued in which the perennial fact that enemies play their strengths 
against the other side’s weaknesses was re-discovered over and over again.343 However, 
the discussion also highlighted a number of strategies and threats that the United States 
was ill-prepared to deal with: “unusual” threats (such as the taking and torturing of 
hostages); “irregular” threats (such as nuclear explosions to disrupt satellite operations); 
threats “unmatched” to the American arsenal of capabilities and plans (such as the use 
of civilian infrastructure to conduct attacks); threats highly leveraged against US 
military and civil assets (such as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction); 
threats that are difficult to respond to in kind or in a discriminate and disproportionate 
manner (such as terrorism and the use of WMD); or threats that are conducive to the 
frightening prospect of the “unknown unknown” (such as the ramifications that may be 
associated with an extensive attack with biological weapons) . 344
These threats, and the methods to infer them, are instructive for the discussion here 
since they were not directly deduced from the observed preparations of specific 
enemies—a priori, they were possible threats only. Analysts assumed a result (a US 
defeat by a much smaller rogue state, for example), which they then tried to explain 
using given rules (of how the US political system and US forces operate). The resulting 
possible explanation or preconditions (the asymmetric threats) are thus based on the use
340 Colin S. Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,’ Parameters, vol. 32, no. 1 (Spring
2002), p. 8.
341 Emphasis in original. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: 
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2001), pp. 5-6.
342 Bruce W. Bennett, Christopher P. Twomey, and Gregory F. Treverton, What are Asymmetric 
Strategies? (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p. 3.
343 For a good critique, see Stephen Blank, ‘Rethinking the Concept of Asymmetric Threats in U.S. 
Strategy,’ Comparative Strategy, vol. 23, no. 4-5 (October-December 2005), pp. 343-367. One of the 
better early works on the subject was Kenneth F. McKenzie, ‘The Revenge o f the Melians: Asymmetric 
Threats and the next QDR,' McNair Paper, no. 62 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University, 2000).
344 Steven Lambakis, James Kiras and Kristin Kolet, Understanding “Asymmetric ” Threats to the United 
States (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), 13-14.
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of abductive reasoning.345 The concept of asymmetry was a logical adaptation to the 
significant uncertainty about the identity and modus operandi of future adversaries by 
identifying threats based on the information that was available—most o f which related 
to the United States itself rather than any future enemies. Not by accident, the concept 
got out of fashion after the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, which provided ample 
direct information on enemy strategies. However, it does live on to some extent in the 
analysis of possible anti-access strategies of regional powers.346
5.2 The Treatment of Strategic Risks
Once requirements are defined, it is necessary to develop capabilities and a force 
structure that are confidently assessed to be able to fulfil them.347 Requirements can be 
well known and detailed, or uncertain and broad. Requirements can also be relatively 
few and similar in nature, or many and dissimilar. Some must be fulfilled in the 
present, some only at some stage in the future. There will, therefore, not be one way of 
fulfilling requirements that is applicable to all cases. Indeed, the literature on defence 
planning uses several terms that relate to the accommodation of uncertainty, without a 
commonly accepted or understood definition of any of them. Often, terms such as 
hedging or options are used interchangeably and without well defined meanings. This 
section will thus define four general properties that can be sought in force structures and 
capabilities and which relate to their ability to deal with different degrees of specificity 
of requirements.
5.2.1 Hedging, Options, Portfolios and Flexibility
The first method of dealing with risk is through the use of hedging. Evans Medeiros 
rightly writes that “The term ‘hedging’ is highly underdeveloped in both the 
international relations theory and the security studies literature.”349 It does, however, 
have a very specific meaning in the context of finance, where it is a term for the 
reduction of a financial risk through the purchase or selling of a derivative financial 
asset whose value is highly, or even perfectly, inversely correlated with that of an 
underlying asset. In its effects, hedging is thus very similar to an insurance contract: 
It always refers to very specific risks (the change in the value of the underlying asset, 
for example, or those mentioned in the insurance policy) and all costs associated with it 
(the purchase price of the derivative or the insurance premium) have to be paid up front. 
These two characteristics are a hedge’s main strength and weakness, since the risk must
345 Only in a second step (usually implicit) are all possible explanations ‘weeded’ out by determining 
those that are credible— however that judgement is made.
346 See, for example, Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Paul Elrick, Theodore Karasik, Robert Klein, Sherrill 
Lingel, Brian Nickiporuk, Robert Uy, and John Zavadil, Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2004).
347 See Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5.
348 There are also parallels between these concepts and mitigation (hedging) and preparedness (options) in 
civilian emergency planning. See David Alexander, Principles o f emergency planning and management, 
p. 5.
349 Evans S. Medeiros, ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future o f Asia-Pacific Stability,’ Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-2006), footnote 1.
350 Basic discussions o f the concept of hedging are included in any corporate finance textbook. See, for 
example, Stephan A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield, and Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance (Chicago: 
Irwin, 2nd edition, 1990), pp. 649-678.
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be well defined, the cost can be substantial, any mismatch between the hedge and risk 
will result in a costly failure, and it can be difficult to unwind."01 Both of these 
characteristics can also be applied to identify hedges in the defence planning context, 
especially when they are to be distinguished from options. Ballistic missile defence 
systems are, for example, capability hedges that are very specific in their tactical use 
and have to be paid upfront. A total force structure can also be a hedge against a very 
specific risk if it is optimised for one scenario only, such as the units on NATO’s 
Central Front.
The second method of dealing with risk and uncertainty is that of an option, again a 
term whose loose use in the defence planning literature, where it is usually used 
interchangeably with a candidate solution under consideration, stands in stark contrast 
to its clear definition in the financial context. There, options are standardized financial 
contracts that give the buyer the right to sell (put-option) or to buy (call-option) an 
underlying asset at an agreed ‘exercise’ or ‘strike’ price in the future. There is, 
however, no obligation on his part to do so. An option is thus worth nothing if the 
market price of the underlying asset at the expiration date is below (call-option) or 
above (put-option) the exercise price, since the option holder is then better off to make a 
transaction through the market itself. Otherwise, the value at the expiration date is the 
difference between the market price and the exercise price. Before that, the price of an 
option depends on, among other parameters, the current price of the underlying asset 
and the exercise price, the time left until the expiration date, and the variance of the
c'y
price of the underlying asset.
Options are thus characterized by the fact that they always involve an investment in two 
stages, first for the option itself, and then a discretionary second one if the option is 
exercised. The value of an option derives from the fact that new information becomes 
available between these two stages, on the basis of which the buyer of the option can 
make a second decision in the future. Many investments in real (as opposed to 
financial) assets, such as in empty land or in oil exploration, also do not generate profits 
immediately but provide the opportunity to invest again, by constructing houses or 
producing oil, once more information is available. These situations are often referred to 
as real options, and there are several accounting techniques to assign a value to such
c
initial investments. The Australian Defence Material Organization explains that
Real options are concerned with investment in physical assets, ideas (including R&D) 
and capabilities. A Real Option has commercial value and, in the Defence context, 
capability value, when it allows decisions to be modified in light of new information 
and when new information is likely to favour an altered strategy. The greater the
351 Diane B. Wunnicke, David R. Wilson, and Brooke Wunnicke, Corporate Financial Risk Management 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), pp. 223-230.
352 Options are also discussed in any corporate finance textbook. See, for example: Ross, Westerfield, 
and Jaffe, Corporate Finance, pp. 561-597.
353 See, for example: Tom Copeland and Vladimir Antikarov, Real Options: A practitioner’s guide (New 
York: Texere, 2001), and Martha Amran and Nalin Kulatilaka, Real Options: Managing Strategic 
Investment in an Uncertain World (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999).
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uncertainty, and the greater the cost o f the investment being contemplated, the greater 
the value of the real option. 354
As in civilian life, many investments in the defence planning area are thus real options 
since their primary aim is to acquire the ability to make another investment at a later 
stage. While options are never free, the initial investment is often small in comparison 
with that of the second stage, which can usually be scaled and designed according to 
future needs. The three important characteristics of options are, therefore, the fact that 
the desired capability is only available after two stages or investments, a lesser degree 
of specificity than hedging regarding the risks that can be treated (due to the choices 
that can be made regarding the scale and scope of the second stage investment), and the 
fact that only some of the costs have to be paid upfront, and the remainder at the time 
that the option is exercised. Any type of defence research and development is thus an 
option, for example, since it does not provide capability directly, but the opportunity to 
build new or improved systems at a later stage.
A third method, suitable to deal with a range of requirements that is however specified 
in advance, is a portfolio of forces—another analogy from financial markets. Portfolio 
theory describes how investors can deal with uncertainty regarding future prices of 
various assets.355 It begins with the assumption that an investor prefers, ceteris paribus, 
assets with high over those with low expected returns, and, ceteris panbus, those with a 
low variance in expected prices over those with a high variance. If an investor holds a 
diversified portfolio of several assets, the expected return of the portfolio is the 
(weighted) average of the component stocks. For a given expected return, the variance 
of the portfolio is however less than the weighted average of the individual variances, 
since it is a linear combination of the individual variances and the covariance between 
the assets.350 In general, a portfolio is thus the optimum solution to a problem in which 
an investor is confronted with uncertainty along several dimensions (the uncertain 
prices of several assets), but information is available to describe all of these 
uncertainties (through historical data on price volatility), and the investor’s objective 
function is also known (to maximize his utility function, which combines the expected 
return and risk of his portfolio).
354 Defence Materiel Organization, Defence Electronics Systems Sector Strategic Plan (Canberra: 
Department o f Defence, 2004), p. 100.
355 Harry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection,’ Journal o f Finance, vol. 7, no. 1 (March 1952), pp. 77-91. An 
alternative explanation for the fact that some risk can be diversified away is included in the Arbitrage 
Pricing Model, which assumes that the variance of all stocks consists o f one part that is a reaction to 
(random) factors that affect all stocks, and an individual random part. In a diversified portfolio, the 
individual random part of the variance is averaged out, so that only the variance due to factors that affect 
the whole market remains.
356 This is, o f course, only true unless the prices o f the assets are independently distributed. In a graph 
with the variance on the horizontal and the expected return on the vertical axis, portfolios of two assets 
thus usually lie above the line that connects the individual assets. Depending on the correlation, the line 
of portfolios can even bend backwards so that, for some portfolios, a rise in the expected return is 
accompanied with a reduction in variance. An investor would thus only choose portfolios on the upward 
sloping part of the line, since only these are efficient combinations o f expected return and variance. It can 
be shown that the form of the efficient line is always o f a similar, upward sloping form, no matter how 
many assets are included in the portfolio. Adding additional stocks to the portfolio reduces its variance, 
until the portfolio represents the whole market. The variance o f a portfolio that is representative for the 
whole market is the residual risk that the investor cannot diversify away.
I l l
Managing Strategic Risk
If one abstracts from the financial context, the problem here is thus not one risk (and its 
associated uncertainty) that could be hedged, but a number of risks that are nevertheless 
fairly well defined. Also, the portfolio consists of a number of assets that all contribute, 
in one form or another, to the reduction of each individual risk (via the covariance 
between asset prices in the financial example, or the fact that any military system will 
usually have at least some, however limited, usefulness in military operations of any 
kind). Since the decisionmaker can only maximise his expected return, it is likely that a 
portfolio that is optimum ex-ante will turn out not to have been so ex-post. Such regrets 
are, however, taken into account since the variance of the outcome is also considered. 
In other words, the decisionmaker selects that force structure and capability 
combination that fares best, on average and with a limited variance, over numerous 
combinations of realised risks,357 which is however going to be a different one from a 
force structures optimised to deal with any of the individual risks. One methodology 
that could be used such a portfolio is the concept of a ‘scenario-space’ developed by 
Paul Davis at RAND.358
The fourth method of dealing with uncertainty is a flexible force. In very general terms, 
flexibility can be defined as the ability of a force structure or capability359 to adapt 
instantly and without warning to threats that have not been explicitly considered in 
advanced0 In a sense, flexibility is thus a general buffer against uncertainty. 361 There 
is no satisfactory general way yet of measuring flexibility, but it is usually described
' i f . ' )
along several dimensions specific to the situation at hand. Unit compositions and 
doctrines that allow task-oriented formations are, for example, more flexible in a 
configurational sense than those which can only be employed in the formal order of 
battle. Joint task groups, brigade combat teams, battlegroups and company groups are 
all based on the same idea that headquarters, combat and support troops can be readily 
mixed and matched at various scales.363 Functional flexibility, rooted in doctrine and 
training, is the ability of a given unit to switch between different roles or perform
357 For a practical example, see for example the discussion on peak-load theory and the substitution of 
reserve for regular forces in Michael A. Rostek, ‘Developing a Surge Capacity for Canadian Forces,’ 
Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 17, no. 5 (October 2006), pp. 421-434.
358 Paul K. Davis, David Gompert, and Richard Kugler, Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a 
New Framework (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), pp. 3-5; Paul K. Davis, ‘Uncertainty-sensitive planning,’ 
pp. 146-151. It can, o f course, also be used to evaluate a force structure’s capability to deal with different 
‘variants’ o f one threat.
359 The need for flexibility can also extend to the civilian part of a defence organization. See for example 
Paul C. Light, ‘Rumsfeld’s Revolution at Defense,’ Policy Brief no. 142 (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 2005).
360 Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia’s Defence (St Lucia: University Press o f Queensland, 1980), p. 
277.
361 A. De Toni and S. Tonchia, ‘Manufacturing flexibility: a literature review,’ International Journal of 
Production Research, vol. 36, no. 6 (June 1998), pp. 1588-1589.
362 Roshanak Nilchiani, Measuring the Value o f Space Systems Flexibility: A Comprehensive Six-element 
Framework, PhD Thesis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), pp. 30-34.
363 For a good discussion o f the organizational and product modularity in a force structure context, see 
Melissa A. Schilling and Christopher Paparone, ‘Modularity: An Application of General Systems Theory 
to Military Force Development,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (August-November 2005), pp. 279- 
293. See also Army Transformation Office, United States Army: 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap 
(Washington D.C.: Department o f Defense, 2004); ‘Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups,’ 
British Army Website, <http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/10014.html> (11 July 2006).
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several roles at once, such as combat operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance 
or training of friendly forces. The Australian DoD uses the term ‘versatility’ in this 
context.364 The US Defense Science board defines ‘strategic agility’ or geographic 
flexibility as “the ability to rapidly move personnel, materiel, and weapons when and to 
where they are needed and to maneuver them within the battlespace as required.'’365 It 
also writes that
“Achieving strategic agility involves ... myriad movement and support issues that are 
important and need to be resolved. However, solving those concerns alone will not 
address strategic agility challenges unless the characteristics of U.S. forces are also 
changed.
The task force concluded that DoD must design strategic agility into future forces 
from the outset ... DoD should no longer treat operations as something supported by 
logistics— rather, operations and logistics must operate as a single entity in the 
battlespace and in providing capabilities for use in the battlespace. They are 
inseparable elements. 366
Although it can thus be relatively straightforward to describe the degree of flexibility of 
any given force structure, achieving flexibility can involve significant costs— 
configurational and functional flexibility, for example, mean that the advantages of 
specialization are foregone. Gray writes that
Flexibility has many components, including an openness of mind, an excellence in 
doctrine (or in provision for doctrinal revision), and a suitable elasticity of 
organizational framework. Also, however, flexibility is a matter of money and time. ... 
[FJIexibility tomorrow in the use o f military> power o f all kinds must depend upon 
decisions made today
5.2.2 A Defence Planning Toolbox for Risk Treatment
If one conceives of defence planning tools as specific and mutually exclusive ways of 
spending limited resources to obtain military capability of some kind, there are of 
course numerous if not countless such tools. This section will analyse them along two 
dimensions to provide a framework or toolbox to deal with uncertainty over time. The 
first dimension distinguished here are the four ways of accommodating differing 
specificity of requirements discussed above. The second dimension is the time that it 
takes to derive combat capability from a defence planning tool. This relates both to 
warning and reaction time considerations, and conceptions of readiness. Since both 
available resources and the useful lifespan of defence assets are limited, any defence 
planning decision inevitably involves a trade-off of risk over time.
Rather than trying to be exhaustive, the aim here is to suggest that any defence 
capability or force structure can be usefully analysed in these terms. It is thus possible 
to describe forces or aspects of forces that primarily hedge in the short term—e.g. units
364 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005 (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005), p. 19.
365 Defense Science Board, 21s' Century Defense Technology Strategies, vol. I (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 1999), p. 21.
366 Emphasis in original. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
367 Emphasis added. Gray, Weapons Don 7 Make War, p. 116.
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that are optimised in terms of equipment, training, and location to respond to one 
particular immediate scenario—or those that primarily provide flexibility—e.g. through 
modular force structures with organic support, compatible communications and 
procedures, and multirole platforms (Figure 21). Options are provided in the short term 
by high readiness reserves and by provisions for the call-up of civilian assets, such as 
the US Civil Reserve Air Fleet. A portfolio organization is usually a trait of a force 
structure as a whole. However, modular platforms or the assignment of specific 
missions to the same unit are tools that can be clearly assigned to this category.
FIGURE 21: DEFENCE PLANNING TOOLS
Hedging Options Portfolio Flexibility
Short
Term
(hours to 
days)
-Specialized
Platforms
-Operational
Readiness
-Units optimised for 
specific scenarios
-Specialized training 
and doctrine
-Resilient
Infrastructure
-Preparations for the 
rapid call-up of 
civilian assets
-High-readiness
reserves
-Multirole platforms
-Multiple missions 
assigned to same 
units
-Modular payloads
-Structural and 
operational readiness
-Modular Order of 
Battle
-Functional 
Flexibility in 
Training and 
Doctrine
-Strategic transport 
-Compatible C2
-Organic logistics 
and combat support
Medium 
Term 
(weeks to 
months)
-Structural 
Readiness to prepare 
for a single risk.
-Preparations for 
specific industrial 
surges
-Platforms ‘Fitted 
for, not with’
-General Reserves
- Structural readiness 
to prepare for several 
concurrent risks.
-Broad platform 
inventory
-Cultural tolerance 
of changes to 
doctrine
Medium 
Term 
(months 
to years)
-Low-readiness
reserves
-Mobilization
readiness
-Prototyping without 
procurement
Long
Term
(years)
n/a -Mobilization
readiness
-R&D
n/a n/a
In a discussion of the trade-off of capability over time, Betts distinguishes three kinds of
n o  n  q
military readiness that all need to be integrated in order to form a coherent strategy. 
They can readily be integrated into the framework proposed here:
368 Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 40-43.
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• Operational readiness* relates to the difference between the full combat 
potential of existing military units and their current potential. Operational 
readiness minimizes this difference through investment in training, stockpiling 
of munitions, spare parts and supplies, the maintenance of wartime manpower 
and materiel levels. Operational readiness is thus useful if it is necessary to 
prepare for combat within days or weeks. But it is difficult and expensive to 
maintain and therefore requires specific answers to such questions as which 
elements of the force structure need to be kept at high levels of readiness, what 
the requirements for this readiness are in terms of, for example, munitions and
*>70
supply stocks, or what lift capability is necessary to deploy. Ceteris paribus, 
operational readiness therefore only helps to deal with those, fairly specific 
situations in which the quantity of troops kept at high readiness is sufficient to 
achieve strategic effect, in which they have the right quality to meet the enemy’s 
challenge, and in which they can get to the point where they are needed in the 
first place. Operational readiness is, therefore, primarily a hedge.
• Structural readiness* relates to the extent to which the military potential inherent 
in a nation’s population and economy has been transformed into military units 
(comprising personnel, weapons- and support systems), regardless of their state 
of operational readiness. It is thus the relevant type of readiness to meet 
demands for combat capability that are expected within months or at most a 
couple of years, which are required to bring these units to an operationally ready 
state. Since structural readiness refers merely to the quantity of units available it 
is, ceteris paribus, also a hedge. If it is combined with operational readiness, 
however, both can provide a measure of flexibility in the short term since such a 
situation implies that quantitative restrictions are largely absent—this was, for 
example, the nature of the flexibility that allowed the United States to react to 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
• Mobilization readiness* relates to the degree to which preparations have been 
made to transform the military potential of a nation into actual capability. It 
comprises such elements as mobilization plans, industrial capacity and military 
technology. Broadly understood, it can refer to timescales of weeks or even 
days (for surges of industrial production with existing machinery and tools) to 
many years. In general, mobilization readiness tries in advance to reduce the 
problems that are caused by the over-proportional demand for inputs of any kind 
(including for military and industrial planning) during mobilization, when 
economic and physical flows need to be raised abruptly to augment stocks of
369 See, for example, the discussion in Colin S. Gray, ‘Mobilization for High-Level Conflict: Policy 
Issues,’ in The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and Priorities, eds. Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra’anan (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1983), pp. 33-49.
370 For a good survey of different methodologies and practices in determining munitions stockpiles, see 
William S. Andrews and William J. Hurley, ‘Approaches to Determining Army Operational Stockpile 
Levels,’ Canadian Military Journal, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 37-46.
371 For a good discussion of the problems o f mobilization in the recent context, see Irene Kyriakopoulos 
and Donald L. Losman, ‘The Economics of Mobilization in the Information Age,’ Joint Force Quarterly, 
no. 37 (2nd Quarter 2005), pp. 87-95.
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military equipment and personnel over time.372 Since it thus by definition 
involves a second stage investment, that of the mobilization itself, mobilization 
readiness in any form is an option.373
While hedging in the medium term is thus largely a question of structural readiness, 
options can be provided by preparations for industrial surges and reserves. Platforms 
that are fitted for but not with certain systems, or the development of prototypes without 
production (or very short production runs for industrial more than military reasons) also 
provide options over this timescale. Structural readiness to deal with several concurrent 
risks allows the achievement several different tasks with a portfolio of forces. 
Flexibility is inherent in forces with a tolerance for changes in doctrine, or a robust 
(civilian) industry that can respond quickly to new demands. For the provision of 
military capability in the long term, options are the only tool available, since hedges 
would be outdated and flexibility is meaningless when there are no constraints in the 
form of a legacy force (yet).
FIGURE 22: INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING TOOLS
Hedging /  Options / Portfolio /Flexibility
Short Term 
(days)
- Resupply Agreements 
- Replacement of Attrition
- Allied Assistance (Money, Intelligence, Logistics, Lorces, Diplomacy)
Medium Term 
(weeks to months)
- Access to New Platforms and Systems (e.g. Patriots for Israel 1991)
- Allied Assistance (Money, Intelligence, Logistics, Forces, Diplomacy)
Medium Term 
(months to years)
- Access to Industrial Capacity 
- Access to Technology
- Allied Assistance (Money, Intelligence, Logistics, Forces, Diplomacy)
Long Term 
(years)
- Access to Industrial Capacity 
- Access to Technology
- Allied Assistance (Money, Intelligence, Logistics, Forces, Diplomacy)
Although hedging, options, portfolio elements and flexibility can usually be readily 
distinguished in the context of domestic defence planning decisions, the distinction is— 
for two reasons—less analytically helpful for the international sourcing of defence 
assets, especially from allies: First, cost in this context is measured in financial as well 
as less identifiable political terms. Access to technology or intelligence information 
can, for example, not usually be bought with money, and although the political
372 For an introduction into these surge dynamics, see Rolf Clark, ‘The Hidden Implications o f Force 
Changes,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (Summer 1997), pp. 243-252.
373 For three, relatively rare post-Cold War examples that look at different kinds of military and industrial 
options to reduce mobilization times, see Defense Science Board, High Performance Microchip Supply 
(Washington D.C.: Department o f Defense, 2005); James A. Dewar, Steven C. Bankes, and Sean J.A. 
Edwards, Expandability o f  the 21st Century Army (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000); John Birkler, Joseph P. 
Large, Giles K. Smith, and Fred Timson, Reconstituting a Production Capability (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1993).
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investment in an alliance that has led to it is 'a price to pay’, it is impossible to 
disintegrate that relationship to identify the cost of specific aspects of the alliance. 
Second, allies have a history of providing direct financial assistance or material support 
free of charge, especially in times of crisis. Even if there is an identifiable financial cost 
associated with the sourcing of support from allies abroad, it is thus not certain who has 
to bear it in the end. Figure 22 therefore only distinguishes internationally available 
defence planning tools according to the timescale they are relevant to. In specific cases, 
however, it would nevertheless be possible to distinguish expected support according to 
whether it was a specific hedge with significant cost associated, an option that required 
a small investment in advance, or flexible in the sense that it was provided free of direct 
charge and with few conditions or constraints.374
5.2.3 The Development and Procurement o f Major Weapons Systems
The terminology developed above can also be applied to the development and 
procurement of major weapons systems. Such decisions lock important parts of the 
force structure in for decades to come, and major capability systems available in the 
short- and medium term are largely a consequence of decisions taken in the, sometimes 
distant, past. For all the reasons discussed in Sections 2.3, it is however impossible in 
practice to predict the security situation with any confidence over the long service lives 
of modem major platforms. Requirements for major programs and ways to fulfil them 
therefore inevitably have to deal with a growing uncertainty over time.
If they are properly maintained, major weapons systems can remain in the order of 
battle for a very long time—the upgraded B-52 bomber, for example, will be in service 
for the better part of a century. It is therefore possible to use them to achieve strategic 
effect over the short, mid- and long term, which implies immediate trade-offs since 
(often yet unknown) operational requirements will vary over this time. One possible 
way around this problem is to reduce the planned in-service life, optimise the platform 
for the requirements over a relatively short period, and replace it with a new model in 
the near future, which can be designed for the then better known, future requirements. 
Obviously, such an approach implies a need to treat a prohibitive strategic risk in the 
present that would justify the significant cost involved. The development and fielding 
of a quick succession of US interceptor aircraft to deal with Russian bombers in the 
1950s, for example, made it possible to provide urgently required capability and deal 
with technological as much as strategic uncertainty at the same time.
If such an approach is not possible (since lead-times are too long, or financial resources 
are insufficient), or not necessary (since risks over the short term are no greater, though 
usually more precisely known, than over the mid- or long term), the same platform 
needs to be able to treat different strategic risk over time. Traditionally, platforms are
374 There is, o f course, usually also the choice to use stockpiling or domestic production support instead of  
allied resupply. Economic modeling shows that low risk of supply interruption and high-risk aversion 
would favour domestic production support over stockpiling. See Martin C. McGuire, ‘Uncertainty, Risk 
Aversion, and Optimal Defense Against Interruptions In Supply,’ Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 17, 
no. 4 (August 2006), pp. 287-309.
375 Air Vice-Marshal Kerry Clarke, the Head Capability Systems in the Australian Department of 
Defence, estimated that 30 percent of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) major systems could be 
changed over a 10 year defence capability plan. Kerry Clarke, ‘Mapping the ADF’s Future Capability to 
Future Warfighting Concepts,’ Presentation at the Joint Future Warfighting Conference, Canberra, 20-21 
April 2005.
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thus designed to fulfil the known requirements of the short term, which in turn could 
require more of a hedge in the form of a platform optimised for a specific mission, 
modularity as part of a portfolio of forces, or multi-role capability to provide for flexible 
use. The uncertainty regarding the nature of the systems that would need to be 
integrated in the future—since future threats and technology are uncertain—has been 
managed through the inclusion of an additional option in the form of space, payload and 
power supply beyond that required by the initial configuration. The growth potential 
thus provided could then be used to enhance the capability of the platform in second- 
stage investments in the form of regular block upgrades. Ideally, the trade-off 
between the provision of initial capability on the one hand and the (financial and 
operational) cost of the option on the other hand should reflect the decisionmaker’s risk 
evaluation over that time.
Whether requirements are certain or uncertain has important consequences for the 
development and acquisition process as well. If they are deductively derived from 
intelligence about enemy systems and placed in a coherent theory of victory, 
requirements should be specific and made with a relatively high degree of confidence. 
Since it is imperative to fulfil them—it is known that the system would be deficient in 
combat otherwise—it becomes necessary to achieve the full requirement in one step. 
The resulting ‘grand design’ approach to acquisition has been used by many defence 
departments over the last decades, with consecutive phases of development, operational
^ 7 0
testing and large-scale fielding. Changes in requirements over time were dealt with 
by the provision of growth potential, as mentioned above, or by Preplanned Product 
Improvements (P I), which also consist of clearly defined requirements followed by
T 7Q
development, testing and fielding of new capability blocks.
If it is, however, not possible to precisely define requirements even in the short term— 
for example if the way in which enemies operate, and consequently the capabilities 
needed to defeat them, are unknown—it becomes possible to trade operational 
capability of individual systems for quantity, money, or even new information in the 
form of operational experience. In order to manage a project on the basis of cost as an 
independent variable, for example, “operational requirements ... should identify system 
characteristics and define threshold ranges required for user effectiveness and be treated
i o n
as interim versus final. ” When requirements are flexible in this way, evolutionary 
acquisition can also be used. Rather than beginning production only once the system
376 For a discussion of this strategy in the context o f Australian naval shipbuilding, see Australian 
Submarine Corporation, Improving the Cost-Effectiveness o f Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: A 
Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee o f the Australian 
Parliament, March 2006.
377 See for example the general discussion in Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (Washington D.C.: Department o f Defense, 2006), 
esp. pp. 4-9.
378 Richard K. Sylvester and Joseph A. Ferrara, ‘Conflict and Ambiguity: Implementing Evolutionary 
Acquisition,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (Winter 2003), pp. 3-27.
379 Wayne M. Johnson and Carl O. Johanson, ‘The Promise and Perils o f Spiral Acquisition: A Practical 
Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (Summer 2002), pp. 177- 
178.
380 Emphasis added. Michael A. Kaye, Mark S. Sobota, David R. Graham, and Allen L. Gotwald, ‘Cost 
as an Independent Variable: Principles and Implementation,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (Fall 
2000), p. 537.
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fulfils all criteria, as in the ‘grand-design' approach, platforms and systems are fielded 
in this method without fulfilling all initial requirements, if they nevertheless provide 
some operational value. In the United States, evolutionary acquisition is now the 
preferred acquisition strategy and usually based on spiral development. Unlike P3I 
based on block improvements, spiral development is explicitly based on the operational 
experience gained with earlier versions, and the exact modifications that will be fielded 
in each spiral are not determined in advance. Instead, various candidate elements are 
developed at the same time and thus represent options that can be implemented in the
T O T
next improvement block.
In this way, it is possible to use incrementally fielded capability to gain operational 
information and thus develop knowledge on how to achieve strategic effect against an 
enemy that is not well understood, or on how to use a completely new technology—an 
adaptive approach as discussed in Section 4.1.4. The US Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), for example, is charged with developing a global ballistic missile defence 
system, but its operational requirement documents were cancelled in 2002. Instead, it 
operates, together with the services, militarily useful capability as part of its testbed to
T O A
gain operational and technological expertise. The agency writes that this approach
allows the development of capabilities and objectives based on technology feasibility, 
disciplined engineering analysis, and our understanding o f the threat. It allows the 
Agency to exploit capability opportunities sooner, focusing on adding capabilities with 
demonstrated military utility rather than delaying to achieve a military requirement that 
may have been defined years earlier. ... It allows the Agency to refine program 
objectives as technology becomes available through experimentation and risk 
management, and factor in continuous feedback that is developed from regular 
interaction with the military operators and test community.383
Given the lack of precise information about the threat, as well as the fluid state of the 
new technology involved, the only basis that is available to infer realistic requirements 
is that generated by the program itself.
5.3 Four Ideal Defence Planning Concepts
This last section will define four ideal defence planning concepts. Each will integrate 
different risk patterns, ways of codification, and force structure concepts in a way that a 
configurational fit is maintained between all three steps.
381 For a good discussion o f the obvious difficulty in implementing such an approach, see Sylvester and 
Ferrara, ‘Conflict and Ambiguity: Implementing Evolutionary Acquisition.’
382 Johnson and Johanson, ‘The Promise and Perils o f Spiral Acquisition: A Practical Approach to 
Evolutionary Acquisition.’
383 For options in the development phase, see Cagan Ceylan and David N. Ford, ‘Using Options to 
Manage Dynamic Uncertainty in Acquisition Projects,’ Defense Acquisition Review Journal (Fall 2002), 
pp. 242-258.
384 For a discussion o f the particularities of the agency’s organization, see Timothy Biggs, ‘Blurring The 
Line Between R&D and Operations: The Missile Defense Agency’s Acquisition Approach,’ Defense 
AT&L Magazine (July-August 2005), pp. 24-27.
385 Emphasis added. Missile Defense Agency, A Day in the Life o f the BMDS (Washington D.C.: 
Department o f Defense, 2006), p. 6.
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5.3.1 Assumptions about Risk Patterns
Section 3.3.3 introduced a framework for evaluating strategic risk along three
t o /:
dimensions: Time, the identity of enemies, and their theory of victory. The resulting 
cube can be conveniently used as a basis for developing defence planning Gestalts, 
since different combinations of strategic risk can be represented by highlighting 
different quadrants of the cube. For the sake of simplicity, two categories will be 
considered here: First, prohibitive risks that the decisionmaker evaluates as being so 
important that treating them is imperative. Second, normal risks where this imperative 
does not exist, either since there is no information that would lead the decisionmaker to 
see specific risks or a case for precaution, or since the capabilities that are planned for 
dealing with other risks are judged to be inherently sufficient to cope with risks from the 
quadrant under consideration.
However, even if each quadrant is only considered to be either normal or prohibitive,
o
this would still lead to 2 , i.e. 256, possible combinations in an eight-quadrant cube. 
Despite the large number of defence planning concepts proposed in the literature, there 
are obviously not 256 basic types, and it would be neither possible nor informative to 
discuss each and every one of these risk combinations. However, a few simple 
assumptions about consistent risk patterns, outlined in the following, can help to reduce 
the number of combinations that have to be considered.
The first assumption is that at least one quadrant is judged to be prohibitive. Otherwise, 
there is no reason for the state to conduct defence planning at all. The empirical record, 
however, suggests that few, if any states see themselves able to completely dispense 
with defence preparations.
The second assumption is that if one of the four risk quadrants in the present is judged 
to be prohibitive, the corresponding quadrant in the future must be judged to be 
prohibitive as well. The contrary could only be true for one of two reasons: First, if 
there was information at the risk assessment stage that indicates that the risk will be 
reduced compared with the present. However, it is difficult to believe that, even if such 
indications exist, it would be possible to make a confident prediction of when exactly 
that would be the case, to the point where force planning decisions could be based on it. 
Also, a reduction of risk from a prohibitive level in the present to a normal level in the 
future would most likely be associated with significant social, economic, or political 
changes, which present a strong case for precaution. Second, there could be a case in 
which present risk was evaluated to be so large that its importance eclipses all future 
risk. In other words, a military challenge in the present could be so important that, if it 
was not met successfully, any planning for the future was meaningless. Israel in 1948 
or France and Britain in 1939 were in such situations, but here the problem of 
developing coherent defence planning concepts reduces itself to meeting quite obvious 
operational-level threats at all cost, and is very much different to the way in which 
similar questions would be approached in peacetime (which is the topic of this thesis). 
These first two assumptions leave 80 possible combinations.
The third assumption is that a state will not be faced with unknown enemies only. It is, 
of course, possible that decisionmakers do not have information at the risk assessment 
stage to confidently know who their (next) enemy will be, however there is then no
386 See Section 5.1.1 for a more elaborate discussion o f timelines in relation to strategic risk.
120
Four Ideal Defence Planning Concepts
reason why they should not consider, out of precaution, at least some states to be their 
enemies (for the purposes of defence planning only, of course). Even if there is 
insufficient information to identify those states that one is more likely to come into 
conflict with than others, outside the peculiar world of (some) international relations 
theory, no two states are alike. There will therefore always be some that are more 
menacing due to their relative economic potential or geographic location, and thus there 
will always be a case for precautionary judgments. Furthermore, this argument can also 
be justified if made within the top or bottom layer of the risk cube, i.e. that a state will 
not face prohibitive risk from unknown enemies using unexpected (or expected) 
theories of victory if it does not face known enemies who pose a threat of similar nature. 
This third assumption leaves 35 possible combinations.
Fourth, one can assume that if a state sees itself confronted with known enemies only, 
these will not all have unknown theories of victory. In other words, if a decisionmaker 
has enough information to enumerate all states that have to be considered enemies and 
can exclude all others from consideration as a threat, that information can be assumed to 
be sufficient to say that at least some of these identified enemies will behave and fight 
in ways that are understood. This last assumption leaves only 28 remaining 
combinations.
5.3.2 Ideal Risk Patterns and Theories o f Victory
FIGURE 23: FOUR IDEAL STRATEGIC RISK PATTERNS
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Several of the remaining risk patterns differ only marginally from each other (primarily 
in terms of future risk, as there are only eight types of present risk left), and most are 
combinations of other, more basic patterns. It is, therefore, possible to identify four 
basic Idealtypen of risk patterns that are of particular interest (Figure 23): An
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anticipated Prospective Threat in the future; a Clear and Present Danger in the present; 
a multitude of potential enemies that tie down Gulliver:; and a situation of uncertainty, 
change and Un-Order. Not only do they and their combinations define risk patterns that 
seem to directly or at least approximately capture the experience of most states 
throughout the times, they are also internally coherent and require very different 
methods to treat strategic risk.
FIGURE 24: INFERENCE AND IDEAL RISK PATTERNS
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These four ideal risk patterns differ significantly in the amount and reliability of 
information that is available on strategic risks. But as discussed in the previous 
sections, this has repercussions for the extent to which requirements can be discounted 
by warning- and reaction times, and which kind of inferential method can be used to 
determine them in the first place. In order to analyse the way in which codification can 
lead to requirements for each of the four ideal risk patterns, it is thus helpful to 
distinguish them according to whether the reliable information available on the 
enemies’ theory of victory is large (Clear and Present Danger and Gulliver) or small 
(Prospective Threat and Un-Order), and whether it is necessary to deal with one or few 
known enemies (Clear and Present Danger and Prospective Threat), or a large number 
of actual or potential ones (Gulliver and Un-Order) (Figure 24).
If information about the enemy’s (or enemies’) theory of victory is reliable and 
comprehensive, the capabilities as well as the way in which these would most likely be 
employed can be considered known. On the basis of this information, it is then possible 
to argue deductively and to derive specific requirements that would need to be fulfilled 
to foil the enemy’s plans and further one’s own goals. These requirements are thus 
derived from a detailed theory of victory developed in advance (see Section 2.1.5), i.e. a 
detailed conception of how and why a given tactical effort with given forces against a 
given enemy would ultimately lead to strategic success in furthering political goals. In 
other words, there is sufficient information available to use net assessment methods to 
determine the degree to which one’s baseline forces or proposed additions are adequate 
for dealing with the enemy’s capabilities and theory of victory. Requirements that are 
deductively inferred from a comprehensive and reliable body of information on the 
enemy can be fairly specific and made with a confidence that is directly proportional to 
the confidence placed in the information they are based on. Since indicators for
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warning can be reliably defined, warning times are generally available and requirements 
to reduce the impact of surprises can be specified with a reasonable degree of certitude. 
Tactical and strategic warning both reduce the extent to which specific provisions have 
to be made to deal with undetected or unexpected enemy actions. Both Threat-based 
Planning to deal with a Clear and Present Danger, and Multi-Threat Planning to deal 
with Gulliver fall into this category (See the left column of Figure 24).
All of this is however not the case in situations in which reliable information about the 
enemy is scare. Here, what is known about one’s own capabilities, intentions and 
various dimensions of strategy becomes the only reliable basis for inference, which has 
to take an abductive form. When the details or even the nature of the enemy’s 
technological, tactical, operational and strategic challenge are unknown, it is not 
possible to develop a full theory of victory to defeat them in advance. Instead, the 
defence effort (or, one might say, ex-ante theory of victory) has to limit itself to develop 
the means from which such a more detailed theory of victory can be built, once a risk 
becomes clearer or even materializes. Both Rearmament Planning to treat a 
Prospective Threat, and Task-based Planning to deal with Un-Order fall into this 
category. (See the right column of Figure 24).
If there is only one main risk to be treated, no further inductive step is required to define 
requirements. On the basis of the good informational basis, Threat-based Planning can 
thus use direct risk treatment to reduce the threat’s probability and consequences. In all 
other cases, the insufficient informational basis prevents such a direct approach. The 
ex-ante theory of victory must thus use indirect risk treatment methods (see Section 
4.1.4). As engineering approaches these are only indirectly transferable into the defence 
planning context, but Rearmament Planning would indeed concentrate on preparing 
one’s own capabilities (a ‘reagent’ approach).
In situations of Gulliver and Un-Order, the large number of actual or potential enemies 
makes it necessary to reduce the complexity and scope of requirements that would result 
if each of them would be considered separately. On the basis of inference, known 
threats can thus, for example, ‘typed’ into similar categories, under the assumption that 
a similar threat would require a similar response. Multi-Threat Planning would thus 
concentrate on such types of enemies (an ‘agent’ approach). As information about 
threats is however still lacking in a situation of Un-Order, Task-based Planning must 
concentrate on the generation of knowledge and use an ‘adaptive’ approach to 
incorporate new information. In the following four sections, each of the four risk 
patterns and corresponding defence planning concept will now be summarized and 
discussed in more detail.
5.3.3 Rearmament Planning
The first ideal risk pattern, Prospective Threat, consists of one prohibitive risk in the 
future from a known enemy. The absence of any prohibitive risk in the present 
indicates that such patterns are associated either with a generally stable regional or even 
global international system and balance of power, and/or such a margin of superiority in 
the present that no other state dares to or is capable of initiating hostile acts. In either 
case, it also indicates that the decisionmakers have high confidence in their ability to 
detect and understand risks, since they did not judge it necessary to take precautionary 
preparations for present threats. Future risk that would be consistent with such a stable 
and well understood situation must thus be caused by a known enemy and a way of
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seeking strategic effect that is understood in principle, yet because of its future nature 
not known in detail.
Details about the future threat are thus still scarce, and while it is judged to take a 
reasonably well understood form in terms of technology, tactics, and strategy should it 
materialize one day, the general lack of information does not allow a deductive analysis 
as a basis of defence planning requirements in a framework of Rearmament Planning. 
Instead, abductive analysis has to be used that (implicitly) departs from an assumed 
failure to achieve one’s political goals. Based on two main argumentative pillars, 
geography and one’s own capabilities, it is then possible to infer enemy actions that 
might have led to such a situation. Geography is a reliable basis for inference since the 
position of the enemy relative to one’s own territory and areas of interest is known. 
Projecting physical force over long distances and terrain obstacles inevitably requires 
physical effort and poses fundamental challenges in terms of logistics and military 
operations that can be assessed with relatively high confidence. Since the enemy’s way 
of seeking strategic effect is expected to take a form that is fairly well understood, the 
same is true for the effect that one’s own capabilities would have on the adversary’s 
planning in peacetime and operations and tactics in wartime.
However, reasoning of this kind can, by its nature, only describe possibilities, and there 
is thus a need to identify those future threats that are not only possible, but also probable 
or plausible. Intelligence information that is available on the (potential) enemy will, 
however, provide a strong case for assessing whether the assumed course of action is 
feasible for the adversary. Existing capabilities of potential enemies and the strategic 
warning times that can be assumed for the development of additional capabilities have 
to play a major role (as mentioned above, a situation of Prospective Threat is consistent 
only with a fairly well understood international order that is conducive to provide good
-> 0 -7
warning indicators). All in all, a situation of Prospective Threat thus gives 
reasonable confidence regarding the nature and type of possible future requirements, but 
their relative quantity in the force structure and the time by which they might be needed 
are yet unknown, since they depend on the potential enemy’s future moves. A theory of 
victory to treat that future risk will thus concentrate on the management of the ‘reagent’ 
or one’s own forces: The enemy’s capabilities as such only indirectly influence that 
theory, as the focus lies on maintaining the capability to produce a balanced force 
structure in the future.
The main way of treating this kind of future risk is through options, which allow 
deferring the second-stage investment to the time when strategic warning of a then- 
present risk is received, and more information regarding detailed requirements thereby 
becomes available. Platforms in the current force structure will therefore be optimised 
for the qualitative growth potential that they provide, for example by fitting them for, 
but not with the latest technology generation. Specific technical requirements that need 
to be fulfilled in the present are relatively imprecise, can be primarily related to the 
development of doctrine and of a trained cadre of personnel, and be selectively traded
387 For a discussion of the role of both factors as a basis o f abductive Australian defence planning, see 
Thomas-Durell Young, ‘Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: The Australian Experience,’ Armed 
Forces & Society, vol. 21, no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 349-369, also published in a shorter version as 
Thomas-Durell Young, Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian Experience (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993). However, the concept described there does 
not fully coincide with the ideal concept outlined here, since it does not deal with future threats proper.
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for cost with relative ease. There is, therefore, no reason to divert from the "grand- 
design’ model of acquisition, although considerations regarding the maintenance of an 
industrial base capable of adapting existing systems, as well as producing new ones, 
will feature relatively prominently.
FIGURE 25: FOUR IDEAL DEFENCE PLANNING METHODS
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5.3.4 Threat-based Planning
The second ideal risk pattern consists of a prohibitive risk, in the present, from a known 
enemy with a known theory of victory. Depending on the innovativeness of the enemy, 
prohibitive risks in the future might also include unknown ways of war and capabilities 
by the same enemy. However, the overall risk pattern is characterized by a situation 
that does not involve much informational uncertainty since it is dominated by a present 
Clear and Present Danger, which is known and has to be met. The number of detailed 
varieties in which the threat could materialize is thus relatively small, making it possible 
to use Threat-based Planning. Furthermore, since the terrain, tactics and doctrine, 
technology, capabilities and political implications are generally understood, the 
requirements to treat strategic risk can be deductively defined in a very detailed and 
specific manner. They flow directly from the application of net-assessment methods to 
the theory of victory, and are therefore precise, coherent (in the sense that they are 
derived from one scenario or threat), can be made with a relatively high degree of 
confidence, and treat risks directly. There is thus no need for the more indirect
O Q O
precautionary approaches.
In such a situation, the force structure will thus be optimised to execute the theory of 
victory against the given enemy, and hedging is the tool of choice. Units as well as 
platforms are specialized for their roles and designed to fulfil precise technical 
specifications. The introduction of new systems can be structured along the grand- 
design approach of consecutive development, testing and production—systems that do 
not fulfil requirements yet are known to be deficient in combat and there is, therefore, 
generally no reason to introduce them prematurely. Future risk will be considered 
through pre-planned block upgrades that allow taking the expected development of the 
enemy’s capabilities into account. If options are used, for example in the form of 
industrial surge capacity or reserve units, the reason are the savings that they can 
provide. The associated choices are not important, given the precise requirements that 
will need to be fulfilled, and second-stage investments (in the form of surge production 
or call-ups of reserves) can be planned with great detail in advance.
5.3.5 Multi-Threat Planning
The third ideal risk pattern, called Gulliver, consists of a multitude of threats from 
known and unknown enemies, all of which are however using theories of victory that 
are fairly well understood. In contrast with the previous two patterns, which are 
dominated by one or at least a very small number of enemies, this one is characterized 
by a large number of potential threats. All of the potential enemies are source of 
strategic risks, which are not however expected to necessarily realise themselves at the 
same time. Herein lies the main characteristic of the defence planning concept of Multi- 
Threat Planning. Of all four ideal risk patterns, the situation of Gulliver is closest to 
strategic overstretch: If there are more unequivocal actual and potential threats than can 
be simultaneously met with available resources, politicians are generally called upon to
388 This is by no means meant to imply that even in such a situation the possibility o f surprise would not 
be a problem— as, for example, Richard Betts has cogently discussed for the NATO case (Betts, Surprise 
Attack: Lessons fo r Defense Planning). However, surprise here is more likely to be due to incertitude 
than ignorance, and its overall importance needs to be seen relative to the other cases discussed in this 
thesis.
389 This does not mean, however, that the acquisition process should proceed at a leisurely pace.
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reduce their country's exposure by limiting commitments, accommodating differences 
or seeking help from new allies.
Although the information available on each potential threat is probably less 
comprehensive than in the situation of Clear and Present Danger, since attention has to 
be paid to a larger number of actors, net assessment-based requirements for strategic 
success against any one of the potential enemies can however still be defined with 
relative ease.390 But when a decision on how to treat a given risk is made, opportunity 
costs in a situation of Clear and Present Danger only arise between the treatment of 
strategic risk on the one hand and other, civilian uses of resources on the other hand. In 
the case of a Gulliver risk pattern, the situation is different since trade-offs must be 
made between the treatment of different strategic risks as well. The treatment of some 
risks may require certain specific capabilities, a need which will act as an additional 
constraint on the optimisation of force structures for other contingencies. A 
fundamental theorem of optimisation mathematics is that it may be necessary in such a 
situation to reconsider the whole problem on its own terms, rather than to simply apply
T Q  1
new restrictions on the unrestricted best solution. In other words, it is not possible to 
simply downscale and combine the best treatment of each individual strategic risk, but 
instead the whole risk pattern has to be considered as one coherent problem that needs 
to be treated as a whole. This can lead to ‘second-best’ solutions for individual 
contingencies that can be quite different from those that would be adopted for each risk 
on its own terms.
Since it is not known who among the number of potential enemies will become an 
actual enemy in the future, the main problem in Multi-Threat Planning is to balance the 
large number of requirements that, although fairly well known, are too large to be met 
simultaneously. The challenge is to reduce the complexity and scope of the 
requirements to a size that can be handled with available resources, and the main 
problem is one of significant uncertainty regarding which of the possible threats will 
materialise in the end. Two complementary approaches can be used to deal with this 
type of uncertainty, which prevents the direct treatment of each specific risk: A theory 
of victory for dealing with classes or types of enemies (‘agent’ management), and 
inductive reasoning during codification.
Since enemies are reasonably well understood in the situation of Gulliver, it is possible 
to develop the requirements to deal with them from the information available on their 
capabilities and theories of victory. Risk treatment as agent or enemy management can 
be based on the assumption that threats of a similar kind require responses based on 
similar capabilities (such as counterinsurgency capabilities, defence of Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC), conventional combined arms operations, or nuclear deterrent 
forces). The extent to which these different capabilities—which are not specific to one 
enemy but able to ‘manage’ a threat by any of them—have to be provided is ultimately 
based on a judgment regarding the degree of concurrency of similar threats that has to
390 Paul K. Davis proposes to use a ‘scenario space’ to account for this type o f uncertainty. See Davis, 
‘Protecting the Great Transition,’ pp. 135-164.
391 R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, ‘The General Theory of Second Best,’ Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 24, no. 1 (1956-1957), pp. 11-32.
392 The Royal Navy was for a long time able to evade the difficulty of the ‘Gulliver’ type situation since it 
had the resources to simply assume war with the next two biggest navies, converting the problem into one 
o f ‘Clear and Present Danger.’
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be expected. In some situations, information on the propensity of actual and potential 
enemies to take advantage of one’s occupation elsewhere can be used to make that 
judgment. However, it will usually be primarily based on inductive reasoning on the 
basis of history, i.e. experience.
The treatment of such a multitude of well defined risks requires a portfolio of forces
' I Q ' l
optimised against a basket of several well-defined types of threats. Platforms will 
thus tend to be multi-role or even modular, in order to fulfil a number of different sets 
of requirements that are precisely defined in their technical specifications, since they are 
derived from complete theories of victory to deal with particular classes of enemy. The 
acquisition can thus also be expected to follow the grand-design model, but the option 
of industrial and personnel surge will be more important than in the Threat-based 
Planning method, in order to deal with an unexpected number of concurrent operations.
5.3.6 Task-based Planning
The fourth ideal risk pattern to be discussed here is that of a situation in which a state is 
again faced with a multitude of enemies, who however use theories of victory that are 
unexpected and not well understood. This pattern is called Un-Order, meaning not the 
absence of order but a type of order that does not conform with one’s experience (like 
the not living, nor dead 'un-dead’ horror characters).394 A situation in which a state’s 
decisionmakers do not understand their enemies is obviously one of a great potential 
volatility, and it is most likely that enemies of both known and unknown identity pose 
prohibitive risk.
While the main difficulty in a risk pattern of Gulliver lay in the need to balance various 
risks, these risks and their treatment were at least fairly well understood. The situation 
here is different, and the difficulty of treating a multitude of risks is compounded by the 
fact that it is not obvious how each individual risk could be best reduced in the first 
place. There might be some consolation in the fact that such periods of large 
uncertainty are most likely to be only transitory, until order re-establishes itself or 
experience and research elucidate the new environment and ways of dealing with it. 
However, this transitory nature might only be evident to later historians, and a new 
order is also often associated with a new power that is able to impose it—an ominous 
prospect for those who enter the ‘dark age’ as a still dominant player. Arguably, aspects 
of Un-Order confront the United States and many of its allies since 9/11, if not since 
1991.395 It is for these times of Un-Order that the concept of Task-based Planning is 
required.
393 See, for example, Paul K. Davis, Gompert, and Kugler, Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis 
of a New Framework. A more detailed methodology that could be used for such a task is described in 
Richard J. Hillestad and Paul K. Davis, Resource Allocation for the New Defense Strategy: The 
DynaRank Decision-Support System (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998).
394 This use of the word Un-Order has been borrowed from Kurtz and Snowden, ‘The new dynamics of 
strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world.’
393 See for example National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), which presents a view o f the future that is highly consistent with the 
‘quad-chart’ reproduced in Figure 7 (See Flournoy, ‘Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defence 
Review Right?’, pp. 70-71. For an earlier but similarly influential study, see Joseph A. Engelbrecht, 
Robert L. Bivins, Patrick M. Condray, Merrily D. Fecteau, John P. Geis and Kevin C. Smith, Alternate 
Futures for 2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise (Maxwell, AL: Air University, 1996). See also
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Since the identity of enemies is often not known yet, and threats are not well understood 
regarding the technology, tactics, or general ways used to seek strategic effect, specific 
requirements are not known in any detail, and the basis of reliable information that can 
be used for inference is very small. There are, however, two areas in which information 
is available, and which can be used to infer scenarios on an abductive basis: One’s own 
capabilities as they exist in the baseline structure, and the nature of war as a physical 
contest between two opposing wills. Wylie writes that
The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the 
final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins. ... [I]f the strategist is 
forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or must present as an 
inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun.396
The defence planner’s task in a situation of Un-Order is thus, at its most basic level, to 
define those tasks that would allow him to put ‘men with guns’ into places where they
TQ7
could exercise control over the enemy, or to prevent the enemy from doing the same.
It is known that moving these men with guns requires physical effort, and that 
overcoming the enemy’s resistance does so, too. Therefore, it is still possible to define 
core tasks—hence the label Task-based Planning—that the defence force must be able 
to accomplish even in the face of the enemy’s opposition, which, whatever form it will 
take, must at least conform with the same physical laws. 398 In very general terms, 
capabilities that would be required are thus, for example, the protection of troops 
against kinetic effects, the movement of men and material independent of whatever 
infrastructure or supplies are available locally, the ability to communicate with 
dispersed units, the ability to gain intelligence about the enemy, the ability to bring 
kinetic energy of various amounts upon identified targets of various natures, and the 
preservation of local air and naval superiority. Often, these capabilities can be 
described in a more detailed form if additional information about the geopolitical 
situation is taken into account.399
Michael Fitzsimmons points out that it is especially important to maintain analytical 
rigour and transparency if uncertainty is judged to be high: A general belief in the 
prevalence of uncertainty can otherwise encourage decisionmakers to reject any 
prediction based on analysis of available data, and thus increase rather than decrease the 
influence of rigid preconceptions. He is also correct in mentioning the importance of 
making use of those aspects of future threats that are known, little as they may be400—
College Architectes de systemes de forces-Officiers de coherence operationnelle (DGA/EMA), Synthese 
du plan prospectif ä 30 ans (Paris: Ministere de la Defense, 2005).
396 Emphasis in original. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory o f Power Control, p. 72.
397 It is, o f course, somewhat paradoxical that historical experience should be most important if the 
present and future seems most unfamiliar. For a discussion of this point, see Eliot A. Cohen, ‘The 
Historical Mind and Military Strategy,’ Orbis, vol. 49, no. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 575-588.
398 For an early formulation of this idea, see Clark A. Murdock, ‘Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning,’ 
Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994/95), pp. 28-35.
399 See for example the list in Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, 
Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p. 20.
400 Michael Fitzsimmons, ‘The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning,’ Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 
(Winter 2006-07), esp. pp. 131-136.
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they could, for example, be used to prioritise between, or even rule out, some of the 
abductively postulated risks. For Task-based Planning to succeed, it is thus important 
to make explicit use of abduction, with all the caveats that are both the strength and 
weakness of this inferential method to define possibilities.401
Overall, however, requirements can only be inferred with a very high degree of 
abstraction, which has two important consequences compared with other defence 
planning concepts (especially those where information regarding the enemy is high): 
First, there is usually no logical basis, other than precaution or the prevention of 
obvious vulnerabilities, for specific detailed technical requirements, since the threat that 
they will face is uncertain to begin with. Other parameters, such as the cost of fulfilling 
a requirement, can thus play a relatively more important role in deciding where to spend 
a marginal dollar. Second, there is significant uncertainty whether the implemented 
solution will be up to the (yet unknown) challenge. Redundancy through capabilities 
based on different and independent systems, which will not suffer from the same 
vulnerabilities, is thus especially valuable here, while it would usually be regarded as 
wasteful if the information that is available on the enemy is comprehensive.402
Since there are strategic risks in the present that need to be met, the interaction with 
these present enemies, known or yet unknown, will provide additional information that 
can be used to infer more specific requirements. The aim of the theory of victory will 
thus be, to some extent, to use ‘adaptive’ approaches in the sense that specific moves on 
one’s own part, or specific capabilities, can be used to ‘explore’ the enemy’s reactions, 
or any other way in which the defence planning challenge can be elucidated. Of all four 
ideal concepts, defence planning here is closest to the conduct of an experiment with the 
aim of generating new information, and consequently requires a particularly open mind 
and willingness to discard old solutions.
In general, it is thus much less certain and also much less probable in these situations 
that the defence preparations that are optimal ex-ante will turn out to have been so ex­
post. Indicators, which are central to intelligence warning systems, cannot be defined 
with the necessary certitude as there is no clear indication of what exactly to look for. 
Reliable tactical warning is thus impossible to achieve, and even strategic warning can 
be hampered if the ability to make sense of observed developments is limited. Given 
the small amount of information available on strategic risks, it is thus especially 
important here to prevent surprise attacks from being conducted in a way that could 
cripple the defence, rather than trying to evade them altogether. Ceteris paribus, 
requirements to treat strategic risk thus tend to be greater than if the informational basis 
of planning is good, as they must take account of the need to prepare for unexpected as 
well as identified threats.
401 Davis and Khalizad point out the similarity of ‘Mission-Puli’ planning and deductive, largely top- 
down ‘Objective-based’ planning. (Davis and Khalilzad, A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning, 
p. 27). However, since the logical basis for the definition o f tasks is a different one, the confidence with 
which more detailed requirements can be defined is significantly different as well.
402 Of course, redundant capabilities always complicate enemy planning. But the point is that in a 
framework o f ‘Threat-based Planning,’ the difficulty that retaining these capabilities causes for the enemy 
is relatively precisely known and, in the end, part of the operational theory o f victory. In a framework of  
Task-based Planning, redundant capabilities for the implementation o f core tasks become an end in 
themselves.
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A force structure that can treat this kind of strategic risk must necessarily be a flexible 
one—there are no requirements precise enough to allow hedging to be used, and the 
need to be already prepared in the present for future risks reduces the applicability of 
options. The confidence with which strategic success can be expected with these 
preparations will, however, always be uncertain, and this will tend to lead to higher 
desired force levels out of precaution (which can also be used to deal with the strategic 
surprises that are likely to occur). It follows that Task-based Planning is unlikely to be 
a cheap way of structuring a defence capability. In order to be flexible, platforms are 
likely to be multi-role capable or modular, and there are few reasons not to trade 
specific technical requirements for reduced cost, earlier fielding or operational 
experience with new systems. Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development, 
without clearly delineated development, testing and production phases, is therefore the 
acquisition method best suited for this kind of situation.
In summary, this chapter has discussed how political guidance must be codified into 
strategic guidance. Intelligence information regarding the threat, dimensions of strategy 
as relating to one’s own side, and the theory of victory are brought together in this step. 
But in order to define requirements over time, these need to be ‘discounted’ through the 
use of tactical or strategic warning and reaction time considerations. The available 
information will only sometimes allow deductive inference. Otherwise, abduction must 
be used, and in either case induction can reduce the complexity and scale of 
requirements. These requirements then must be fulfilled by a force structure.
Depending on their specificity, hedges, options, portfolios, or flexibility will be 
emphasized at the level of the overall force structure, and of individual capabilities and 
platforms. Together with some considerations regarding four basic, coherent risk 
patterns, the considerations outlined above can be used to define the four ideal defence 
planning concepts Rearmament Planning, Threat-based Planning, Multi-Threat 
Planning, and Task-based Planning. The second part of this thesis will now use eight 
exemplary case studies to illustrate these four ideal concepts.
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PART II: 
PRACTICE
A REMARK ON NORMATIVE THEORY 
AND EXEMPLARY EVIDENCE
As mentioned in the introduetion, this thesis is normative in nature. This has direct 
implications for the use of logical approaches that would be less defensible in a positive 
(i.e. descriptive) theory. Samuel P. Huntington writes that
People sometimes argue that military policy involves the determination o f the military 
programs and actions required to implement a given set o f national goals. National 
policy ... is decided first, and military policy then follows, subordinate to the more 
“ultimate” goals of higher policy. This image is a logical construct o f what people 
think military policy ought to be. It is an image, however, which has little basis in fact.
... Military policy ... is the result o f politics not logic, more an arena than a unity.403
This is of course a valid point in the case of studies that have an overall positive 
character and deal wdth the policy process as it occurs in reality. However, it is not 
applicable to a study such as this one, which is mainly normative in nature and only 
concerns itself with what the policy process and outcomes should be, not how they 
would be brought about. Every normative theory is, of course, at its most fundamental 
level based on statements of a positive nature. Nevertheless, these are central to 
theories that try to explain real phenomena (i.e. those with positive aims) in a way that 
they are not to a normative theory (at least as long as it does not claim direct, Jominian 
applicability).
Hans Albers reminds in a blunt yet salutary warning that “all epistemic certainties are 
self-constructed and thus worthless for the comprehension of reality.” 404 Although final 
proof of the universal validity of a theory is impossible, empirical testing of falsifiable 
hypotheses derived from it can lead to its (provisional) acceptance.405 On the basis of 
its power of explanation, it is then also a means for prediction.406 But what is being 
empirically tested in the case of a normative theory is always the positive underpinning, 
which explains why behaviour in accordance with the recommended actions leads to 
greater success or satisfaction, however defined, than behaviour not in accordance with 
it. The normative part, primarily the definition of success or failure, is value-based and 
not a part of objective, testable reality.
403 Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, p. 2.
404 Translation by author. Hans Albert, Traktat über die kritische Vernunft (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 3rd 
revised edition, 1975),p. 30.
405 Karl R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 3rd revised edition, 1969), pp. 6-8.
406 Hans Albert, ‘Theorie und Prognose in den Sozialwissenschaften,’ in Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 
ed. Emst Topitsch (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Wisch, 3rd edition, 1966), p. 130-131. The validity of a 
prediction is, however, limited to the initial conditions applied to the theory. Social science theories thus 
cannot be used for historical prophecy, since society develops as a whole and these conditions, which by 
definition lie outside the area explained by the theory itself, can change. Karl R. Popper, ’Prognose und 
Prophetie in den Sozial Wissenschaften,’ in Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, ed. Topitsch, pp. 116-118
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In the area of public economics, for example, the validity (or at least completeness) of 
normative theories of government can thus be tested by empirically comparing the 
relative importance of market and state failures, respectively. 407 Economics is, 
however, an area in which a multitude of similar and quantifiable situations can be 
subjected to statistical analysis under ceteris-paribus assumptions. But due to the nature 
of the research topic, the unavailability of data, and the strong influence of 
idiosyncrasies and path-dependence in defence planning, the theory developed in this 
thesis needs to be tested in a qualitative way.408 As defence planning is an area in 
which “boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident,” 409 it is 
best analysed in an individual case study approach. Testing normative theories with 
case studies is, however, anything but straightforward as the aim is not to explain 
observed behaviour, but to make a statement regarding its appropriateness or 
effectiveness.
In many respects, the problems faced by this thesis are similar to those confronted by 
philosophers of science looking for criteria to decide on the relative merits of scientific 
methods: In general, idiosyncrasies are so great that case studies cannot be construed as 
controlled tests.410 Analysing the outcome of observed behaviour in a case study thus 
does not in and of itself give conclusive information on whether it was the result of 
particular factors or of the issue to be analysed. The use o f counterfactuals in an 
‘intuitionist’ approach has obvious attractions not only to philosophers, but fails to solve 
this problem as it would not provide a basis to question the intuitions involved, which 
directly relate to the normative issue in question.411 There is unfortunately no 
methodologically satisfying answer to this problem yet. The crux of the issue is the 
following question: Should a divergence of observed behaviour from that
recommended by the theory lead to the rejection of the theory, or to the rejection of the 
behaviour observed? Daniel Baumslag writes, in the context of normative theories of 
science, that the question is
how we can check whether a scientist’s behaviour was indeed justified. The simplest 
way of doing this, showing that what the scientist did was consistent with certain 
widely accepted scientific norms, is not available to us, since we are here dealing with 
cases in which the norms and the action diverge. But there are frequently other ways of 
deciding whether a given approach is justified. ... [W]e can draw on rules o f rationality 
and practical reasoning which are not purely scientific, but which constitute generally 
acceptable principles o f rational behavior [sic!]. ... So we can often decide whether a 
given scientists’ [sic!] arguments were justified. A more difficult question is how these
407 Joseph J. Cordes, ‘Reconciling Normative and Positive Theories o f Government,’ American Economic 
Review, vol. 87, no. 2 (May 1997), pp. 169-172.
408 For an overview on qualitative research methods, see John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and 
Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998).
409 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 
3rd edition, 2003), p. 13.
410 See David Baumslag, ‘Choosing Methods,’ Ratio, vol. 14, no 2 (June 2001), pp. 121-124.
411 Larry Laudan, ‘Some Problems Facing Intuitionist Meta-Methodologies,’ Synthese, vol. 67, no. 1 
(April 1986), pp. 115-129.
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wider principles are to be justified, but this is one for general philosophy rather than 
philosophy of science to answer.412
This seems to be the best approach to validating the theory proposed in Part I, and will 
be the approach taken in this thesis (knowing, of course, that given the uncertainty 
inherent in a risk management situation the course of action that is correct ex-ante will 
usually not be so ex-post).
There is, however, the additional problem that no comparable normative theory exists. 
In the absence of an alternative theory, the null hypothesis to be tested would therefore 
be that there is no valid normative framework for defence planning that transcends time 
and geographical, political and technological contexts at all, and that the 
appropriateness of a defence planning decision is determined by the particular 
circumstances of that decision alone. However, due to the problems discussed above, 
showing that defence planners in different circumstances but facing similar risk patterns 
behave in similar ways would not be proof for either, as it is evidence for positive 
behaviour, not the validity of normative recommendations.
It is, therefore, necessary to relax the strict demands of social science methodology 
regarding the testing of theory, and instead use examples to demonstrate rather than 
prove the theory developed in this thesis. With Gray, the author believes that in the 
applied area that strategic studies is, intellectual constructs are “more or less useful 
rather than true or false.”413 Demonstrating how the theory can illuminate, and be 
illuminated by, historical examples can make it both more useful414 and provide a ‘test’ 
at the same time—although the methodological problems mentioned above must 
relegate this aspect to second place. The choice of examples can, however, still be 
informed by methodological recommendations on the choice of case studies. They 
should therefore provide theoretical replication, on the basis of different initial 
conditions, and at the same time cover periods that are long enough to argue on the 
basis of multiple-in-case congruence, i.e. the covariance between observed predicted 
variables over time, as well as causal process tracing.415 In other words, the examples 
used to demonstrate the theory developed herein should both cover a variety of risk 
patterns, as well as analyse the same countries over time in order to eliminate the 
influence of geography, culture and other idiosyncrasies. All of these points have been 
taken into account in the case study selection, as discussed in Section 1.4.
412 Daniel Baumslag, ‘How to Test Normative Theories o f Science,’ Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science, vol. 31, no. 2 (December 2000), pp. 271-272.
413 Gray, Strategy for Chaos, p. 17.
414 Arguing by historical example is, o f course, not without danger in an applied field, as discussed in 
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time (New York: The Free Press, 1986). The 
purpose here is, however, an indirect one as it is not the aim to propose direct analogies, but to 
demonstrate how the theory applies in different situations— one might say to appeal to Cohen’s ‘historical 
mind.’ Eliot A. Cohen, ‘The Historical Mind and Military Strategy.’
415 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students o f Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 61-67. See also Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, pp. 47, 97-101, 116- 
137. It goes without saying that evidence presented in the examples will need to be verified, as far as 
possible, through triangulation of sources. See Robert E. Stake, The art o f case study research (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995), pp. 107-115.
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CHAPTER 6
REARMAMENT PLANNING
Rearmament Planning deals with situations in which a threat is only expected well in 
the future. The main value of the present force structure thus lies not in what it can 
achieve in its existing form, but in the basis that it provides (in the sense of an option) 
for expansion to meet a developing threat. The two examples discussed here are much 
further removed in time from each other than those in the following chapters. 
Nevertheless, they demonstrate, through success and failure, respectively, the 
importance of using immutable geography to shed light on the challenges that may lie 
ahead.
FIGURE 26: REARMAMENT PLANNING OVERVIEW416
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6.1 United States—The Interwar Years 1919-1938
US defence planning between the World Wars did not produce a strategy document akin 
to the White Papers or Reviews on which most of the other examples are based. 
However, a reformed Joint Army and Navy Board, or in short ‘Joint Board’, was re­
established in 1919, and began to adapt existing pre-war plans for the new era. This 
section will thus concentrate on general observations about the US theory of victory and 
strategic risk, and then look in greater detail at the role of the Colour War Plans in US 
defence planning. The period under study ends in 1938, when the Colour Plan system
416 This and the following Figures at the beginnings of Chapters 7, 8, and 9 reproduce the respective 
columns of Figure 25.
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was abandoned and the Joint Board began to prepare for an eventual conflict with the 
Axis powers.417
6.1.1 The American Approach to Warfare
It is easy to forget how much of an aberration the nature of America’s engagement with 
the world over the last 60 years has been, compared with the first century and a half of
A 1 Ö
the country’s existence. After that rather embarrassing episode of the War of 1812, 
the United States was the beneficiary of the largely benign nature of British seapower. 
For the following decades, it kept the country insulated from the international tensions 
of the time (small as they were, in any case, compared with the wars of the French 
Revolution). It also provided the real muscle behind the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, 
ensuring that the Holy Alliance would not reverse the independence of the former 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Western Hemisphere.419
For close to half a century following their second war against Britain, Americans were 
thus free to devote their energies to exploring their continent, expand the frontier of 
settlement further into the West, and begin an increasingly agonizing domestic debate 
about the ‘peculiar institution' of slavery. During that time, the US perspective on 
military matters strategic and tactical was dominated by the defensive—in the East, in 
the form of numerous harbour fortifications, in the West, in the protection of white 
settlers from the Indians. However, this general outlook was pared with a certain, one 
may say disturbing, ruthlessness in the use of force, which put an end to the sheer 
existence of numerous Indian tribes along the way, and did not shy from outright 
aggression when the advance of American settlers spilled into (Mexican) Texas.420
In the Civil War, the first great conflict of the industrial age,421 both sides tried to 
achieve decision by manoeuvre. However, and perhaps inevitably given the nature of 
the conflict, the war only ended once the Confederacy had collapsed between the 
constant grinding away at its Army of Northern Virginia by Grant’s Army of the
417 See Steven T. Ross, ed., American War Plans 1919-1941 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), pp. 
ix-xiv (introduction common to all volumes).
4IX For a discussions of US national style in strategy that endured, see Colin S. Gray, ‘National Style in 
Strategy: The American Example,’ International Security, vol. 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1981), pp. 21-47; 
Thomas G. Mahnken, United States Strategic Culture, Paper prepared for the Advanced Systems and 
Concepts Office, Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 13 November 2006, p. 7, 
<http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparitive_strategic_cultures 
curriculum/case%20studies/United%20States%20(Mahnken)%20fmal%2013%20Nov%2006.pdf> (30
April 2007). For questions relating to US military history, the author regularly consulted Allan R. Millet 
and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defence: A Military History o f  the United States o f  America, 
revised and expanded edition (New York: The Free Press, 1994). For background on general US history, 
the following two volumes were used: Udo Sautter, Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 
(Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1994), and Paul Johnson, A History o f  the American People (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1997).
419 Mark T. Gilderhus, ‘The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,’ Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1 (March 2006), pp. 5-16.
420 Peter Maslowski, ‘To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865,’ in The Making o f  
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Potomac, and the destruction of its economic and civilian base wrought by Sherman’s 
March from Atlanta to the sea, and up the Carolinas.422 The American approach to 
large-scale warfare became one of annihilation or, if necessary, attrition, of the enemy’s 
main military strength—in Virginia, on the Western Front, or the heart of Festung 
Europa—and also of his economic and societal war-making potential—in Georgia and 
the Carolinas, or Japanese and German cities.423 Despite the maritime nature of its 
relation to the rest of the World, the US approach to warfare was aggressive, offensive 
and large-scale, and did not display Britain’s quest for an indirect, limited approach.
Such an approach to the operational level of war rhymed with the American view of war 
as a political instrument, or rather non-instrument—in the words of the US Army’s 
1936 textbook on strategy,
Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins 
where politics end. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and 
command shall be regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics.424
American liberal culture regarded war as an aberration from the natural state of affairs, 
not a purposeful act of state for political aims. Consequently, it was to be rejected out 
of principle—a quite self-righteous attitude that was allowed to establish itself as a 
tradition by America’s favourable geostrategic location, as Henry Kissinger remarks:
We have confused the security conferred by two great oceans with the normal pattern of 
international relations ... A power favoured by geography or by a great material 
superiority, as we have been through most of our history, can afford to let a threat take 
unambiguous shape before it engages in war. ... And because many other states had to 
be attacked long before the threat to our security became apparent, we could always be 
certain that some powers would bear the brunt of the first battles and hold a line while 
we mobilized our resources. Thus we came to develop a doctrine of aggression so 
purist and abstract that it absolved our statesmen from the necessity of making 
decisions in ambiguous situations and from concerning themselves with the minutiae of 
day-to-day diplomacy.425
Rejection of a Clausewitzian conception of war as a political instrument meant that 
Americans were reluctant to use force—or, rather, believed themselves to be, since the 
Indians, Mexicans or Spanish would likely have a different reading of American culture
422 On the Civil War, see James M. McPherson, Battle Cry o f Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 
Ballantine Books, 1988).
423 Russell F. Weigley, ‘American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,’ in Makers 
o f Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, pp. 408-443. Weigley’s classic The American Way o f War, based on 
Delbriick’s distinction between attrition and annihilation, has elicited some criticism on its use of these 
terms of late (see Brian McAllister Linn, ‘The American Way of War Revisited,’ Journal o f Military 
History, vol. 66, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 501-533.), but this debate is less relevant for the point made here.
424 The Principles o f Strategy for An Independent Corps or Army in a Theater o f Operations (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1936), quoted in Mahnken, United States 
Strategic Culture, p. 7.
425 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 8- 
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in this regard.426 But if they had to wage it, the conduct of war was then unbound by 
limitations imposed by a political goal—especially if war was, for example, waged ‘to 
end all war’. If the United States did not demand full and unconditional surrender of the 
enemy who had led them to ‘sin' in the first place, it never (before Korea) settled for 
less than the enemy’s full acceptance of peace on US terms. Samuel Huntington writes 
that “[f]or the American a war is not a war unless it is a crusade,”427 an approach that 
allowed the United States to make full use of its material superiority to crush the enemy 
in wartime. However, it was not an attitude amenable to the open formulation of 
realistic and detailed politically guided theories of victory in advance to deal with 
strategic risk.
With regards to major threats, this difficulty was further compounded by the colonial 
heritage of the, at times somewhat anarchic, militia system in the United States. 
Although in practice the militia was largely ineffective already at the time of the 
revolution, as an ideal it remained the dominant form of US military organisation 
(although largely in the form of the volunteers). Volunteers were essential to raise 
forces for wartime duty as conscription was only used in the Civil and WWI, and never 
in peacetime. Various schemes to increase military effectiveness led to a bewildering 
array of reserve formations at the state and federal level. And mobilization efficiency 
improved in WWI over that in the conflict with Spain, the United States could not enter 
major conflict without first undergoing a messy and laborious effort to raise military 
forces in quantity. Able to rely on strategic warning on the basis of geography; having 
to raise a citizen army for war; reluctant to contemplate the use of force for political 
purpose; yet unlimited in its war goals (and commensurate effort) when it did, the 
United States naturally tended towards a framework of Rearmament Planning.
6.1.2 Strategic Risk in the Interwar Years
With the closing of the internal frontier in the 1880s and in line with global navalist 
fashion, the United States had begun at the end of the 19 century to build a navy more 
commensurate with its industrial potential. But although the Spanish-American war of 
1898 had made the United States an empire with possessions from East Asia to the 
Caribbean, and the use of military force abroad was to become a regular experience 
over the years that followed, the country did not create national-level bodies to 
coordinate security policy. Only the National Security Act of 1947, finally, created
426 Samuel P. Huntington makes the interesting observation that Americans generally do not regard the 
border fighting with the Indians as war, unlike the British perception o f imperial policing. Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1957), p. 152.
427 Ibid.
428 To a large degree, these resulted from the concurrent implementation of largely incompatible Army 
organisations— professional Uptonians seeking fully trained reserves to round out the federal Army, while 
proponents of the citizen army aimed for skeleton formations with regular officers (an approach that can 
be traced to, among others, George Washington) or fully reserve formations with citizen officers (as 
preferred by Jeffersonians). Since Emory Upton’s followers were at odds with American culture, they 
failed to move the locus of the main strength of the US military from the reserves or volunteers to the 
standing Army. For a good discussion o f the Uptonian and citizen soldier philosophies, see Russel F. 
Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought From Washington to Marshall (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1962), esp. pp. 100-242. The various types of militia, standing forces and volunteers 
over the years are also well treated in Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defence: A Military 
History o f the United States o f America.
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institutions comparable to the Committee of Imperial Defence that had guided British 
defence policy in the period under consideration here. Defence planning largely 
occurred at the service level—coordinated by the Joint Army and Navy Board, or Joint 
Board—with limited civilian input, including by the service secretaries. The State 
Department was wary of involving itself with the military and thought it “inadvisable” 
to work with Army and Navy planners. Neither it, nor the departments of the treasury 
or commerce provided geopolitical advice.429 In the absence of formal political 
guidance, the US military thus returned to dealing with the same or similar risks that 
had occupied it before World War I. The Senate’s rejection of the League of Nation’s 
treaty, and US non-ratification of the treaty of Versailles, made it abundantly clear that 
the enforcement of international obligations would not be one of them.
Several strategic risks were present ones, deductively inferable from the geopolitical 
situation, primarily in the Western hemisphere and Asia. First, these related to 
traditional roles of the federal military in terms of support to the civil authorities. By 
the 20 century, both the Indian threat and the post-Civil War administration of the 
South during the Reconstruction era were over. However, the Army played a major role 
in strike breaking, and the control of domestic dissent if state authorities, who controlled 
the National Guard, were unable (or unwilling) to enforce the law.430 Related to this 
role were intelligence activities, all of dubious legality but many clearly illegal, that 
targeted domestic radicals and suspected foreign agents of various sorts.431
Second, in terms of border protection, Mexico posed continuing problems. The civil 
war (or ‘Revolution’) from 1910 to 1921 had spilled repeatedly over the US border, 
with attacks motivated by both political and criminal motives. The US had landed at 
Veracruz in 1914, and the Army under Pershing had led a quixotic expedition in 1916 
into Northern Mexico in a vain attempt to find Pancho Villa, who had previously raided 
American border towns.432 Instability in Mexico continued well into the 1920s, and 
flared up again during the Cristero rebellion of 1926-1929, a bloody civil war over state 
repression of the Catholic Church.433
Third, the United States had significant commercial interests in Central America and the 
Caribbean, an area where also significant numbers of its nationals lived. In addition, the 
Panama Canal had significantly increased the region’s strategic importance, which 
however featured a large number of small independent countries of limited political and 
economic stability. Consequently, the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
429 Secretary of State Hughes said in 1921 that “I shall cordially avail myself o f the opportunity to do so” 
when asked to cooperate with the Joint Board. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to 
Defeat Japan 1897-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; Steven T. Ross, 
American War Plans 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 96-97.
430 Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, The Role o f Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 
1877-1945 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1997).
h31 Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); 
Roy T. Albert, Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left 1917-1941 (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1991).
432 Manuel A. Machado, Centaur o f the North: Francisco Villa, the Mexican Revolution, and Northern 
Mexico (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1988); John S.D. Eisenhower, Intervention: The United States 
Involvement in the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993).
433 Jean A. Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between Church and State, 1926-1929 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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Doctrine had claimed that the United States had the sole right and responsibility to 
exercise the ‘international police’ function in the Western hemisphere.434 Until its 
repudiation in 1934 by the second Roosevelt to become President, it served as the basis 
for repeated US interventions in Central America and the Caribbean to safeguard 
American commercial interests and hegemony, both before and after WWI.435 The 
United States effectively occupied Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic for 
several years, but while these Caribbean and Central American states were relatively 
small, the demands placed on the US military had such an operation become necessary 
in Mexico would have been very significant.
Fourth, the United States had two formal commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. After 
the Spanish-American war of 1898, it annexed the Philippine Archipelago against the 
will of most of the local population. What followed was a nasty guerrilla campaign in 
the new possessions from 1899 to 1902,436 which cost twice the combat deaths of the 
‘Splendid Little War’ and led to US atrocities especially in its last year.437 Although the 
war succeeded in pacifying the Archipelago, a renewed uprising remained a distinct 
possibility. The second US military task in Asia related to the safeguarding of 
international interests in China. American gunboats of the Yangtze patrol had policed 
that river since the mid- 19th century, and US forces protected the international
n o
settlements in Shanghai and other Chinese ports. China plunged into Civil War and 
widespread warlordism in the 1920s, and a renewed large-scale uprising against 
Western powers was a distinct possibility, which would have required an operation 
similar to the China Relief Expedition (the US contribution to the repression of the 
Boxer uprising in 1900-1902).
In addition to these present and rather limited risks, one future one loomed large—the 
danger of a confrontation with Japan over that country’s policies in China. Since 1900, 
the United States demanded both equal commercial access to China, and the 
maintenance of its administrative and territorial integrity—both of which were central to 
the policy of the ‘Open Door’ promulgated by Secretary of State Hay.439 In 1915, this 
policy led to serious contention with Japan, when the United States resisted its attempt 
to gain disproportionate influence through its 21 demands to the Chinese. Clayton 
James comments that
434 Serge Ricard, ‘The Roosevelt Corollary,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1 (March 2006), 
pp. 17-26.
435 Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America 
from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion o f Panama (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 157-285.
436 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); 
Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
437 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and The Rise o f American Power (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), pp. 120-124.
438 Bernard D. Cole, Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925-1928 (Newark: 
University o f Delaware Press, 1983); Dennis L. Noble, The Eagle and the Dragon: The United States 
Military in China, 1901-1937 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).
439 Jerry Israel, ‘”For God, for China and for Yale”-The Open Door in Action,’ The American Historical 
Review, vol. 75, no. 3 (February 1970), pp. 796-807.
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Like the illusion of amity with the French people since the 1770s, Americans cultivated 
a misperception of special friendship with the Chinese nation—a strange idea that was 
not buttressed by empirical evidence but pervaded official Washington, too.440
But although US sympathies for China can seem somewhat strange—and were certainly 
not reciprocated in a similar way—they were nevertheless real. Fortunately, Japan in 
the 1920s actively cooperated with Western powers in the League of Nations, militarily 
retreated from the Soviet Union, and engaged in arms limitation talks. Its domestic 
order showed trends towards democratic reform, including the rise of political parties, 
of trade unions, and the introduction of universal male suffrage.441 In the decade after 
WWI, the question whether the United States would militarily enforce the Open Door 
against Japan thus did not pose itself directly, but presented a future strategic risk that 
dominated war planning, in particular in the Navy (a point discussed in more detail in 
the next section). Due to the lack of civilian input, however, the military planners 
themselves had to define even basic US policy goals in a hypothetical conflict.
But like the eerily similar concurrent developments in the Weimar Republic, the 
positive trends in Japan of the 1920s occurred in a society and political system that were 
still highly illiberal and unstable. The industrial system was quasi-feudal, economic 
crises were severe, not the least due to the earthquake of 1923, and nationalist 
extremists repeatedly assassinated political opponents. Army activities in China 
bordered on insubordination, and the independence movement in Korea was brutally 
repressed. The Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931 in support of its de-facto 
sphere of influence there (in contrast to the principle of the Open Door) was 
accompanied by a spate of assassinations, as well as failed but lightly punished attempts 
at coups by the Army—both aspects of Japanese politics that would further increase 
during the 1930s.442
In 1932, the Stimson Doctrine declared that the United States would not recognize 
Japanese conquests in violation of the international treaties on China, and was—by the 
name-giving Secretary of State and incoming President Roosevelt, although not 
President Hoover—understood as a precursor to the use of economic and military 
sanctions.443 The risk of military conflict with Japan over China, while arguably not yet 
an unequivocal one, had distinctly shifted from being a future possibility to a more 
present prospect. The renewal of hostilities in 1937 led to Japanese massacres in 
Shanghai and the shelling of American (USS Panay) as well as British warships. It 
significantly aggravated the US-Japanese relationship, albeit at a time in which attention 
of European powers, especially, was already firmly focussed on the threat posed by 
Japan’s Anti-Comintern partners in Europe.
US opposition to Japanese designs in China did not derive from a vital national interest 
in the way it did regarding the necessity to prevent hostile domination of Western
440 D. Clayton James, ‘American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,’ in Makers o f Modern 
Strategy, ed. Paret, pp. 709.
441 Ibid., pp. 703-705.
442 Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers 1890-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 
49-119.
443 Richard N. Current, ‘The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,’ The American Historical 
Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (April 1954), pp. 513-542.
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Europe.444 But although the United States position was primarily moralistic, it 
nevertheless had very real consequences for decisionmakers in Tokyo. While it was 
unthinkable for the American polity to acquiesce in the results of Japanese aggression, 
that same polity largely did not want to face up to the possible consequences of its 
stance. Throughout the period under consideration here, war over China was never 
articulated as an option in public, nor realistically taken into account when defence 
policy and budgets were set well into the second half of the 1930s.
The same was true for strategic risks that ultimately related to the nation’s self- 
preservation, notably the imperative to prevent a situation in which the European 
continent would be dominated by a hostile hegemonic power.445 Although it was 
addressed on the basis of the precautionary principle in war plans, Walter Lippmann 
wrote in 1944 that the American people
had not had it demonstrated to them how much the defense of the Western Hemisphere 
depended upon having friendly and strong partners in the British Isles, in the French 
ports on the Atlantic, at Gibraltar and Casablanca and Dakar; or how much the defense 
o f the Philippines depended upon French Indo-China, and upon British Hong Kong,
Malaya, and Burma, and upon the attitude and the strength of Russia and upon China in 
Eastern Asia. ... Knowing that Japan was the only possible enemy we had to consider 
in the Pacific, we nevertheless turned upon our natural partners, Britain and France, and 
treated them as rivals whose armaments it was a diplomatic triumph to reduce.446
Contrary to popular perception, America did not retreat from the world in the 1920s and 
1930s—especially not in the former decade, when it was actively pursuing global arms 
limitation treaties, tried to find a mutually beneficial settlement of war debts and 
reparations, and participated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But US participation in 
international agreements consistently excluded, usually explicitly, any commitment to 
enforcement—including the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Four Power Treaty of 1922. 
As Henry Kissinger remarks,
Disillusionment with the results o f the war erased to a considerable extent the 
distinctions between the internationalists and isolationists. ... No significant group had 
a good word to say about the balance of power. What passed for internationalism was 
being identified with membership in the League of Nations rather than with day-to-day 
participation in international diplomacy.447
Even during the 1930s, isolationists thus did not usually advocate a reduction in 
American commitments overseas, for example in China. What they did advocate, 
however, was a conscious self-restriction in terms of the US ability to balance its 
commitments with commensurate power—be it through the formal or informal 
maintenance of the wartime alliance with Britain and France, through ‘offensive’ 
military forces that might be used to compel compliance, or through material support to
444 Although, ironically, that vital interest was not acknowledged at the time.
445 Nicholas Spykman, The Geography o f Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944).
446 Lippmann, US. Foreign Policy: Shield o f the Republic, pp. 38-41.
447 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 372.
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any country who, in defending itself, also defended US security.448 When the world 
situation took a turn for the worse in the early 1930s, the United States (like the other 
Anglophone countries) as a polity thus did not acknowledge growing present strategic 
risk and the need for a commensurate increase in defence preparedness. Luckily, it 
turned out that the geostrategic location of the United States, as discussed in the 
previous section, meant that addressing present strategic risk on the basis of a 
framework of Rearmament Planning did not lead to catastrophe.449 The following 
section will now look in closer detail at how US defence planners at the time dealt with 
the difficult task they had been given.
6.1.3 Defence Planning and Codification in the Colour Plans
Defence planning in the interwar years remained a service affair. However, the Joint 
Board was renewed in 1919 in a strengthened form. Its members were now not named 
as individuals any more, but participated ex officio. In its old form, the Joint Board was 
largely limited to signing off on war plans developed by either the Army or Navy. After 
1919, however, a Joint Planning Committee, consisting of the heads of respective 
service bodies involved in war planning, was developing joint plans upon direction by 
the Board. In addition, it could also initiate studies on its own, and bring plans to the 
attention of the Board.450 War planning was, however, only a small part of the Joint 
Board’s responsibility, and the bulk of the detailed planning work stayed in service 
hands. As Eliot A. Cohen remarks, “[t]he Board fell short of the integrated mechanisms 
of military planning that the services required, but it represented a substantial advance 
over the pre-1914 [era]."451
The Joint Board continued to use the colour-coded planning system it inherited from its 
predecessors. The United States, or BLUE, was pitted in various plans against 
individual or combinations of enemies, notably Japan (ORANGE), Great Britain (RED), 
Mexico (GREEN), Cuba (TAN), Philippine Insurgents (BROWN), China (YELLOW), 
Central American and Caribbean republics other than Cuba and Mexico (GRAY), or 
Latin and South American countries (VIOLET and PURPLE). In addition, Plan 
WHITE dealt with domestic disorder, and Plan BLUE was a plan for mobilization, not a 
war plan proper. Some of these plans existed in several variants (especially those 
covering several countries), and many of them spelt out more specific instructions for 
some or all Army and Navy districts, whose commands created and updated more 
detailed plans until the overall plan was rescinded. The Colour Plans were thus mainly 
what would today be referred to as contingency plans.452
448 Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, pp. 45-46; Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 369-382; 
Johnson, A History o f the American People, pp. 769-777; Eugene V. Rostow, A Breakfast for Bonaparte: 
US National Security Interests From The Heights of Abraham to The Nuclear Age (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 1993), pp. 253-332.
449 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘The strategy o f innocence? The United States, 1920-1945,’ ’ in The Making of 
Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Murray, Knox, and Bernstein, p. 437.
450 Ross, American War Plans 1890-1939, pp. 93-97.
451 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘The strategy o f innocence? The United States, 1920-1945,’ pp. 432-433.
452 The literature on the war plans o f the time is surprisingly small, perhaps since many o f them remained 
classified until 1974. A comprehensive overview, unfortunately in a very badly structured and edited 
form, is given in Ross, American War Plans 1890-1939. Facsimiles o f joint war plans are reproduced in 
Ross, ed., American War Plans 1919-1941. War Plan ORANGE is discussed in detail in the following
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This does not, however, capture all facets of the planning activity they contained. The 
establishment of dedicated planning staffs in the Service headquarters did not mean that 
the Army and Naval War Colleges, which had conducted war planning before WWI, 
left that field of activity. They continued to play supporting roles, none the least as the 
class of each year studied particular problems in detail, whose results then fed into the 
war planning process.453 War plans of the interwar period, especially Plans ORANGE 
and RED, thus continued to have an express educational aspect (which in particular 
benefited senior naval officers in WWII, who had thus throughout their career studied 
problems similar to those that confronted them in the war). In addition, several of the 
operational plans assumed the existence of BLUE forces beyond those available in 
reality—such as Plans ORANGE and RED, but also Plan GREEN. In addition, various 
versions of Plan ORANGE included elements that were challenging propositions in 
technological or operational terms, and certainly not feasible with existing capabilities. 
In short, in the absence of explicit political guidance and any other joint planning 
machinery, the Colour Plans also became means to define requirements for defence 
planning purposes. It is this latter aspect that is of particular interest for the discussion 
here.454
It is thus possible to pass relatively quickly over Plans WHITE, BROWN, YELLOW, 
TAN, and GRAY, as well as VIOLET and PURPLE. All of these responded to the 
present strategic risks discussed in the previous section, domestic (as in WHITE and 
BROWN) as well as foreign. China as well as Central America, the Caribbean and 
Latin America were obviously politically unstable at the time, and the United States had 
explicitly committed itself to military intervention (through the policy of the 'Open 
Door’, the Roosevelt Corollary and the Monroe Doctrine) should its interests be 
threatened. These plans were thus contingency plans proper, and of very limited 
relevance to capability development decisions per se (although they did, of course, 
influence the peacetime levels of forces deployed to the Philippines and China) . 455 Plan 
GREEN can be added to this list, even though it assumed (in its most ambitious version) 
a full-scale occupation of the country, involving BLUE force levels that would have 
been very difficult, if not impossible, to generate from the regular Army and National 
Guard.456
The situation was, however, different for War Plans ORANGE and RED (and their 
combination, RED-ORANGE). When contemplating a war against Japan, US planners
excellent book: Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, 
which convincingly demonstrates that the joint plans alone (without Navy plans) only tell part of the 
story. War Plan RED is discussed in Richard A. Preston, The Defence o f the Undefended Border: 
Planning for War in North America 1867-1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977).
453 For the Army War College’s influence on plans for the Second World War, see Henry G. Gole, The 
Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2003). For the role of the Naval War College in forming the naval officer corps, see Michael Vlahos, The 
Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941 (Newport, RI: Naval War 
College Press, 1980).
454 Oddly, Steven T. Ross misses this multiple purpose of the colour war plans and dismisses many o f  
them as ‘politically irrelevant’ or ‘unrealistic’, but does not provide a suggestion of what, in his opinion, 
the Joint Board should have planned for. See Ross, American War Plans 1890-1939, esp. pp. 177-183.
455 For a discussion of the post-First World War versions o f these plans, see ibid., pp. 121-137.
456 Ross, ed., American War Plans 1919-1941, p. xii (introduction common to all volumes).
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did not have much information to base their considerations on, beyond the geography of 
the Pacific and the overall ‘correlation of forces’. They quickly realized in drawing up 
War Plan ORANGE,457 even before WWI, that direct US military pressure on Japan 
over China was not a credible rationale for an assumed conflict. Instead, they began to 
(correctly) see the cause for war in the US role as “a nebulous restraining force that 
Japan would assail someday to unblock its ambitions” in East Asia. There was no 
information regarding the way in which Japan would attack the United States, and 
assumptions in US war plans had to be based on abductive reasoning on the basis of 
geography.459 Given the overall material superiority of the United States, Japan would 
have to strike quickly and unexpectedly, and evict the United States from the Western 
Pacific before the US fleet could establish a base of operations there. Afterwards, it 
would have to wage a war of attrition in the hope of outlasting US national will. In the 
absence of political guidance, US war planners assumed that BLUE would demand the 
complete subjugation of Japan, and that it would have to achieve this within a limited 
time before US resolve would falter. On the basis of these considerations, they 
established early on that the war would consist of three main phases: A quick Japanese 
occupation of BLUE possessions in the Western Pacific (Phase I), a US return in force 
to that area, including the establishment of an operational fleet base (Phase II), and a 
naval blockade of Japan with the goal of starving the country into submission (Phase 
III).460 Both before WWI and throughout the 1920s and 1930s, US planners discussed 
whether it was not possible after all to find a way to avoid defeat in Phase I (through the 
construction of a fleet base in the Philippines or Guam), and whether the United States 
fleet could quickly ‘thrust’ through to the Western Pacific in Phase II, or whether a step- 
by-step advance through conquered intermediate bases in the Mandate461 was required.
Importantly, however, the assumptions regarding the causes for hostilities between 
BLUE and ORANGE meant that war would only break out if Japan went on the 
offensive on the East Asian mainland, and US policies had a sufficiently constraining 
effect to warrant ORANGE to choose war. The rationale for war was thus a world 
situation significantly different from that of the 1920s, and even much of the 1930s. 
Moreover, War Plan ORANGE assumed that Japan would attack BLUE at a time when 
it was free of other strategic concerns and able to concentrate its naval effort in the
457 War Plan ORANGE never existed as a single comprehensive document, but comprised a large number 
of joint and Navy strategic and operational studies relating to war with Japan. Moreover, it evolved 
significantly over the years, notably with regards to the US strategy for crossing the Pacific.
458 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, p. 25.
459 In fact, the logical approaches taken in drawing up War Plan ORANGE are not dissimilar to those 
used in the Dibb Review discussed in Section 7.2.
460 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, pp. 19-38. 
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a Mandate by the League of Nations, i.e. the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (other than Guam). After 
the War, a widespread misconception held that the Japanese occupation of these islands severely 
restricted the US position in the Western Pacific. In fact, it had been the neutrality o f the islands (and 
thus the impossibility of using them as refuelling stations and intermediate bases) that had constrained 
American options in pre-First World War plans, while it would have been impossible in any case to 
defend them against a Japanese attack, had they come under US suzerainty.
149
Managing Strategic Risk
Pacific—in short, it ‘'planned a war that the United States could not lose and that Japan 
would not wage.”462
Since War Plan ORANGE addressed a future risk, its authors did not see themselves 
bound by existing force structure. Given the assumption of limited US tolerance for a 
long war, the US Navy did not expect to be able to build new capital ships during the 
war, and thus concentrated its peacetime building program on battleships and carriers. 
Additional auxiliaries and smaller warships, such as destroyers, were expected to join 
the fleet after the outbreak of hostilities. But in what at first seems like a paradox, War 
Plan ORANGE was based, for most of the 1920s and early 1930s, on a quick direct 
‘thrust’ of the BLUE fleet through to the Philippines in Phase II, so that it could arrive 
before the Japanese were able to fortify the whole Archipelago—and this ‘thrust’ 
required exactly the large number of auxiliaries and screening destroyers that were not 
available in the peacetime fleet!463 The situation was similar with regards to the mobile 
base facilities required in the ‘thrusting’ strategy, or amphibious assault capabilities for 
the slower move through the Mandate that was part of the plans in the early 1920s, and 
then again from the mid-1930s. In short, since War Plan ORANGE was written by 
operational staffs, it had all the appearances of a contingency plan. In reality, however, 
it was a means to define requirements for a future Pacific war, and did indeed serve to 
guide the naval side of the rearmament effort that began in the last years before the 
American entry into the war.
In general, Army involvement in Plan ORANGE was limited, and unlike the Navy, that 
service devoted more energy to mobilization plans (Plan BLUE) than actual war plans. 
“How much the mobilization plans were to be tailored to fit the color plans was a 
question never quite resolved”,464 Russell F. Weigley writes. However, this was all the 
better since the only war plan requiring national mobilization, other than Plan 
ORANGE, was Plan RED for a war against Britain, which was updated until the mid- 
1930s. Before WWI, the Joint Board had drafted several versions of a Plan BLACK to 
deal with German aggression in the Western Hemisphere, but the treaty of Versailles 
had obviously made these redundant. France was deeply scarred and (rightly) 
preoccupied with a potential resurgence of its eastern neighbour, and the Soviet Union 
both landlocked and mired in civil war. The precautionary principle demanded that a 
threat from Europe be addressed, and abductive logic, perhaps combined with a certain 
amount of Anglophobia,465 led to the consideration of Britain as the only European 
power that could threaten the United States. Understandably, the Navy concentrated its 
efforts on War Plan ORANGE, and the main feature of War Plan RED was an invasion 
of Canada by four US Armies, with the goal of preparing the Canadian provinces for 
incorporation into the BLUE union.466 The only realistic setting for a US military
462 Ross, American War Plans 1890-1939, p. 183.
463 See, for example, the table in Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 
1897-1945, p. 128.
464 Russell F. Weigley, History o f the United States Army, enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), pp. 406.
465 John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion ’s Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars (New York: 
New York University Press, 1999).
466 See the quotes in Peter Carlson, ‘Raiding the Icebox: Behind Its Warm Front, the United States Made 
Cold Calculations to Subdue Canada,’ Washington Post, 30 December 2005, p. COl. That somewhat
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conflict with a European power—namely, a repeat of WWI circumstances in which 
America would come to the aid of European allies—was not dealt with in any war; 
perhaps because the US military resented its junior role during the Great War, or 
perhaps because such a scenario was even less palatable politically than the ’defensive’ 
planning that did occur.
Ultimately, Plan RED did, however, have a few beneficial effects. First, it formed the 
basis for a two-front RED-ORANGE War Plan. Although this plan was “rendered 
hypnotically engrossing not by its contact with political realities but by the immense 
problems posed by its hypothetical enemy combination”,467 it did serve to keep alive the 
principle, dating back to the war with Spain, of dealing with a European enemy before 
an Asian one.468 Second, it was the only scenario involving naval combat in the 
Atlantic, and could consequently be ‘mined’ in 1939 when plans were drawn up for a 
war against Germany.469 Third, it was the only plan that involved land combat against a 
first rate power, and thus provided a basis for US Army investigations of tanks and 
other aspects of modem warfare, which were of only very limited relevance in the other 
war plans for intervention in the Western Hemisphere or China and the Philippines.
6.1.4 Developments in Intenvar Force Structure
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, the United States were faced during the interwar years 
with a number of comparatively small present strategic risks, and a more ominous but 
future possibility of war with Japan and, possibly, in Europe. A pattem of division of 
labour, which had emerged before WWI but was only formalized in 1927, meant that 
the Marine Corps carried the main burden of peacetime intervention operations. Until 
the early 1930s, a significant part of its strength thus remained bound in the occupation 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Army, however, having only a very limited 
role overseas,470 was to devote itself to providing the option of expansion for major 
operations in wartime. In addition, it garrisoned the Philippines and the Canal Zone.
In order to prevent another haphazard mobilization as had been necessary in 1917, 
Congress passed the National Defence Act of 1920. It authorized a regular Army of 
280,000, organized in full strength tactical units to perform operational duty overseas or 
at the border, and to train the reserves. The first tier of these was the National Guard, 
with an authorized strength of up to 435,000 men. From 1933, Guard units were 
formally designated as federal reserve units, which ensured that Guardsmen would be 
called up as units and not as individuals, as had been the case in WWI. A second tier 
reserve was the federal reserve, officers and enlisted men who maintained skeleton 
reserve units up to division level that would receive wartime enlistees and conscripts. 
In addition, other federal reservists would round out active units as required. The 1920 
Act’s introduction of the Reserve Office Training Corps at American colleges and
cheeky article also contains the memorable comment that “[ijnvading Canada won’t be like invading Iraq: 
When we invade Canada, nobody will be able to grumble that we didn’t have a plan.”
467 Weigley, History o f the United States Army, pp. 405-406.
468 Ross, American War Plans 1890-1939, pp. 152-153.
469 Preston, The Defence o f the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939, p. 
226.
470 Mostly occupation duties in the Rhineland during the early 1920s, and in the protection of the Beijing 
railway.
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universities proved to be one of its most beneficial elements in this context. The overall 
force structure was divided into nine corps areas with one regular, two National Guard, 
and three reserve divisions each, and optimistically believed to be able to expand to 2.3 
million men within 60 days.471
Risk treatment in a Rearmament Planning framework concentrates on the preparation of 
one’s own forces (reagent management). Indeed, detailed mobilization plans were 
drawn up following the 1920 Defence Act, but without reference to particular Colour 
Plans as that was an endeavour judged too complicated. Plan BLUE, however, linked 
the two types of plans as it established minimum requirements for the defence of the 
continental United States, in order to cover the mobilization process. In spite of the 
continued maintenance of War Plan RED, however, the assumption that war would be 
waged in North America was dropped for the purposes of mobilization planning in 
1924, which was now to provide forces for deployment overseas. War Plan BLUE 
withered away.472 In parallel with these manpower-focused plans of the Army General 
Staff, the War department tried to prepare for industrial mobilization. The mechanisms 
and plans it proposed, particularly in the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1930, were 
widely criticized by politicians, unions, industry and pacifists, and bore only limited 
resemblance to later policies. Nevertheless, they led to the establishment of, for 
example, the Army Industrial College, and besides providing basic studies, kept 
awareness of the tasks involved alive.473
However, the program of the 1920 Defence Act was never fully funded. By 1927, 
appropriations for the regular Army were cut to 1 18,750 men, and the National Guard 
hardly reached half its authorized strength. Instead of cutting force structure, Uptonians 
prevailed in the General Staff, and the reductions in personnel were accommodated by 
converting nominally full strength to skeleton units in the regular army as well. The 
Army was adamant that a trained cadre as a basis for mobilization be preserved at all 
cost. Upon becoming chief of staff in 1930, Douglas McArthur began to move the 
Army back to the logic behind the 1920 Defense Act, namely that the professionals 
were to provide the cover for the mobilization of the main force. He cut back and 
consolidated paper units and planned for an ‘Initial Protective Force’ of 400,000 trained 
and equipped men, which would be operational at the outset of war. However, it was 
only under his successor Malin Craig that his plans would begin to be adequately 
funded in the second half of the 1930s.474 With the belated introduction of conscription 
in 1940, following ‘strategic warning’ in the form of the fall of France, the whole 
machine sprung into action—although there was never the formal M-Day on which all 
plans were based.
471 Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defence: A Military History o f the United States o f America, 
pp. 385-386; Weigley, History o f the United States Army, pp. 393-402; John K. Mahon, History of the 
Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 169-183.
472 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 
1775-1945 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), 
pp. 384-409.
473 Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defence: A Military History o f the United States of America, 
pp. 397-399; Weigley, History o f the United States Army, pp. 407-408; Kreidberg and Henry, History o f 
Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945, pp. 493-540.
474 John W. Killigrew, The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1979); Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp 400-407, 415-420; Millet and Maslowski, For the 
Common Defence: A Military History o f the United States o f America, pp. 396-397.
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Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the General Staffs fixation on manpower issues, and 
the unwillingness of Congress to fund additional equipment before WWI stocks were 
‘used up’, severely curtailed procurement and development budgets of the Army. A 
major problem in this regard was, however, that the needs were far from clear. The 
geopolitics of the 1920s, as well as the nature of modem military operations, were very 
much in flux and unfamiliar to decisionmakers at the time,475 and developments in both 
areas stand out much starker in hindsight than they would have at the time. Given the 
situations in Mexico and the Philippines, counterinsurgency was a major concern for the 
Army. It closely followed the French pacification of the Berbers in Morocco, and Plans 
GREEN and BROWN required large bodies of infantry and mounted cavalry, who 
would operate with limited logistics trains, largely based on pack animals.476
The Army disbanded its two tank battalions after the World War, and efforts in that 
field were divided between the cavalry and infantry corps. Like the British (and 
following their example), the Army experimented with an armoured force in the late 
1920s, but (also like the British) disbanded it during the Great Depression. 
Development and fielding of light tanks continued, but armoured units as separate from 
cavalry or infantry did not emerge before WWII.477 We now know that similar 
deficiencies also afflicted Britain and France (albeit in different ways).478 The relative 
lack of a clear strategic focus of the US Army may be more an explanation than an 
excuse for this, but in its situation it was an appropriate strategy to keep a wide variety 
of capabilities, such as cavalry and coastal artillery, which despite their arguably 
foreseeable obsolescence were still relevant for its war plans.479
The situation was somewhat different for the Army Air Corps, as in the 1920s in 
particular it was difficult to relate air power in most, if not all of the forms in which it 
existed in reality (as opposed to doctrinal phantasies) to the war plans. As in the British 
Royal Air Force, doctrinal development (which, to a significant degree, pushed 
technological development) was dominated by interservice politics, and the need to 
assert a distinct mission and identity for the new branch.480 By the early 1930s, the 
coastal defence task provided a geographically grounded rationale for the development 
of the long range bomber. However, government support for the development of a 
healthy (civilian) aviation industry probably contributed the most significant part to the
475 Talbot Imlay, ‘Strategic and Military Planning, 1919-1939,’ in The Fog o f Peace and War Planning: 
Military and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty, eds. Imlay and Toft, pp. 139-158.
476 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 
(Washington D.C.: Center o f Military History, United States Army, 1998), pp. 247-260.
477 Timothy K. Nenninger, ‘Organisational Milestones in the Development o f American Armor, 1920- 
1940,’ in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The history o f U.S. armoured forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and 
Donn A. Starry (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 37-66.
478 Williamson Murray, ‘Armored warfare: The British, French, and German experiences,’ in Military 
Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Murray and Millet, pp. 6-49.
479 A point made in Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defence: A Military History o f the United 
States o f America, p. 399.
480 Richard R. Muller, ‘Close Air Support: The German, British, and American experiences, 1918-1941,’ 
in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Murray and Millet, p. 173.
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fact that the United States, by the late 1930s, had the technological and industrial option
40  1
to embark on mass air warfare, if that was to prove necessary in the future.
After WWI, demobilization in the Navy was far from being as stark as in the Army. 
Nevertheless, wartime building programs were cut back, and the goal of a navy ‘second 
to none’ given up in the Washington Treaty of 1922, whose main provision was a limit 
on battleship tonnage divided 5:5:3 between the United States, Britain and Japan. ” As 
further capital ship construction was banned for 10 years, the Navy concentrated on 
modernizing its existing units, notably with the conversion of the whole fleet from coal 
to oil fuel. The treaty’s battleship procurement holiday also meant that, although 
procurement funds were reduced overall, there would be money available for the further
4 0 0
development of new arms such as naval aviation and the submarine force.
As mentioned in the previous section, the interwar Navy did not procure auxiliaries and 
small vessels to the extent that would be required in a future war.484 Limited by treaties 
in its capital ship building program, it instead concentrated, partly by design and partly 
by accident, on developing new technologies and operational capabilities. 
Requirements relating to combat performance against future Japanese weapons systems 
were, of course, only vaguely, if at all, known in advance. Many of the Navy’s 
specifications for equipment to be developed could, however, be derived from the 
demands of War Plan ORANGE, especially regarding the importance of long range and 
endurance. Submarine engines providing sufficient speed and range for operations with 
the fleet in the Western Pacific (as opposed to coastal defence) only became available in 
the late 1930s. Similarly, it took the development of the Catalina flying boat in the 
early 1930s to achieve the one thousand mile range required for effective scouting in the 
mid-Pacific (a mission for which cruisers were not available due to arms limitations 
agreements).486
The cautionary version of War Plan ORANGE, requiring a drive through the Mandate, 
also demanded the capability to conquer atolls and islands as intermediate bases, a 
mission to which the Marine Corps devoted itself after the end of its quasi-colonial 
duties in the Caribbean in the early 1930s. Based on theoretical work by the legendary 
Major Earl H. Ellis in the early 1920s, when War Plan ORANGE had dropped, for a 
time, the strategy of a quick drive to the Philippines, the Corps developed a doctrine for
481 Williamson Murray, ‘Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German experiences,’ in Military 
Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Murray and Millet, pp. 96-143.
482 The relation of 5:3 between Japan and the United States was derived from the assumption that 1000 
nautical miles o f travel reduced a fleet’s effectiveness by 10%, leading to rough parity between the two 
countries in the Western Pacific.
483 Philip T. Rosen, ‘The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937,’ in In Peace and War: Interpretations o f  American 
Naval History, 1775-1978, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 221-236.
484 See also Allan R. Millett, ‘Assault From the Sea: The development of amphibious warfare between the 
wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences,’ in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 
eds. Murray and Millet, p. 83.
485 Ironically, the ‘fleet’ submarines were of course used for independent guerre de course in the war. 
See Holger Herwig, ‘Innovation Ignored: The Submarine Problem: Germany, Britain and the United 
States, 1919-1939,’ in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Murray and Millet, esp. pp. 252- 
260.
486 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, pp. 175-179.
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assault across defended beaches. Over the following years, numerous associated 
problems such as naval fire support, close air support, logistics, embarkation, and the 
best composition of landing parties, were examined in a series of exercises. 
Construction of the required transports and landing craft, however, did not occur until 
the start of the war.487
Of course, War Plan ORANGE also provided a compelling rationale for the 
development of carrier aviation, as the fleet would have to bring its air cover with it to 
the Western Pacific. Iterative theoretical studies at the Naval War College, annual 
Fleet exercises of an experimental character, and targeted technological development 
throughout the interwar years produced the material and conceptual basis for carrier 
operations in WWII. Force structure per se was largely limited to the development of 
that option. Given the rapid technological development in the area, the Navy 
consciously limited the numbers of carrier planes it procured, in particular in the 1920s, 
and, with more limited success, tried to space the design of new carriers in a way that 
would enable new experience to be taken into account.489 The carriers were also built 
with growth potential in mind, although that design principle was generally less 
pronounced in the context of the interwar years than in the ideal case: Technology 
progressed relatively fast, platforms were relatively cheap and quick to build, and the 
US emphasis lay on mobilization rather than structural readiness. Like the new 
submarines and flying boats designs (and followed by amphibious vessels), carriers 
capable of Pacific warfare were becoming technologically feasible in time for WWII 
when the shipbuilding holiday began to end in the latter stages of the Great Depression.
In summary, the risk pattern in the interwar years was very close to a Prospective 
Threat, as limited present risks were dominated by those of future war with Japan and in 
Europe. As was American tradition, the theory of victory was not specified in much 
detail, and concentrated on the preparation of US forces. Requirements to treat the 
dominant future risks were abductively inferred in War Plans ORANGE and RED, 
primarily based on an analysis of geography and the reliance on strategic warning (or 
M-Day). The Army but also Navy force structure primarily provided options for a 
future rearmament. Industrial mobilization considerations were relatively prominent, 
and in the Army and Carrier force in particular, equipment was primarily procured for 
developmental purposes. US defence planning in the interwar years thus shows all 
defining traits of Rearmament Planning.
487 Millett, ‘Assault From the Sea: The development o f amphibious warfare between the wars: The 
American, British, and Japanese Experiences,’ pp. 50-95; George F. Hofmann, ‘The Marine Corps’ First 
Experience with an Amphibious Tank,’ in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The history o f U.S. armoured 
forces, eds. Hofmann and Starry, pp. 67-91.
488 Geoffrey Till, ‘Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese case studies,’ in 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Murray and Millet, pp. 191-226.
489 Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Transforming to Victory: The US Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for 
War in the Pacific,’ in The Fog o f Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning under 
Uncertainty, eds. Imlay and Toft, pp. 179-204. A popular misconception in this context is that the ‘big 
gun club’ refused to recognize the obsolescence o f the battleship, but this view does justice neither to 
senior naval officers at the time, nor to the operational capabilities of both types o f ship during the war. 
See the discussion o f this and other naval ‘paradigms’ in William M. McBride, Technological Change 
and the United States Na\y, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 139- 
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6.2 Australia—The 1976 Australian Defence White Paper
With the return of the last Australian troops from Vietnam in 1972, the era of ‘Forward 
Defence’ had come to an end. After the British withdrawal from East of Suez and 
President Nixon’s Guam doctrine, Australia could not expect its main allies to carry the 
burden of fighting communist expansion in South-East Asia any more. At the same 
time, however, the Sino-Soviet split, the growing resilience of non-communist 
governments in the region and the friendly attitude of the Suharto regime in Indonesia 
eliminated the sources of previous urgent concerns. Up to this point, the Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF), Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Army expected to 
operate in the context of operations led by powerful allies. Interoperability in terms of 
equipment and doctrine was thus more important with regards to British and American 
sister services than with the other Australian services. As Australia usually 
complemented the forces of its allies, there was less need for rigour in force planning or 
the provision of independent logistic systems. Also, Australian forces rarely needed to 
be the first on the scene, and readiness levels and deployment schedules could take a 
relatively leisurely pace.490 In general, Australian military deployments abroad were 
designed to support diplomacy with its major allies rather than to influence the enemy 
himself.491
Australian strategic planners were not experienced in the task that was now before them, 
having relegated strategic decisions to its main allies for so long, and military officers 
were good tacticians rather than strategists.492 The capability for independent strategic 
level intelligence collection and assessment was strictly limited, and the three separate 
service departments were only amalgamated into the Department of Defence in 1975. 
Cooperation between the services was hindered by the lack of joint operational 
experience, planning and doctrine, and strong resistance within the armed forces to 
change. Even if it was found inappropriate, much of the equipment procured in the 
1960s had long service lives and could not be scrapped or replaced, given the size of the 
defence budget after the Vietnam War. Similarly, defence infrastructure was 
concentrated in the South East of the continent, far from likely areas of operation in the 
defence of Australia.493 It is in this context that the Coalition government published the 
1976 White Paper.
490 Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), pp. 2-4.
491 Robert O’Neill, ‘Diplomacy and Defence,’ Reference Paper, no. 51 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1979), esp. pp. 1-8.
492 M.G. Smith, ‘Strategic Thinking and the Australian Military Profession,’ Reference Paper, no. 141 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1985). In the words of  
Michael Evans, the Australian Army in addition suffers from an “anti-intellectual culture within its 
ranks.” Michael Evans, ‘Forward From the Past: The Development o f Australian Army Doctrine, 1972- 
Present,’ Working Paper, no. 301 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1999), p. 74.
493 J.O. Langtry, ‘Australia’s Defence Policy in Transition— 1970 to March 1986,’ Reference Paper, no. 
140 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986), p. 8-9; Alan 
Thompson, ‘Defence Down Under: Evolution and Revolution 1971-1988,’ Working Paper, no. 40 
(London: Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, University of London, 1988), pp. 5-6.
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6.2.1 Risk Pattern
The 1976 White Paper judges that “[strategic pressure or direct military pressure 
against Australia ... are at present not estimated as probable.’'494 More distant conflicts 
would not necessarily impinge on Australia’s security or call for “heightened defence 
preparedness”, since “regional conflicts, as in the Middle East, have been successfully 
localised” and “regional conflict need not be seen as a preface to the collapse of 
international stability and the first stage of a new world war.”495 The stability of South 
East Asia is judged to have significantly improved, and is not seen to be seriously 
threatened by the remaining insurgencies throughout the region.496 “The prospect of 
large external powers acquiring major strategic influence in the region [of South East 
Asia] has very substantially receded,”497 the White Paper states, not the least since the 
Communist bloc had now unequivocally split between the Soviet Union and China, and 
the latter was moderating its confrontational policies.498
In this relatively benign situation, the only mention of present risks is indirect, and 
made in the context of the discussion of the tasks of the force-in being, which
should be capable of performing current and foreseeable tasks and dealing with selected 
shorter-term contingencies— for example, ... sea control in areas of Australia’s 
maritime jurisdiction; quick detection of and response to any maritime or coastal 
harassment; aid to the civil power in counter-terrorist operations ...; maritime 
surveillance and display in areas of Australian interest; ... and contributing to UN 
[United Nations] peace-keeping;499
However, the White Paper also cautions that the benign circumstances in the region 
might not last:
It remains true that external powers have ample resources directly to support insurgent 
groups did they choose to adopt such a policy ... Domestic instabilities in the region 
and even a level of political discord between the states would not o f themselves 
jeopardise Australia’s security ... But in such circumstances, there could be risks of 
external intervention; regional rivalry and confrontation between external powers could 
develop. Prolonged regional tension could lead the regional states to develop capability 
for conventional military operations on a regional scale.500
Although it judges that “[n]one of these developments is at present in prospect”,501 the 
White Paper remarks that the Soviet Union is gaining in military potential:
494 Department of Defence, Australian Defence (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1976), p. 10.
495 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
496 Ibid., pp. 1,6-7.
497 Ibid., p. 6.
498 Ibid., pp. 1,4,6.
499 Ibid., p. 13.
500 Ibid., p. 7.
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Continuing large scale Soviet military development is a cause for concern. If it cannot 
be slowed down or stabilised it must be countered, lest imbalances grow in important 
areas of the strategic relationship between the two Super Powers502
The White Paper judges that the United States and NATO countries show both 
willingness and ability to balance the Soviet Union, 503 but also remarks that “Australian 
assessments note many uncertainties.” 504 Soviet expansion into regions that were 
previously peripheral to the Super Power confrontation is a source of particular concern 
that is extensively discussed:505
the size of the Soviet military build-up and the scale o f strategic weapons still leave 
questions about Soviet motivations unanswered. The USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics] demonstrated in Angola both motivation and capability to project military 
power into a distant region.506 ... It appears ready to use its increasing global military 
reach for political purposes. At the present time, the USSR appears capable, following 
its action in Angola, of exploiting the developing situation in Southern Africa to further 
its political and strategic influence. It is already directly involved in the Horn of 
Africa.507
There is, therefore, the possibility of more direct Soviet pressure on Australia. The 
assessment of prospects for the maintenance of basic stability between the Super 
Powers
does not rule out lesser situations developing in a manner adverse to the interests o f 
smaller powers. The Super Powers’ relationship must be expected to fluctuate from 
time to time.508 ... Soviet facilities [at the Horn of Africa] locate the USSR favourably 
for involvement further afield into the east Indian Ocean, should opportunity offer and 
it calculate the effort and risk to be worthwhile.500
If it gained a foothold in Australia’s region, Soviet pressure could take a direct form, or 
manifest itself in Soviet support to a regional power hostile to Australia:
Littoral states on the Indian Ocean have varying relationships with the Super Powers.
These are a function of national strategic situations [sic] and are a matter for national
502 Ibid., p. 3.
503 Ibid., p. 3.
504 Ibid., p. 4.
505 This focus on the Soviet influence in the region was a novelty in the 1976 White Paper insofar as a 
potential threat from that empire had traditionally been overshadowed by perceptions of Japan, China or 
Indonesia. See Robert O ’Neill, ‘Australian Perceptions o f Threats to International Security,’ Reference 
Paper, no. 97 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1982). 
Delivered as a paper to the Pacific Forum Conference on National Threat Perceptions in East Asia and the 
Pacific, Waikoloa, Hawaii, 6-8 February 1982. For a contemporary discussion of the growing importance 
o f events in the Indian Ocean, see Robert O ’Neill, ‘Australia and the Indian Ocean,’ Reference Paper, no. 
50 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1976).
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discretion. Significant extension of Super Power activity, however, can exercise a 
powerful influence on the strategic circumstances of nations in a region. Arms supply 
and other support can heighten regional confrontation and destabilise the military 
balance; it can attract competition and confrontation from the other Super Power; 
regional states can be drawn into these rivalries. Short of such major developments, the 
USSR could seek and gain local access for its military deployments, enabling it to exert 
direct pressure on local political developments.510
The White Paper thus acknowledges that major direct threats to Australia from yet 
unspecified enemies can develop in the future, but they are not imminent and would 
take time to do so:
Where there is political instability, tension or military confrontation, a detailed course 
of events can be difficult to predict with reasonable confidence beyond a few years, or 
even less. ... [B]ut there is much continuity in the determinants of Australia’s strategic 
circumstances. Major threats (requiring both military capability and political 
motivation) are unlikely to develop without preceding and perceptible indicators. The 
final emergence of a major military threat to Australia would be a late stage in a series 
of developments.511
Overall, the possibility of the expansion of Soviet influence or other deteriorations in 
Australia’s security situation thus gives sufficient reason for an imperative need to 
address future risk—on the basis of precaution, as the nature of future challenges is 
uncertain. This uncertainty is however ontological rather than epistemic, as Australia 
does not have difficulty making sense of observed developments. Rather, the country is 
confronted with the general incertitude of the future development of the international 
system, as “Australia is now in a new strategic situation, and one that is still evolving, 
globally and regionally.”512
Since epistemic uncertainty is low and observed developments are well understood, 
strategic warning is possible. The White Paper therefore requires Australia’s defence 
planning to be responsive to the emergence of new risks and risk levels (a position also 
reiterated in the 1976 Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives 
(ASADPO) paper):513
Australia’s defence interest is not confined to the presence or absence of military threat 
itself. We are concerned with developments that could directly or indirectly support 
Australia’s security from military threat, or favour the development of threat sooner or 
later. Unfavourable developments in mainland South East Asia would not necessarily 
mean of themselves that threat of direct attack upon Australia was developing, but they 
could introduce uncertainties into our strategic prospects.514
510 Ibid., p. 5.
511 Ibid., p. 10.
512 Ibid., p. 2.
513 Paul Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1986), 
p. 25.
514 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 6.
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The risk pattern laid out in the 1976 White Paper is thus very similar to that of a 
Prospective Threat. Present risks are very limited, even hardly mentioned at all, but 
trends that could lead to future threats are sufficiently grave to warrant attention on the 
basis of the precautionary principle. The relative lack of epistemic uncertainty makes 
relying on strategic warning credible, and both potential enemies (the Soviet Union, its 
proxies or regional countries) and the ways in which they could seek strategic effect 
would be reasonably understood and known. However, as the following sections will 
discuss, codification into strategic guidance proved much more difficult.
6.2.2 Theory o f Victory
Since the possibility that the conflict between the Western and Communist blocs might 
spill over into Australia’s neighbourhood was not imminent, the Government did not 
judge it necessary to make its contribution to the global balance the focus of its defence 
effort or force structure.515 The White Paper states that Australia “cannot contribute 
military forces that would be significant to the strategic balance in Europe or North East 
Asia, nor to the western nuclear deterrent,”516 and that in any case its
assessments of the international situation have not revealed any present likelihood of 
our being called upon to provide any direct military assistance to our allies or other 
defence associates.517
While the White Paper does “not rule out an Australian contribution to operations
C I O
elsewhere”, and states that “in certain circumstances we would be able usefully to 
support local forces by making available equipments or skills in which they were 
deficient,”519 it also makes it clear that participation would only be forthcoming “if our
c o n
forces could be spared from their national tasks.”
Australia is thus trying to reduce present and future risk by limiting its efforts to
the areas closer to home— areas in which the deployment of military capability by a 
power potentially unfriendly to Australia could permit that power to attack or harass 
Australia and its territories, maritime resources zone and near lines o f communication.
These are our adjacent maritime areas; the South West Pacific countries and territories;
Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and the South East Asian region.521
515 As Alan Thompson has pointed out, an Australian contribution could and probably would have been 
provided, as it was in 1914 and 1939, if the probability o f superpower conflict was judged to be high. See 
Alan Thompson, ‘Defence Down Under: Evolution and Revolution 1971-1988,’ p. 2. Australia did, 
however, contribute significantly through the US joint facilities on its soil, and maritime surveillance 
operations in its area of strategic interest— in particular from 1980 onwards with P-3C Orion aircraft 
operating out of Butterworth in Malaysia. David Homer, The Australian Centenary History o f Defence, 
Vol. IV: Making the Australian Defence Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 69-70.
516 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 6.
517 Ibid., p. 13.
518 Ibid., p. 10.
519 Ibid., p. 13.
520 Ibid., p. 10.
521 Ibid., p. 6.
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Here, as “a not insubstantial local power, Australia is able to influence 
developments.” It plans to do so first and foremost by being, up to a point, self- 
reliant in combat forces:
Our alliance with the US gives substantial grounds for confidence that in the event of a 
fundamental threat to Australia’s security, US military support would be forthcoming.
... Short of this major, and improbable, situation, we could face a range of other 
situations that we should expect to handle more independently. It is not our policy, nor 
would it be prudent, to rely upon US combat help in all circumstances.523
Therefore, Australian
forces and associated capabilities should be able to operate with substantial 
independence in our own environment. We should avoid development of defence 
capabilities that are not relevant to our own requirements.524
But while the White Paper states that Australia’s “policy will be to support as best as we 
may the present relatively favourable prospect in South East Asia,” it does not 
contain any guidance as to the rough outlines of a military strategy or political-military 
theory of victory that might bring about success in that policy. Even the role of regional 
defence associates, such as Malaysia and Singapore in the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA), and of Australian capabilities to assist them remains ambiguous:
We must continue to work constructively with [local and regional associates] to support 
stability and security in the general strategic situation; and by our own policy and effort 
we can insure against the uncertainties that continuing change will sustain and that 
could produce situations with which we may well have to deal on our own.526
Passing remarks about deterrence are also not integrated in a coherent way. The 
White Paper thus failed to provide even a general outline of a military strategy to deal 
with strategic risks. Only in 1983 did a Strategic Basis paper finally recommend the 
development of such a military strategy, as well as of associated operational
529concepts.
522 Ibid., p. 2.
523 Ibid., p. 10.
524 Ibid., p. 12.
525 Ibid., p. 7.
526 Ibid., p. 2.
527 Ibid., pp. 13, 18,20.
528 This failure may be explained by the inexperience of the Australian strategic community mentioned 
above, and the factional division which were only to become more severe over later years. It spawned an 
academic debate in which a wide range of sometimes quite unconventional strategies were discussed. 
See, for example, Babbage, Rethinking Australia’s Defence, pp. 158-183; Peter J. Murphy, ‘Civilian 
Defence: A Useful Component of Australia’s Defence Structure?’ Working Paper, no. 93 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1985).
529 Dibb, Review o f Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 26.
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6.2.3 Codification o f Requirements
The 1976 Australian Defence White Paper discusses several aspects of codification in 
ways that are consistent with Rearmament Planning, but in the end their application 
foundered due to the vagaries of the political guidance.530 As mentioned above, the 
prospective risks diagnosed in the White Paper were not deduced from any observed 
enemy preparations, but addressed on the basis of the precautionary principle. 
Therefore, risk treatment required the definition of a range of scenarios (like the US 
Colour Plans) that describe future possibilities, and the 1976 White Paper, indeed, 
includes instructions to this effect. It states that adverse developments should be 
examined as a range of contingencies that “while possible, are not considered likely to 
occur but that appear typical of the sort of situation that could arise or are important 
enough to warrant policy attention.”331 All Strategic Basis Papers from 1971 to 1983 
contained similar recommendations to use contingency studies as the basis of defence 
planning. The White Paper makes clear that the contingencies, abductively defined, 
are not meant to be predictions:
None of these developments is at present in prospect. Reference to them, however, can 
help to clarify the basis for our abiding concern regarding prospects in South East Asia.
As already mentioned, defence policy is concerned with contingencies and not simply 
demonstrable threats.533
However, force structure planning was not based on a single particular contingency, in 
order to preserve flexibility to deal with others.534 According to the Department of 
Defence,
Developing the core force against specific threats or contingencies of threat would risk 
the unacceptable distortion of that force to meet what could be the wrong threat, in the 
wrong place and at the wrong time.535
Yet, neither the 1976 White Paper nor the Strategic Basis documents gave an indication 
of which contingencies to include in the range of possibilities that needed to be 
addressed, nor how to establish a relative order of priorities between them (nor did they 
explicitly direct the defence organization to address them all). Neither did they give 
directions as to a methodology and criteria by which such a decision should be made, or 
how an order of priorities should be established—such as the study of worst cases, or of
530 F.A. Mediansky writes that the Department of Defence at the time claimed that the development of 
guidelines for the bureaucracy was not part of strategic guidance itself, but of subordinate documents. 
But he makes the same point as made herein, that the absence of a “stated and authoritative national 
strategy” makes the development of coherent and comprehensive guidelines impossible. F.A. Mediansky, 
‘The Role of the Military in Strategic Policy,’ in The Military and Australia's Defence, ed. F.A. 
Mediansky (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1979), p. 33.
531 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 12.
532 Dibb, Review o f Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 26.
533 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 7.
534 Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry, ‘Development of Australia’s Defence Force Structure: An Alternative 
Approach,’ Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 9, no. 3 (September 1979), pp. 7-16.
535 Evidence to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 25 July 1979, p. 2108, quoted in 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their Nature and 
Probability, (Canberra: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1981), p. 50.
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most likely ones. A more detailed examination of the credibility of different 
contingencies and associated warning times on the basis of intelligence information 
could arguably have been the basis for such decisions, but neither is recommended or 
mentioned in the White Paper.
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that agreement within the defence organization on 
which contingencies to consider proved hard to achieve. Key to the argument was the 
relative importance of raids on the one hand and a full-scale invasion on the other hand, 
a theme that had already divided Australian defence planners in the inter-war years.536 
The 1976 ASADPO Paper provided examples of low-level contingencies based on the 
'Defence of Australia’ studies undertaken in previous years, which had “postulated 
two levels of conflict—a low-level conflict involving harassment and raids, and an 
escalated conflict involving a ground force lodgement on Australian territory.” 
However, the years 1979 and 1980 saw considerable unease about Soviet intentions and 
strategy following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Fraser government in particular 
showed itself to be greatly concerned with developments in the global balance and 
South West Asia, and events at the time were certainly perceived as giving more 
credence to scenarios of higher-level conflict.540 Ten years after the 1976 White Paper, 
Paul Dibb thus wrote that
The key difficulty here is that the Department and the ADF do not agree on the 
appropriate level o f conflict against which we should structure the Defence Force. ...
The Department believes that priority should be given to credible low-level 
contingencies and the expansion base as force structure determinants. The ADF 
considers that these requirements are best met in the context of planning force 
development on the basis o f preparing for larger-scale contingencies.541
Whatever scenario was to be considered, it had to be developed on the basis of those 
dimensions of strategy that can be predicted with reasonable certainty—in other words, 
long-term trends such as demography, relative economic development, culture and, 
above all, geography (see Section 4.2.2). The White Paper thus made explicit reference 
to geography as a main influence on Australian requirements:
The physical environment of Australia suggests that the characteristics of our force 
structure should include: ...
536 Michael Evans, ‘From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20Ih 
Century,’ Working Paper, no. 113 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2001), pp. 9-15.
537 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 25.
538 Ibid., p. 25, footnote.
539 Robert O’Neill, ‘The Strategic Environment in the 1980s,’ Reference Paper no. 53 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1980), esp. pp. 22-27; Eric 
Andrews, The Australian Centenary History o f Defence, Vol. V: The Department o f Defence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 223-224.
540 Ray Sunderland, ‘Australia’s Changing Threat Perceptions,’ Working Paper, no. 78 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1984). See also the Defence 
Minister’s address to Parliament: D.J. Killen, Statement by the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P. Minister for 
Defence, 29 March 1979.
541 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. vi.
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• capacity for the regular surveillance and patrol of our ocean approaches and 
maritime resource zone;
• naval and air strike components to deter potential adversaries;
• readily transportable and mobile land forces, with adequate capability for 
reconnaissance, to meet hostile incursions at remote localities;
• mobile air defence elements;
• elements for the protection of shipping from attack or other interference in 
Australia’s focal areas and port approaches;
• a capability for sustained operations at long ranges from bases and in areas remote 
from sources of logistic support.542
However, dimensions of strategy cannot be used directly to derive requirements, but 
only in conjunction with a strategy or theory of victory that provides the system of 
cause-effect relationships to explain their influence on the expected outcome of a 
conflict. Since the political guidance in the 1976 White Paper did not provide the 
outline of such a strategy, its treatment of the influence of geography on defence 
requirements, as quoted above, had to remain vague and general, unsuitable to derive 
detailed conclusions or priorities between capabilities. It is only later, in the context of 
the Dibb Review and its implementation, that joint strategies were developed that took 
full advantage of geography and even culture543 in Australia’s area of direct interest.
Besides the use of abductive scenarios, strategic warning of future risks is a second 
main element of codification in a framework of Rearmament Planning. As mentioned 
in the previous section, epistemic uncertainty in the international system was judged to 
be low compared with the incertitude inherent in its future development. Therefore, it 
would have been both possible and necessary to adjust the Australian defence effort to 
emerging, more clearly perceived risks by the use of strategic warning. This point was 
confirmed in the classified 1976 ASADPO paper, which reportedly
observed that a warning time which began when specific threats were perceived was too 
narrowly based, and that defence planning and preparations could be expected to be 
responsive to adverse strategic changes in advance o f a perceived threat.544
The 1976 White Paper elaborates on the implementation of such a reliance on strategic 
warning, and states that
there must be continuous review of assessments by an expert intelligence organisation 
to ensure prompt detection of any significant change in the developing strategic 
situation. This relates ... to the requirement for maximum warning time or any 
requirement for expansion o f the Defence Force. Constant and close watch must be
542 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 14.
343 Ross Babbage, ‘Looking Beyond the Dibb Report,’ Working Paper, no. 110 (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986), pp. 19-22; Babbage, A Coast Too Long, 
pp. 105-112.
544 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 25.
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maintained on whether this warning time is likely to fall short of the lead times— 
sometimes many years—necessary for expansion, including development and training 
of the force, organization of the defence infrastructure, acquisition of equipments, 
securing supply lines and other external support. Requirements in these respects will, 
of course, differ according to the nature of the possible threat that is perceived.545
But reaction and expansion times are, of course, different from warning time in that 
they depend on how the defence force is to react and what is to expand. In other words, 
a general idea about the strategy used to meet a possible future threat is already required 
for a comprehensive analysis of reaction and expansion times. Again, the imprecision 
of political guidance of the 1976 White Paper stood in stark contrast to the quite 
detailed and sound (in the light of the theory developed in this thesis) recommendations 
regarding its codification.
6.2.4 The ‘Core Force’ Concept
In 1975, a Strategic Basis paper accepted by the Labor cabinet used the term ‘Core 
Force’ to describe the concept on which to base the development of the ADF. It stated 
that
the core force should be a force able to undertake peacetime tasks, a force sufficiently 
versatile to deter or cope with a range of low-level contingencies which have sufficient 
credibility, and a force with relevant skills and equipment capable of timely expansion 
to deter or meet a developing situation. Capabilities related to the least conceivable 
contingency of major assault against Australia should command a low priority in the 
development of force structure, provided the capability for expansion is not 
prejudiced.546
Although the Coalition’s 1976 White Paper does not use the term ‘Core Force’, the 
concept it develops is essentially the same and the term stayed in use for several years. 
The requirements for present capabilities in the force-in-being are limited and comprise
sea control in areas of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction; quick detection of and response 
to any maritime or coastal harassment; aid to the civil power in counter-terrorist 
operations ...; maritime surveillance and display in areas of Australian interest; ... and 
contributing to UN peace-keeping;547
More important is thus the treatment of uncertain future risk, which dominates the risk 
pattern and therefore also the requirements placed upon the force-in-being. That force
should be of a size and versatility and possess or have under development or acquisition 
the structure, equipments and professional skills adequate for timely expansion against
545 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 12.
546 Strategic Basis 1975 originally quoted in the Submission of the Department of Defence (p. S313), 
quoted in Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, The Management o f Australia’s 
Defence, p. 36.
547 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 13.
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a range of contingencies of various types and timings, as indicated by the strategic 
guidance from time to time.548
The 1976 White Paper thus demands “that all the necessary skills be at hand or capable 
of timely development as the need is foreseen”,549 and states that
Preparatory planning and practical measures taken in advance and based upon a capable 
and versatile force-in-being would substantially reduce the time necessary to organise 
an effective defence response.550
Overall, the idea of providing options through the ‘Core Force,’ as well as the way in 
which the requirements for this force were to be codified, was thus largely consistent 
with the ideal concept of Rearmament Planning. Uncertainty regarding the shape of 
future risk was more pronounced than presumed in the ideal case, largely due to the 
absence of priorities in the political guidance. This led to the fact that the ‘Core Force’ 
was a portfolio of forces that could expand in several ways, rather than the nucleus of a 
known terminal force. Accordingly, ‘force expansion models’ were identified for the 
growth of specific core blocs.551 As in the ideal model, however, geography and 
abductive reasoning were to be used to codify political into strategic guidance, and the 
focus of requirements lay on the coherent design of Australia’s forces rather than 
meeting an enemy’s known order of battle.
The White Paper did not give as high a priority as the ideal concept to considerations 
regarding the options for expansion in the industrial base, as the capability of the small 
Australian economy in this regard was limited in any case. It did however remark that
A further objective is the progressive development of a range of basic technologies and 
capacities which would facilitate an intensification and diversification of present 
activities to match force expansion, should the need arise.552
The later emphasis on the use of ‘state of the art’ technology was another divergence
r  r  'i
from the ideal concept, which assumes that platforms with growth potential are more 
appropriate in this situation. In fact, the 1976 White Paper itself was relatively mute on 
the required technological level of the forces, although its statement that “Australia 
should ... be prepared to increase selectively the technological level of its forces if this 
should be called for”554 could be read to imply that the ideas of its authors might have 
been closer to those of the ideal concept. In any case, Australian defence planners were
548 Ibid., p. 13.
549 Ibid., p. 30.
550 Ibid., p. 12.
551 Langtry, ‘Australia’s Defence Policy in Transition— 1970 to March 1986,’ p. 7.
552 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 51.
553 Langtry, ‘Australia’s Defence Policy in Transition— 1970 to March 1986,’ p. 7. 
534 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, p. 14.
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reluctant at the end of the 1970s to commit to specific systems, as the area of 
conventional weapons technology was seen to undergo revolutionary change.555
Despite the theoretical congruency of the risk pattern, guidelines regarding the 
codification, and the force structure concept outlined in the 1976 White Paper, two 
weaknesses hampered the application of the ‘Core Force' concept. One of these related 
to its implementation, the second to its inception. First, the defence organisation was 
most concerned with the application of the ‘Core Force' concept to defence equipment 
and the order of battle, rather than other aspects of the expansion process. Desmond 
Ball wrote in 1980 that
Departmental thinking today is dominated by the concerns of peacetime management.
Insofar as the military considers the requirements of mobilisation and possible war- 
fighting, such consideration is almost entirely in terms of hardware and of equipment 
acquisition lead-times. ... [T]here is evidently an assumption prevalent within the 
Australian Defence Force to the effect that organisation, command, and staffing, 
personnel and infrastructure arrangements are either zero or at least very short lead-time 
items.556
But since the acquisition times for aircraft carriers, frigates and fighter planes, which 
were the main equipment projects at the time, are very long compared to warning times 
for many contingencies, applying the ‘Core Force’ concept primarily in terms of 
equipment was not particularly suitable for guidance regarding force structure
c  c n
decisions. And with regards to land forces in general, and infantry in particular, 
training rather than equipment is the limiting factor, so that the ADF’s focus here 
probably also precluded more appropriate manpower schemes from being seriously 
considered.558
Second, the inadequacies of political guidance—namely the lack of a clear prioritisation 
between contingencies and of even the outline of a theory of victory—meant that it was 
impossible to determine what the force-in-being should be the core of, even if it were to 
be a portfolio of cores. Arguably, the lack of clear guidance should have called for a 
maximum of flexibility in the long term. Indeed, this view resonates with the fact that 
the ‘Core Force’ was to react to strategic warning of changes in long-term risks, rather 
than merely to clear threats themselves:
The core force is not a static entity maintained against the day when warning of a 
particular threat is declared to have been received. Rather, the expansion base provided 
by the force-in-being is continually being developed in response to changing
555 Desmond Ball, ‘Equipment Policy for the Defence of Australia,’ in The defence of Australia— 
fundamental new aspects, ed. O’Neill, pp. 97-124. See also Babbage, Rethinking Australia’s Defence, 
Appendix B.
556 Desmond Ball, ‘The Australian Defence Force and Mobilisation,’ in Problems o f Mobilisation in 
Defence o f Australia, eds. Ball and Langtry, p. 23.
557 J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, ‘Australia’s Defence Forces at the Crossroads,’ in Defence Yearbook 
1980, ed. Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies (London: Brassey’s Publishers, 1979), pp. 
76-92.
558 See, for example, Babbage, Rethinking Australia’s Defence, pp. 184-208; J.O. Langtry, ‘Manpower 
Alternatives for the Defence Forces,’ Working Paper, no. 2 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1978).
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circumstances including both strategic and technological. The expansion capacity of 
the Defence Force will depend on many factors such as the extent of the developing 
threat, the civil resources that are mobilised and directed to its development and the 
extent of support in the community. Numerous study treatments have demonstrated the 
futility of relying on simplistic analysis techniques drawn from peace-time derived data 
for assessment of expansion capacity.559
Yet, while flexibility can be preserved over the medium term by the maintenance of a 
broad platform inventory and tolerance to changes of doctrine—something that the ADF 
did try to maintain, options are the only defence planning tool available over long time 
frames, and do require some authoritative guidance on the question of what terminal 
force or forces were necessary. In the absence of such guidance,
The system fails to perform any of its major objectives satisfactorily. Certainly the 
present security system does possess a token capacity to meet a large number of 
contingencies, but it is important to realize that the price of this nominal multiple- 
contingency flexibility and adaptability is very high. In effect, it necessitates the 
procurement of small numbers of practically every conceivable unit and equipment 
type. ... Moreover, because the combat personnel who can be mobilized readily are so 
widely dispersed, in a functional sense, the total structure’s immediate response 
capacity is constrained severely. But perhaps the most important weakness of all is that 
this wide diffusion of expertise limits heavily the current security concept’s surge 
capacity.500
The limitations of political guidance at the time thus meant that strategic guidance could 
not provide a clear conceptual basis for decisionmaking. It is possible that, to some 
extent, this failing was due to a lack of ambition—Chief of the Defence Force Staff 
(CDFS) Synnot, for example, wrote that “[a]t a time of low or intermediate threat, 
strategic guidance cannot be expected to be sufficiently specific to enable us to 
determine the force structure.” 561 To some extent, it might even have been deliberate, 
so that the Services “can use it to justify the selection of any piece of equipment they
r s ' }
want”—as Admiral Peek, a former member of the Defence Committee, suggested.
In the end, the ‘Core Force’ concept remained a rather simple idea that could not be 
fleshed out by codified rules, a fact acknowledged by a senior official at the time:
The [core force] notion is essentially simple; in a sense it is almost a null concept. 
Essentially all forces anywhere are core forces which can be expanded, contracted or 
changed in concept to meet a variation of the strategic conception either in a time of 
peace, threat of war or time of war. Core force is just another pair of portmanteau
559 Department of Defence, in Official Hansard Report, 18 March 1981, p. 1612, quoted in Ray 
Sunderland, ‘Australia’s Defence Forces—Ready or Not?,’ Working Paper, no. 94 (Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1985), pp. 6-7.
560 Babbage, Rethinking Australia ’s Defence, pp. 150-151.
561 A.M. Synnot, ‘The Changing Challenge of our Defence Force,’ Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 2, no. 9 
(March 1976), p. 14.
562 Quoted in Desmond Ball, ‘The Role of the Military in Defence Hardware Procurement,’ in The 
Military and Australia ’s Defence, ed. Mediansky, p. 54.
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words which can if necessary be defined accurately, but I think ... it is unnecessary to 
do so.563
6.2.5 Suggested Improvements on the ‘Core Force ’ Concept
The weaknesses of the ‘Core Force’ as a planning concept, rather than as a loose 
framework of thinking, were thus already widely known and discussed at the time.564 
One of the major factors in the public debate was a perceived inability to expand the 
force to meet threats within the available warning time—an issue that had already been 
raised prior to the publication of the 1976 White Paper.565 The Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence also wrote in 1979 that it was
not satisfied that the core force, as presently constituted, could expand to its required 
level within a realistic period of warning should the threat o f major direct attack emerge 
in the future.566
Several improvements on the ‘Core Force’ concept were suggested in the public arena. 
They can be distinguished into two conceptually different approaches, which were 
however usually combined to a greater or lesser extent by different authors. Both 
resonated with parallel developments in the services, and ultimately laid the intellectual 
groundwork for the 1986 Dibb Review.
The first was to find ways of more precisely defining representative contingencies that 
the ADF should be able to meet. Ross Babbage proposed a methodology for doing so 
that conformed with the role of scenarios in risk management on the basis of the 
precautionary principle, namely that they are to demonstrate a range of possibilities 
rather than to try to predict future events on the basis of an inadequate informational 
basis. Expansion paths to meet scenarios thus derived would then have to be more 
precisely analysed, especially with regards to the identification of future decision points, 
as the length of both warning and reaction time could differ significantly between 
contingencies.568
563 Testimony of G.F. Cawsey, First Assistant Secretary, Force Development & Analysis Division, 
Department of Defence, in official Hansard Report o f the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs & Defence, Inquiry into Australia’s defence procurement programs and procedures, 9 November 
1978, p. 1070, quoted in J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, ‘Australia’s Strategic Situation and its 
Implications for Australian Industry,’ Reference Paper, no. 38 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1980), p. 10.
564 For a good summary, see Babbage, Rethinking Australia 's Defence, pp. 76-85. See also Dibb, Review 
of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 26-28, 34-35.
565 Ross Babbage, ‘Australia’s Strategic Re-Orientation— Some Important Implications,’ in The defence 
of Australia—fundamental new aspects, ed. O’Neill, pp. 7-26.
566 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Defence Procurement (Canberra: 
Government Printing Service, 1979), p. 17.
567 Babbage, Rethinking Australia’s Defence, esp. pp. 262-274. See also Sunderland, ‘Australia’s 
Defence Forces— Ready or Not?’.
568 Babbage, Rethinking Australia ’s Defence, esp. pp. 275-294; Ray Sunderland, ‘Problems in Australian 
Defence Planning,’ Canberra Paper, no. 36 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, 1986), esp. pp. 67-82; Ray Sunderland, ‘Selecting Long-Term Force Structure 
Objectives,’ Working Paper, no. 95 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1985).
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The second approach was to more precisely define the way in which current force 
structure could be used to have strategic effect on future threats. In other words, the aim 
was to define the outline of a theory of victory, which related in particular to focussing 
more on the dissuasive role of the force-in-being rather than viewing it merely as the 
organisational basis for expansion. J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball developed this 
concept in more detail, 569 building on ideas that had already been developed by several 
other authors at the time in a discussion of how to implement conventional deterrence in 
the Australian context. However, this label is somewhat misleading as they were
cn 1
concerned with deterrence through denial rather than deterrence through punishment, 
and with dissuasion (of the emergence of new enemy capabilities) rather than 
deterrence in a more limited sense (i.e. of hostile enemy actions themselves). Robert 
O’Neill also made this distinction at the time, when he wrote that
we are concerned with deterrence, but in most cases it is not deterrence of the use of 
forces which exist but deterrence of the development of forces which could project 
substantial combat power across the great distances which separate Australia from any 
potential enemy nation.573
Central to the concept proposed by Langtry and Ball was the use by Australia of
specific capabilities that will cause a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately 
in terms of the cost in one or all of money, time, materiel, and/or manpower in order to 
gain the advantage.574
Potential enemies would thus be forced to undertake military build-ups of a kind that 
would provide unambiguous warning, a longer reaction time as well as more
569 J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, Controlling Australia ’s Threat Environment (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1979). Their ideas were endorsed by both the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Australian Defence Force—Its Structure and Capabilities (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1984), p. 
83.) and the Labor Party (Desmond Ball, ‘Labor’s Policy of Self-Reliance and National Defence: A 
National Effort for a National Defence,’ in Policies and Programs for the Labor Government, eds. John 
Reeves and Kelvin Thomson (Blackburn: Dove Communications, 1983), pp. 113-131.), but as the 
following section will discuss, the concept was incompatible with the growing emphasis placed on short- 
warning time, low-level contingencies in Australian defence planning and thus did not become highly 
influential in practice.
570 For a good overview on that discussion, see Michael Evans, ‘Conventional Deterrence in the 
Australian Context,’ Working Paper, no. 103 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1999), esp. pp. 18- 
28.
571 See Langtry and Ball’s discussion of the relationship between deterrence and ‘war-fighting’, itself 
based on artificial distinctions en-vogue at the time amongst American theorists of nuclear strategy. 
Langtry and Ball, Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment, pp. 9-21.
572 Kugler, ‘Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept’; Hagood, ‘Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic 
Concept of Dissuasion and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal’.
573 Robert O’Neill, ‘The Structure of Australia’s Defence Force,’ Working Paper, no. 10 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1979), p. 8.
374 Langtry and Ball, Controlling Australia ’s Threat Environment, p. 22. It is interesting to note that 
potential enemies would apply the same principle against Australia in low-level harassment. J.O. Langtry 
and Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the Australian Defence Force,’ in Strategy and Defence, ed. 
Desmond Ball (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. Ill-Ill).
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information about the enemy challenge/ and Australian forces could then be built up 
in an appropriate, more balanced fashion. Using capabilities that require a 
disproportionate response to gain unambiguous warning and more information about the 
enemy’s strategy thus provided the outline of a theory of victory, and explained how the 
force-in-being could be used to strategic effect in the future. What the Langtry and Ball 
concept could not do was to substitute for lack of political guidance regarding the risk 
pattern to be treated, as the authors freely admitted:
For it to be fully effective, however, much more explicit strategic guidance would be 
needed concerning the specific range o f contingencies to be deterred and as to the 
extent of and circumstances in which US support would be forthcoming. 577
But for a given type of potential threat, specific force structure priorities could be 
derived from this theory of victory by using known dimensions of strategy for 
codification, notably geography and technology. The former defined the setting in 
which both the Australian and (abductively postulated) enemy forces would have to 
operate, in particular the maritime approaches to the continent over which an enemy 
would have to project forces. In the context of high-level threats, for example, it would 
require a substantial effort on the enemy’s part to overcome an Australian force-in­
being that placed strong emphasis on submarine, offensive naval mining and maritime 
air strike capabilities. This effort would be evident to Australian intelligence before the 
adversary could commence a serious attack. Similarly, the ability to raise quickly one 
division to full strength would be valuable not so much for fighting off an imminent 
invasion, but because it would force the enemy to go to significantly greater effort in
r  70
creating amphibious forces, should he contemplate such a course of action. 
Technology, tactics and operational art provided another avenue for codification as 
those capabilities that maximise the effectiveness of the force-in-being, as opposed to 
those that augment it quantitatively, would be most appropriate for the initial force 
structure. In this context, Ball and Langtry examined force multipliers and identified,
579for example, command, control and communications as an important priority.
In summary, the risk pattern in the 1976 White Paper was very close to a Prospective 
Threat, as limited present risks were dominated by those of a potential Soviet-supported 
adversary arising in Australia’s neighbourhood in the future. While the theory of 
victory was not specified in much detail and did concentrate on the preparation of 
Australian forces, it failed to give any indication of how Australia might react to such a 
risk. Requirements to treat the dominant future risk were to be abductively inferred on
575 Ball and Langtry, ‘Development of Australia’s Defence Force Structure: An Alternative Approach,’ 
pp. 27, 31.
576 Langtry and Ball, Controlling Australia ’s Threat Environment, p. 23.
577 Ball and Langtry, ‘Development of Australia’s Defence Force Structure: An Alternative Approach,’ p. 
33.
57x Langtry and Ball, Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment, 37-44, 53-54. See also the discussion 
in Robert O’Neill, ‘Australia’s Future Defence Requirements,’ Working Paper, no. 24 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1980).
579 J.O. Langry and Desmond Ball, ‘The Concept of Force Multipliers and the Development o f the 
Australian Defence Force,’ Working Paper, no. 66 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, 1983); J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, ‘Force Multipliers, the Concept 
of Disproportionate Response and Defence Planning,’ Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 9, no. 3 (September 
1982), pp. 35-40.
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the basis of scenarios, based on an analysis of geography and the reliance on strategic 
warning. In practice, however, political guidance did not set priorities among endless 
possible developments thus defined. The ‘Core Force’ was meant to provide options for 
a future rearmament, but was hampered by the lack of indication what to prepare for. 
Given Australia’s economy, industrial considerations were limited, but still oriented 
towards future rearmament. The White Paper is moot on the technological level of 
platforms required, and subsequent practice did not accord with the ideal concept in this 
regard. Overall, however, Australian defence planning, at least in its intentions, showed 
most of the defining traits of Rearmament Planning.
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CHAPTER 7:
THREAT-BASED PLANNING
Threat-based Planning is in many ways the most straightforward defence planning 
framework and often taken as a reference case. Requirements are deductively inferred 
from an application through net assessment of force structure variations and theory of 
victory to the known enemy threat. In order to provide the context for the discussion of 
the BUR below, the US example in this chapter will concentrate on the forces and 
concepts developed after the Vietnam War. The second example, the Australian White 
Paper of 1987, is based on a particular application of abduction, which nevertheless 
leads to a Threat-based Planning framework in, perhaps, an even more accentuated 
form.
FIGURE 27: THREAT-BASED PLANNING OVERVIEW
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7.1 United States—General Purpose Forces After Vietnam
Peacetime military engagement overseas did not come easily to the United States after 
WWII. However, the country appreciated the lessons of its retreat from active balance- 
of-power politics 25 years before, and the exhaustion of European powers left little 
doubt that they would be unable to fill the vacuum should it retreat into isolationism. 
But as it had always done, the United States thoroughly demobilized its military after 
the war, even while “[a] shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the 
Allied victory” in the form of the ‘iron curtain’ that surrounded the territories ‘liberated’
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by the Soviet Union. In 1947, the year of the start of both the Berlin Blockade and 
the French war against the Vietminh, the Truman administration took over the baton
C O  1
from the United Kingdom in supporting Greece against communist insurgency. The 
same year, George Kennan wrote that the Soviet totalitarian challenge required “a long
C O -)
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” 
through
the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting 
geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet 
policy.583
7.1.1 Containment: Risk Pattern and Theory o f  Victory o f  the Cold War
At the time, Western European states already began to ally themselves more formally— 
first through the Dunkirk treaty and then, hurried by the pressure of events especially in 
Czechoslovakia in early 1948, the Brussels treaty between Britain, France and the 
Benelux countries. The US military began to cooperate on an informal basis with the 
treaty powers, which already at this early time established the principle of defending 
Europe as far to the East in Germany as possible, none the least to provide time for a US
5 0 4
entry into the war and US reinforcements to arrive.
In the United States, debate on the consequences flowing from Kennan’s idea of 
containment quickly led to the conclusion that efforts would have to be concentrated in
C O  c
areas of vital US interests. The premise before and during the World War that the 
safety of the American hemisphere required the survival of allies in the Rimland of 
Mackinder’s ‘world island’, still held true. In spite of the devastations wrought by the 
war in Europe, the United States could not afford to let the Old World’s demographic 
and industrial potential fall under Communist rule. Only four years after the war, the 
United States thus formally committed itself to the defence of Western Europe through 
the Washington Treaty.586
That same year, and several years before it was expected to gain this capability, the 
Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. US assumptions underlying the estimate 
of a low likelihood of global war in George Kennan’s NSC-20/4 had to be rethought, as 
a strategy of slow mobilization under the US atomic screen—in fact, a replay of
580 Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews o f Peace, speech at Westminster College, Fulton, MO, 5 March 
1946.
581 And, for the sake of regional balance, to Turkey.
582 George Kennan (under the alias of “X”), ‘The Sources o f Soviet Conduct,’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, 
no. 4 (July 1947), p. 575.
583 Ibid., p. 576.
584 For a concise summary o f these developments, which occurred with a remarkable speed that attests to 
the urgency felt at the time, see David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: John Murray, 
1998), pp. 3-24.
585 Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 463-466.
586 At the same time, it arranged the formation of an (as yet not fully sovereign) German state, holding out 
the prospect of German divisions contributing to the common defence in the not-too-distant future, and 
challenging Soviet domination o f Eastern Europe through its very (divided) existence
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Rearmament Planning—was becoming rapidly obsolete. The result of these 
deliberations was NSC-68 of 1950.5X7
NSC-68 laid out the theory of victory for what was to become the Cold War. It 
summarizes the objectives of containment as to
(1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet 
pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in 
general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system...588
C O Q
However, these goals were to be achieved ”by all means short of war”. It goes on to 
state that
The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully 
functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the 
Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can 
develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet 
expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a 
limited or total character.590
The goal of containment was positive—ultimately, the destruction of the Soviet 
system—and it included an offensive as well as defensive component.591 This offensive 
was, however, to be carried by political means, none the least the example that free 
societies could set for those enslaved under Communist rule. The role of military 
force was limited to the strategic defensive, notably foiling Soviet expansive aspirations 
that would threaten hostile domination of the Rimlands. The purpose of large parts of 
NSC-68 was then to convince the reader that such a rapid, radical and sustained build­
up of (defensive) US military power was both possible and necessary to execute this 
role. In particular, it had to be able
a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their 
war-making capabilities can be developed;
b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for 
victory are being built up;
587 For background on NSC-68, see Paul Nitze, ‘The Grand Strategy of NSC-68,’ in NSC-68: Forging the 
Strategy o f Containment, ed. S. Nelson Drew (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1994), pp. 
7-16.
588 National Security Council, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, NSC 68, 14 
April 1950, section VI.A.
589 Ibid.
590 Ibid.
591 See also Peter Schweitzer, Victory: The Reagan Administration ’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).
592 A grand strategy whose main outline was confirmed, at a different time and in a different context, in 
the 1967 NATO Harmel Report. It is of course also true that the means and objectives of the political 
‘offensive’ by which the West tried to change the Soviet Union varied much more over the course of the 
Cold War than those of the military ‘defensive’ side
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c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making 
capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the 
United States and its allies can be brought to bear;
d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the 
execution of the above tasks; and
e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the 
above tasks.593
Successful execution of these tasks in war would foil Soviet expansion into Western 
Europe and thus fulfil the military’s role in the overall theory of containment set out in 
NSC-68.594 They would thus remain the core objectives of the collective Western 
military effort for the following 40 years, even if the relative emphasis changed 
repeatedly over time. To their end, President Truman proclaimed “the existence of a 
national emergency” in December 19 5 0,595 and NATO, within a few years, created an 
integrated military organization of unprecedented scale and scope that bound the United 
States to the defence of Western Europe.596
The purpose here is not to recount the history of the Cold War in all its shifts in terms of 
geographic, political or military focus.597 Whether Indochina was an ‘essential allied 
area’ in the terms of NSC-68 is debatable, but losses to communism in South East Asia 
did remain small in relation to the overall demography and geography of the region. 
More important for the conduct of the Cold War as a whole was the growing 
estrangement between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Although largely 
reduced in popular perception to anecdotes of ping-pong diplomacy, the informal, 
tentative and conditional alliance between Communist China and the United States after
f Q O
1972 forced the Soviet Union to deploy significant military resources to protect its
593 National Security Council, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, section 
IX.D.l
594 This is not to deny that they, or the forces with which they were to be achieved, may not have been 
sufficient all the time to force the Soviet Union to end a war. See Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a 
Theory of Victory.’
595 Harry S. Truman, Proclamation 2914: Proclaiming the Existence o f a National Emergency, 16 
December 1950. NSC-68 was not declassified until 1975, which has probably contributed to the popular 
impression that the Korean War was the reason for the following build-up. In fact, NSC-68 had been 
approved in principle already before the war broke out.
596 The defence of Central Europe, and of Germany in particular, dominates popular perception of 
NATO’s defence effort. However, the Alliance’s role in the defence of Sea Lanes of Communication in 
the Atlantic was no less important, and relied on no lesser a level of integration. See Robert S. Jordan, 
Alliance Strategy and Navies (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990).
597 See, for example, Kissinger, Diplomacy, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f 
Postwar American National Security Policy, Richard K. Betts, U.S. National Security Strategy: Lenses 
and Landmarks, Paper presented at the launch conference of the Princeton Project “Towards a New 
National Security Strategy”, Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University, 2004.
59x Norman Podhoretz remarks that the development of this alliance signified a shift in the perception of 
threat from Communist totalitarian ideology as such, to an expansionist Russian nation-state. (Norman 
Podhoretz, ‘The Rise and Fall of Containment: Informal Remarks,’ in Containment: Concept and Reality, 
eds. Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), pp.
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soft land underbelly, and introduced a major source of uncertainty into its war 
planning. 599 Nevertheless, the defence of Western Europe always remained the focal 
point of the Cold War in political as well as military terms, with the defence of Japan 
and South Korea a distinct second.600 To a large degree, the strategic nuclear balance 
only derived its importance from the threat to Europe, as the US extended deterrent had 
a central role in the defence of its allies in the Rimland.601
7.1.2 Soviet Threat and US Military Strategy after Vietnam
In order not to be drawn into a discussion of the astrategic nature of significant aspects 
of US decisions regarding nuclear forces, and to maintain consistency with the other 
case studies discussed in this thesis, this section will limit itself to a discussion of 
conventional force structure decisions. After the end of the Pentomic division, US 
force planning and NATO's operational and escalation strategy were largely based on a 
proclaimed dichotomy between conventional and nuclear war—despite evidence that 
the Soviet Union had distinctly different views on the subject, 603 confirmed by war 
plans discovered after the fall of the Berlin Wall,604 and despite the fact that a credible 
threat of nuclear theatre war required nuclear and conventional forces able to operate on
703-719.) This is, of course, correct, but at the same time the Sino-Soviet split demonstrated that 
Communism as a totalitarian system at a global state still layered around, rather than replaced, the nation­
state. With regards to the Soviet’s followers outside Russia, President Lincoln’s adage comes to mind 
that ‘you may deceive all the people part of the time, and part of the people all the time, but not all the 
people all the time.’
599 Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China, R-2943-AF (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1982).
600 This reflected the longstanding geostrategic judgement of the relative importance of an Asian versus 
European threat to the Western Hemisphere, the advantages of defending a maritime theatre against a 
land power threat, and the relatively smaller military-industrial potential of the region compared with 
Europe.
601 A fundamental difference between the role of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals that gets completely lost 
in numerical comparisons conducted in a geopolitical vacuum, which unfortunately make up the bulk of 
the literature on the subject.
602 Although arms control ideas and a-strategic systems analysis studies influenced US strategic nuclear 
force structure decisions to a considerable degree, these only overlaid but did not replace the Soviet threat 
as the direct determinant of force sufficiency. See for example William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott 
Thompson, eds., Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done? (New York: National 
Strategy Information Centre, 1979).
603 Richard Pipes, ‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,’ Commentary 
(July 1977), pp. 21-34; William R. Van Cleave, ‘Soviet Doctrine and Strategy: A Developing American 
View,’ in The Future of Soviet Military Power, ed. Lawrence L. Whetten (New York: Crane, Russak, 
1976), pp. 41-71.
604 David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History, pp. 358-362. Whether Soviet or NATO war plans 
would have been executed as anticipated is, of course, a totally different question.
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the same battlefield. 605 NATO cohesion, political imperatives and military 
requirements were nearly always in conflict.606 As Betts put it,
For decades, the bedrock of NATO military strategy made no good sense, but no 
alternative could be found that would not divide the alliance. The key to the apparent 
success of NATO strategy (winning the Cold War without firing a shot) was 
obfuscation of the strategy’s bad sense.607
Somewhat paradoxically, defeat in the Vietnam War in 1975 was followed by a period 
of overall US advantage in the Pacific theatre, largely due to the geostrategic 
repositioning of Communist China. In Northeast Asia, the main concern was to box the 
main part of the Soviet Pacific fleet into the Sea of Japan, and keep SLOC open. 
Economic growth and US military assistance meant that South Korea’s armed forces 
were becoming capable of defending the Peninsula without significant US ground 
combat troops, in a theatre that would in any case have been of secondary importance in
Z. A O
a global war. Soviet forces in Cam Ranh Bay and the Indian Ocean were isolated 
from their sources of supply and reinforcement and thus unlikely to be able to operate 
for a long time.
In Europe, however, the Soviet arms build-up of conventional capabilities since the 
1960s had ensured that, despite parallel improvements in Western capabilities, the 
operational problems of NATO defence on the Central Front remained formidable. By 
the early 1970s, 55% of the Soviet Army’s manoeuvre battalions were tank formations, 
and all infantry was mechanized.609 Commensurate improvements in artillery, tactical 
aviation and the high readiness of Category I divisions in Eastern Europe and the 
western Soviet Union meant that the Soviet Army was poised for a rapid, shock assault 
against NATO defences. Armour provided both defence against nuclear attack, and 
speed to exploit breaches opened by tactical nuclear strikes. Soviet forces were 
organized in thinly spread, consecutive echelons from the inter-German border into the 
western Soviet Union. In wartime, they would move westward at about the same speed, 
thus reducing the need for concentrations of forces at a distance from the line of battle, 
where they would be vulnerable to NATO nuclear attack.610 In effect the Soviet mode 
of operations was a resurrection of 1930s Soviet Deep Operation Theory, adapted to the 
conditions of the modem, nuclear battlefield.
605 Thus the advantages of the enhanced radiation warhead, or neutron bomb. See William R. Van Cleave 
and S.T. Cohen, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination o f the Issues (New York: Crane, Russak, 
1978); S.T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: Political, Technological and Military Issues (Cambridge, MA: 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1978).
606 See Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962).
607 Betts, U.S. National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks, pp. 22-23.
608 Stuart E. Johnson and Joseph A. Yager, The Military Equation in Northeast Asia (Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1979).
609 Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 15.
610 William E. Odom, The Collapse o f the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998),
pp. 12-16.
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When attention shifted from Vietnam back to Europe, and in particular to the Central 
Front,611 the initial American answer lay in the formulation of a doctrine of tactical 
defence in the 1976 Army Field Manual on Operations, concentrating on the battle with 
the first Soviet echelon. However, it became a focal point for both military and civilian 
critics who, based on a thorough analysis of Soviet doctrine, demonstrated that it was
S 1 2
insufficient to deal with the operational challenge posed by the Warsaw Pact forces. 
Over the following years, operational concepts that evolved into the Airland Battle of 
the 1986 Field Manual were developed to stall a Soviet attack, centring on synchronous 
joint operations against several Soviet attack echelons at the same time.613 The Soviet 
reaction to Airland Battle (and its NATO companion, Follow On Forces Attack) 
consisted of a further compression of the time element in Soviet offensives, and the 
increased use of air-assault operations, but the required forces were never accumulated 
before the end of the Cold War.614
An area of relatively new military concern that arose after the Vietnam War was the 
Middle East, in particular the Gulf region. The 1973 crisis that had demonstrated the 
importance of oil for Western economies, estimates (albeit contested) that the Soviet 
Union might develop into an importer of oil, and the attractiveness of horizontal 
escalation for an enemy deterred from action at the Central Front focussed growing 
attention on the region in the second half of the 1970s.615 The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq significantly 
accentuated these concerns, even if they did not make them any clearer. Consequently, 
President Carter declared that “any attempt by outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will ... be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including 
military force.”616 In practice, this meant that the United States would prepare to defend
z | 7
the Iranian oilfields in Khuzestan against a Soviet overland thrust through Iran.
Any shifts in the US theory of victory during the Cold War were subject to acrimonious 
debate at the time. Perhaps only in hindsight is it thus obvious how remarkably focused
611 The Soviet Union also increased its threat to NATO’s northern flank (See, for example, Marian K. 
Leighton, ‘The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern Flank,’ Agenda Paper, no. 10 (New York: National 
Strategy Information Centre, 1979).
612 In fact, it played into the Soviets’ hands by concentrating on the holding echelon of the Soviet Deep 
Operations concept, which was to bind down the defence, not the strike echelon that was to widen tactical 
breakthrough into an operational breakout.
613 For the development of both Soviet and US doctrine, see Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit o f Military 
Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 209-322.
614 Odom, The Collapse o f the Soviet Military, pp. 76-80.
615 Melvin A. Conant, ‘The Global Impact o f Energy on US Security Interests and Commitments,’ in 
Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policymakers, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta (Washington 
D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), pp. 59-72; Geoffrey Kemp and Harlan K. Ullman, ‘US Global 
Strategy: The Future of the Half-War Planning Contingency,’ in Proceedings o f the National Security 
Affairs Conference 1977: Toward Cooperation, Stability and Balance (Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University, 1977), pp. 69-77.
616 President Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/NSC-63, 15 January 1981, p. 1. This statement is 
sometimes referred to as the Carter Doctrine.
617 See Joshua M. Epstein, ‘Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent,’ International Security, 
vol. 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 126-158; Joshua M. Epstein, Strategy and Force Planning: The case o f the 
Persian Gulf (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 44-97. See also Paul K. Davis, 
‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging,’ pp. 25-27.
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it was on the same threat for more than 40 years, following its adaptations, but all the 
same concentrating on the tasks laid out in NSC-68. Since it included operational 
concepts developed in reaction to actual Soviet doctrine, the Airland Battle is perhaps 
the best example of how the American military theory of victory was tailored to the 
specifics of the Soviet threat. However, examinations of US tactics in every service 
could demonstrate the same.619 When William W. Kaufmann discusses uncertainties 
facing the defence effort at the early 1980s, the specificity of the questions he considers 
is telling: They relate either to the US and NATO effort itself,620 to the fact that the 
conditions of a nuclear war can only be predicted up to a point, or the reliability of 
warning estimates. Even the uncertainty regarding the Soviet propensity to behave 
aggressively was limited to the probability of fairly well defined scenarios. The 
following section will now turn to the question of how US force structure planning in 
particular dealt with the Clear and Present Danger presented by the Soviet Union.
7.1.3 Codification o f Requirements
In order to determine the conventional forces necessary for its strategy of flexible 
response, the Kennedy Administration undertook a General Purpose Forces Study in 
1962, which estimated potential requirements in 11 theatres. In an application of the 
Multi-Threat Planning model not dissimilar to the logic of the later BUR, the 
Administration chose to develop forces for 2 Vi wars, i.e. against the Soviet Union in 
Europe, against China in Indochina and Korea, and a ‘half war’ somewhere else, for 
example in Cuba. Central to the strategy, never fully funded and implemented, was the 
constitution of a large strategic reserve in the United States itself, with commensurate 
strategic lift capabilities to shift forces to wherever full or half wars might break out.622
The Nixon Administration adjusted planning to the level of realistically available 
forces, and the geopolitical rapprochement with China, by reducing requirements to a 1 
Vi war standard. Besides the European contingency, it was understood to account for a 
non-Chinese supported attack by North Korea against the South. As mentioned 
above, the situation in Northeast Asia was generally favourable at the time, and US 
troops in Korea were actually reduced.624 By the late 1970s, focus shifted to the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Persian Gulf as likely areas of operation. Overall, however, both the 
2 Vi and 1 Vi war strategies were never articulated in detail—not the least to preserve a
618 For a good discussion of Cold War strategy after Vietnam, see Andrew J. Goodpaster, For the 
Common Defense (Lexington, MA: Lexington Book, 1977).
619 See, for example, Owen R. Cote, ‘The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War 
Struggle with Soviet Submarines,’ Newport Paper, no. 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003).
620 The reliability o f Allied contributions, the self-imposition of arms control limits, and personnel and 
production expansion capabilities.
621 He also cites the concurrency judgement regarding the 1 'A war concept as a source of uncertainty, but 
this would be revised shortly thereafter to the 1 and 2 x 'A concept of the Reagan administration. William 
W. Kaufmann, Defense in the 1980s (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 30-39.
622 William W. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces 1950-1980 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982), pp. 5-13.
623 Jeffrey Record, Revising U.S. Military Strategy (Washington D.C.: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1984), pp. 
29-35.
624 Although one of the two divisions did remain for political more than strictly military reasons.
180
Threat-based Planning
TO Scertain amount of flexibility in keeping conventional requirements affordable, and 
since the option of nuclear escalation was inseparable from conventional defence in a 
war in Europe.626
The attention of the Carter administration, in particular, was focused on the defence of 
Europe. Richard Kugler writes that
Never before had a hypothetical contingency been subjected to so much analysis of not 
only its broad parameters, but also its myriad details. The size and timing of the enemy 
threat was studied in great depth, along with the characteristics of allied forces, in an 
effort to establish a framework for determining U.S. force requirements for the forward 
defense of West Germany’s borders. Once this framework was established, DOD 
analysts carefully examined a range of U.S. military options in order to identify the 
most effective responses that would make the best use of the funds available. Over the 
course of several years, a rich analytical paradigm was built that made a lasting 
contribution to refining U.S. defense planning. By the late 1970s, this paradigm helped 
channel the Carter administration’s limited defense funds. Under the Reagan 
administration, the paradigm was employed to guide growing defense budgets.627
The central linchpin of this paradigm was a comparative assessment of NATO and 
Soviet forces with the goal of estimating the likely outcome of, or the capabilities 
necessary to prevail over, a Soviet assault on Western Europe. Methods of doing this 
ranged from very simplified, Lancaster-equation based calculations to computer 
simulations of tactical engagements of high complexity, and from personal opinions and 
estimates to extensive collaborative net assessment studies and wargames. The Global 
War Game series of the 1980s, for example, involved hundreds of participants and 
highlighted issues such as problems with NATO’s planning assumptions of a short war, 
with consequences regarding the importance of war stocks to bridge the time required 
for industrial mobilization, or the difficulty of achieving negotiation leverage in 
situations of inconclusive operational stalemate.
None of these methods was, of course, without fail—inevitably, they simplified many, 
if not most aspects of a problem as it presents itself in reality, and analysed what were 
really technical or operational sub-problems of the overall, political task of forcing 
NATO’s will on the Soviet leadership. Moreover, no model could deal with 
uncertainties relating to the nature of war and combat in advance—friction, chance and
625 Paul K. Davis, ‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms 
Emerging,’ pp. 16-24.
626 A point often missed in treatments of conventional force modernization of the 1980s. See Roger L.L. 
Facer, Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy o f Flexible Response, R-3209-FF (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1985).
627 Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era, pp. 258-259.
628 Grave, ‘Global War Game: Second Series, 1984-1988.’
629 At the time, Eliot A. Cohen mentioned as common errors in net assessment analysis a disregard of 
political factors, overconfidence in the completeness of order of battle intelligence, reasoning on the basis 
of very simplified Soviet operational doctrine, simplifications by disregarding, for example, important 
applications of air power, or the use of artificial ‘armoured division equivalents’. Eliot A. Cohen, 
‘Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,’ International Security, 
vol. 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
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the vagarities of strategic interaction630 could only be assumed, not modelled away. If 
understood, however, as an attempt to reduce the complexities of the Soviet threat to 
these irreducible uncertainties, the cumulative study effort of the 1970s and 1980s was 
certainly impressive in its scale and scope. (Luckily, the peaceful end of the Cold War 
means that the correctness of the broad conclusions will never be known.)631
The logical point of departure of all these studies was the same—accurate information 
(or, more precisely, information believed to be accurate) on the Soviet order of battle, 
mobilization times, operational doctrine, weapons characteristics, geography, as well as 
on the NATO defence. Hence the unprecedented intelligence attention paid by 
Western services to (almost) anything of even marginal relevance to the military 
potential of the Soviet Union, institutionalised and linked back to the needs of 
comparative analysis through the intelligence-tasking process. And hence, also, the 
importance of successes and failures in, first, conveying (epistemic) uncertainty 
regarding the reliability, precision and completeness of intelligence estimates, and, 
second, of coming to terms with (ontological) irreducible uncertainty regarding the fact 
that important parts of the strategic problem simply depended on decisions the Soviet 
leadership had yet to take.634 However, it is also the case that NATO forces in reality 
usually lagged behind those levels estimated as required to deal with demanding 
situations, which were by far not the worst cases imaginable. Therefore, the question 
of how large a ‘margin of error’ to include in the Western defence capability to 
accommodate uncertainties related to intelligence and modelling did not directly pose 
itself.
US ground forces in Europe (and, in general, NATO allies’ troops forward deployed in 
Germany) always had political functions that sometimes even eclipsed their military 
ones—serving as symbols of Alliance unity, ‘tripwires’ for nuclear retaliation, or 
hostages to the NATO allies facing the Soviet threat on their borders. Under the 
concept of ‘flexible response’ and its (conditional) commitment to conventional 
defence, however, the size of the US ground forward deployment to Europe was 
calculated from basic considerations regarding NATO defences against Soviet attacks. 
Levels of ground forces required then, in turn, also drove proportional requirements for 
tactical airpower for air superiority, close air support and interdiction missions.636 
Within this paradigm of comparative assessment of US and Soviet ground forces, 
(implicitly) codified rules on determining ground force structure requirements largely
630 See Sections 2.3.3 to 2.3.5.
631 See also Pickett, Roche, and Watts, ‘Net Assessment: A Historical Overview.’
632 The latter is an important point. One’s own plans, by their very nature, create an illusion of control 
that hides the fact that their implementation in reality is simply an ex-ante assumption. See Betts, 
Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, esp. pp. 170-188.
633 Berkowitz and Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, pp. 30-63
634 See footnotes 225 and 290 in this thesis, and Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet 
Strategic Threat (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977).
635 For an example study from the end of the Cold War, see CSIS Resources Strategy Project, NATO: 
Meeting The Coming Challenge (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988).
63(> Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces, pp. 56-65.
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rested on the time component and tactical warning, especially the relative mobilization
n  7
rates, of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
FIGURE 28: EXAMPLE OF RELATIVE MOBILIZATION GRAPH
H 1.6
5  1.4
g V2
Days After Pact Mobilization
Note: The lines refer to different reinforcement options, the details o f which are not of interest here. 
Barry R. Posen, Ts NATO Decisively Outnumbered?,’ International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 
1988), p. 188.
Robert P. Haffa writes that about a six-division US forward deployment in Germany 
was the size required to prevent a quantitative Soviet advantage early into the
z o o
mobilization process, before M+9. The overall size of the Army was then determined 
by considerations regarding reinforcement rather than deployment. About 15 US 
divisions were necessary to halt, in conjunction with NATO allies’ forces, the Soviet 
attack, and since NATO alliance cohesion did not permit explicit planning on the basis 
of trading territory for time, this level of forces had to be available in the regular Army, 
and be in Europe by M+30. These estimates were, of course, subject to a number of 
assessments and qualifications that changed over time and, due to the problems of
637 Also see the hypothetical ‘instructions’ in Paul K. Davis, ‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: 
Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging,’ pp. 20-23.
638 1.e. nine days after mobilization (or M-) day. ‘Divisions’ in this context did not necessarily refer to the 
military unit as such, but often to analytical constructs such as the ‘Armored Division Equivalent’. For a 
discussion o f these metrics, see William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense o f Central Europe 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 105-125.
639 Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces, pp. 52-56.
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alliance cohesion mentioned above, did not always make much strategic sense.640 Also, 
parameters that could be adjusted included not only force levels and deployment 
positions, but also logistical reinforcement capabilities (including, but not limited to 
strategic lift) as well as pre-positioning of materiel—all of which were extensively used. 
However, the overall framework of analysis in which these questions were raised 
remained the same, and graphs of relative force ratios over time, such as the example 
reproduced in Figure 28, were standard diet of US force planners.641 In addition, 
smaller European NATO contingencies—such as the defence of Norway—also required 
US ground troops, but these paled in comparison with the force levels required on the 
Central Front.
Besides its role related to the strategic nuclear balance,642 two main missions drove US 
Navy force structure planning during the Cold War—sea control and power projection. 
However, the quality of planning for the naval forces lagged behind those for the land 
forces, due to the absence of a similarly coherent framework of analysis. This was not 
the least since the purpose and importance of sea control was unclear, if NATO 
officially assumed a short land war of only 30 days duration. During the late 1970s and 
1980s, however, the Navy began to plan for a protracted global war, which would 
involve both convoy protection and offensive operations against Soviet surface, as well 
as subsurface forces close to their home bases.643 The difference between the ‘500’ and 
‘600’ ship programs of the late 1970s and 1980s can thus largely be attributed to 
different assumptions and strategies at the operational level, which lead to different 
numbers of required carrier battle groups. In particular, the ‘600 ship Navy’ includes 
forces for an offensive against Soviet naval and air forces on the Kola Peninsula, which 
was not part of the ‘500 ship’ concept. In addition, the former includes additional 
carriers for convoy protection in the North Atlantic, which the latter substitutes with 
land-based aviation.644
US planning for a generic ‘half-war’ lacked codified rules for much of the Cold War, 
partly since a war in Europe would have involved a number of regions, such as Jutland 
or Norway, which in all likelihood would have required reinforcement by US projection 
forces anyway.645 Overambitious strategic concepts, organisational and command chain 
conflicts and a lack of dedicated mobility resources severely hampered preparations for 
a half-war ‘contingency of choice’ that, by definition, was less important than the 
preparation for the global war of necessity. Although the Vietnam War was conceived 
of as a ‘half-war’, it was not commanded by STRIKE Command, established for such 
contingencies, and quickly devoured more than its fair share of military and political
640 See, for example, the comments in Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional 
Forces for NATO: Overview (Washington D.C.: Congress o f the United States, 1978), pp. 7-8.
641 See, for example, the recommendations in Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, esp. 
pp. 295-302.
642 This included both US ballistic missile submarines, and attack submarines that were to hunt their 
Soviet counterparts.
643 For the development o f naval planning during that time, see John B. Hattendorf and Ernest J. King, 
‘The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986,’ Newport Paper, no. 19 (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 2004), esp. pp. 3-21, 37-91.
644 Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces, pp. 68-73.
645 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios, and Options 
(Washington D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1978), pp. 31-39.
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capital. The conversion of STRIKE Command into Readiness Command in 1969, 
tasked with providing combat-ready forces for overseas duty in general, made clear that 
priority had decidedly shifted to planning the full war. During the 1970s, the 
sufficiency of US strategic lift capability, and the ability of large forces to deploy 
overseas within planned timelines, was significantly in doubt—underscored by the 
‘Nifty Nugget’ exercise in 1978. Improvements, however, focussed on the 
reinforcement of Europe in a NATO contingency.646 Implicit codification thus worked, 
in so far as the requirements of the full war that the United States had to win took 
precedence over those of the ill-defined ‘half war’ contingency, regardless of US 
declaratory policy.
However, the increasing concerns about the Gulf region led to studies of possible 
defence requirements in 1979.647 The Rapid Deployable Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was 
stood up in Tampa as a dedicated command for operations in the region, and later 
transformed into US Central Command. On the basis of a defence build-up which 
raised the size of available conventional forces, the Reagan administration expanded the 
1/4 war standard to a ‘1 and 2 x Vi framework, comprising concurrent conflict in 
Europe, Korea and the Persian Gulf.648 Forces identified for the Gulf were, however, 
still also assigned to other theatres. Paul K. Davis writes that
Few remember this now, but these first programs [initiated in late 1979] were oriented 
more toward generic threats (e.g., Iraq) than toward the threat of a Soviet invasion. ... 
Ironically, and despite lip service to diversity, detailed military planning by the Joint 
Chiefs, the RDJTF, and services soon focused almost exclusively on the Soviet threat to 
Iran— virtually ignoring others such as the Iraqi threat to Kuwait.649
Until the end of the Cold War, Threat-based Planning focussed on the Soviet Union 
would thus remain the dominant US planning framework for all important theatres in 
which US forces might be engaged.
7.1.4 Force Structure
Throughout the Cold War, but in particular once the Vietnam War was lost and the 
comfortable margin of Western nuclear superiority had been allowed to erode, concern 
about the relative balance of power dominated US defence policy.650 This concern with 
the central balance also drove the size and shape of conventional forces since, as 
discussed above, (nearly) all requirements in that area were derived from considerations 
regarding a global war against the Soviet Union.651 When American defence 
capabilities required a series of ‘quick fixes’ in the early 1980s, a clear benchmark of
646 Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces, pp. 75-101.
647 Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1984), pp. 16-17.
648 Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era, p. 261.
649 Paul K. Davis, ‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms 
Emerging,’ pp. 26-27.
650 See, for example, the exemplarily comprehensive account in Patrick M. Cronin, U.S.-Soviet Military 
Balance 1980-1985 (Washington D.C.: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1985).
651 See, for example, Barry M. Blechman, ‘The Balance of Conventional Forces and the US Role in 
Assuring Regional Stability,’ in Proceedings o f the National Security Affairs Conference 1977: Toward 
Cooperation, Stability and Balance, pp. 55- 67
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sufficiency was available in form of their estimated performance against the Soviet 
Union. “ The US military after Vietnam was probably as close as the forces of a power 
with vital interests across the globe will ever come to being a pure hedge against a 
precisely defined strategic risk.653
In fact, a case could be made that this case study does not even meet the criteria set out 
in Section 1.1, namely that the thesis would study The material preparation for the 
possibility of war, but not of war itself.’ Routine readiness levels during the Cold War, 
in particular in the area of strategic nuclear forces, were often such that it would have 
been a stretch to describe them with the term ‘peacetime’. US attack submarines and 
other Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces were, over decades, engaged in very real 
operations against Soviet naval forces.654 In the end, direct superpower confrontation 
only claimed the lives of a handful of pilots, but the Cold War was a very real war 
nevertheless—although escalation was, consistent with Clausewitzian theory, limited by 
the political objective.655
Weapons technology was an inherent part of the conflict.656 Soviet technology drove 
requirements regarding the technological specifications of nearly all US weapons
z r n
systems, probably nowhere more than in the area of electronic warfare. One example 
among many, NATO Standard Tank Targets, based on the known criteria of Soviet 
tanks, were used in the development of western armour and anti-armour weapons. New 
Soviet weapon systems repeatedly required crash programmes as a reaction (often with
z r o
less than satisfactory outcomes, such as the M60A2 tank). Given the relatively 
precise technological requirements, procurement followed the ‘grand design’ approach 
of development, testing and large scale production.
US planning for the defence of Europe was, of course, inseparable from that of NATO 
as a whole.6^ 9 US forces stationed in or marked for deployment to Europe would have 
fought with allied forces under combined NATO commands. The Alliance standing 
command structure for the Central Front consisted of four levels above national corps, 
and a whole range of other commands were concerned with the defence of the northern 
and southern flanks, the Channel, the Atlantic, or with rapid reaction and integrated
652 See, for example, W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to 
Strength (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980).
(’53 NATO (and neutral) frontline states during the Cold War, such as Germany, Norway or Sweden, and 
countries such as Taiwan or South Korea, can o f course specialize their force even more, as the 
geographic dimension o f the threat they face is even more limited.
654 Cote, ‘The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet 
Submarines.’
655 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 90-91. See also Steven J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical 
perspective on nuclear strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 66-97.
650 S.T. Possony and J.E. Poumelle, The strategy of technology: Winning the decisive war (Cambridge, 
MA: University Press of Cambridge, 1970).
657 Alfred Price, The History o f U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. II: The renaissance years, 1946 to 1964, 
and vol. Ill: Rolling Thunder through Allied Force, 1964-2000 (Arlington, VA: Association of Old 
Crows, 2000).
658 David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History, pp. 265, 271-272.
659 See John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution o f NATO’s Conventional Posture (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 194-232.
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military capabilities.660 NATO war plans assigned each unit a specific role in the initial 
defence against the Warsaw Pact—most battalions would have known the location in 
which they were meant to enter the war down to the village. The plans for a NATO 
mobilization were of enormous scale, scope and specificity. A NATO General Alert 
would have easily seen the largest movement of men and materiel in the history of 
mankind, not only across the Atlantic, but also over the English Channel, through the 
Benelux countries, and within Germany itself.661
The focus on the NATO contingency, as discussed in the previous section, thus did not 
remain without consequence for the materiel and equipment of the US military:
To illustrate the pervasiveness of the focus on Central Europe and global war, consider 
that as of the late 1970s, the United States had woefully inadequate strategic mobility, 
only very light Marine units, no mountain infantry, minimal ability to provide purified 
water to expeditionary units in places such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, helicopters that 
were highly vulnerable to desert dust, and very little capability aside from Marine 
amphibious units to land equipment “over the shore” where access to high-capacity 
ports was unavailable.662
Many of these deficiencies were reduced during the build-up of the 1980s, which added, 
for example, the 10th Mountain Division to the force structure in 1985. Requirements 
for deployment to the Persian Gulf, in particular, led to the strengthening of anti-armour 
capabilities of the air assault and airborne division, and the configuration of the 9th 
Infantry division into a force of combined arms battalions.663 In their mix of airborne, 
infantry, mechanized and armoured ground units, forces earmarked for the RDJTF were 
thus similar to the composition of the 2 (GE) Corps that was to fight Warsaw Pact 
forces on the Czech border—both shaped by the particular demands of fighting delaying 
actions in complex mountainous terrain.664 The defence effort as a whole, however, 
continued to be aligned with the relative importance of the disparate theatres—William 
W. Kaufman estimates that allocations in fiscal year 1986 were (in billion) $54.7 for
660 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949-1989 (Brussels: 
NATO Information Service, 1989), pp. 344-353.
661 David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History, pp. 243-246. No wonder, then, that the plans were 
never comprehensively tested. Mobilization exercise ‘Nifty Nugget’ in 1978 led one commentator to 
write that “an army of some 400,000 of the best trained soldiers in the United States was sent to the plains 
of Central Europe. It probably died there. It had been equipped with some of the most lethal, most 
advanced high technology weaponry on the planet, but it did not have enough shells, missiles, fuel, food, 
spare parts or replacements to survive more than a few weeks ... As one high-level Pentagon planner 
explained it: “The army was simply attrited to death.”” (John J. Fialka, ‘The Grim Lessons of Nifty 
Nugget,’ Army, vol. 30, no. 4 (April 1980), pp. 15.) Thus, improvements were always possible, and took 
the form of, for example, increased prepositioning, the establishment of the Joint Mobility Agency, and a 
number of other measures both physical and organisational. For a relatively positive assessment, see 
Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington D.C.: National Defense 
University, 1988).
662 Paul K. Davis, ‘Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms 
Emerging,’ p. 25.
663 Karl E. Cocke, Department o f the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington D.C.: 
Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995), pp. 60-62.
664 See the forces mentioned in David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History, p. 233, and Richard A. 
Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, ‘The United States,’ in Fighting Armies: NATO and the Warsaw Pact, A 
Combat Assessment, ed. Richard A. Gabriel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 15-16.
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nuclear weapons, $107.2 for the conventional defence of Central, Northern and 
Southeastern Europe (excluding the Atlantic), $34.6 for Korea, the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, and only $20.9 for the Persian Gulf.665
In summary, the risk pattem during the Cold War was one of Clear and Present 
Danger, dominated by the Soviet Union. The US theory of victory of containment was 
implemented by a detailed military strategy specifically tailored to that threat, and 
aimed at directly reducing the likelihood (and consequences) of war in Europe. 
Requirements to treat the Soviet risk were directly derived from that theory through net 
assessment. The US force structure was a specialized hedge against the Soviet threat, 
even in the half-war contingency in the Gulf. Procurement followed the 'Grand Design’ 
approach and even technological specifications of equipment directly flowed from their 
role in meeting Soviet forces. US defence planning during the Cold War thus shows all 
defining traits of Threat-based Planning.
7.2 Australia—The 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper
Differences regarding the interpretation of political guidance between civilian and 
military officials in the Australian Department of Defence escalated in the early 1980s, 
to a point where “almost a civil war then raged in the organization.”666 At the heart of 
the controversy were the relative importance of low and higher-level contingencies in 
the framework of the 1976 White Paper, and force structure consequences that flowed 
from them. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence’s inquiry into Threats 
to Australia's Security in 1981 is instructive for understanding that controversy, as its 
list of low-level threats seems highly influenced by the activities of Palestinian and 
Communist terrorists in Europe and the Middle East at the time. Most of the threats 
considered were closer to peacetime, routine tasks of the defence force than to more 
traditional defence emergencies—indeed, the Committee defined low-level 
contingencies as “those threats which can be dealt with within the peacetime
z  z  o
organisation and structure of the Defence Force.”
Such an argument was close to being a tautology. There was no minimum boundary for 
a ‘low-level’ contingency in such a framework, and a defence force structured to meet 
primarily these types of threats could in theory degenerate to a paramilitary back-up 
force to civilian authorities. But the ‘Core Force’ concept, the White Paper’s call for a 
capability to deter escalation, and the activity of Soviet maritime forces in the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans still required the ability to meet higher level threats. The tension 
between these two positions was never resolved by explicit guidance from the political 
leadership.669
665 William W. Kaufmann, A Reasonable Defense (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 
14. It would have been difficult to even split up the defence budget in this way after the Cold War.
666 Andrews, The Australian Centenary History o f Defence, Vol. V: The Department o f Defence, p. 245.
667 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their Nature and 
Probability', p. 48.
668 Ibid., p. 48.
669 See Stewart Woodman, ‘Defending the Moat: Maritime Strategy and Self-Reliance,’ in ‘In Search of a 
Maritime Strategy: The maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901,’ Canberra Paper, 
no. 119, ed. David Stevens (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1997), pp. 122-123.
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In order to break the stalemate within the Defence organisation and to arrive at a more 
coherent, precise and less divisive basis for defence planning, the Minister of Defence 
Kim Beazley commissioned Paul Dibb to write a Review o f Australia's Defence 
Capabilities in 1985. The recommendations of the 1986 Dibb Review then formed the
s n r \
basis for the subsequent 1987 Defence o f Australia White Paper.
7.2.1 Risk Pattern
The assessment in the 1987 White Paper of Australia’s overall strategic environment is 
quite similar to that in its 1976 predecessor: As before, the priority for the Australian 
defence effort is seen in its region and not in a contribution to the Cold War central 
balance, although it does spell out Australian commitments in this regard more 
clearly:671
In the remote contingency of global conflict Australia would have regard in the first 
instance to the situation in our immediate region. Our responsibilities would include 
those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of 
shipping .... Subject to priority requirements in our own area the Australian 
Government would then consider contributions further afield.672
The White Paper remarks that “[i]n general, Australia’s strategic environment is 
favourable”,673 and
that Australia’s bilateral relations with its major allies and with neighbouring countries 
are basically sound, notwithstanding the political fluctuations which inevitably occur 
from time to time. No neighbouring country harbours aggressive designs on Australia, 
and no country has embarked on the development of the extensive capabilities to 
project maritime power which would be necessary to sustain intensive military 
operations against us.6'4
In addition, the White Paper reiterates its predecessor’s judgement regarding the gravity 
of a potential decision to attack Australia:
670 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1987), p. 2. 
With regards to their defence planning concepts, both documents only differ in details and emphasis. The 
following discussion will therefore concentrate on the authoritative political guidance as outlined in the 
White Paper, but draw significantly on the Dibb Review for codification and strategic guidance, as they 
are discussed in more detail in that document.
671 Much of the criticism of Defence of Australia has, despite assertions of the critics, nothing to do with 
defence planning or even strategy and everything with political views regarding Australia’s place and role 
in the world. See, for example, Michael Evans, ‘The Tyranny of Dissonance,’ Study Paper, no. 306 
(Canberra: Land Warfare Centre, 2005).
672 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 3. Accordingly, the Collins Class submarine was 
designed to be capable of long-distance operations against Soviet fleets in the Pacific. Maryanne Kelton, 
‘New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class Submarine Project,’ Canberra Paper, no. 162 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2005), p. 4.
672 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia., p. 13.
674 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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Any decision to embark upon hostilities as a deliberate act of state policy is a major one 
for any government to make. ... Much would need to change, therefore, in our 
international position for the possibility of such conflict to arise.675
As the 1976 White Paper, its successor concludes the existence of uncertainties about 
Australia’s future security situation, and the potential for future interference by external 
powers:
Our assessments now depict a regional situation with underlying strengths, albeit with 
many uncertainties.676
Major changes in regional relationships or internal instability in individual countries in 
South-East Asia could introduce or expand uncertainties in Australia’s strategic 
prospects, even though developments may not be directly threatening to us. Tensions 
between nations in South-East Asia could provide opportunities for increased 
involvement in the region by unfriendly or contending powers.677
Like its predecessor, it also identifies the super power balance as one possible cause for 
the deterioration of Australia’s security situation:
A redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an 
extension of Soviet influence in our region at the expense of the United States, would 
be a matter of fundamental concern to Australia, and would be contrary to our national 
interests.678
Compared with the previous White Paper, the discussion of the global balance has 
however lost much of its urgency and detail. Australia’s situation has improved, not 
least since the “formation and consolidation of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has not only benefited those nations but has also been of strategic 
benefit to Australia.” While the 1976 White Paper had shown itself quite concerned 
about the significance of Soviet expansion in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, 
the 1987 White Paper can conclude that
Uncertainties in South-East Asia relate principally to:
• economic and political problems in the Philippines;
675 Ibid., p. 30.
676 Ibid., p. 14.
677 Ibid., p. 13.
678 Ibid., p. 3.
679 The Dibb Review had been even more sanguine on the relevance of the Cold War and Soviet 
expansionism for Australia than the White Paper itself (see, for example, Dibb, Review o f Australia ’s 
Defence Capabilities, pp. 26, 31-32, 47). In these judgements, which proved correct, he showed himself 
much less concerned than only a few years before. See Paul Dibb, ‘World Political and Strategic Trends 
Over the Next 20 Years—Their Relevance to Australia,’ Working Paper, no. 65 (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1983); Paul Dibb, ‘Soviet Capabilities, Interests 
an Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s,’ Working Paper, no. 45 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1982).
680 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 14.
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• the unresolved question of the political future of Cambodia ... [and];
• the establishment of the Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh Bay.681
In some respects, the focus of concern regarding significant adverse developments had 
shifted from South East Asia to the South West Pacific. This area had seen the retreat 
of European powers and independence of several new states over the previous ten years, 
with resulting instability in Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia as well as Soviet and 
Libyan activities. Here, “[t]he fragile and narrowly based economies of the South 
West Pacific countries will continue to present opportunities for exploitation by external 
powers.”683
Given these uncertainties, the 1987 White Paper comes to the same fundamental 
conclusion as its predecessor, that the basis of Australian defence policy must be one of 
insurance against the incertitude that affects the—generally positive—outlook:
Australia’s defence interest is not confined to the presence or absence of military threat 
itself. We are concerned with developments that could either support Australia’s 
security or have the potential to lead to a military threat. Prudent defence policy must 
insure against uncertainties and the risk that they might resolve unfavourable to our 
interests.684
With regards to the development of capabilities for the invasion of the continent or a 
major enemy lodgement, the 1987 White Paper writes that it would not only “imply 
dramatic change, not now in prospect, to a belligerent and provocative external policy 
on the part of a neighbouring country,” but also that the alternative of a “major strategic 
lodgement in the northern archipelago by an external power” is “also now a remote
z: or
prospect given the increased strategic resilience of our ASEAN neighbours.” 
However, “[different considerations apply when low level threats are contemplated. ... 
The capabilities required are much less and already exist in a number of countries.”686 
Moreover,
The political problems which might lead to low level threats are more diverse in nature 
than those which might invite more substantial attack. Less time would be needed for
681 Ibid., p. 14.
682 See David Hegarty, ‘Libya and the South Pacific,’ Working Paper, no. 127 (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1987); David Hegarty, ‘South Pacific Security 
Issues: An Australian Perspective,’ Working Paper, no. 147 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1987)
683 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 18.
684 Ibid., p. 20.
685 Ibid., p. 26. The defence of Papua New Guinea against Indonesia is the one (relatively) high-intensity 
contingency that was much more realistic, but which—for obvious reasons—was never discussed in any 
detail in public documents. Open source analysis make a convincing case, however, that the capability 
programs discussed below would have provided appropriate means to deal with such a situation as well. 
See, for example, Ross Babbage, ‘The Dilemmas of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Contingencies in 
Australian Defence Planning,’ Working Paper, no. 128 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, 1987).
686 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 30.
191
Managing Strategic Risk
an adversary to prepare and Australia would also have less time to mount a military
687response.
The two central judgements regarding the risk pattern in the 1987 White Paper68* are 
thus that, first, due to
the severe consequences if such threats [of invasion or major lodgement] emerged over 
a longer time-scale, Australian defence policy and force structure planning cannot 
ignore them,689
but that, second,
the Government has directed that priority be given in defence planning to ensuring 
adequate and appropriate capabilities exist within the Defence Force to deal with [low- 
level] pressures.690
As in the 1976 White Paper, attention to future risk was thus paid on the basis of the 
precautionary principle since developments that could lead to major threats in the long 
term were affected by significant uncertainty. But the present risk of low-level conflict 
is addressed on the basis of risk-aversion, not precaution: The assessment of even low- 
level conflict being very unlikely, given Australia’s friendly relations with its 
neighbours, is not affected by any severe uncertainties at all; nor, as discussed below, 
were the possible forms that low-level harassment could take regarded as particularly 
uncertain. Confidence in the long-term stability of Australia’s strategic environment 
thus became greater, and as did risk-aversion regarding a present, and fairly well 
known, particular risk. Overall, the 1987 White Paper thus shifted to dealing with a 
Clear and Present Danger, which, as discussed below, had important consequences 
both for the way political guidance could be codified, and the force structure concept 
that would be used to treat the risk.
7.2.2 Theory o f Victory and Defence in Depth ’
The 1987 White Paper lists three complementary ways in which the Government wants 
to reduce strategic risk, and which form the rough outline of a theory of victory:
• maintaining and developing capabilities for the independent defence of Australia 
and its interests;
• promoting strategic stability and security in our region; and
• as a member of the Western strategic community working for a reduction in the 
level o f tension between the superpowers and limiting the spread of influences in 
our region inimical to Western interests.691
The White Paper writes that
687 Ibid.
688 Both are spelled more explicitly in Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 55.
689 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 26.
690 Ibid., p. 30.
691 Ibid., p. vii.
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Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia therefore supports the 
ability of the United States to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet 
Union.692
But Australia has to accept that “[t]here are limits to our defence capacity and 
influence,” and that “[sjupport for the positions of allies and friends in this [wider 
Indian and Pacific Ocean] region must be predominantly diplomatic.”694 Significant 
capability implications of the support of wider Western interests are thus limited to the 
joint facilities, 695 but forces procured for other tasks could be made available if 
warranted: Explicitly mentioned in this context is the possibility of using the RAN’s 
FFGs as part of US carrier battle groups.696
With regard to cooperation within Australia’s region of strategic interest, defence 
support to the South-West Pacific primarily consists of training and surveillance 
assistance, although the Government continued the Pacific Patrol Boat project. In 
South East Asia, Australia concentrates on “practical co-operation with the countries of
Z Q O
ASEAN in activities of common defence interest.” It remains committed under 
FPDA to participating in the Integrated Air Defence System,699 rotating RAAF aircraft 
through Malaysia and Singapore, leaving a rifle company in Malaysia700 and conducting 
regular surveillance of the South China Sea by P-3C Orions from Butterworth — 
activities which all relate to the employment rather than the structuring of the defence 
force. While the stabilization of the region was thus an important part of Australia’s 
wider theory of victory to treat strategic risk, its relevance to defence planning, and 
especially to force planning, was in fact very small.
The only task used for force structure determinations proper was thus the defence of 
Australia, since
Meeting our requirements for the defence o f Australia will provide the Government 
with practical options for use of elements of the Defence Force in tasks beyond our area 
of direct military interest in support of regional friends and allies. It is therefore not
692 Ibid., p. 3.
693 Ibid., p. 8.
694 Ibid., p. 13.
695 Ibid., pp. 10-11. For a more detailed, contemporary discussion o f Australia’s support to the United 
States, see Thomas-Durrell Young, ‘Assessing the 1987 Australian Defence White Paper in the Light of 
Domestic Political and Allied Influences on the Objective of Defence Self-Reliance,’ Working Paper, no. 
152 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988).
696 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 3.
697 Ibid., p. 18.
698 Ibid., p. 15.
699
700
Ibid., p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 7.
/U1 Ibid., p. 16.
702 See also Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley, ‘Australia’ Regional Security Policies 1970- 
1990: Some Critical Reflections,’ Working Paper, no. 101 (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian 
National University, 1990), pp. 15-20.
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necessary that such contingencies should themselves constitute force structure 
determinants.703
Australia’s military strategy for the defence of Australia as laid down in the 1987 White 
Paper can best be described with reference to the strategy of denial defined in the Dibb 
Review. Dibb did not see a major role for long-range strike and interdiction forces, 
particularly in low-level conflict, as there would be political restraints on their use 
against the enemy homeland.704 Instead, his strategy was heavily based on maritime 
capabilities able to interdict enemy forces in the sea-air gap to Australia’s north. Dibb 
wrote that
a strategy of denial would present an enemy with a series of interlocking barriers to an 
attack on Australia, as follows:
• First, we require extremely high quality and comprehensive intelligence ... [and 
bjroad area surveillance . . . .  The possibility of a surprise attack will be denied the 
enemy. ...
• Second, Australia’s air and naval forces must have the capacity to destroy enemy 
forces, at credible levels of threat, in the sea and air gap. ...
• Third, closer to our shores, defensive capabilities are required to prevent enemy 
military operations in our focal areas or shipping lanes or on our territory. ...
• Fourth, ... we would need ground forces capable of denying the enemy our vital 
population centres and military infrastructure.705
The 1987 White Paper’s 'defence in depth’ retained these four layers as the basis of 
Australia’s strategy. It did not however share the Review’s scepticism regarding the 
utility of long-range strike forces, writing that “the ability to conduct such operations 
[against the enemy homeland] would allow an important option.” In some regards, it 
was thus closer to a concept of operations developed by the RAAF in previous years 
that focused on the need to prevent a lodgement of enemy forces by maritime strike 
against the adversary’s bases, forces in transit towards the continent and enemy 
SLOC. In the end, both the unclassified versions of 'defence in depth’ and Dibb’s 
strategy of ‘denial’, in particular, came under justifiable criticism of being too reactive 
and not proposing any leverage over the enemy. For the purposes of the argument
703 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 6. See also p. 8.
704 Dibb, Review o f Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 36, 66.
705 Ibid., p. 51.
706 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 25.
707 David Evans, A Fatal Rivalry: Australia ’s Defence at Risk (Melbourne: The MacMillan Company of 
Australia, 1990), pp. 21-24; Alan Stephens, Power plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the 
Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), pp. 
164-168.
708 See, for example, Babbage, ‘Looking Beyond the Dibb Report;’ and Desmond Ball, ‘Notes on Paul 
Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities,’ Reference Paper, no. 143 (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986). See also the surveys in Andrew Mack, 
‘Defence Versus Offence: The Dibb Report and its Critics,’ Working Paper, no. 14 (Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986), esp. pp. 1-5; and Matthew Gubb,
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here, however, the appropriateness of the strategy is secondary to the fact that it 
established, for the first time, authoritative political guidance regarding the way that the 
ADF should treat strategic risk, and that it was directly tailored to reduce the risk of low 
and escalated-low level conflict.
7.2.3 Codification o f Requirements
As discussed above, the 1987 White Paper directed the ADF to prepare to meet first the 
present risk of low-level conflict, and second the future risk of a significant 
deterioration of Australia’s strategic circumstances. Given the clear prioritisation 
between the two and the fact that the latter task had already been the, albeit contested, 
focus of defence planning in previous years, it is perhaps not surprising that neither the 
White Paper nor the Dibb Review contain any specific comments on how requirements 
regarding the latter risk should be codified. Instead, they directly contain force structure 
decisions, discussed in more detail in the following section, that significantly cut back 
capabilities only required on the basis of expansion base considerations. It can thus be 
inferred that the ten years of strategic warning time presumed in authoritative political 
guidance were seen as sufficient to expand minimal capabilities. The Dibb Review 
wrote with regards to capabilities for conventional land conflict that it
is not in a position to draw detailed conclusions on the levels o f organization that would 
be adequate to retain the appropriate skills against the somewhat remote possibility of 
their use as an expansion base, but the overriding principle should be that the allocation 
of resources remain constrained.709
Given the reduced emphasis on the expansion base, capabilities only justified due to 
their contribution to this task, such as medium artillery or tanks, were thus to be kept at 
a level that was the minimum necessary to retain essential skills, and generally in 
integrated regular-reserve units. Only the quality or type of present capabilities required 
for the expansion base was now to be considered. Quantitative considerations, which 
had been central to the expansion path studies of the ‘Core Force’ concept, were the 
victim of the demotion of future risk to second rank.
‘How Valid was the Criticism of Paul Dibb’s ‘Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’?,’ Working 
Paper, no. 164 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986). 
The Dibb Review did, however, contain the statement that “[a] manifest capability to threaten bases from 
which an adversary’s air and naval forces could attack Australia direct would be a disincentive to the use 
of those forces, and an inhibition on their deployment.” (Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, pp. 65-66.) Stewart Woodman also criticizes the Dibb Review as missing a proper ADF 
operational strategy, which arguably led to an overemphasis on simultaneous naval coverage of several 
focal areas (Woodman, ‘Defending the Moat: Maritime Strategy and Self-Reliance,’ pp. 128-135.). In 
some regards, the Australian strategic community at that time had not completely overcome the 
limitations that had plagued it since the end of ‘Forward Defence.’ Embryonic joint operational 
headquarters had only recently been established, and both the Dibb Review and the 1987 White Paper 
consequently urged to increase jointness in capability as well as operational planning. (Dibb, Review of 
Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 28-30, 90-93, 148; Department of Defence, The Defence of 
Australia, pp. 60-62.) Indeed, Woodman acknowledges that “the impetus [the Dibb Review and 1987 
White Paper] gave [to the development o f joint operational doctrine] may eventually be seen as their most 
significant contribution to the defence of Australia.” (Woodman, ‘Defending the Moat: Maritime 
Strategy and Self-Reliance,’ p. 136.)
709 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 87
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The main innovation of the Dibb Review was the way it codified requirements for low 
and escalated low-level conflict. In line with the theory developed in this thesis, the 
Review used considerations regarding available intelligence information, geography and 
other dimensions of strategy, and warning time considerations for this task. However, it 
was still an exercise in coming to terms with the general lack of an observable threat, 
and the combination of deduction and abduction used to infer requirements 
distinguishes the Dibb Review from the ideal case of Threat-based Planning. It is this 
methodology that lies at the core of much of the controversy that the Review can elicit 
to this day.
Since Australia’s priority risk of low and escalated low-level risk was a present one, a 
plethora of intelligence information could be obtained about Indonesian capabilities and 
used in Australian defence planning. The 1987 White Paper thus writes that “[t]he 
limits of escalated low-level conflict would be set at any one time by the military 
capabilities that could practically be brought to bear against Australia’s interests,”710 
defining a pivotal rule that could be used by the wider national security community to 
assess this type of strategic risk and monitor it in the future. Unlike the concept of 
low-level conflict of the 1981 Joint Committee Report mentioned above, the concept
7  1 9
developed in the Dibb-Report thus had relatively clear upper as well as lower bounds. 
With regards to capabilities in the wider sense, such as military forces, organisation, 
economic resources and infrastructure, the present risk defined in the 1987 White Paper 
was located towards the right hand side of the spectrum in Figure 15, where the amount 
of available information is sufficient to define specific risks and design tailored risk 
treatment programmes.
However, low and escalated low-level conflict were addressed on the basis of a high 
risk aversion towards a purely hypothetical situation, as no information was available 
that signalled any intention on the part of Australia’s neighbours to use military force 
against the country. There was, therefore, no ‘hard’ information available regarding the 
enemy’s political goals, and only historical experience with enemy strategy and tactics 
from Konfrontasi and the invasions of East Timor and West Papua, all of which were 
settings very much different in both political and geographic terms to that postulated 
in the Dibb Review. Intelligence information regarding capabilities and considerations 
regarding geography and warning time thus could not a-priori be analysed in deductive 
terms, as it was by no means clear what function they would have in the unknown 
enemy theory of victory. Instead, ‘missing’ information regarding enemy intentions and 
strategy had to be postulated on an abductive basis—a point freely admitted by the Dibb 
Review when it writes about low and escalated low-level conflict that “[tjhese 
assessments simply represent judgements of what might be possible, given potential
710 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, p. 25. See also Dibb, Review of Australia’s 
Defence Capabilities, p. 38.
711 Paul Dibb, ‘The Conceptual Basis o f Australia’s Defence Planning and Force Structure Development,’ 
Canberra Paper, no. 88 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
1992), pp. 9-11.
712 Criticism that warning time for high-level conflict was shorter than officially assumed because of the 
risk of escalation of low-level conflict was therefore at odds with strategic guidance. See for example 
Ball, ‘Notes on Paul Dibb’s Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities,’ p. 5.
713 With regards to the distance from Indonesian bases o f operations.
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military capacities, should conflict arise.”714 However, abduction can only establish a 
possible cause but never a necessary relationship—in other words, reasoning in this way 
could never on its own provide a basis for a decision on which of all the possible enemy 
intentions or strategies to prepare for.
Neither the Dibb Review nor the 1987 White Paper explicitly addresses this issue. 
However, both seem to presume an enemy intent on causing the ADF maximum 
difficulty without resorting to operations that could be considered unreasonable715 in 
Australian (or generally Western) eyes: The Dibb Review, for example, dismisses the 
possibility of larger-scale lodgements during escalated low-level conflict on the basis of 
“the key judgement that a continuing campaign of raids could cause us significantly
71 Amore difficulties than would an attempted lodgement with inadequate forces.” 
Although the enemy postulated in the 1987 White Paper was thus one that decided to 
attack Australia not long after an abrupt end to what was an amicable relationship, he 
was expected to do so in a strictly rational fashion. Perhaps inevitably, given the very 
small likelihood of the risk to be treated, some facets of the postulated threat were thus 
awkward to reconcile and could make the whole logical edifice seem somewhat unreal. 
However, certainty about current enemy capabilities thus led to certain requirements— 
albeit only on an abductive basis.
The way in which the 1987 White Paper makes use of warning times is closely related 
to its use of the enemy’s capabilities as the benchmark for low and escalated low-level 
conflict. It reiterates several of the 1976 White Paper’s points regarding the role of 
strategic warning to signal changes in risks and dimensions of risk, rather than of direct 
threats;717 the importance of monitoring the international environment to provide 
maximum reaction time; the fact that changes in capabilities as well as in political 
intentions could be used for this task; and the judgement “that higher levels of threat
n i o
could emerge only after a longer period of time.” These assessments reflected 
concepts developed by Australian intelligence and defence organisations throughout the 
1970s, which were based on a detailed analysis of the capabilities necessary to mount 
operations across the sea-air gap to Australia’s north.719 However, in the case of low 
and escalated low-level conflict the enemy by definition did not need to add to his 
military capabilities, and it is consequently seen as “possible with relatively little 
warning” —Dibb later wrote of several months during which political relations would
714 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 54.
715 For a discussion of the problems associated with concepts o f reasonableness and rationality in the 
defence planning and strategy context, see Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.
716 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 79.
717 The official position regarding warning time was thus more appropriate than sometimes suggested by 
criticism of inadequate defence reaction times (if not inadequate warning times), such as, for example, 
Ross Babbage, ‘What’s Wrong With the Defence White Paper?,’ Reference Paper, no. 149 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1987), pp. 1-3.
718 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 29-30.
719 Dibb, ‘The Conceptual Basis o f Australia’s Defence Planning and Force Structure Development,’ pp. 
1-8. For summaries o f criticisms of this judgement, largely from outside the official sphere, see Gubb, 
‘How Valid was the Criticism o f Paul Dibb’s ‘Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities’?, pp. 5-7.
720 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 40.
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deteriorate.721 Since the definition of present risk is directly tied to present enemy 
capabilities, strategic warning about changing risks thus becomes equivalent to the 
tracking of regional capability plans. And since the ADF is directed to prepare for low 
and escalated low-level conflict even though no hostile intentions have been detected, 
warning over shorter time-scales reduces to tactical warning about the realization of 
that risk—hence the Review’s emphasis on forestalling surprise attacks by use of, for 
example, Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR).722
This use of warning is thus the corollary of addressing low and escalated low-level risk 
on the basis of a high risk aversion, as it effectively eliminates the danger for Australia 
of strategic surprise within the range o f threats considered in the concepts o f low and 
escalated low-level conflict. Given the lack of observable threats in the short term, 
Australia a-priori found itself in a situation of ignorance, in the terminology of Figure 
5. Defining escalated low-level conflict by referring to known (potential) enemy 
capabilities was thus equivalent to the transformation of this ignorance under open 
expectations into more precisely defined risks. The question of which abductively 
defined potential enemy operations to consider is thus closely related to the question of 
the extent to which expectations within the framework of low and escalated low-level 
conflict really were open, or how significant the residual potential for surprise.
The use of geography to codify political guidance in the 1987 White Paper and Dibb 
Review is relatively straightforward. As the main risk to be treated was a present one, 
infrastructure and settlement patterns during conflict could be assumed to be unchanged 
from their present state. The Review’s strategy of denial was already developed on the 
premise that “[tjhrough a strategy based on the fundamentals of our geographic location 
we can maximise the benefits of an essentially defensive posture in our 
neighbourhood.” In order to derive strategic guidance, the strategy’s individual 
layers thus had to be defined in a more detailed form, in context with ADF and enemy 
capabilities. Geography thus provided the stage for a net assessment analysis, which 
could also include more tentative assessments of other dimensions of strategy, such as 
the Australian public’s willingness to incur the costs of harassments, or the 
effectiveness of civil-military coordination and other organisational issues.
Although the term was not commonly used in Australia at the time, net assessment was 
indeed central to the Australian defence planning framework in the 1987 White 
Paper.724 It states that
To have significance for our planning, potentially opposing capabilities must be 
assessed in terms of their ability to project military force against Australia in the face of 
our offensive and defensive capabilities, and in terms of the rationale that would 
underlie possible forms of military action ...725
721 Dibb, ‘The Conceptual Basis of Australia’s Defence Planning and Force Structure Development,’ p. 9.
722 Dibb, Review of Australia 's Defence Capabilities, p. 51.
723 Ibid., p. 42.
724 Brice Pacey highlighted this fact at the time and argued that it required a new approach to analytical 
studies in the defence organisation. See Pacey, ‘The Potential Role of Net Assessment in Australian 
Defence Planning.’
725 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, p. 25.
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In a deductive net assessment analysis, known enemy and ADF capabilities could be 
pitted against each other in the known arena of geography, and in the context of the 
known Australian polity at large. As discussed above, information about the enemy’s 
theory of victory at large was not available and had to be abductively postulated, which 
made the resulting requirements conditional on the validity of these assumptions. The 
Dibb Review also repeatedly highlighted planning shortcomings, writing that “our 
inability to assess the overall sustainability of our forces even in low-level combat 
remains a significant deficiency”, and that
our practical understanding of expansion for the defence of Australia is lacking. 
Continuing study and planning is required, especially of the implications for levels of 
manning, spares and ammunition, and for the possibility of concurrent operations in our 
area of direct military interest.727
Any advance in these areas would, of course, contribute to refining and improving the 
results of the net assessment analysis. These were, however, problems of the 
implementation rather than the conception of that method. With these two caveats, the 
deductive process of net assessment allowed the definition of requirements that could be 
both detailed and related with high certainty to the challenges posed by the scenario of 
low and escalated low-level conflict.
Based on a net assessment analysis of enemy capabilities, Australia’s forces and the 
structure of Australia’s economy and trade routes, for example, the 1987 White Paper 
could reject the complete interdiction of Australia’s overseas trade as a credible threat 
outside a situation of global war, but identify the selective interdiction of coastal traffic 
as an attractive option for the enemy. The prediction that
The paucity of population and o f transport and other infrastructure in northern 
Australia, and the nature of the land, would tend to focus military operations of 
substance on a few areas . . .729
ultimately flows from a net assessment analysis, as does the assessment that “[t]he use 
of limited military force to harass ... would pose significant problems for us.” It is 
predicted that “the adversary could, if he wished, sustain a low level activity virtually 
indefinitely,” but that at the same time
His calculations would need to take account of our force structure and the probability of 
his forces suffering heavy attrition through clashes with the ADF and the expectation 
that escalation would allow Australia greater freedom in the use of its strike assets.732
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727
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Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 146. 
Ibid., p. 95.
Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 27-28. 
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Net assessment is also the basis for the judgement, already mentioned above, that “[t]he 
arguments against the likely success of [larger-scale] conventional lodgements are
7
substantial”, since
Even if sufficient forces survived the transit and were not met by Australian ground 
forces, they would face eventual and comprehensive destruction as we cut off lines of 
communication and mobilised for their defeat our considerable national assets in the 
largely invulnerable industrial heartland of the south and south-east.734
7.2.4 Force Structure Concept
Since political guidance directed the ADF to deal with two distinct risks, two different 
sets of requirements had to be fulfilled by the same overall ADF force structure. As it 
was obviously impossible to know whether either of these two risks would actually 
materialize, the situation at its most basic level called for a portfolio of forces that could 
provide suitable combinations to meet either of them—although, as mentioned above, 
political guidance established a clear order of priority between the associated hedge and 
option. Some capabilities were thus included in the force structure only because of their 
contribution to one or the other task—tanks as part of the expansion base, for example. 
But since the whole portfolio of forces would have been available to meet either threat, 
it was legitimate and necessary to study how to make best use of all capabilities in 
either situation. Although tanks could thus be assigned a role in low-level conflict, it
was important to distinguish this role from the justification for their existence as a 
capability in the first place.
With regard to expansion base planning for dealing with future risk, both the 1987 
White Paper and the Dibb Review endorse the continued use of options.736 Australia’s 
approach to meeting future risk was thus to remain that of maintaining specific 
capabilities not for their present operational value, but since they provided the option of 
expanding should circumstances in the future require to do so. Both the Review and the 
1987 White Paper thus identify various capabilities such as ASW technology,737 
surface-to-air missiles, and conventional armoured operations as primarily or only
733 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 82. There must however be significant doubts 
about the validity o f this judgement regarding the Christmas and Cocos islands, especially in the case of 
concurrent threats to the mainland. For the difficulty of defending these overseas territories, see for 
example Ross Babbage, ‘Christmas and the Cocos Islands: Defence Liabilities or Assets?,’ Working 
Paper, no. 129 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1987).
734 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 83.
735 The Review, for example mentions the use o f armour in the Darwin/Tindal region. (Ibid., p. 86). It also 
noted that “A number of force units contain capabilities relevant to both lower and higher levels of 
conflict. Thus selectivity in levels o f readiness within a capability or platform may be appropriate.” Dibb, 
Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 56.
736 Department o f Defence, The Defence of Australia, p. 27; Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, p. 49.
737 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 38; Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, p. 62..
738 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 50; Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, pp. 77, 134.
739 Department o f Defence, The Defence of Australia, pp. 27, 59; Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence 
Capabilities, pp. 86-88.
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justified due to expansion base considerations.740 But as discussed in the previous 
section, capabilities justified only through their contribution to the expansion base were 
to be kept at a minimum level.741
Since the present risk of low- and escalated low-level conflict was addressed on the 
basis of an (abductive) framework of net assessment, there was sufficient information 
available to deductively infer the effect of ADF capabilities on the likely outcome of a 
conflict. Requirements could thus be defined with sufficient detail and confidence742 to 
use hedging in the form of a force-in-being optimised for the task. With regards to 
readiness, for example, a clear hierarchy could be established between surveillance 
forces, initial response forces, and follow-up forces as well as capabilities only required 
for high-intensity conflict.743 Similarly, sustainability and stockholding could be 
addressed on the basis of considerations such as the fact that overseas supply would 
unlikely to be interrupted in situations of low-level conflict, and that advanced 
munitions would only be required in proportion to the limited number of appropriate 
targets in the region.744 Since the strategy of defence in depth implied operations from 
domestic rather than foreign bases, the logistic system could be planned on the basis of 
the integration of civilian and military assets, and for the likely workloads that maritime 
conflict in the Northern approaches and counter-raid operations on land would 
generate.745
In general, the focus of Australia’s military effort shifted from the traditional basing 
areas in the South East to the likely area of operations in the North. Up-to-date charts 
and maps of that region were required, and a significant acceleration of the mapping and 
charting activities of the Department of Defence was one outcome of the White 
Paper.746 The 2nd Cavalry Regiment moved to Darwin in order to gain experience with
740 In addition, the 1987 White Paper explicitly mentions air refuelling and modem conventional air- 
delivered munitions, (Department of Defence, The Defence o f  Australia, pp. 49-50.) and the Dibb Review 
intelligence collection and analytical capacities, electronic warfare, sea-mining, naval air defence, naval 
command and control, strike capabilities in general and strike aircraft and submarines in particular, 
armoured vehicles and skills for armoured operations, 155mm artillery, and airborne ground attack skills 
as justified partly or fully through their role as part of the expansion base. (Dibb, Review o f  Australia’s 
Defence Capabilities, pp. 61,63, 70, 72, 66-67, 87, 121, 136-137, 142.)
741 The Dibb Review did, however, mention that discharged servicemen could provide a rapid manpower 
expansion, and that materiel and weapons systems could be drawn from overseas sources as well as old 
ADF inventories. Ibid., pp. 95, 157.
742 It is, o f course, important to distinguish the confidence that could be placed in this part of the 
definition of requirements from the confidence that could be placed in the ‘upstream’ judgement that the 
ADF was preparing for the right risk— but that was a question of political guidance, not o f the 
development of force structure.
743 Dibb, Review o f  Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 56.
744 Ibid., pp. 97, 146. For a critique of the department’s efforts to link readiness and sustainability to 
strategic guidance, see Tony Minchin, Peter Robinson and Tina Long, ‘Management o f Australian 
Defence Force preparedness,’ Audit Report, no. 17 (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 1996).
745 Dibb, Review o f  Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 82, 95, 103-105, 154-155; Department of 
Defence, The Defence o f  Australia, pp. 65, 68.
746 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f  Australia, p. 40; Dibb, Review o f  Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, pp. 43, 63, 119.
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operations in the particular environmental conditions of the North,747 and was followed 
by 1st Brigade in later years. In order to facilitate Navy operations around the continent, 
HMAS Stirling in Perth was expanded into a second major fleet base and patrol boat 
facilities in Port Hedland expanded. Another bare base airfield on Cape York Peninsula 
completed the chain of RAAF bases between Learmonth and the East Coast. Finally, in 
order to command joint operations, Northern Command (NORCOM) was established as 
a standing joint force headquarters in Darwin.748
In terms of force structure consequences of low-level conflict that flow from the 
strategy of defence in depth, the White Paper states that
priority capability areas include:
• surveillance and patrol operations in our maritime resources zone and proximate 
ocean areas;
• maritime forces (including mine countermeasures forces) able to protect shipping 
in coastal waters and in our focal areas and ports;
• ground reconnaissance and surveillance forces;
• mobile ground forces able to defeat hostile incursions at remote localities and 
protect military and infrastructure assets that support the projection of our maritime 
power[;]
• air defence within our maritime areas and northern approaches;
• maritime and land interdiction and strike capabilities, particularly the ability to 
undertake maritime strike operations in the approaches to north and north-west 
Australia;
• a capability to sustain operations in areas of Australia and its territories remote 
from our industrial and logistic support centres; and
• command, control and communications systems commensurate with these tasks.749
With regard to the naval patrol forces required to challenge surface ships in northern 
waters, the Dibb Review wrote that
a significant presence of surface patrol assets might be required at the following five
offshore focal areas: Dampier, Timor Sea, Arafura Sea and Torres Strait, Christmas
Island, and the Indian Ocean approaches. A surface vessel presence could be sustained
with two or three vessels in each area. . . . Taking account of the need for periodic
747 These included changed service procedures for engines, problems with operating overseas-designed 
tanks as well as acclimatised soldiers. Auditor General, ‘Army Presence in the North,’ Audit Report, no. 
27 (Canberra: National Audit Office, 1997).
748 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 48, 51, 53, 66.
749 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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maintenance, transit time from northern ports and some reserve capacity, a need is seen 
for between about 16 and 24 vessels.750
Of these, eight or nine would be destroyer-class vessels capable of high-intensity 
conflict, while the remainder would consist both of patrol boats and a new ‘Light Patrol 
Frigate.’ This new class would have better sea-keeping capabilities and endurance than 
the former and be capable of operating helicopters, but not require the extensive combat 
systems of full destroyers, as it would only face the relatively lightly armed vessels 
available to potential enemies.751 Since surface vessels in low and escalated low-level 
conflict would patrol within the range of land-based fighters, and Australia would be 
unlikely to expose major units to a threat from the air in high-level conflict, the Dibb 
Review saw only a very circumscribed requirement for naval air defence. With 
regards to mine-clearing capabilities, the Review concluded a priority need for a 
capability to clear three areas (on the West, North and East Coasts; or the North West 
ports, Darwin Harbour and the Torres Straits) simultaneously, as sea mines are a means 
for the enemy to cause disproportionate effect with relatively unsophisticated means. 
Amphibious forces, however, did not have a role in the strategy of defence in depth and 
were consequently to be run down.754
With regards to surveillance, the focus on the north of the continent as the likely area of 
operations led to a requirement for 12 operational Long-Range Maritime Patrol (LR.MP) 
aircraft to cover three northern sea areas. Given the size of the airspace to be 
covered, OTHR was needed to monitor the approaches to Australia. On the basis of the 
limited number of worthwhile targets in Northern Australia, and the restricted regional 
air combat capabilities, the Review only identified a requirement for a selective 
capability to intercept hostile aircraft in low-level conflict. This translated into a 
need for two squadrons for continental defence, with three being judged sufficient for 
both continental and maritime air defence in the Learmonth/Derby, Darwin/Tindal and
7S7Cape York areas.
Emphasizing the role of net assessment in force structuring, the White Paper writes that
750 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 71.
751 Ibid., pp. 72, 129-130; Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 44.
752 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 70.
753 Ibid., pp. 69-70, 126; Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 45.
754 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 104, 145.
755 Ibid., pp. 62-63, 118; Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 37.
756 Dibb, Review o f Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 74-75.
757 Ibid., pp. 75-76; 132-133. In addition, there was a need for the creation of a national integrated air 
defence system, as well as for a microwave area surveillance capability to direct intercepts (Ibid., pp. 76, 
132; Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 36). The need to staff the bare bases in the 
North also provided a framework for RAAF personnel sizes and roles. Alan Stephens, The Australian 
Centenary History o f Defence, Vol. II: The Royal Australian Air Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 303.
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Specific implications for ground force development follow from the constraints the sea 
and air gap imposes on the range and type of ground forces that an opponent could land 
and sustain against Australia.758
The Dibb Review thus developed a scenario of how a campaign to counter raids might 
unfold, beginning with the use of the regular Army to guard important military assets in 
the North, especially in the Darwin/Tindal area and a number of airfields and 
communications installations elsewhere:759
Protection of the vital Darwin/Tindal area would require at least a three-battalion 
brigade group, while Learmonth, Derby and Cape York airfields would each require a 
battalion group. Thus there is a priority need for some six battalions in the Regular 
Army.760
After the Regular army had assured the ability of the ADF air and naval forces to 
operate from Northern bases, the Review then saw it being progressively freed up by the 
Reserves to undertake more offensive counter-raid operations. Consistent with the 
overall shift from Rearmament Planning to Threat-based Planning, the role of the 
Reserves thus changed from being part of the expansion base to the ‘total force’ 
integration with the Regular Army that the Millar committee had recommended thirteen 
years earlier. In this framework, the size of the Army reserve was thus directly 
related to the installations and settlements that the Government would wish to protect, 
and not to the size of a future force any more. The Review also recommended that 
reserve units already in peacetime be allocated their wartime roles. Accordingly, the 
White Paper announced legislation to enable a more flexible call-out of Reserves, and
758 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 27.
759 Dibb, Review o f Australia 's Defence Capabilities, pp. 79-80, 83-85.
760 Ibid., p. 85.
761 For a further analysis of Army force structure suited to this task, see Stewart Woodman and David 
Homer, ‘Land Forces in the Defence of Australia,’ in ‘Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 
1990s,’ Canberra Paper, no. 77, ed. David Homer (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, 1991), pp. 71-140.
762 Dayton McCarthy, The Once and Future Army: A History o f the Citizen Military Forces, 1947-1974 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 169-196; Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities, 
pp. 153-154. Although the changes recommended to the role of the reserve were most prominent in the 
case of the Army, similar recommendations were made in the Review in the case of navy reserve ship 
crews and Air Force aircrews. Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 127, 152, 155. In 
later years, the fact that the resulting total force was still small in comparison to the task before it—even 
in terms of the ratio of aircrews to available aircraft—led to repeated proposals to significantly expand the 
role of the Reserves. See, for example, Ross Babbage, ‘More Troops for Our Taxes? Examining Defence 
Personnel Options for Australia,’ Working Paper, no. 194 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1989); Alan K. Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990); Charles Heller, ‘The Australian Defence 
Force and the Total Force Policy,’ Working Paper, no. 249 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, 1992); John Coates and Hugh Smith, Review o f the Ready 
Reserve Scheme (Canberra: UNSW, 1995); Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, The 
Australian Defence Force Reserves (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991).
763 Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 80, 85-86, 154; Department of Defence, The 
Defence o f Australia, p. 55.
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closer integration of Regulars and Reserves both in the 1st Division and Logistic 
Support Force.764
The counter-raid role of the Army also had important implications for doctrine, 
organisation and equipment. In many respects there was a knowledge deficit regarding 
operations in the North that had to be addressed over time through experience from
n s  c
basing and training in that region. In general, however, the size and capabilities of 
enemy forces likely to be encountered, and the expanse of the area to be defended, 
meant that a capability to fight dispersed, over long distances and in austere conditions 
had a clear priority over more conventional operations. Mechanisation plans were
7A7 7ARthus restricted, mobility was at a premium over heavy protection and firepower,
769and a second helicopter company troop lift was acquired.
The use of regional capabilities as benchmarks for enemy capabilities also had 
important consequences for the definition of requirements that had to be fulfilled by 
major weapons platforms. Rather than at least striving for the state of the art in all 
areas, as was implicit policy in previous years, the sophistication of ADF capabilities 
that was required to hedge the risk of low-level conflict could now be determined more 
precisely, and was often of a lesser than NATO standard. It was of course only 
possible to do so for the limited time that enemy capabilities could be confidently 
predicted into the future, and not for the whole in-service life of major platforms. A 
major outcome of the 1987 White Paper in this regard was, therefore, the ‘fit-for-not- 
with’ policy. Both that document and the Dibb Review apply these considerations 
(explicitly) to the Light Patrol Frigate, as well as (implicitly) to electronic warfare 
capabilities.772
As mentioned above, the 1976 White Paper had placed a smaller emphasis on expansion 
capabilities in its defence industry than suggested by the theory in this thesis, mainly 
due to the relatively restricted size of its industrial base. The 1987 White Paper’s 
recommendations in this regard were therefore a shift in emphasis rather than a break 
with previous practice, but they are consistent with the role of industry in a force
764 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 59-60.
765 See, for example, Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 89, 102, 106, 141. See also 
Desmond O’Connor, ‘Problems o f Research and Development Relating to the Defence of Northern 
Australia,’ Working Paper, no. 43 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1981).
766 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 53.
767 Ibid., p. 59. See also Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 136-139.
768 Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 86.
769 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 57.
770 A point explicitly made in Dibb, Review of Australia ’s Defence Capabilities, p. 57.
771 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, p. 44; Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, pp. 68, 129-130. See also Denis McLean and Desmond Ball, ‘The ANZAC Ships,’ Working 
Paper, no. 184 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1989), 
pp. 7-11; Department of Defence, Force Structure Review (Canberra: Commonwealth o f Australia, 1991),
p. 20.
772 Department o f Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 39-40; Dibb, Review o f Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities, p. 63..
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structure designed as a hedge of the present risk of low-level conflict: There would not 
be a priority of substituting for overseas supplies, a capability to expand the force on the 
basis of domestic supply, or the replacement of large-scale combat losses. Instead, the 
main role for industry was to support ADF operations in terms of maintenance and 
repair of equipment, and the adaptation of overseas systems to the particular operating 
conditions of Australia’s North. Although the Dibb Review mentions the preservation 
of core high-tech industrial capabilities as an option for expansion, the priority in terms 
of local production lay in those areas where industry could competitively deliver less
7 7 0
complex platforms and systems.
In summary, the risk pattern in the 1987 White Paper was close to a Clear and Present 
Danger of low and escalated low-level conflict with Indonesia, a risk that was however 
abductively inferred. Future risk was accorded second priority. Force structure 
relevance was explicitly limited to those parts of the theory of victory that reduced that 
risk directly and in a very specific way. Requirements flowed from the application of 
net assessment to known regional capabilities, within the peculiar abductive framework 
established by the overall risk pattern. The resulting force structure was a hedge against 
low and escalated low-level conflict on Australian soil, although some elements of an 
expansion base were maintained. The role of industry was primarily to support 
operations in the North, and the technical specifications of platforms could be precisely 
linked to the ‘threat’ of regional capabilities. In its own peculiar way, the 1987 White 
Paper thus shows all defining features of Threat-based Planning.
777 Department of Defence, The Defence o f Australia, pp. 69-70, 76-78, 84, 87, 89; Paul Dibb, Review of 
Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 45, 107-113. See also the officially endorsed Ken Anderson and 
Paul Dibb, ‘Strategic Guidelines for Enabling Research and Development to Support Australian 
Defence,’ Canberra Paper, no. 115 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1996).
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CHAPTER 8:
MULTI-THREAT PLANNING
Multi-Threat Planning is the appropriate framework for dealing with a multitude of 
known and understood risks. As the risk pattern is one close to (usually geographic) 
overstretch, a country’s defence force must be able to divide and organize itself in 
several shapes to deal with whichever risk materializes. The two case studies in this 
chapter are complementary in the sense that the BUR primarily illustrates the 
consequences that flow from this for the determination of the overall force size. The 
conceptual core of the Australian Defence 2000 White Paper lies in the definition of 
multiple and different missions for parts of the overall force.
FIGURE 29: MULTI-THREAT PLANNING OVERVIEW
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8.1 United States—The 1993 Bottom-Up Review
The BUR was authored by the first administration that began its time in office in the 
post-Cold War world, and the document makes it clear that an era has ended:
The threat that drove our defense decisionmaking for four and a half decades—that 
determined our strategy and tactics, our doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the 
design of our weapons, and the size of our defense budgets—is gone.774
774 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1993), p. 1.
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In re-orienting US defence policy after victory over global communism, the Review had 
to grapple with concurrency issues that make it a good example of Multi-Threat
77SPlanning —even if its implementation proved to be severely underfunded.
8.1.1 Risk Pattern 
According to the BUR,
the most basic goals of the United States ... are to:
• Protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad.
• Maintain the political freedom and independence of the United States with its 
values, institutions, and territory intact.
• Provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.777
But it acknowledges that “the threat of a massive nuclear attack on the United States is 
lower than at any time in many years,” and that “dramatic changes ... have occurred 
in the world”. Overall, the discussion of strategic risks in the BUR was dominated by 
the need to come to terms with these changes, and to determine what would replace the 
threat that the United States had become accustomed to during the previous decades. 
One might say that the Soviet Union still dominated the BUR through the void that it 
had left in US defence planning frameworks.
The Review did not try to develop a coherent conception of the new world order. 
Rather, it concentrated on broad categories of new threats that span operational, 
geostrategic as well as economic domains:
•  Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction ...
• Regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat of large scale aggression by major 
regional powers with interests antithetical to our own, but also by the potential for 
smaller, often internal, conflicts based on ethnic or religious animosities, state- 
sponsored terrorism, or subversion of friendly governments.
•  Dangers to democracy and reform180
775 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said before taking office that his ideas, on which the BUR was based, 
would help to develop a “threat-driven” response to “generic real world threats”. Robert P. Haffa, ‘A 
“New Look” at the Bottom-Up Review: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces for a New Century,’ 
Strategic Review, vol. 24, no. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 22.
776 See the good discussion in Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner, Defense 
Planning in Decade o f Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial 
Defense Review (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 41-81.
777 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 2-3.
778 Ibid., p. 25.
779 Ibid., p. iii.
780 Ibid., p. 2. The review also mentions economic dangers from failing to develop a growing economy, 
but as these do not relate to strategic risk or indeed defence planning per se, they are not further discussed 
here.
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The latter were most evident in the former communist countries and, in particular, the 
former Soviet Union. The BUR remarks that “[e]ven under START II [Strategic Arms
*70 1
Reduction Treaty], Russia will retain a sizable residual nuclear arsenal,” and notes 
the continued sophistication of conventional armaments produced and fielded there.
A reversal of recent trends towards democracy and liberal institutions there thus “could 
have a profound impact on U.S. security and on U.S. defense requirements.” But to a 
large extent, these dangers also manifest themselves in the form of opportunity costs 
should the community of democracies not be enlarged. The BUR, for example, sees 
opportunities from a continued spread of democracy, market economies and rule of law 
to “[p]romote new regional security arrangements” as well as to “[p]rotect and advance
7R4our security interests with fewer resources”.
After the ‘end of history’ in the form of global ideological confrontations, and in the 
absence of a great power threat—remarkably, the BUR does not mention the emergence 
of possible peer-competitors at all—regional dangers in various forms dominate the 
military threat spectrum. The Review states that
Regional dangers include a host of threats: large-scale aggression; smaller conflicts; 
internal strife caused by ethnic, tribal, or religious animosities; state-sponsored 
terrorism; subversion o f friendly governments; insurgencies; and drug trafficking.786
Each of the regional dangers “jeopardizes, to varying degrees, interests important to the 
United States.” However, “[c]hief among the new dangers is that of aggression by 
regional powers,” particularly by “rogue leaders set on regional domination through 
military aggression while simultaneously pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons capabilities.” The BUR explicitly mentions North Korea, Iran and Iraq in 
this context.790 “Regional aggressors represent a danger that must be deterred and, if
781 Ibid., p. 25.
782 For example, with regards to submarines, combat aircraft, air defences and helicopters: Ibid., pp. 36, 
39, 56.
783 Ibid., p. 74.
784 Ibid., p. 2.
785 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?,’ The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
786 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 6.
787 Ibdi.
788 Ibid., p. iii.
789 Ibid., p. 1. Given long-term trends such as the rise o f Islamic fundamentalism, the youth bulge in many 
countries of the Middle East and developing world, and growing urbanisation, a good case can be made 
that this assumption was not questioned sufficiently, especially further into the 1990s. Williamson 
Murray, ‘Preparing to Lose the Next War?,’ Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 51-62. 
Given the uncertainty o f what form threats caused by such trends would take, it is not surprising that 
proposals to deal with them generally are much closer to the Task-based Planning framework discussed in 
the next chapter. See, for example, Robert David Steele, ‘Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure: An 
Alternative Paradigm for National Security in the 21st Century,’ in Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping 
Paradigm, ed. Steven Metz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), pp. 
139-163.
7)0 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 7. Efforts to refine the list o f enemies, for example by 
proposing that the US plan for war against those states that combine military potential, hostile intentions 
and regions of U.S. interest, and take more limited preparations against all cases that combine two o f the
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7Q 1necessary, defeated by the military capability of the United States and its allies.” The 
BUR expects this aggression to take the form of an invasion into the territory of a US 
ally, “ a critical assumption further discussed below.
The danger of regional aggression is underpinned by rogue states’ ability to tap a 
vibrant trade in advanced conventional armaments of Western as well as Russian 
production, notably fighter aircraft, air defense systems, and helicopters. More 
importantly, it is superimposed with that of the proliferation of WMD, notably nuclear 
weapons. The BUR remarks that “[m]ore than 25 nations either have or attempting to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction,”794 and that
In most areas where U.S. forces could potentially be engaged on a large scale, such as 
Korea or the Persian Gulf, our likely adversaries already possess chemical and 
biological weapons. Moreover, many of these same states (e.g. North Korea, Iraq, and 
Iran) appear to be embarked upon determined efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.795
Regional enemies could use WMD against their neighbours, concentrations of US
7QAforces, regional sea- and airports as well as the continental United States itself, and 
thereby “threaten not only U.S. lives but also the viability of our regional power 
projection strategy.” Part of this threat is based on the proliferation of short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles that can be armed with non-conventional weapons. In 
addition, the review acknowledges that “the possibility of a limited ballistic missile 
threat [to the territory of the United States] from the Third World sometime in the first 
decade of the next century cannot be excluded.”798
The post-Cold War environment at large not only adds gravity to WMD proliferation 
due to the higher risk of regional conflict involving the United States, it also directly 
facilitates WMD proliferation:
First, alternative suppliers ... are emerging, with countries such as North Korea 
offering to sell technologies and missiles ... In addition, the indigenous capabilities of 
countries of concern are improving. There is also the new danger of nuclear,
three, did not change the fact that the overall approach remained one o f ‘Multi-threat Planning,’ in which 
the US could not meet all identified individual threats at once. David Ochmanek and Stephen T. Hosmer, 
‘The Context for Defense Planning: The Environment, Strategy, and Missions,’ in Strategic Appraisal 
1997: Strategy and Defense Planning fo r the 21st Century, eds. Zalmay M. Khalilzad and David 
Ochmanek (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), pp. 51-55.
791 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 7.
792 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
793 Ibid., pp. 36, 39.
794 Ibid., p. 73.
795 Ibid., p. 5.
796 Ibid., p. 5.
797 Ibid., p. 73.
798 Ibid., p. 44. The BUR did not act on this threat, however, only funding a missile defence program that 
would allow to field a defence system for the continental United States 10 to 15 years after a decision to 
do so. (pp. 47-48)—a decision that had to do with domestic politics as much as it had to do with defence 
planning per se.
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biological, and chemical weapons, materials, equipment, and knowledge leaking from 
the former Soviet Union. Further, the challenges associated with controlling dual-use 
technologies have grown.799
In addition, economic, political and military dislocations in the former Soviet Union
have increased the risk that nuclear weapons could be subject to accidental or 
unauthorized use, could form the basis for the emergence of new nuclear weapons 
states, or even could fall into the hands of terrorist groups.800
Overall, the BUR thus concludes the existence of two main types of strategic risk— 
failure of reform and democratisation, particularly in the former Soviet Union, and
on 1
regional conflict. Although encompassing a variety of issues, the latter category is 
dominated by the threat of regional aggression by countries such as Iraq, Iran or North 
Korea. Meeting the challenge from these (and possibly other) rogue states while at the 
same time dealing with lesser threats to regional security, such as ethnic conflict or state 
failure, was to be the main task of the US military in the post-Cold War world. The 
single threat of Communist aggression had been replaced by a multitude of smaller 
ones, and the overall risk pattern confronting the United States was thus one very 
similar to the ideal Gulliver type. Remarkably, with the exception of the risk of a 
resurgent Russia, all the threats discussed in the Review lay in the present.
8.1.2 Theory o f Victory 
The BUR remarks that
As a hedge against possible reversals, we ... must ... retain the means to rebuild a 
larger force structure, should one be needed in the future to confront an emergent 
authoritarian and imperialistic Russia reasserting its full military potential.801
Current force structure, however—with the exception of strategic nuclear weapons— 
was not seen as directly relevant for addressing that risk. Consequently, the military 
strategy was tailored to meet primarily the new regional dangers identified in the BUR.
Although the military was thus to meet a significantly different threat than in the 
decades before, the Review did not change forward engagement as the overall 
geopolitical strategy:
[T]he United States must pursue a strategy characterized by continued political, 
economic, and military engagement internationally. Such an approach helps to avoid 
the risks o f global instability and imbalance that could accompany a precipitous U.S. 
withdrawal from security commitments. It also helps shape the international
799 Ibid., p. 73.
800 Ibid., p. 71. However, the review also states that “Accidental or unauthorized launches of Chinese or 
former Soviet nuclear missiles are also considered unlikely.” (pp. 43-44).
801 As mentioned above, WMD are less a threat themselves than a qualitative condition of the two main 
types o f risk.
802 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review , p. 10.
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environment in ways needed to protect and advance U.S. objectives over the longer 
term, and to prevent threats to our interests from arising.803
Not all regions are equally important—the BUR explicitly gives “first priority to regions 
critical to our interests.” However, this would still entail the United States to remain 
“the leading security partner in Europe, East Asia, the Near East, and Southwest 
Asia.” 804 It would do so through a three-pronged military strategy,
based on defeating aggressors in major regional conflicts, maintaining overseas 
presence to deter conflicts and provide regional stability, and conducting smaller-scale 
intervention operations, such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster relief.805
As during the Cold War, overseas basing is central to US strategy as it
deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassures friends, 
enhances regional stability, and underwrites our larger strategy of international 
engagement, prevention, and partnership.806
In addition, basing provides access to logistical facilities that are critical for 
expeditionary operations, as well as rapid response capability through forces close to 
potential crisis areas. Permanent overseas basing is, however, concentrated in those 
regions “where the United States has important and enduring interests and wants to 
make clear that aggression will be met by a U.S. military response,” leaving the Cold 
War emphasis on Europe and Northeast Asia, both arguably under lesser threat than 
before, largely intact.808
The BUR has a very clear idea of how US forces would operate under peacetime 
conditions:
we will conduct routine overseas presence operations. Moreover, the nature of the new 
regional dangers and our recent experience suggests that we will also need building 
blocks of lower-scale operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well 
as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. Beyond these types of 
operations, we will routinely hold large forces in “strategic reserve.”809
Peace enforcement operations are thus seen as part of peacetime missions supporting 
international stability. While the Report writes that “[humanitarian operations can also
803 Ibid., p. 3. The BUR thus foreshadowed the strategy later laid out more explicitly in William J. 
Clinton, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement (Washington DC: The White 
House, 1994).
804 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 3.
805 Ibid., p. 7.
806 Ibid., p. 8.
807 Emphasis added. Ibid., p. 8.
808 This point highlights the severe deficit in the political science and strategic literature regarding the role 
and function of overseas basing, especially in the post-Cold War era. One exception being Robert E. 
Harkavy, ‘Thinking about Basing,’ Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 12-42.
809 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 27.
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prove an effective means of addressing potential sources of regional instability before 
they lead to armed conflict,” it was finished only weeks before 18 American soldiers 
were killed in the battle of Mogadishu, significantly dampening any enthusiasm for 
these kinds of operation.
O 1 1
Should a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) occur, overseas presence forces as well as
o  I
reinforcements from the United States would move to the theatre to defeat the enemy. 
Although the Review remarks that “we must avoid preparing for past wars,” the way 
the US military is expected to go about fighting the MRC bears an uncanny 
resemblance to the first Gulf War:
Phase 1: Halt the invasion. The highest priority in defending against a large-scale 
attack will most often be to minimize the territory and critical facilities that an invader 
can capture. ... In the event of a short-warning attack, more U.S. forces would need to 
deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible.
Phase 2: Build up U.S. combat power in the theater while reducing the enemy’s.
Once an enemy attack had been stopped and the front stabilized, U.S. and allied efforts 
would focus on continuing to build up combat forces and logistics support in the theater 
while reducing the enemy’s capacity to fight. ...
Phase 3: Decisively defeat the enemy. In the third phase, U.S. and allied forces 
would seek to mount a large-scale, air-land counteroffensive to defeat the enemy 
decisively by attacking his centers of gravity ...
Phase 4: Provide for post-war stability. Although a majority of U.S. and coalition 
forces would begin returning to their home bases, some forces might be called upon to 
remain in the theater ...814
As discussed above, regional dangers are overlaid by a continued proliferation of 
WMD. The BUR proposes a three-pronged strategy to deal with this development 
based on non-proliferation efforts, cooperative threat reduction in the former Soviet
o 1 z
Union, and counterproliferation. The latter firstly encompasses deterrence— 
however, in one of the few remarks that show any uncertainty in the US theory of 
victory, the Report remarks that
the unpredictable nature of some Third World regimes, coupled with the fact that 
potential adversaries may have more at stake in a regional conflict than the United
810 Ibid., p. 75.
811 From the 1997 QDR on, the term Major Theater War (MTW) was used instead of MRC.
812 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 28.
813 Ibid., p. 14.
814 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
815 In fact, the Review shows a remarkable confidence in the success of non-proliferation, writing that 
“With international cooperation to strengthen and expand existing agreements, it should be possible to 
slow, if not halt, further proliferation; reduce the size and aggregate destructive power of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological arsenals; and deter or prevent the actual use of these weapons.” Ibid., p. 5.
816 Ibid., pp. 71-73.
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States, means that the United States’ ability to deter such actions [of WMD use] may at 
best be uncertain.817
Under the heading of counterproliferation, efforts to strengthen deterrence are therefore 
complemented by measures to incorporate enemy WMD in tactical and operational 
planning, and to improve capabilities related to intelligence, the ability of US forces to 
seize, disable and destroy WMD, passive defences, and the general capability to fight
O 1 o
on a non-conventional battlefield.
The BUR does acknowledge in passing that a “revolution in weapons technology” was 
taking place, which “suggests that we must reexamine our concepts for employing
O 1 Q
certain weapons.” And although the Review acknowledges that militarily relevant 
technology heavily relies on areas where civilian industries are making the most 
significant advances, it did not see this revolution as a source of uncertainty regarding 
the operational and technological parts of the theory of victory, stating that it
took into account the potential contributions of enhanced support systems (such as 
surveillance and communication assets), advanced munitions, and new major systems, 
seeking to identify those that could provide the greatest “value added” under a 
constrained budget.820
Overall, the theory of victory proposed in the BUR to meet the new post-Cold War 
dangers is thus a relatively straightforward one. The likelihood of a resurgent hostile 
Russia was to be reduced by political engagement, and the risk from such a 
development addressed by preparations for a renewed build-up of US force structure. 
The severity of any single regional risk paled in comparison to the Soviet threat, and 
confidence in the US military’s capability in principle to fight and win against any 
single regional adversary was high. The main task in terms of developing the theory of 
victory was thus to integrate this capability with the larger strategy of enlarging the 
community of democratic nations—an undertaking that was not too difficult as it was 
aimed at having strategic effect on (unstable) friends rather than strong enemies. From 
the geostrategic to the operational and technological level, the BUR could thus show a
o ?  1
remarkable confidence in the theory of victory it outlined.
817 Ibid., p. 73.
818 Ibid., pp. 6, 73.
819 Ibid., p. 33.
820 Ibid., p. 33. The Review writes, for example, that “theater air forces will undoubtedly play an even 
greater role in any future conflict in which the United States is engaged” (p. 35), although they depend on 
relatively vulnerable bases close to the theatre, unlike the heavy bombers that recently took up some of 
the close air support duties in Afghanistan and Iraq.
821 Unsurprisingly, however, given its relatively small ambition, the Review came under strong criticism 
for not providing a more coherent grand strategy or doctrine to replace containment after the Cold War. 
See, for example, Malcom Wallop, ‘American Defense Planning Gone Astray,’ in Security and 
Insecurity: A Critique o f Clinton Policy at Mid-Term, eds. Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jacqueline Tillman 
(Washington D.C.: Empower America, 1994), pp. 95-97. This may be partly due to the fact that the Joint 
Chiefs were developing force structure concepts in parallel, rather than with, the strategy part developed 
by civilians in the office of the secretary. Sharon K. Weiner, ‘The Politics of Resource Allocation in the 
Post-Cold War Pentagon,’ Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 135.
214
Multi-Threat Planning
8.1.3 Codification o f Requirements and the Two MRC Standard
The BUR considered requirements for three main types of operation—MRCs, peace 
enforcement, and overseas presence missions. Lesser contingencies such as 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance or drug interdiction were not considered major 
determinants of general purpose force structure. The Review then defined ‘building 
blocks' believed to be sufficient to deal with one MRC or peace enforcement operation, 
respectively. In doing so, the Review applies what may be called agent or enemy 
management strategies, instead of the direct treatment of strategic risk used during the 
Cold War: Requirements are not based on the net assessment of individual enemies, but 
(ostensibly) on scenarios representative of classes of adversaries that, because they pose 
a threat of similar nature, would require a similar response.
The representative enemy in a MRC was assumed to field
• 400,000-750,000 total personnel under arms
• 2,000-4,000 tanks
• 3,000-5,000 armored fighting vehicles
• 2,000-3,000 artillery pieces
• 500-1,000 combat aircraft
• 100-200 naval vessels, primarily patrol craft armed with surface-to-surface 
missiles, and up to 50 submarines
• 100-1,000 Scud-class ballistic missiles, some possibly with nuclear, chemical, or 
biological warheads.825
US force structures under consideration were tested in net-assessment type scenarios 
against this notional enemy, taking account of
critical parameters, including warning time, the threat, terrain, weather, duration of 
hostilities, and combat intensity. Overall, these scenarios were representative of likely 
ranges of these parameters.826
822 Deterrence of WMD attacks was a fourth criterion for the adequacy of force structure, but as the 
evaluation of nuclear forces was not part of the BUR, it did not receive much attention in the document. 
Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, pp. 13, 26.
823 Ibid., p. 13.
824 Before becoming Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin spoke of ‘Desert Storm equivalents’ around which 
the new US force structure should be organized. See the discussion of Aspin’s views in John T. Correll, 
‘The Legacy of the Bottom-Up Review,’ Air Force Magazine, vol. 86, no. 10 (October 2003), esp. pp. 
54-56.
825 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 13. These numbers fall roughly in between those given 
for North Korea on the one hand, and Iran and Iraq on the other hand in International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 115-117, 159-161. 
The exception are ballistic missiles, which the BUR expects to be available to the enemy in significantly 
larger numbers than was the case at the time.
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However, while enemy force structure, and arguably even the enemy’s strategy, could 
be postulated without reference to a particular geographical setting, this was not the 
case for factors such as terrain, climate, or distances and facilities relating to strategic 
lift. Therefore, the Review “selected two illustrative scenarios that are both plausible 
and posit demands characteristic of those that could be posed by conflicts with other 
potential adversaries”, namely “aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, and by North Korea against the Republic of Korea”. Although both 
countries were openly hostile to the United States at the time, the BUR points out that
o 9 o
“[n]either of these scenarios should be regarded as a prediction of future conflicts.” 
And indeed, although North Korea was the only rogue state in Northeast Asia, Iraq lay 
in a region that included a number of other, similar-sized states whose future friendly 
relationship with the United States could not be taken for granted—for example, Iran, 
Syria, Saudi-Arabia or Egypt.
Both scenarios assumed
an armor-heavy, combined-arms offensive against the outnumbered forces of a 
neighboring state. U.S. forces, most of which were not presumed to be present in the 
region when hostilities commenced, had to deploy to the region quickly, supplement 
indigenous forces, halt the invasion, and defeat the aggressor.830
No variability in terms of the enemy’s theory of victory was thus taken into account— 
the scenarios assumed that future US adversaries would follow the same basic 
operational strategy as Iraq did during the Gulf War.
Unfortunately, the BUR does not discuss the logical basis for this assumption. 
However, the use of representative scenarios should rule out pure deduction on the basis 
of available information about, for example, North Korean contingency plans—the one 
possible enemy that arguably was most likely to follow such a course. Instead, 
deductive inference would have had to be based on information regarding all of the 
possible potential enemies—which was unlikely to be available, given that some of 
them were still governed by friendly, albeit unstable regimes. Inductive reasoning on 
the basis of past experience—notably the Gulf War—ignored not only the fact that the 
sample size was de-facto limited to one, but also that past behaviour was unlikely to be
826 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 15.
827 Ibid., p. 14. Although North Korea was the only rogue state in Northeast Asia, Iraq indeed lay in a 
region that included a number o f other, similar-sized states whose future friendly relationship with the 
United States could not be taken for granted— for example, Iran, Syria, Saudi-Arabia or Egypt.
828 Ibid., p. 15.
829 Overall, the choice of both scenarios was thus plausible on the basis o f likelihood as well as the fact 
that the analysis would have been based on the detailed studies supporting contingency plans in US 
Central and Pacific command for conflict with either country.
830 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 15.
831 It also obviously did not make sense for Iran, which did not border any weak US allies that it could 
invade (an invasion of NATO member Turkey was obviously an altogether different scenario). On the 
other hand, the BUR somewhat surprisingly ignored the experience o f the tanker war with Iran, which had 
ended only five years previously and posed altogether different problems than an armed invasion.
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Q ' l ' )
a guide for the future in a strategic context. This leaves abduction, which at a broad 
level would have meant assuming a future US defeat and considering those possible 
explanations that could not be excluded on the basis of deductively available 
information. At a minimum, such considerations should have led to the inclusion of 
enemy theories of victory based on attrition, aimed at wearing out American national 
will, in addition to those based on (strategic) manoeuvre or outright breaking of 
American resolve.
After defining the scenario adversaries, the BUR develops the US theory of victory in 
more detail. For each of the four phases, it lists tasks that would need to be performed 
against enemy opposition, such as the establishment of air and maritime superiority in 
the first phase; breaching of minefields, amphibious invasions and offensive urban 
warfare in the third phase. In addition, the Review discusses supporting capabilities— 
air- and sealift, prepositioning, battlefield surveillance, command, control and 
communications, advanced munitions or airborne tankers—that would be required
O i l
throughout the campaign. US force structures could thus be evaluated in a net- 
assessment framework as to their ability to achieve these tasks against a North Korean 
or (future) Iraqi enemy at politically acceptable cost. However, somewhat surprisingly 
given the disparate geography of the Middle Eastern and the East Asian scenarios, the 
BUR concluded that the following, same ‘Building Block’ was required to fight and win 
one MRC:835
• 4-5 Army divisions
• 4-5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
• 10 Air Force fighter wings
• 100 Air Force heavy bombers
• 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups
• Special operations forces836
The BUR applies the same methodology to peace enforcement operations, except that it 
does not identify specific enemies as scenario adversaries. Instead, it seems to argue 
directly from an assessment of notional enemy forces, writing that
The types, numbers, and sophistication of weapons in the hands of potential adversaries 
in such operations can vary widely. For planning purposes, we assume that the threat
832 And the fact that experience in US confrontations with rogue states was not that clear cut, given the 
Tanker War with Iran and confrontation with Libya during the 1980s.
833 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, pp. 16-18.
834 Robert P. Haffa, ‘Planning U.S. Forces to Fight Two Wars: Right Number, Wrong Forces,’ Strategic 
Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 15-21.
835 For an open source methodology on how such a building block can be assessed, see Paul K. Davis, 
Richard Hillestad, and Natalie Crawford, ‘Capabilities for Major Regional Conflicts,’ in Strategic 
Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century, eds. Zalmay M. Khalilzad and 
David Ochmanek (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), pp. 141-178.
836 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 19.
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we would face would include a mix of regular and irregular forces possessing mostly 
light weapons, supplemented by moderately sophisticated systems, such as antitank and 
antiship guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, land and sea mines, T-54 and 1 - 12-  
class tanks, armored personnel carriers, and towed artillery and mortars. Adversary 
forces might also possess a limited number of mostly older combat aircraft (e.g. MiG- 
218, 23s), a few smaller surface ships (e.g., patrol craft), and perhaps a few 
submarines.837
The BUR outlines the theory of victory for peace enforcement operations in much less 
detail than that for a MRC. It is based on the use of US forces for the physical 
separation of combatants, and encompasses the following tasks:
• Forced entry into defended airfields, ports, and other facilities and seizing and 
holding these facilities.
• Controlling the movement of troops and supplies across borders and within the 
target country ...
• Establishing and defending zones in which civilians are protected from external 
attacks ...
• Preparing to turn over responsibility for security to peacekeeping units and/or a 
reconstituted administrative authority.838
The Review concludes that “[bjecause these operations are so diverse, the forces and 
capabilities needed to conduct them will vary.” However, it also assumes that the 
required forces would be “largely those maintained for other purposes—major regional
O I Q
conflicts and overseas presence.” It concludes that the following forces should be 
planned for a peace enforcement operation:
• 1 air assault or airborne division
• 1 light infantry division
• 1 mechanized infantry division
• 1 Marine Expeditionary Brigade
• 1 -2 carrier battle groups
« 1 -2 composite wings of Air Force aircraft
• Special operations forces
• Civil affairs units
• Airlift and sealift forces
837 Ibid., p. 22.
838 Ibid., p. 22.
839 Ibid., p. 9.
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• Combat support and service support units
• 50,000 total combat and support personnel840
On the basis of these building blocks for MRCs and peace enforcement missions, the 
BUR sought to decide on, or justify, the overall force structure level:
Determining the overall force structure needed to provide the building blocks ... rests 
on the key question: How many of each type o f building block might need to be 
engaged at once?841
The Review’s answer to this question consists of two main related judgements:
The first judgement was that US forces should be able to fight two MRCs concurrently, 
which had already been part of the Bush administration’s Base Force. Two reasons 
were advanced for this judgement: First, without such a capability the United States 
would run the risk that a second enemy would take advantage of the situation, if US 
forces were already engaged in another MRC elsewhere. Second, the capability to fight 
two wars at the same time provides strategic reserves should an adversary prove to be
0 4 7
more difficult to defeat than anticipated.
The department rejected as too risky in terms of operational outcome a strategy of 
fighting one MRC while holding in the second theatre, and then shifting forces to defeat 
the remaining adversary.844 Therefore, the two-MRC standard meant that the MRC 
building block discussed above had to be doubled for the bulk of ground, naval, and air 
general purpose combat and combat support forces. Fiscal constraints, however, 
prevented this from being done with certain particularly expensive assets—an issue that
0 4 c
will be addressed in the following section.
The second judgement regarding the concurrency of operations was “that the United 
States would have to forgo the option of conducting sizable peace enforcement or
840 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
841 Ibid., p. 27.
842 The two MRC standard came under significant criticism in the latter half o f the decade, without 
consensus developing however on how to best replace it. See Richard L. Kugler, ‘Replacing the 2 MTW 
Standard: Can a Better Approach Be Found?,’ in Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm, ed. 
Metz, pp. 41-69, and the other chapters in that monograph; John F. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of 
Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 1997); Hart-Rudman Commission, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for 
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, Phase II Report (Washington D.C.: The United States 
Commission on National Security/2Is' Century, 2000), pp. 14-15.
843 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, pp. 7-8, 19. The Clinton administration had originally 
favoured a win-hold-win strategy of fighting two MRCs back-to-back, but the opted for the more 
ambitious goal of fighting both simultaneously after criticism from Congress, the press as well as allies. 
Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, Defense Planning in Decade o f Change: Lessons from the Base Force, 
Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 48-50.
844 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 29.
845 In fact, the capability of the US military to implement the two MRC strategy rested on a whole range 
of favourable assumptions. See Government Accounting Office, Bottom-Up Review: Analysis o f DOD 
War Game to Test Key Assumptions, GAO-NSIAD-96-170 (Washington D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, 1996).
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846intervention operations at the same time it was fighting two MRCs,” since units for 
lesser contingencies were to be drawn from the same pool of general purpose forces. 
The retention of a larger force structure that would have allowed to perform at least one 
such contingency concurrently with two MRCs was rejected on the basis of cost 
considerations. However, even the BUR itself—admittedly in a different section than 
the one treating concurrency issues—admits that “once committed to peacekeeping 
operations, these forces will not be readily available to respond to crises elsewhere.”848
Peacetime overseas presence requirements, the third general purpose force structure 
driver, could in general be accommodated within the forces required to fight two 
MRCs. One exception to this rule were aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. 
Together with the other ships that make up carrier battle and amphibious ready groups, 
they could be surged in wartime but required regular rotations for training, rest and 
refurbishment during routine operations. The BUR found that “a force of 10 carriers 
would be adequate to fight two nearly simultaneous MRCs”,849 while the United States 
had sought in the recent past to continuously deploy aircraft carrier battle and
o cr\
amphibious ready groups to Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, and Europe.
Therefore, the requirement for numbers of naval combatants was developed on the basis
o r  1
of warfighting as well as overseas presence considerations. The relationship between 
carrier numbers and the gap in overseas presence in two of three regions (with 
permanent presence in the third) is relatively straightforward: A fleet of 15 carriers 
could maintain permanent presence in all three regions, a fleet of 12 carriers would 
cause two-month gaps per year in two of three regions, and a further reduction would 
increase these gaps by two months per eliminated carrier. Decisions on carrier numbers 
thus ultimately had to be based on a judgement regarding the importance of maintaining 
concurrent forward presence in the three critical regions. In the end, the Review settled
o r-}
on eleven active carriers, with one in reserve status but available for surges. 
Resulting gaps were to be partly compensated for by naval groups centred on different 
vessels, such as large-deck amphibious ships or Aegis cruisers.853
The treatment of readiness in the BUR can best be understood with reference to the 
theoretical concepts of operational, structural and mobilization readiness. As discussed 
in Section 8.1.1, the risk pattern developed in the Review consisted of a multitude of 
present threats to be addressed by the US capability to fight two MRCs and conduct 
peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, as well as the risk of a resurgent 
Russia in the future, which was to be dealt with by the capability to reconstitute a larger 
force structure. The BUR thus writes that “we must keep our forces ready to fight”, 
since MRCs and stabilization missions would involve “’come as you are’ campaigns 
with little time to prepare our forces for the challenges they met”, as had been the recent
846 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 23.
847 Ibid., p. 30.
848 Ibid., p. 87.
849 Ibid., p. 51.
850 Ibid., p. 25.
851 Ibid., p. 24.
852 Ibid., p. 49-54.
853 Ibid., p. 25.
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• X S4case in Panama, Iraq or Somalia. When the Review thus writes, on the one hand, that 
“there must be no doubt that preserving readiness is the cornerstone of our new defense
o c r
strategy”, ' it is referring to operational readiness in particular. When it, on the other 
hand, remarks that “[broadening the base of potential suppliers will ensure that the 
United States has the capability to gear up production again should that become
O c s
necessary,” or that it was important to preserve “those parts of the industrial base that 
are essential to our long-term defense needs and that would be difficult or costly to
o c n
reconstitute once lost”, it is referring to mobilization readiness.
The risk pattern established in the BUR did not indicate that the conditions on which the 
two-MRC standard was based were expected to be only short term. However, 
considerations regarding structural readiness, or the maintenance of modem force 
structure in the medium term, is only discussed in passing in the BUR. The whole 
Review was, of course, an exercise in cutting back the inherited Cold War force 
structure even below the levels of the previous administration’s Base Force. With the 
exception of a few selected new capabilities related to the counterproliferation initiative, 
new qualitative requirements are not defined. Modernization did not receive priority at
O C O
the beginning of the ‘procurement holiday’ of the 1990s. Given the inherited Cold 
War defence industry and the large US force structure compared with any regional 
adversary, the Review also does not include the emphasis on surge production 
capability that is part of the ideal concept of Multi-Threat Planning.
8.1.4 Force Structure Concept
In quantitative terms, the following force structure portfolio emerged from the BUR: 10 
active and 5 reserve Army divisions; 11 active and one reserve aircraft carriers, 45-55 
attack submarines and a total of 346 ships in the Navy; 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 
(MEF) (as prescribed by law); and 13 active and 7 reserve fighter wings as well as up 
to 184 heavy bombers in the Air Force. Of these forces, about 100,000 troops were 
to be stationed in Europe, including two and one-third Air Force fighter wings, 
substantial parts of two Army divisions, and a Corps headquarters. Close to 100,000 
troops were to remain in Northeast Asia as well, including a two-brigade division and 
one Air Force wing in South Korea, and one MEF, an Army Special Forces battalion,
854 Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 11. The Review even goes so far as to say that it was required to “keep 
our forces ready to fight as a top priority in allocating scarce defense resources” (p. 12), and that “the first 
priority o f the Clinton-Aspin defense plan is to ensure that the United States has forces ready to fight 
today and in the future.” (p. 77). While it acknowledges the need to develop new metrics for readiness 
that align with the two-MRC concept, the BUR is silent on how these may be defined, (pp. 77-78).
855 Ibid., p. 79.
856 Ibid., p. 102.
857 Ibid., p. 33.
858 The Review’s comment in the introduction to the section concerning weapons systems under 
development that “[o]f foremost concern was operational need”, and that “[i]n the post-Cold War era, our 
weaponry and equipment must be able to deal with myriad potential threats and with weapon systems of  
various origins” (Ibid., p. 33) was thus not meant to suggest that US force structure would have to be 
modernized to the extent that it had been during the previous decade.
859 U.S. Public Law 416, 28 June 28 1952.
860 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 28.
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one and one-half Air Force wings and Navy ships in mainland Japan and Okinawa. 
The balance of the forces was to remain stationed in the United States and regularly 
rotate through overseas deployments.
But while the overall force structure was able to fight and win two MRCs 
simultaneously, it was not optimised to do so even in quantitative terms—individual 
MRCs were, after all, only one of the risks to be treated, and only a limited number of 
permutations of individual risk combinations involved two concurrent MRCs. 
Therefore, although the overall force level resulted from a doubling of the individual 
MRC force structure building block,
certain specialized high-leverage units or unique assets might be “dual tasked,” that is, 
used in both MRCs.” For example, certain advanced aircraft—such as B-2s, F-117s,
Stars, and E F-llls—that we have purchased in limited numbers because of their 
expense would probably need to shift from the first to second MRC.862
Ideally, the marginal dollar invested in such assets should have bought the same 
strategic effectiveness as the marginal dollar in any other capability—which would 
presume that they were, over all contingencies, less strategically effective per individual 
platform than other systems. In reality, the opposite is likely to be the case, and the fact 
that ‘high-demand low-density’ assets had to be shifted between MRCs was the
o s  'i
consequence of a lack of funds for new acquisitions. Throughout the 1990s, these 
systems proved to be a constant issue and main weakness of the BUR judgements.864 
Many overseas deployments, such as to Bosnia or the Gulf, did not require the large 
general purpose forces of an MRC, but nevertheless bound up a significant number of 
indivisible assets such as reconnaissance-battlefield management assets (E-3, E-8, U-2), 
electronic warfare aircraft (EA-6B and Compass Call), special operations forces, Patriot
o z i r
batteries, rescue aircraft, and chemical/biological defence units. In addition, a second
861 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
862 Ibid., p. 19. Indeed, already at the time the capability of the BUR force structure to fight two nearly 
simultaneous MRCs was in doubt. See, for example, Correll, ‘The Legacy of the Bottom-Up Review,’ 
pp. 54-59; Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Beyond “Bottom-Up”’, National Review, 15 November 1993; Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, ‘Assessing the Bottom-Up Review,’ Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), pp. 
22-24.
863 Secretary Rumsfeld was later to comment that the term “high-demand low-density’ was “a 
euphemism, in plain English, for ‘our priorities were wrong and we didn’t buy enough of the things we 
now find we need.’” Donald H. Rumsfeld, 21st Century Transformation o f the U.S. Armed Forces, 31 
January 2002 <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef2.html> (4 June 2002).
864 For the purposes of the 1997 QDR, the use of these systems was studied in the Dynamic Commitment 
series of wargames and found to be at the limits, a result confirmed by the experience of the Kosovo War. 
Robert P. Haffa and James H. Patton, ‘Wargames: Winning and Losing,’ Parameters, vol. 31, no. 1 
(Spring 2001), pp. 29-43. For background on the practical allocation of these assets, see Steven 
Kochman, America ’s Silver Bullets: Allocating Low Density High Demand Assets (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 1999).
865 On high-demand low-density assets in general, see Robert P. Haffa and Barry D. Watts, ‘Brittle 
Swords: Low-Density, High-Demand Assets,’ Strategic Review, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall 2000), pp. 42-48. 
During Operation Enduring Freedom, only one in four of 122 EA-8B Prowler aircraft was ready to fly, 
and the status of the fleet was briefed daily to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. David Brown, 
‘Wear and Tear on Aging Prowlers Taking a Toll,’ Navy Times, vol. 51, no.l 1 (17 December 2001), p. 
20; David Brown, ‘Contaminated Oil Grounds One-Fifth of Prowler Fleet,’ Navy Times, vol. 51, no.25 
(25 March 2002), p. 12.
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weakness of the BUR's quantitative judgements was that it did not assess the strategic
mobility requirements of shifting forces between two MRCs (or to extract peacekeeping
866forces if they were required for warfighting elsewhere).
In qualitative terms, uncertainty about future contingencies varied in fairly well-defined 
ways in the two spectra of geography and nature of threat: MRCs were most likely to 
occur in Korea and the Middle East. Lesser contingencies were to be met wherever and 
to the extent that they infringed on US interests, which meant that the more challenging 
types of such operations were most likely to occur in Eastern Europe, or Central and 
Latin America. 867 The focus on counter-invasion and peace enforcement operations 
also provided sufficient guidance that could be used to develop one force structure that 
would perform adequately along the spectrum of relevant contingencies.
The portfolio character of the force thus also extended to qualitative considerations. On 
the one hand, the Review comments that a balanced force was chosen not on the basis 
of best performance in a particular scenario, but that
while the analysis indicated that a force structure geared toward particular types of 
forces might enhance overall capabilities under very specific conditions, it would also 
create serious vulnerabilities under other circumstances. Given the great uncertainty as 
to where, when, and how future crises might occur, anything but a carefully balanced 
force will risk ineffectiveness, high casualties, or a failure to meet objectives.868
On the other hand,
Our analysis showed that we can maintain a capability to fight and win two major 
regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in our overall force structure— so 
long as we implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve our strategic 
mobility and strengthen our early-arriving antiarmor capability, and take other steps to 
ensure our ability to halt regional aggression quickly.869
The Army and Marine Corps had prepositioned equipment for reinforcements of the 
NATO Central and Northern fronts during the Cold War. These arrangements were 
kept in place, with sufficient equipment stored in Germany to augment the two Army 
divisions stationed there to three full strength divisions. In order to be prepared for 
contingencies in the Middle East and Korea, an Army brigade set was to be 
prepositioned in Kuwait, with the possibility of a second set on the Arabian Peninsula 
and additional equipment being prepositioned in South Korea to be studied. Existing 
afloat prepositioning schemes in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean (where 
equipment for operations under the RDJTF had been based at Diego Garcia in the
866 See Government Accounting Office, Bottom-Up Review: Analysis o f DOD War Game to Test Key 
Assumptions; Government Accounting Office, Bottom-Up Review: Analysis o f Key DOD Assumptions, 
GAO-NSIAD-95-56 (Washington D.C.: Government Accounting Office, 1995).
867 Northeast Asia being fairly stable in terms of state structures, and the Middle East being dominated by 
the MRC threat.
868 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 31.
869 Ibid., p. iii. Reportedly, the Pentagon looked at these enhancements when the force structure 
requirements first defined were several billion dollars above the planned figure. Weiner, ‘The Politics of 
Resource Allocation in the Post-Cold War Pentagon,’ pp. 135-136.
870 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, pp. 23-24.
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1980s), were to be augmented by an additional brigade set of heavy equipment afloat, 
the ships being “positioned in areas from which they could be sent on short notice either 
to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia.” Strategic lift was also to be improved by 
additional roll-on/roll-off ships, the continued replacement of the C-141 aircraft, and 
measures to enhance the “fort-to-port” flow of units in the United States.
Once they arrived in the theatre, US forces were to be able to stop an enemy offensive. 
Anti-armour capability of early arriving forces was, therefore, at a premium, and the 
BUR included several initiatives to increase capabilities in this regard. The US Army, 
for example, was to develop new smart submunitions for the Army Tactical Missile 
System, Multiple-Launch Rocket System, new joint standoff attack missiles and tube 
artillery. The development and introduction of Longbow radars for AH-64 Apache 
helicopters was to continue, and the self-deployment of Apaches from overseas bases to 
be examined. The Navy was to emphasize its contribution to the land battle over blue
£74water sea control. Its F-14 fighters were to be modified to have a ground attack 
capability, and the capability to fly additional squadrons of F-18 to forward deployed 
carrier be developed. The Air Force was to improve the conventional bombing 
capabilities of its heavy bombers and develop new precision and all-weather 
munitions.875 However, the threats to be dealt with were now less precisely known and 
more varied than that during the Cold War, and funding was more constrained. Hence, 
in line with the concept of Multi-Threat Planning, preference was now to be given to 
multi-purpose aircraft capable of air superiority, strike and support missions over
07z:
specialized platforms.
In addition to these measures relating to strategic deployments and individual weapons 
systems, the BUR force structure also included modified organisational structures to 
deal with the larger number of individual threats. European Command’s (EUCOM) two 
divisions in Germany, for example, were to prepare for peace enforcement as well as 
rapid deployment outside of central Europe, in addition to their traditional NATO 
mission within Europe itself. With the Balkans and Africa, EUCOM’s responsibility 
included two areas likely to see ‘non-traditional’ operations, and it was therefore 
accepted that “[tjhese missions might lead, over time, to changes in the equipment and
877configuration of Army units stationed in Europe.”
Pacific Command and EUCOM were relieved of the force provider role for units 
stationed in the continental United States but earmarked for their commands. Instead, 
Atlantic Command assumed command of the majority of US based forces. This change 
would improve overseas deployments in a variety of scenarios, as
8/1 Ibid., p. 21.
872 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
873 Ibid., p. 21. Apaches later self-deployed as Task Force Hawk to Albania during the 1999 Kosovo 
War.
874 Ibid., p. 29.
875 Ibid., pp. 21, 38. However, the Navy lost its deep interdiction capability with the retirement of the A-6 
aircraft.
876 Ibid., p. 36.
877 Ibid., p. 23.
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The principal purpose of the new command is to ensure joint training and readiness of 
forces stationed in the United States. As a result of this change, forces would already 
be accustomed to operating together and could therefore be deployed efficiently to 
overseas locations when crises arise.878
The goal was not full flexibility in overseas deployments. But “Adaptive Joint Force 
Packages” could be developed for overseas presence missions, containing
a mix of air, land, special operations, and maritime forces tailored to meet a theater 
commander’s needs. These forces, plus designated backup units in the United States, 
would train jointly to provide the specific capabilities needed on station and on call 
during any particular period.879
In addition, Atlantic Command would support peacekeeping operations and training, 
and consolidate and strengthen US planning capabilities for humanitarian operations. 
Such operations were now also to be funded separately from operations and 
maintenance accounts.880
Ever since the introduction of the Total Force Concept in the early 1970s, the US 
military used the reserves as an integral part of its force structure—a policy that the 
BUR explicitly continued, as it sought “’compensating leverage’; that is, to use the
O O  1
reserve components to reduce the risks and control the costs of smaller active forces.” 1 
Adjustments were thus of a quantitative rather than qualitative nature. National Guard 
and Reserve forces would continue to provide combat support and combat service 
support units working with the regular forces, as well as combat units that could backfill 
and relieve active units on operational deployments. Some of them were to be 
organized and resourced to be able to deploy more quickly.*82 In addition to their role 
in the total force, low readiness units were however also seen as having a role as an 
option for expansion of US force structure, in case of “failure of democratic reforms in 
Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the world.”883
In summary, the risk pattern of the BUR was very close to one of Gulliver, as a large 
number and variety of regional conflicts potentially called for US attention. The theory 
of victory gave detailed guidance on how to meet these risks, but had to address classes 
of enemies rather than individual adversaries. Requirements to deal with these classes 
were deductively inferred through net assessment, but then simplified and combined on 
the basis of concurrency judgements that reflected inductively gained experience. The 
overall force structure was an explicit portfolio designed to meet up to two MRCs. 
Equipment specifications become wider as platforms should be able to fulfil several 
roles. Given the Cold War legacy, there is no need for industrial surge production 
capacity, but otherwise US defence planning in the BUR shows all defining traits of 
Multi-Threat Planning.
878 Ibid., p. 85.
879 Ibid., p. 25.
880 Ibid., pp. 75-76, 79, 85.
881 Ibid., p. 91.
882 Ibid., pp. 91-94.
883 Ibid., p. 94.
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8.2 Australia—The Defence 2000 White Paper
The overall framework of the Australian 1987 White Paper remained government 
policy for close to a decade. The 1991 Force Structure Review cut back force structure 
for financial reasons and allowed for adjustments at the margins that provided increased 
capability for interventions in the South Pacific. The 1994 White Paper confirmed 
that the main conclusions of its predecessor were still valid, although further marginal 
adjustments to account for increasing capabilities of regional militaries had to be
o  o  c
made. But in the context of growing regional apprehension of China’s policy in the
o o z
region, the new Coalition government’s 1997 Australian Strategic Policy Review 
hinted that a central tenet of the 1987 White Paper may be violated, when it stated that 
developments in the wider Asia-Pacific influenced Australia’s security not just 
indirectly through the global balance, but through their direct impact on Australia’s 
neighbourhood. The purpose of the 2000 White Paper was thus largely to spell out
0 0 0
the consequences that flowed from this shift for defence policy and force structure. It 
also had to incorporate the experience of the INTERFET (International Force for East 
Timor) operation, where 4,500 Australian military personnel were, for the first time in
O O Q
living memory, deployed as the lead nation in a major international operation.
8.2.1 Risk Pattern and Concentric Rings
The 2000 White Paper thus had to come to terms with a situation in which Australia 
was less shielded from adverse developments outside its own immediate regional 
neighbourhood than before. The government found that the risk of armed conflict 
between states “is as high in the Asia Pacific region as it is elsewhere in the world.”890 
Additional demands were placed on Australia from the fact that “military operations 
other than conventional war are becoming more common ... including for humanitarian 
relief, evacuations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.” Both of these
developments occurred in an international environment shaped by two major factors 
that had overall positive influence. The first, globalisation, benefited Australia’s 
security through growing integration, but the White Paper cautions that nation states
884 Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, p. 28.
885 Department o f Defence, Defending Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1994).
886 Allen S. Whiting, ‘ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension,’ Asian *Survey, vol. 37, no. 4 (April 
1997), pp. 299-322.
887 Department o f Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), 
pp. 9-10. However, wish was probably father o f the thought when some observers concluded that the era 
of ‘Defence of Australia’ had come to an end with that document. Michael Evans, ‘From Deakin to 
Dibb: The Army and the Making o f Australian Strategy in the 20th Century,’ p. 25.
888 For an overview of how much the debate at the time had moved away from the problems of defending 
the North, see for example Anthony Bergin, ed. ‘Australian Security in a New Era,’ Special Report, no. 5 
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1998). See also 
Desmond Ball, ‘Australian Defence Planning: Problems and Prospects,’ Pacifica Review, vol. 12, no. 3 
(October 2000), pp. 281-294; Homer, The Australian Centenary History o f Defence, Vol. VI: Making the 
Australian Defence Force, pp. 95-101.
889 Although INTERFET fought a number of skirmishes, the relatively smooth nature of the operation 
was by far not clear ex-ante. See, for example, Adam Cobb, ‘East Timor and Australia’s Security Role: 
Issues and Scenarios,’ Current Issues Brief no. 3 (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 1999).
890 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, p. 9.
891 Ibid., p. viii.
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remain principal security actors, and that nationalism as well as regional dynamics were 
on the rise. According to the White Paper, the factors underlying the second major 
factor, US primacy, were not endangered, but again there was a possibility that US 
national will to bear the associated burdens could be eroded in the future.
The overall outlook was thus not necessarily less optimistic than in 1987, and the White 
Paper does not identify any particular and unequivocal risks to Australia. However, the 
confidence that could be placed in the continuity of the overall benign situation was 
noticeably reduced. At the same time, the margin for failure was further limited by the 
continuing increase of across-the-board military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific and 
South-East Asia. Regional air forces become more capable through the introduction of 
fourth-generation fighters, of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
O Q 1
and air-to-air refuelling. Longstanding Australian advantages are thus eroding:
The effect o f all these changes is that, increasingly over the coming decade, the 
capabilities of our F/A-18 aircraft will be outclassed by a number o f regional 
airforces.894
Modem anti-ship missiles had proliferated and could be launched by growing numbers 
of platforms, including surface ships, submarines and aircraft. Regional navies had 
improved their defences against comparable Australian systems. Submarine- as well as 
ASW capabilities were on the rise, as are air and naval strike and land force capabilities 
with the introduction of night-vision equipment, helicopters, and armoured vehicles. 
“Intelligence, surveillance, communications, command and control capabilities, and the 
whole spectrum of information warfare, will expand significantly”, the White Paper 
writes, at a time when also “a wide range of non-state actors, including criminals and
o n e
insurgents, [are] continuing to gain access to modem, sophisticated weaponry.”
In this environment, uncertainty and precautionary considerations come to the fore 
again as the prime justifications for Australian defence efforts, which are less 
dominated by the aversion of the very specific yet unlikely risks of the 1987 White 
Paper. But while the 1976 White Paper had prepared for the threats from changes to the 
Asian security environment, notably in the global balance, the timelines for the 
emergence of strategic risks have shrunk significantly, as they were now likely to arise 
from the relatively fluid present environment. Increased regional capabilities and 
regional volatility undermined the applicability of strategic warning and expansion
OQ7
considerations, which are notable for their relative absence in the 2000 White Paper:
Striking that balance [between security and fiscal responsibility] is made harder by the 
environment o f uncertainty in which defence decisions must be made. We cannot
892 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
893 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
894 Ibid., p. 85.
895 Ibid., p. 26.
896 See also Paul Dibb, ‘The Remaking of Asia’s Geopolitics,’ Working Paper, no. 324 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988).
897 A point also made in Graeme Cheeseman, ‘Defence and Security,’ in The National Interest in a 
Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000, eds. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 202.
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predict with certainty when or where Australia might need to use its armed forces.
Today we are among the more secure countries in the world. But our defence policy 
must take account of the possibility that changes in the international situation, 
especially in the dynamic Asia Pacific region, could produce a more unstable and 
threatening strategic situation. ... Our defence decisions today therefore need to 
consider the strategic environment we might face after 2010. We must take account of 
the possibility of major changes over that time, including for the worse.898
Since the area of more immediate concern for Australian security has widened at the 
same time that timelines for the emergence of risks have shrunk, the White Paper needs 
to prioritise, which it does on the basis of geographical considerations:
We have given highest priority to the interests and objectives closest to Australia. In 
some circumstances a major crisis far from Australia may be more important to our 
future security than a minor problem close at hand. But in general, the closer a crisis or 
problem to Australia, the more important it would probably be to our security and the 
more likely we would be able to help to do something about it.899
The White Paper operationalises this idea of risk prioritisation in the form of five 
‘concentric rings’—regrettably mislabelled as a ‘strategy’ in the White Paper, although 
they do not relate to means or ways of the defence effort.
The first of these rings is the defence of Australia against armed attack. The risk 
assessment here is very similar to those of preceding White Papers—Australia’s 
territorial integrity is seen as very secure, and invasion is judged to be credible only 
after significant changes in the security environment. Major attacks are considered very 
unlikely but not impossible, and the White Paper explicitly mentions ballistic missiles 
and WMD capabilities in this regard.900 Minor attacks, a new label for what were low 
and escalated low-level contingencies in the 1987 White Paper, are again seen as 
possible with little warning, given regional capabilities, but still unlikely.901 Overall, 
however, the White Paper still judges that “[ejven if the risk of an attack on Australia is 
low, the consequences would be so serious that it must be addressed.”902
The second ring relates to
the stability, integrity and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share 
with Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the island countries 
of the Southwest Pacific. We would be concerned about major internal challenges that 
threatened the stability and cohesion of any of these countries. We would also be 
concerned about any threat of outside aggression against them. We have a key interest
898 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 6-7.
899 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
900 Later criticism that threats from WMD were not given sufficient attention in the White Paper are thus 
not fully correct, although that document did conceptualize of them in a geostrategic framework that still 
emphasizes Australia’s remote position in the world. For a critique, see Alan Dupont, ‘Transformation or 
Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence,’ Working Paper, no. 374 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2003).
901 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 23-24.
902 Ibid., p. 30. The White Paper also, again, mentions the challenge of policing the Exclusive Economic 
Zone. (p. 12).
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in helping to prevent the positioning in neighbouring states of foreign forces that might 
be used to attack Australia.903
The White Paper writes that “[political and social evolution is strengthening the 
robustness, legitimacy and resilience of the political systems in many countries” , 904 
especially in Indonesia. However, that county still faces challenges related to 
economic, political and religious and ethnic stability which would, because of the 
country’s importance, also affect Australia.905 At the same time, the outlook for other 
states in the region such as East Timor, Papua New Guinea or the South Pacific 
countries regarding political, economic, separatist and ethnic tensions remains much 
bleaker, so that the “viability of some of these nations will remain under significant 
pressure over the years ahead.” 906
Stability and security between the states in South East Asia forms the third concentric 
ring. Australia’s
interest is to maintain a resilient regional community that can cooperate to prevent the 
intrusion of potentially hostile external powers and resolve peacefully any problems 
that may arise between countries in the region. We would be concerned about any 
major external threat to the territorial integrity o f the nations in our nearer region, 
especially in maritime Southeast Asia . . .907
The fourth ring relates to the avoidance of major conflict and instability in the Asia- 
Pacific as a whole, notably in Northeast Asia. Australia is clear about the need “to 
avoid the emergence in the Asia Pacific region of a security environment dominated by 
any powers whose strategic interests might be inimical to Australia’s.” 908 However, 
economic dynamism is expected to “put strains on old relationships, raise new 
expectations and perhaps offer new temptations” ,909 with consequences for the critically 
important relationships between the major powers, particularly China, the United States 
and Japan. The White Paper thus warns that
significant problems remain in the [Sino-US] relationship - especially concerning the 
issue of Taiwan. It is therefore possible that US China relations may be a significant 
source of tension in the region in coming years.910
It goes on to state that
There is a small but still significant possibility o f growing and sustained confrontation 
between the major powers in Asia, and even of outright conflict. Australia’s interests
903 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
904 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
905 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
906 Ibid., p. 23.
907 Ibid., p. 31.
908 Ibid.
909 Ibid., p. 17.
910 Ibid., p. 18. The White Paper also mentions a re-united Korea as another possible source of tension.
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could be deeply engaged in such a conflict, especially if it involved the United States, 
or if it intruded into our nearer region.911
In a new and significant deviation from past practice, the White Paper comments on the 
two-way nature of the ANZUS commitments that “Australia’s undertakings in the 
ANZUS Treaty to support the United States are as important as US undertakings to 
support Australia.” Finally, the fifth ring relates to developments elsewhere and “the 
efforts of the international community, especially the United Nations, to uphold global 
security.”913
Most, if not all, of the concerns mentioned in the 2000 White Paper were not new to 
Australian defence considerations. However, the more fluid international system, 
regional dynamics and globalisation meant that the country can no longer consider itself 
as isolated from such developments, as it still had done in 1987. The definition of the 
five concentric rings was thus an attempt to come to terms with the fact that Australia 
was facing a growing number of risks, all of which the Government wanted to address, 
and all of which combined a number of possible enemies or crisis. In their combination 
and concurrency, the risks they represent thus placed the country in the position of a 
Gulliver tied down by multiplying security concerns.914
8.2.2 Theory o f Victory
As before, the government calls upon the ADF to assist civilian authorities on a routine 
basis, notably in the areas of border security and coastal surveillance, maritime search 
and rescue, counterterrorism, disaster relief and, in a new category, the defence against 
cyber attack. Military involvement in these tasks remains limited to the extent that it 
does not interfere with preparations for the defence against armed attack.915 The 
government also continues the policy of defence cooperation on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis with countries in the neighbourhood. It aims to remain “the key 
strategic partner” of Papua New Guinea and the nations in the Southwest Pacific, and 
continues the Pacific Patrol Boat Project.916 In South East Asia, Australia aims to 
enhance transparency through bilateral technical and education exchanges and 
cooperation through, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum. Regional relationships 
are underpinned by regular deployments of ADF units to the region. Indonesia, 
Thailand, East Timor, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Australia’s FPDA
917partners Singapore and Malaysia are explicitly mentioned.
911 Ibid., p. 19.
912 Ibid., p. 36.
913 Ibid., p. 31.
914 For a less sympathetic commentary that makes the same point, see Andrews, The Australian 
Centenary History o f Defence, Vol. V: The Department o f Defence, p. 303. See also Hugh White, 
‘Security, Defence, and Terrorism,’ in Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001- 
2005, eds. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. p. 182.
915 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 13, 53-53.
916 See also Steve Bell, ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project,’ Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 16 
(Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2005).
917 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 37-44.
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Regarding those parts of the theory of victory with relevance to force planning, the 
White Paper confirms that Australia should be self-reliant in combat forces required for 
the defence of Australia against armed attack (i.e. the first ring), and that the relevant 
military strategy would centre on the defence of the maritime approaches. In doing 
so, it drops the term ‘defence in depth’ that had still featured in the 1994 White 
Paper,919 and instead takes a more assertive operational posture, writing that
if attacked, Australia would take a highly proactive approach in order to secure a rapid 
and favourable end to hostilities. We would be concerned to ensure that hostilities were 
concluded swiftly and decisively, without harming unnecessarily the prospects for 
future relations with the adversary. However, we would aim to minimise Australian 
casualties and damage. We would therefore seek to attack hostile forces as far from our 
shores as possible, including in their home bases, forward operating bases and in 
transit. We would aim to seize the initiative and dictate the pace, location and intensity 
of operations.920
In order to implement this strategy, ADF forces would continue to be equipped to give 
them a ‘knowledge edge’ over the enemy, “ a term that used allusions to the American 
RMA to conceal the steady erosion of Australia’s regional capability advantage. Unlike 
the nearly contemporary US QDR, however, the White Paper does not see technology 
as a source of significant uncertainty regarding the operational part of its theory of 
victory. It professes relative confidence in the ability to take advantage of new 
technologies, and to introduce them in select areas into the Australian defence
i 922industry.
As before, the forces designed to defend Australia could also be used to make “a 
relatively modest contribution to any wider UN or US-led coalition”923 in support of 
global stability. These forces thus continue to be drawn from force structure procured 
for higher priority tasks. Australia still does not expect to carry strategic weight 
globally (i.e. in the fifth ring).
However, the greater scope of risks that the government saw Australia confronted with 
called for a theory of victory with commensurately greater scope as well, in particular 
for the second, third and fourth ring. The White Paper sees military power as an 
integral part of that theory, as “[t]he sense of security that our armed forces give us
918 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
919 Department o f Defence, Defending Australia, pp. 28-30.
920 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 47-48. The White Paper also writes that “[w]e do not 
intend to seek a strike capability large enough to conduct sustained attack on an adversary’s wider civil 
infrastructure; our capability would be focussed on an ability to attack those militarily significant targets 
that might be used to mount or support an attack on Australia. We do, however, want to have the 
capacity to mount sustained strike campaigns against a significant number o f such targets.” (p. 92).
921 Ibid., p. 111. The term had been introduced in the 1997 ASP Paper (Department of Defence, 
Australia’s Strategic Policy, pp. 56-57). See also Michael Evans, ‘Australia and the Quest for the 
Knowledge Edge,’ Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 30 (Spring 2002), pp. 41-51.
922 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 56-57, 100, 107-109, 111. See also Christopher Flaherty, 
‘The Relevance o f the US Transformation Paradigm for the Australian Defense Forces [sic!],’ Defense & 
Security Analysis, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2003), pp. 219-240.
923 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 52.
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underpins our optimistic outlook and the confidence with which we engage the 
region.” 924 Australia “requires strategic policy which is integrated with wider 
diplomatic and political policies”, since
Australia’s strategic interests are compatible with the interests of so many other 
regional countries. This is important to Australia’s security, because we do not have 
the power or reach to protect many of our interests on our own.926
However, Australia is not New Zealand, and the White Paper asserts that “as a middle- 
size power, there is much we can and should do to help to keep our region secure, and
927support global stability.”
One way Australia can do this is by more explicitly leveraging its influence through the 
US alliance. The White Paper writes that Australia would “continue to support the 
United States in the major role it plays in maintaining and strengthening the global 
security order”, as “[o]ne of the main benefits we seek from the alliance is the 
support it gives to sustained US engagement in the Asia Pacific region.”929 It also 
makes explicit that “Australia relies on the extended deterrence provided by US nuclear 
forces to deter the remote possibility of any nuclear attack on Australia.”930
Obviously, the use of the US alliance to influence regional developments is inextricably 
linked with the increased emphasis on support to US operations in case of a major 
conflict in Asia. The White Paper thus also writes that Australia would provide 
military support to regional coalitions in the Asia-Pacific and, especially, South East 
Asia—something that is not included in its 1987 predecessor. In the wider Asia-Pacific 
(i.e. the fourth ring),
we would want to have the capacity to make a significant contribution to any coalition 
we thought it appropriate to join. In most cases the United States would lead such a 
coalition, and we would expect our forces to operate closely with US forces.922
In Southeast Asia (i.e. the third, and especially second ring), ambitions in terms of 
strategic weight are greater as “Australia would want to be in a position, ... to help our 
neighbours defend themselves” against external aggression. Here, Australia
924
925
926
927
928
929
Ibid., p. 8. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 33. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 32. 
Ibid., p. 35.
930 Ibid., p. 36. A contradiction with the self-reliance for defence in conventional conflict (see Stewart 
Woodman, ‘Not quite the full Monty?: analysing Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper,’ Australian 
Journal o f  International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1 (April 2001), p. 33.)is only superficial, since ballistic 
missile attacks would originate from outside the region and thus originate from wars o f choice (from 
Australia’s perspective) that would in all likelihood already involve the United States.
931 With all the diplomatic problems that entailed, already apparent at the time. See William T. Tow, 
‘Australia and the United States,’ in The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 
1996-2000, eds. Cotton and Ravenhill, pp. 171-192.
932 Ibid., p. 51. See also p. 44 for the same formulation regarding the South West Pacific.
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would want to be able to make a substantial contribution ... especially if it involved our 
undertakings under the FPDA.934
In terms of operational strategy, the White Paper extends the ADF emphasis on 
maritime operations to the participation in regional coalitions, since “[fjortunately the 
strategic geography of our neighbourhood makes this feasible.” ' Australia’s 
contribution would thus concentrate on air and naval forces, complemented by special 
operations troops, while general purpose land forces would be largely limited to 
securing bases. These do not need to be conquered amphibiously, since the White 
Paper makes clear that Australia “would provide such support only at the request of a 
neighbouring government, and would expect to be able to operate from bases in its 
territory.” 936
A third part of the overall Australian theory of victory that receives new, stronger 
emphasis are Australian-led peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and relief missions to 
stabilize its close neighbourhood in the second ring. The White Paper writes that 
Australia “should be prepared to be the largest force contributor to such operations”, 
and that “planning needs to acknowledge that we could be called upon to undertake 
several operations simultaneously”. At the same time, however, it cautions that “it is 
important that we recognise the limits to Australia’s ability to influence and help in 
major crises, even in our immediate neighbourhood”, and that “our approach to lower 
level regional crises needs to recognise that the use of armed forces is not always a 
useful or practical response to a crisis.” 939 Nevertheless, “[t]he boundary between a 
benign situation and open conflict, either against local irregulars or more capable armed 
forces, can become blurred,” 940 and
Even in benign situations, an evident capability to use force can help to keep things 
peaceful. When trouble starts, the ability to respond promptly with a clear 
predominance o f force will often restore peace quickly . . .941
The White Paper thus explicitly subscribes to the peace-through-superior-firepower 
school even in stabilization missions:
933 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 48.
94 Ibid., p. 51. See also p. 44 for the same formulation regarding the South West Pacific.
935 Ibid., p. 48.
936 Ibid., p. 49. A sentence that puts RAN plans for the procurement o f two large LHD on a somewhat 
tenuous relationship with strategic guidance. For the Navy’s (and Army’s) case, see Bruce McLennan 
and Gregory P. Gilbert, ‘Amphibious Ships— Bigger is Better,’ Quadrant, vol. 50, no. 9 (September 
2006), pp. 52-59.
937 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 48.
938 Ibid., p. 50.
939 Ibid., p. 51.
940 Ibid., p. 10.
941 Ibid., p. 12.
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Success in pacifying an unstable situation often depends on a demonstrated ability and 
willingness to use preponderant force swiftly in response to any violence, so forces 
need to have ample firepower.942
In addition, it reminds that
there can be potential for escalation by intervention o f well-armed conventional forces.
We need to have capabilities available to deter or, if need be, respond to such 
escalation. This would often involve not just land force capabilities but also air and 
naval forces to protect force elements as they deploy, maintain lines o f supply and 
provide additional firepower.942
In one sentence, the theory of victory of the 2000 White Paper thus boils down to a 
willingness to use Australian military force to defeat threats to Australian security both 
close to home and afar. The prioritisation between five rings of fairly distinct strategic 
risks, however, means that this overall approach falls out into a corresponding number 
of distinct sub-strategies, 944 including the traditional ‘Defence of Australia’, 
stabilization missions in the region, and contributions of varying extent to maritime 
coalitions in South East Asia and further afield. The strategic weight Australia would 
expect to carry in these operations ranges from the full extent for the first ring, to none 
in the fourth and, especially, fifth. Notably, the theory of victory does not relate to any 
particular enemies—instead, similar threats within each ring are to be met by similar 
responses.
8.2.3 Codification o f Requirements
Unlike its predecessors of 13 years earlier, the 2000 White Paper thus did not provide 
political guidance that focussed on one major task. It acknowledges that “[ojver the 
next decade, we can be reasonably sure that governments will consider using the ADF 
in circumstances that we have not envisaged”, and goes on to explain that
Our aim is to provide Australia with a set o f capabilities that will be flexible enough to 
provide governments with a range o f military options across a spectrum o f credible 
situations within the priorities set out in this [White Paper].945
In codifying these credible situations, the White Paper continues to use regional 
capabilities as the benchmark of technological sufficiency. The White Paper assumes, 
like its 1987 predecessor, that in the case of a major attack on Australia enough 
preparation time would be available to expand existing capabilities. The eroding 
Australian edge however reduces margins of error for strategic warning thus defined, 
and the White Paper reduced ambitions to demanding that “our forces have an overall
942 Ibid., p. 50. These plans ultimately led to the program for a ‘hardened and networked Army’. See 
Australian Army, The Hardened and Networked Army (Canberra: Department o f Defence, 2005).
943 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, p. 50.
944 This is not to say that the White Paper did not suffer from the absence of a national security strategy. 
See Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Maritime Strategy 
(Canberra: Parliament o f the Commonwealth o f Australia, 2004).
945 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 54.
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capability edge in key roles.’'946 In particular, it advocates air combat capability “at a 
level at least comparable qualitatively to any in the region”.947 Nevertheless, the 
quantity and type of forces required to meet lesser contingencies in the defence of 
Australia still provides a clear, if more demanding, benchmark for the structuring of the 
ADF:
The Government has reaffirmed that the primary priority for the ADF is to maintain the 
capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack, without relying on 
help from the combat forces of any other country. ... This provides a clear basis for our 
defence planning.948
As before, the force structure acquired for the defence of Australia will be used to 
generate forces for other mission.949 But the rise in importance of these missions means 
that the 2000 White Paper cannot simply assume its adequacy any more. The ADF thus 
becomes a portfolio of forces that must be able to generate adequate forces for a number 
of different, distinct and demanding missions within the overall quantitative limits and 
requirements set by the defence o f Australia. The defence of Australia does not 
dominate areas such as training or logistics any more as it had in the framework of the 
1987 White Paper. Since 1997 already, operational readiness was to be determined by 
regional contingencies,950 and the White Paper complemented this by highlighting the 
importance of sustainment and rotation in extended peacekeeping operations.951 Major 
changes also flow on for intelligence, whose role in the estimation of warning times was 
now to be complemented by the capability to monitor, and operational support in, 
several major crises.952
Quantitative portfolio considerations are dominated by the fact that overall force levels 
are determined by the defence of Australia. This, however, already implies the 
concurrency judgment that all other operations would cease and deployed forces be 
repatriated in the occasion. With regards to other types of operations, the White Paper 
states that
We ... do not plan on the ability to undertake major operations simultaneously in more 
than one theatre of operations. However, within a theatre of operation, especially in the 
defence of Australia, we would need forces large enough to undertake some types of 
operation simultaneously in widely separated locations. And in our immediate region,
946 Ibid., p. 55. See also Paul Dibb, ‘The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge,’ Working Paper, no. 329 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1998). It is somewhat 
ironic that proponents o f the defence of Australia school had to defend themselves first for placing 
emphasis on low-level contingencies during the 1980s, and then for not discounting higher-intensity 
operations in the late 1990s and 2000s. See Hugh White, ‘Australian defence policy and the possibility of 
war,’ Australian Journal o f International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2 (July 2002), pp. 253-264.
947 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 85.
948 Ibid., p. 46.
949 Ibid., pp. 12,49-50, 52,92.
950 Department o f Defence, Australia ’s Strategic Policy, p. 41.
951 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 49-50.
952 Ibid., p. 95.
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we may need to be able to sustain one major deployment and undertake a lesser 
deployment at the same time.953
The portfolio considerations that determine both the quantity and quality o f force 
structure are thus much more prominent and evident for the latter characteristic. 
Roughly, portfolio roles follow service lines. The White Paper explains, in what is the 
conceptual core o f the document, that
a major Australian contribution to a coalition for higher intensity operations would 
more likely involve air or naval forces than land forces. The air and naval forces we 
develop for the defence of Australia will provide the Government with a range of 
options to contribute to coalitions in higher intensity operations against well-armed 
adversaries. Our land forces would be ideally suited to provide contributions to lower 
intensity operations including peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and many types of 
humanitarian operations.954
Land forces thus preserve their previous role of supporting the defence of the maritime 
approaches through base protection and the defeat of any enemy incursions on 
Australian territory. 955 Their role as an expansion base, already significantly de- 
emphasized 13 years before, is explicitly dropped.956 In addition, they are now to 
conduct peace enforcement, peacekeeping, stabilization and relief missions in the near 
neighbourhood. The White Paper explicitly and repeatedly states that there is thus no 
requirement for general purpose forces to be able to operate with heavy armour in a 
high-intensity conflict environment, although it decides that “our land forces will have
Q C O
the combat weight they need to achieve their missions without undue risk.” 
Emphasis also lies on “logistics and support capabilities, including deployable medical 
facilities, cargo-handling systems, water and fuel supply facilities, and engineering 
capabilities.”959 Regarding the concurrency o f operations, the White Paper demands 
that the Army “be able to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended 
periods, and at the same time maintain at least a battalion group available for 
deployment elsewhere”,960 an intuitionist rather than analytical judgement of sufficiency 
based both on the size of the Army, and the INTERFET experience.961
Air and naval forces preserve their traditional role of defeating attacks against Australia 
by aircraft and naval vessels as they are available to regional militaries, as well as 
strike. In addition, they are to be able to contribute to coalition operations in high-
953 Ibid., p. 56.
954 Ibid., p. 52.
955 Ibid., p. 47.
956 Ibid., p. 79. Ghosts from the past did, however, raise up their heads again in: Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, The Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, 
Peacekeeping and War (Canberra: The Parliament of the Commonwealth o f Australia, 2000).
957 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, p. 54.
958 Ibid., p. 79. See also p. 52.
959 Ibid., p. 50.
960 Ibid., p. 80.
961 Hugh White, personal email to the author, 29 September 2006.
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intensity conflicts.962 A main practical consequence of this new, second formal mission 
is that interoperability with the United States, which had been de-emphasized in the 
1987 White Paper, now becomes “an important issue in capability development” — 
the 1997 Australian Strategic Policy Paper had even given it “highest priority”.964 In 
spite of major replacement programs for both the RAN and RAAF, the White Paper is, 
however, strangely silent on how quantitative sufficiency for the defence of Australia 
should be measured. The detailed way in which the Dibb Review had approached this 
problem was probably not optimal. However, the absence of explicit justification for 
the planned one-to-one replacement of the F-18 and F-l l l  on the one hand, and the 
reduction in the number of major RAN surface combatants to eleven on the other,965 is 
one of the major omissions of the document.966
8.2.4 Force Structure Concept
Two main trends were thus driving requirements placed on the ADF beyond those of 
the 1987 capability program—the erosion of Australia’s regional capability edge, and 
the new formal tasks of high-intensity maritime expeditionary and regional stabilization 
operations. Fulfilling the resulting additional demands was, to some degree, facilitated 
by the government’s commitment to an annual 3% real growth of the defence budget 
over ten years, which also allowed for an increase in personnel from 51,500 to 54,000
q z  n
over the same period.
The ADF continued to improve its capabilities for the defence of Australia within the 
operational framework outlined in the 1987 White Paper. Enhancements were made to, 
for example, the OTHR system and the Air Defence Ground Environment. The 
Army also retained a number of units whose sole role was in the defence of Australia, 
such as the three Regional Force Surveillance Units in the North.969 A collocated 
Theatre Headquarters and two deployable joint headquarters were to be developed,970 
and increased investments made into the intelligence support to operations.91 Overall, 
however, the change from a force built as a hedge against low and escalated low-level 
conflict to one providing a portfolio of forces primarily involved practical adjustments 
that allowed each service, and in particular the Army, to become more expeditionary 
within the existing force structure.
962 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 53-54, 85, 88, 92.
963 Ibid., p. 55.
964 Department o f Defence, Australia ’s Strategic Policy, p. 48.
965 Eight ANZAC frigates and three new Air Warfare Destroyers.
966 Hugh White, principal author of the White Paper, later stated that the document was drafted under 
instructions from the Cabinet that no capability was to be cut, and obsolete equipment to be replaced. 
Hugh White, ‘Buying Air Warfare Destroyers: A Strategic Decision,’ Issues Brief (Sydney: Lowy 
Institute, 2005), p. 3.
967 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, pp. xii, xvii.
968 Ibid., pp. 87, 96.
969 Ibid., p. 81. The domestic counterterrorism responsibilities of the SAS were also retained.
970 See also David Homer, The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations, Presentation at the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 10 October 2006.
971 Department o f Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 96-97.
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Since most Army units were now to be able to deploy overseas and thus outside the 
range of domestic logistics support, deployment and sustainment of expeditionary 
forces became a focus of Army force structure enhancements. The White Paper decided 
to replace all three amphibious ships at the end of their lifetimes, as well as the fleet of 
landing craft. New tactical airlift aircraft were to replace the Caribou, and C-130 
Hercules were to be refurbished. Both transport aircraft and helicopters were to be 
supplied with improved electronic warfare self-protection, as they would from now on 
regularly deploy outside Australia. In addition, the logistics backbone of the Army 
would be enhanced by investments into specialist transport and petroleum supply units, 
new water and fuel supply and bridging systems, and the procurement of deployable 
medical facilities.973
Army’s capabilities in both the defence of Australia and expeditionary operations were 
further enhanced by improvements to mobility and firepower. Most prominent were 
two squadrons of armed reconnaissance-, and an additional squadron of troop-lift 
helicopters, and upgrades to 350 Ml 13 vehicles. New shoulder-fired weapons for the 
defeat of armoured vehicles and bunkers, improved infantry fighting equipment as well 
as new short range air defence and mortar systems, a tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) and field artillery systems were to be procured.974
Sustainment in longer operations was facilitated by the designation of 7lh Brigade as a 
follow-on force (if it was not required for immediate deployment). In addition, the 
reserves were even further integrated with the regulars. The 1987 White Paper had 
changed the reserve’s focus from one of a mobilisation base to one of operating in 
conjunction with the regular army in the unlikely case of an attack on Australia. Now, 
they were also to provide round-up, sustainment and surge capabilities for expeditionary 
operations on a regular basis, which required additional changes to legislation, reserve 
readiness and equipment. The two-role character of the regular Army thus extended 
into the reserve component, and provided additional wherewithal to deal with the 
increased demands placed on the defence force.
Force structure decisions regarding the RAAF and RAN were dominated by the 
replacement of major systems close to the end of their operational lifetimes. With 
regards to the RAAF, these were primarily the F-18 and F-111, to be replaced by a 
common type of aircraft after 2012, and the ageing tanker aircraft. New AW ACS 
aircraft were to join the ADF for the first time. With regards to the RAN, patrol boats 
and FFGs were to be succeeded by new and more capable ships, supply vessels and
972 In parallel, the Army began to develop concepts of operations for manoeuvre operations in a littoral 
environment. Russell Parkin, ‘A Capability of First Resort: Amphibious Operations and Australian 
Defence Policy 1901-2001,’ Working Paper, no. 117 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2002), p. 
37-39.
973 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 84.
974 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
975 Ibid., pp. 81.
976 Ibid., pp. 69-71, 81-82. For the challenges that these new tasks posed for the existing reserve force 
structure, see for example Peter Robinson, Oneeka Robb, and Len Crossfield, ‘Australian Defence Force 
Reserves,’ Audit Report, no. 33 (Canberra: National Audit Office, 2001).
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heavy torpedoes were to be replaced with new systems, and major refurbishments to be
Q77undertaken of Seahawk helicopters as well as P-3C Orion.
Given the demands of expeditionary high-intensity maritime operations, the ‘fit-for-not- 
with' policy had already been abandoned in 1997. The 2000 White Paper included 
further improvements to existing systems that would allow them to operate against both 
increasingly capable systems in the region, and in high-intensity coalition operations. 
Mainly, these included improved electronic self-defence capabilities of the F-18 and F- 
111 aircraft, new radar and air-to-air missiles for the F-18 and standoff capabilities for 
the F-l l l .  ANZAC frigates were to get improved self-defence systems and be fitted 
with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and the capabilities of both submarines and P-3C 
Orion ASW aircraft be improved in their respective roles.979
In summary, the risk pattern in the 2000 White Paper was close to Gulliver as Australia 
saw it necessary to deal with a large number of disparate risks, albeit of varying 
geographic distance and political importance. The concept of the concentric circles 
allowed the theory of victory to deal with whole classes of risk. Requirements were 
deductively inferred via the consideration of regional capabilities. However, as 
Australia did not (or only to some extent) carry strategic weight in four out of five 
circles, it had significant freedom to determine the quantitative requirements of all rings 
other than the defence of Australia. The concurrency judgement that all operations 
would cease if Australia itself had to be defended thus also set the quantitative upper 
limit of operation in the other rings. The ADF force structure became a portfolio in 
which all forces would be used in the defence of Australia. In addition, the Army 
would perform stabilization operations, and maritime forces higher-intensity coalition 
operations. The White Paper was largely moot on general characteristics sought from 
weapons platforms, and on industry policy. Overall, however, it shows nearly all of the 
defining traits of Multi-Threat Planning.
977 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 85-87, 90-91.
978 Department of Defence, Australia ’s Strategic Policy, pp. 39-40.
979 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, pp. 86, 89, 90-91, 93.
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CHAPTER 9:
TASK-BASED PLANNING
The significant uncertainty about strategic risks for which Task-based Planning is 
appropriate is likely to be transitional. The ideal concept includes the generation of new 
knowledge through experimentation and ‘probing' of adversary reactions, which would 
assist in moving away from requirements defined around generic operational tasks 
without a direct logical foundation in coherent theories of victory. The following two 
case studies are thus largely complementary: While the 2001 QDR demonstrates the 
transitional and even experimental nature of the concept, the 1991 New Zealand 
Defence White Paper uses codification through tasks in a more explicit fashion.
FIGURE 30: TASK-BASED PLANNING OVERVIEW
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9.1 United States—The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
The 2001 QDR presented the new Bush administration with an opportunity to outline its 
plans for the area of defence policy. The authors of the Review saw its task as twofold:
First, it had to address significant concerns regarding the near-term ability of the force 
to protect and advance U.S. interests worldwide in a dangerous and evolving security
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environment. Second, it had to implement the President's goal of transforming the 
Armed Forces to meet future security challenges.980
As the following discussion of the document will demonstrate, both of these tasks 
involved significant uncertainties—underscored by the 9/11 attacks on America only 
days before the publication of the Review. More so than any of the other documents 
discussed in this thesis, but congruent with Task-based Planning, the QDR itself thus
q o  1
stated that “this report represents not so much an end but a beginning.”
9.1.1 Risk Pattern
The 2001 QDR takes a noticeably darker view of the future than the BUR. While the 
latter had been filled by a sense of relief about the end of the Cold War and focused on 
the risk of regional instability and aggression that seemed to present fairly 
straightforward challenges, the QDR writes that “the United States cannot take its recent 
successes for granted or mistakenly assume that no other nation or group will seek to 
challenge the United States in the future”. In “a geopolitical setting that is 
increasingly complex and unpredictable,” the QDR asserts that “[t]here are many 
threats against this Nation, and they will take many forms.”984 Therefore, the risk 
pattern developed in the Review is based on abductive considerations, in addition to
Q O  C
more precisely known and observable risks.
The basis of the abductive parts of the QDR assessment is twofold. First, the Review 
defines US national interests that could be threatened in a much more detailed and 
operationalised fashion than the BUR as:
• Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, including
o U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom 
o Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad 
o Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure
• Honoring international commitments, including:
o Security and well-being of allies and friends
o Precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, 
Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and 
Southwest Asia
980 Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 67.
981
982
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. vi. 
Ibid., p. 61.
983
984
985
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 1.
For a survey of perceived future risks in the lead-up of the QDR, see Sam J. Tangredi, ‘The Future 
Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View,’ in QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices 
for America ’s Security, ed. Flournoy, pp. 25-73.
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o Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere
• Contributing to economic well-being, including:
o Vitality and productivity of the global economy
o Security of international sea, air and space, and information lines of 
communication
o Access to key markets and strategic resources.986
In addition, the QDR places a new emphasis on the security of the American
987homeland—promoting it “to the top priority" — as the basis of security policies
abroad, since US enemies
are placing greater emphasis on the development of capabilities to threaten the United 
States directly in order to counter U.S. operational advantages with their own strategic 
effects. Therefore, the defense strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending 
the United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to 
safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source of its capacity 
to project decisive military power overseas.988
Threats to the homeland result, of course, from known and observed threats such as 
“terrorist groups [which] possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct 
devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure", possibly with 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or enhanced high-explosive munitions 
(CBRNE) . 989 In addition,
the geographic position of the United States no longer guarantees immunity from direct 
attack on its population, territory, and infrastructure. ... [I]t is clear that over time an 
increasing number of states will acquire ballistic missiles with steadily increasing 
effective ranges.990
But there are other threats as well that have not yet been observed, but can be inferred 
on an abductive basis. For example, “[t]he increasing dependence of societies and 
military forces on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities,” which 
adversaries could exploit “through means such as computer network attack and directed 
energy weapons.” 991 Similarly,
Because many activities conducted in space are critical to America's national security 
and economic well being, ... potential adversaries may target U.S., allied, and 
commercial space assets as an asymmetric means of countering or reducing U.S.
986 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 2.
987 Ibid., p. 60.
988 Ibid., p. 14.
989 Ibid., p. 5.
990 Ibid., p. 3.
991 Ibid., p. 31.
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military operational effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic and societal 
stability, and national will.992
Overall, the QDR's assessment regarding homeland security is thus that
Future adversaries will most certainly have a range of new means with which to 
threaten the United States. It is possible to identify confidently some of these means ...
Others, like those used to attack the United States on September 11, 2001, may be a 
surprise. Defenses against known and emerging threats must be developed.993
With regards to the identity and type of future enemies, the Review states that
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the 
potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten 
stability in regions critical to U.S. interests.994
While Russia “pursues a number of policy objectives contrary to U.S. interests,” it 
“does not pose a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO” .995 However, in a 
thinly veiled reference to China, the QDR remarks that “[t]he possibility exists that a 
military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region [of 
Asia] . ” 996 Unlike the BUR, however, the QDR is generally hesitant to concentrate on or 
even mention particular actual or potential enemies of the United States—North Korea, 
Iran or Iraq are not even mentioned once in the whole document.997 Instead, the Review 
remarks that “a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast 
Asia ... contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers” , 998 emphasizing 
that “[t]he United States cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity of 
the countries or the actors that may threaten its interests and security.” 999
The Middle East remains an area of concern because of US and allied dependence on 
energy resources there, as well as conventional and CBRNE arsenals and support to 
international terrorism. 1000 The spread of crisis or insurgencies in South America is also 
mentioned as a possible threat to US economic and political interests. 1001 Throughout 
the globe, however,
992 Ibid., p. 45.
993 Ibid., p. 30.
994 Ibid., p. 4.
995 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
996 Ibid., p. 4.
997 To be precise, Iraq is mentioned once, but only in relation to the historical experience of the first Gulf
War.
998
999
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 4.
Ibid., p. 3.
1000 Ibid., p. 4.
1001 Ibid., p. 5.
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the inability of some states to govern their societies, safeguard their military 
armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary to terrorists and 
criminal organizations can also pose a threat to stability,1002
which leads the QDR to diagnose an “[ijncreasing diversity in the sources and 
unpredictability of the locations of conflict.’' 1003 Therefore, it concludes that
The United States will not be able to develop its military forces and plans solely to 
confront a specific adversary in a specific geographic area. Instead, the United States 
could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range 
of capabilities.1004
Uncertainty does not only relate to the identity of future adversaries, though— 
something that was, after all, already the case with the BUR, although the QDR 
extended the list of enemies that might have to be dealt with imperatively to terrorist 
groups and the like. What is gone is the certainty with which the BUR assumed 
aggression to take the form of an armoured invasion, and the confidence that it placed in 
diplomatic and technological non- and counterproliferation programs to manage the 
dangers from WMD. The QDR remarks that adversaries “could significantly enhance 
their capabilities by integrating widely available off-the-shelf technologies” in the areas 
of sensors, information processing or precision guidance into their existing weapons 
systems, that proliferation of WMD as well as advanced conventional munitions is 
“pervasive,” and that
the pace and scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier 
intelligence estimates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster pace than 
previously expected.1005
In addition, new fields of military competition may rise to prominence, as “the 
biotechnological revolution holds the probability of increasing threats of biological 
warfare” 1006 and “[technological advances create the potential that competitions will 
develop in space and cyber space.” 1007
When the QDR writes that “the types of military capabilities that will be used to 
challenge U.S. interests and U.S. military forces can be identified and understood”, it 
thus does so only on the basis of abductive reasoning that “future adversaries will seek 
to avoid U.S. strengths and attack U.S. vulnerabilities” . 1008 Besides striking at the US 
homeland itself, as discussed above, in the theatre itself
1002
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Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., pp. 6-7. See also the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Commission: Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary o f the Report o f the Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
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Future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our current 
ability to project military power overseas. Saturation attacks with ballistic and cruise 
missiles could deny or delay U.S. military access to overseas bases, airfields, and ports. 
Advanced air defense systems could deny access to hostile airspace to all but low- 
observable aircraft. Military and commercial space capabilities, over-the-horizon 
radars, and low-observable unmanned aerial vehicles could give potential adversaries 
the means to conduct wide-area surveillance and track and target American forces and 
assets. Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, and advanced mines 
could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral 
waters. New approaches for projecting power must be developed to meet these 
threats.1009
In addition, “U.S. military dependence on information is unprecedented and 
growing”,1010 creating new possibilities for adversaries who are “also likely seek to 
deny U.S. forces unimpeded access to space.”1011 The QDR also expects future enemies 
to exploit strategic depth, for example with space denial capabilities or mobile ballistic 
missile launchers deep inside their own territory.1012 Overall, however, the Review 
asserts that
In the future, it is unlikely that the United States will be able accurately to predict how 
successfully other states will exploit the revolution in military affairs, how rapidly 
potential or actual adversaries will acquire CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles, or 
how competitions in space and cyber space will develop.1013
The QDR thus not only diagnoses significant uncertainty regarding the identity of future 
enemies, but also regarding their theory of victory:
An assessment of the global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty 
about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the 
form that threats and attacks against the Nation will take.1014
At the same time, however, all examples discussed in the QDR relate to technological or 
operational innovation on the part of the adversary—a stark contrast to the successor 
Review of 2006, written after years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq.1015 The QDR's 
disregard for insurgencies as a strategic threat is an indication that the abductive 
reasoning on which it largely based the analysis of present and future risk was, perhaps, 
not applied with sufficient rigour and open mindedness. Overall, however, the risk
1009
1010 
1011
Ibid., p. 31. See also Bennett, ‘Responding to Asymmetric Threats,’ pp. 33-49.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 37. 
Ibid., p. 31
1012 Ibid., p. 31.
1013 Ibid., p. 7.
1014 Ibid., p. 3. A strong and explicit emphasis on uncertainty became something of a hallmark of 
administration policy in subsequent years. For a critique, see Fitzsimmons, ‘The Problem of Uncertainty 
in Strategic Planning,’ 132-133.
1015 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2006), esp. pp. 20-24. See also Mackubin Thomas Owens, ‘A Balanced Force 
Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order,’ Orbis, vol. 50, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 307-325.
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pattern laid out in the Review is thus close to the ideal case of Un-Order and as a result, 
the United States “must learn to expect” surprise.1016
9.1.2 Theory o f Victory
In line with the stronger emphasis on the security of the US homeland, the QDR writes 
that it had developed “a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, 
America must be safe at home.”1017 The consequences of this decision are however 
more of a practical than conceptual nature, as the Review mentions that the Department 
must
work through an integrated inter-agency process, which in turn will provide the means 
to determine force requirements and necessary resources to meet our homeland security 
requirements.1018
With regards to the overall theory of victory with which the QDR wants to meet 
strategic risks, the QDR does not change the general US strategy of international 
engagement:
America’s security role in the world is unique. It provides the basis for a network of 
alliances and friendships. It provides a general sense of stability and confidence, which 
is crucial to the economic prosperity that benefits much of the world.1019
More precisely, it writes that
U.S. military strength is essential to achieving these goals [of peace, freedom and 
prosperity], as it assures friends and allies of an unwavering U.S. commitment to 
common interests.1020
The Review confirms that “the Nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable 
security partner.”1021 Compared with the provision of regional stability itself, the role of 
the United States as a provider of security for its friends and allies gains a much more 
prominent place in the QDR than in the BUR. Rather than the expansion of democracy, 
freedom and rule of law in general,
U.S. alliances, as well as its wide range of bilateral security relationships, are a 
centerpiece of American security. ... These security arrangements and coalitions 
constitute a formidable combination of actual and potential power that enables the 
United States and its partners to make common cause to shape the strategic landscape, 
protect shared interests, and promote stability.1022
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020 
1021 
1022
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. iii. 
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Instead of the three main elements of the BUR's strategy (overseas presence, defeat of 
aggression in MRCs, and smaller-scale interventions), the QDR proposes four ‘key 
goals’ to guide force structure development, deployment and use:
• Assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and its 
capability to fulfil its security commitments;
• Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could 
threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;
• Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly 
defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s 
military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
• Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.1023
With regards to the assurance of allies and friends, the QDR displays solid realism, 
writing that
A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create 
favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or 
coercion.1024
Using forward deployed forces not primarily as a sign of important US interests, but to 
maintain military balances also provides a rough yardstick to measure sufficiency. 
Consequently, the QDR does not confirm the 100,000 man levels for Northeast Asia and 
Europe, but remarks that the
new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward 
stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the 
Middle East/Southwest Asia.1025
These forces are also more explicitly tied to deterrence since the QDR moves further 
from a concept of punishment to one of denial, a shift that had been recommended by a 
number of theoreticians and practitioners in previous years in order to reduce the 
likelihood and severity of deterrence failures.1026 Forward deployed forces are thus 
important not only as a sign and means of threatening cost on the adversary, a role for
1023
1024
1025
Ibid., pp. iii-iv.
Ibid., p. 11. See also pp. 15,20. 
Ibid., p. 20.
1026 See for example National Institute Study Group, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces 
and Arms Control, vol. 1 (Fairfax, VA: National Insitute for Public Policy, 2001); Payne, Deterrence in 
the Second Nuclear Age, p. 158; Colin S. Gray, ‘Deterrence and Regional Conflict: Hopes, Fallacies, and 
‘Fixes’,’ Comparative Strategy, vol. 17, no. 1 (January-March 1998), p. 58; Robert G. Joseph, ‘Nuclear 
Deterrence and Regional Proliferators,’ Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 167. 
See also Keith B. Payne, ‘Bush Administration Strategic Policy: A Reality Check,’ Journal o f Strategic 
Studies, vol. 28, no. 5 (October 2005), pp. 775-787.
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109 7which they are to be coupled with global strike capabilities, but also since they can 
provide protection to US allies and friends:
DoD will pursue new deterrence tools that not only hold at risk an adversary's military 
forces and other valued assets, but also extend greater protection to allies and friends in 
crisis through capabilities such as missile defenses, defensive information operations, 
and counter-terrorist operations.1028
Like the BUR, the QDR also calls for the capability of forward deployed forces to defeat 
regional aggression with modest reinforcements, primarily in the form of global strike 
capabilities and self-sustainable forces from outside the theatre. 1029 But since the view 
of the enemy threat is more ambiguous than in the BUR, the operational strategy 
developed in the QDR is also less precise:
Combat operations will be structured to eliminate enemy offensive capability across the 
depth of its territory, restore favorable military conditions in the region, and create 
acceptable political conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In addition, U.S. forces 
will degrade an aggressor's ability to coerce others through conventional or asymmetric 
means, including CBRNE weapons.1030
The goal would be, in general terms, to “defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their 
will on the United States, its allies, or friends.” However, the QDR also explicitly calls 
for “the capability at the direction of the President to impose the will of the United 
States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including states or non-state 
entities” , 1031 a more ambitious goal than the former statement.
Just as the QDR's risk pattern has become noticeably more uncertain compared with the 
BUR, the confidence placed in an intricate geopolitical and military-operational theory 
of victory has thus diminished: The Review displays a renewed emphasis on military 
balances rather than ‘engagement and enlargement’ aimed at changing former 
adversaries’ behaviour, prepares for deterrence failures by shifting to deterrence through 
denial rather than punishment, and uses much less precise formulations on operational 
strategy in regional conflicts than the BUR's emphasis on anti-armour capabilities. 
Behind quite bold statements, this shift towards uncertainty and reduced confidence is 
can also be found in the outline of the theory of victory that the QDR proposes for 
future risk.
The QDR writes that
Through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future 
military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complications military
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 12, 25. 
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 13.
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planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can 
therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.1032
In order to achieve this dissuasion with regard to new enemy capabilities and ways of 
war,
U.S. defense strategy must take into account the need to transform U.S. forces to 
address several key emerging operational challenges that are inherent in current security 
trends.1033
Transformation can thus best be understood as a theory of victory to meet this future 
risk, 1034 as
The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve U.S. military preeminence in 
the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the strategic 
environment.1035
Although “over time, the full promise of transformation will be realized as we divest 
ourselves of legacy forces” , 1036 the Review also acknowledges that “prudence dictates 
that those legacy forces critical to DoD's ability to defeat current threats must be 
sustained as transformation occurs.” 1037 The main challenges is thus that “DoD must 
prepare for future challenges over time, while meeting extant threats at any given time,” 
and
This tension between preparations for the future and the demands of the present 
requires the United States to balance the risks associated with each. Because resources 
are always finite, hard choices must be made...1038
The QDR goes on to explain that
Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts 
and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization
1032 Ibid., p. 12.
1033 Ibid., p. 7. See also Kugler, ‘Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept,’ pp. 7-8.
1034 The QDR however also sees transformation as having an indirect impact on the way US forces can 
reduce present risk, as the enemy will be uncertain about the extent to which new capabilities have 
already been acquired: “Moreover, field exercises and experiments that enable the U.S. military to create 
and maintain options for a variety of emerging capabilities greatly complicate the planning of would-be 
adversaries. By enabling the creation of a range of capabilities and warfighting options, field exercises 
and experimentation can compel future competitors into an unenviable choice. They can seek to develop 
responses to most or all of the U.S. capabilities and options and consequently stretch their limited 
resources thin, or they can choose the high-risk option of focusing their efforts on offsetting only one or a 
few of the new warfighting options, leaving themselves vulnerable to the others. When confronted with 
this dilemma, potential adversaries may find themselves dissuaded from entering into a military 
competition in the first place.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(2001), p. 36.
1035 Ibid., p. 30.
1036 Ibid., p. v.
1037 Ibid., p. 47.
1038 Ibid., p. 13. See also pp. 57, 62.
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that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational 
challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war 
obsolete or subordinate. Transformation can involve fundamental change in the form of 
military operations, as well as a potential change in their scale. It can encompass the 
displacement of one form of war with another, such as fundamental change in the ways 
war is waged in the air, on land and at sea. It can also involve the emergence of new 
kinds of war, such as armed conflict in new dimensions of the battlespace.1039
Transformation as a concept is an obvious brainchild1040 of the mid-to-late 1990s 
“American Revolution in Military Affairs”. The QDR is relatively mute with regards to 
specific new systems that would be involved in transformation, but it states that 
“[information technology will provide a key foundation for the effort to transform U.S. 
armed forces for the 21st century”,1041 and that
new information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly 
distributed joint and combined forces and for ensuring that such forces have better 
situational awareness ... than in the past.1042
As it is designed to meet and possibly even forestall or ‘dissuade’1043 future new enemy 
challenges,1044 the appropriateness of transformation as a theory of victory obviously 
stands or falls with the quality of the (abductive) reasoning that postulated the future 
risks it is designed to meet.
But since transformation involves changing core competencies of warfare1045 even if it 
is limited to the conventional state-on-state battlefield, information about practical 
aspects has yet to be gained—something the QDR acknowledges when it writes that 
transformation “entails ... experimenting with the development of new military 
capabilities.”1046 Therefore,
1039 Ibid., p. 29.
1040 Some might say twin, or the same in disguise.
1041 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 45.
1042 Ibid., p. 31.
1043 One additional problem is that, as with deterrence, only failure but never success of dissuasion is 
obvious. This does, however, mean that if e.g. missile defence is successful in this respect, it will be a 
defence against largely non-existent threat. Peppi DeBiaso, ‘Proliferation, Missile Defense and the 
Conduct of Modem War,’ Comparative Strategy, vol. 25, no. 6 (July-September 2006), pp. 164-165.
1044 Unlike earlier writers on the RMA had done in the mid- to late 1990s (see, for example, Bill Owens, 
‘The American Revolution in Military Affairs,’ Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 
37-38), the QDR sees transformation as something that is not a discretionary American initiative, but a 
necessary (anticipatory) reaction to enemy programs. It thus combines what Steven Metz called the 
‘Transformation Approach’ and the ‘Counter-Asymmetry Strategy’: Steven Metz, American Strategy: 
Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), pp. 66-70, 75-81.
1045 Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, p. 9. See also Section 2.3.5.
1046 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. iv.
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To identify the best available solutions to emerging operational challenges, the defense 
strategy will employ military field exercises and experiments. ... These operations 
reduce uncertainty about the future conflict environment and future capabilities.1047
In addition, the Review acknowledges that innovation in military technology cannot be 
directed through governmental programs any more in the way it used to be in previous 
decades:
During the Cold War, U.S. government programs were a primary impetus for research 
into new technologies, particularly in areas such as computers and materials. Today 
and well into the foreseeable future, however, DoD will rely on the private sector to 
provide much of the leadership in developing new technologies. Thus, the Department 
has embarked on an effort (a) to turn to private enterprise for new ways to move ideas 
from the laboratory to the operating forces, (b) to tap the results of innovations 
developed in the private sector, and (c) to blend government and private research where 
appropriate.1048
The QDR thus does not profess to present a clear picture of what transformation would 
actually look like—uncertainty affects this theory of victory for future risks to a 
significant degree, in addition to the more fundamental uncertainty about the validity of 
the technology-focused pattern of future risk. Overall, and perhaps contrary to 
established popular wisdom, the QDR displays a noticeably qualified confidence in the 
theories of victory for present and future risk, which are much less specific than those in 
the BUR, and emphasize the need to adapt to new information.1049
9.1.3 Codification o f Requirements and Transformation
In order to come to terms with the difficulties in defining requirements for meeting a 
threat that is uncertain in terms of the identity and theory of victory of future 
adversaries, the QDR shifts to a ‘capabilities-based approach’, which “focuses more on 
how an adversary might fight rather than specifically whom the adversary might be or 
where a war might occur.”1050 Capabilities-based planning is thus, at least partly, based 
on the abductive inference of future enemy capabilities discussed in the previous two 
sections.1051 From these considerations, it derives requirements for US force planning 
in the form of US capabilities to overcome the enemy’s capabilities:
1047 Ibid., p. 35. See also: Defense Science Board, The Role and Status o f DoD Red Teaming Activities.
1048 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 41.
1049 Unfortunately, this very qualified confidence in the US military’s ability to overcome high- 
technology enemy opposition did not extend to its ability to deal with other, more mundane tasks such as 
occupation duties. This is, however, a question of intelligent employment rather than structuring of 
forces, or at most one of a risk pattern that, arguably, is skewed towards the high-technology end of the 
threat spectrum.
1050 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. iv.
1051 In practice—a paradox only at first glace—the Pentagon brought the input from combatant 
commanders into the requirements process forward, from demands for certain platforms, to demands for 
certain capabilities. See Senior Defense Officials, Defense Department Background Briefing, 5 March 
2004, <www.defense.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20040305-0507.html> (12 August 2005). For a discussion of 
the difficulty of moving away from point scenarios, see Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities- 
Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation, pp. 20-26.
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A capabilities-based model ... requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces 
will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and 
asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. Moving to a capabilities-based force 
also requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities that certain 
capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, 
transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems, to overcome anti-access 
and area denial threats, can confer on the U.S. military over time.1052
While the QDR concentrates its discussion on US capabilities, these derive their 
strategic value from the fact that they make it possible to achieve certain tasks. 
Formulating requirements in the form of capabilities independent of specific adversaries 
is thus equivalent to defining tasks to be achieved that, at a later stage, can be combined 
into a coherent theory of victory—the Review writes that capabilities-based planning 
was to
require planners to define the military objectives associated with defeating aggression 
or coercion in a variety of potential scenarios in addition to conventional cross-border 
invasions.1053
In line with Task-based Planning, the QDR develops the tasks to be achieved from basic 
considerations regarding the projection of kinetic power and military forces:
The defense strategy rests on the assumption that U.S. forces have the ability to project 
power worldwide. The United States must retain the capability to send well-armed and 
logistically supported forces to critical points around the globe, even in the face of 
enemy opposition, or to locations where the support infrastructure is lacking or has 
collapsed. For U.S. forces to gain the advantage in such situations, they must have the 
ability to arrive quickly at non-traditional points of debarkation to mass fire against an 
alerted enemy and to mask their own movements to deceive the enemy and bypass its 
defenses.1054
It remarks that these tasks are particularly challenging in the Asian theatre with its vast 
distances and low US basing density. 1055 Future operations would be joint and 
combined, based on interoperable systems as well as a practice of peacetime training, 
and also involve other federal and state agencies, as well as civilian elements. 1056
Because the risk pattern involves a significant degree of uncertainty, strategic warning 
cannot be relied upon to signal the need for new capabilities—the QDR remarks that 
adapting quickly to surprise “must therefore be a condition of planning.” 1057 A practical 
consequence of this condition is that it is not easily possible to define specific points in 
time when transformational capabilities to meet future risk are required—transformation 
is not about planning for a future mobilization, or about having to do something in the
1052 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 10-14.
1053 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
1054 Ibid., p. 43. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy o f the United States of 
America, pp. 16-20.
1055 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 4.
1056 Ibid., pp. 15,46.
1057 Ibid., p. iii.
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future that would be different from what the Unite States hoped to be able to do in the 
present already. 1058 Therefore, requirements related to transformation are linked to the 
same tasks that underlie the theory of victory for present risks. In the words of the 
QDR,
Six critical operational goals provide the focus for DoD's transformation efforts:
• Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and 
friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery;
• Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective 
information operations;
• Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial 
environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats;
• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and 
rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike, through a combination of 
complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets 
at various ranges and in all weather and terrains;
• Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting 
infrastructure; and
• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an 
interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable 
joint operational picture.1059
However, one of the greater weaknesses of the QDR is that the geostrategic situation 
from which these transformational challenges are derived is not used to define them in 
further quantitative or qualitative detail, or to assess the coherence of the underlying 
considerations. 1060 Beyond the specific examples it gives, the Review is largely moot 
on how to decide whether a possible, abductively defined threat warrants attention or 
not.
With regards to concurrency considerations, the QDR begins to move away from the 
formal focus on two MRCs, announcing a planning framework that “for the first time
1058 Although it is clear in some circumstances that new capabilities will only be required in the fu ture- 
such as, for example, with regards to missile intercept capabilities for Iranian ICBM. See Henry A. 
Obering, Media Teleconference, 25 January 2007.
1059 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 30. Note that 
these tasks do not form a theory of victory in a way that, for example, the BUR's four phases of US 
operations did (see Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3).
1060 There is, therefore, merit in Andrew Krepinevich’s suggestion to revisit the use of colour coded 
warplans not as operational contingency planning (which would lead to a defence planning concept of 
Multi-threat Planning), but in order to appreciate what future conflict may entail. Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the US Military Posture (Washington D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005), pp. 56-77.
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takes into account the number and nature of the tasks actually assigned to the Armed 
Forces.”1061 The new
approach shifts the focus of U.S. force planning from optimizing for conflicts in two 
particular regions— Northeast and Southwest Asia— to building a portfolio of 
capabilities that is robust across the spectrum o f possible force requirements, both 
functional and geographical.1062
However, the Review can of course not avoid making concurrency judgements. Instead 
of the two MRC standard, the QDR settles on what may be called a 1-4-2-1 structure: 
US forces are required to be able to defend the US homeland and conduct forward 
deterrence and deployment operations in four regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East 
Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia).1063 While “U.S. forces will remain 
capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of 
operation in overlapping timeframes”, the Review scaled back ambitions somewhat as
U.S. forces will be capable of decisively defeating an adversary in one o f the two 
theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing 
America's will and removing any future threat it could pose. This capability will 
include the ability to occupy territory or set the conditions for a regime change if so 
directed.1064
The QDR also acknowledges that smaller-scale operations place additional demands on 
the force structure, and that they cannot always be easily terminated when more 
demanding conflicts arise. Therefore,
DoD will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base— a larger base of forces from 
which to provide forward-deployed forces— to support long-standing contingency 
commitments in the critical areas o f interest. These long-standing commitments will, in 
effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.1065
As the number and type of formal missions with force structure relevance has expanded, 
the QDR also demands that the measurement of operational risk, for which the BUR had 
used the two MRC scenario, should take a wider range of contingencies into 
account.1066 Finally, it accounts for the fact that transformation may place additional
1061 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 18.
1062 Ibid., p. 17.
1063 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
1064 Ibid., p. 21. Although, as Michael O’Hanlon pointed out, the threat from both Iraq and North Korea 
in conventional terms seemed more hollow at the beginning of the 21st century than in 1993. Michael 
O’Hanlon, ‘Rethinking Two-War Strategies,’ in Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm, ed. 
Metz, pp. 81-92.
1065 Office o f the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 21. Overall, the 
new standard is thus closer to the one-and-two-half standard than the BUR's two MRCs. See Hans 
Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, ‘Revising the Two-Major War Standard,’ Strategic Forum, no. 179 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2001). For a discussion of the building block concept in 
more sophisticated frameworks than the two MRC standard, see Michele A. Flournoy and Kenneth F. 
McKenzie, ‘Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria and Methodology,’ in QDR 2001: Strategy-driven 
Choices for America ’s Security, ed. Flournoy, pp. 167-191.
1066 Qffjce Qf  the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 60-61.
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demands on the force as units are re-organized or engaged in experimentation,1067 for 
which up to 5% of US-based forces are made available.1068
As mentioned in the previous section, the way in which transformation would impact on 
strategic cause-effect relationships was uncertain, and new information had to be 
generated in an adaptive approach from experimentation or interaction with the 
enemy.1069 The QDR thus explicitly states that transformation “requires a substantial 
investment in explicit searches for new and improved capabilities”, 1070 where 
“wargames and simulations serve as a filter to enhance the focus and value of field 
exercises.”1071 For example,
with respect to the challenge of projecting power in an anti-access environment, field 
exercises and experiments will enable the military to identify promising operational 
concepts for deploying forces into theater and conducting extended-range precision 
strikes against mobile targets. Further, these exercises and experiments will help to 
determine if secure access to forward bases is possible and to identify ways to sustain 
operations for a period sufficient to achieve U.S. objectives. They will also assist the 
United States in determining which new systems and capabilities will be required, 
which existing systems and capabilities should be sustained, and what combination of 
transformational and legacy systems should be created.1072
In the end,
The findings of this program of field exercises and experiments will feed back directly 
into the process for determining systems, doctrine, and force structure requirements.1072
Therefore, the codification of the QDR is left relatively vague in order to accommodate 
new information. It “plans to reduce the time required to introduce new concepts and 
systems into the fielded force.”1074 “Over time, the full implications of the QDR will 
emerge”, the Review writes, as the “ability of the force to field transformed capabilities 
... will be more accurately assessed as joint and Service transformation roadmaps are 
developed.”1075
1067 Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Ibid., pp. 68-69.
1068 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 37.
1069 Admiral Gehman, initiator of the Joint Experimentation Directorate, mentions that early in the process 
of joint experimentation (before the QDR), there was a “strong pressure for short term results.” Harold 
W. Gehman, and James M. Dubik, ‘Military Transformation and Joint Experimentation: Two Views from 
Above,’ Defense Horizons, no. 46 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2004), p. 2.
1070 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 62.
1071
1072
1073
Ibid., p. 36. 
Ibid., p. 36. 
Ibid., p. 37.
1074 Ibid., p. 63. Following the QDR, the interval in which contingency plans were reviewed was also 
reduced from two to one year. Richard Meinhart, Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs o f  
Staff, 1990 to 2005 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), p. 16.
1075 Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 70.
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9.1.4 Force Structure Concept
Since both the risk pattern and theory of victory showed (yet unresolved) significant 
uncertainties, and since the codification of requirements highlighted the need to gain 
additional information, it is not surprising that the QDR's comments regarding the 
future US force structure are much less final than those of the BU RU)1(1 They roughly 
fall into three broad categories: First, regarding the revitalisation of current force
structure; second, the introduction of additional geographical and configurational 
flexibility; and third, hedges of (abductively defined) future risks. As the 
implementation of transformation straddles both present and future risks, it relates to 
both the second and third area. New ‘transformational capabilities’ that the review calls 
for are directly related to the codification of requirements in the form of tasks, as 
discussed in the previous section. Overall, the QDR's comments thus only relate to the
107Rdirection, rather than a final goal of force structure development.
The QDR writes that
The current force structure ... was assessed across several combinations o f scenarios on 
the basis o f the new defense strategy and force sizing construct, and the capabilities of 
this force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although certain 
combinations o f warfighting and smaller-scale contingency scenarios present high 
risk.1079
It does not however yet decide on major changes—instead, it plans that as the 
“transformation effort matures ... DoD will explore additional opportunities to 
restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.”1080 In the meantime, existing forces are 
recapitalised, to a limited degree, with selective upgrades to the Abrams tank, B-l 
bomber, ship self-defence systems and amphibious assault vehicles.1081 Counter­
terrorism, force protection and domestic nuclear, biological and chemical defence 
capabilities are also improved.1082
The Review aims to increase US capabilities to gain information about actual and 
potential enemies, writing that “[investments in intelligence, surveillance, and
1076 Another contributing factor was probably the relatively short time in which the QDR was put 
together. See Government Accounting Office, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit 
From Better Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope, GAO-03-13 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Accounting Office, 2003).
1077 The QDR writes of “the need to provide over time a richer set o f military options across the 
operational spectrum than is available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the means to adapt in 
time to surprise.” Office o f the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 17.
1078 In his comments on the QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff remarked, for example, that 
significant work especially in the areas o f reserves and logistics had to be undertaken to ascertain the 
force structure implications of the Review. The Review also remarks that major studies on air- and sealift 
and prepositioning in the previous financial year did not yet take the new strategy into account. Ibid., pp. 
61,69.
1079
1080 
1081 
1082
Ibid., p. 22. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
Ibid., p. 47. 
Ibid., p. 42.
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1 OR ^reconnaissance (ISR) initiatives must be bolstered.” The procurement of UAV is 
accelerated and commercial imaging capabilities are integrated into the US ISR system. 
The overall system is made more robust by overlapping capabilities through, for 
example, the complementation of airborne radar systems with future space-based
1084ones.
The QDR plans to enhance the geographical flexibility of US force in three main ways:
• Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical 
areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond 
Western Europe and Northeast Asia.
• Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to 
conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges and bases. ...
• Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing 
infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of 
operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters against 
adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny 
access to U.S. forces.1085
The force structure implications of the latter point can, for example, be demonstrated by 
the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) or MPF(F) program. Existing 
prepositioning ships, including those acquired after the BUR, require harbour facilities 
to offload and must, because of the tight storing of equipment, be completely emptied 
even if only select items are required. MPF(F) ships would have the ability to deliver 
materiel over the shore through helicopters and amphibious landing craft. In addition, it 
will be possible to move (and service) equipment aboard, so that tailored force packages 
can be created. 1086 Like the BUR, the QDR again highlights the role of long-range 
bombers and special operations forces based in the continental United States to “provide 
an immediately employable supplement to forward forces”. In addition, the 
replacement of nuclear Trident systems with cruise missiles on four submarines
1 O R Rprovides a strike capability that does not depend on aircraft entering hostile airspace. 
Subsequent to the QDR, the National Military Strategy also placed special emphasis on 
what it called geographic “agility” . 1089
The Review also places additional emphasis on configurational flexibility:
1083 Ibid., p. 44.
1084 Ibid., p. 39.
1085 Ibid., p. 26. For a discussion of the need to review US overseas basing in the context of the QDR, see 
Roger Cliff, Sam J. Tangredi, and Christine E. Wormuth, ‘The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,’ in 
QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America ’s Security, ed. Flournoy, pp. 235-262.
1086 See, for example, Congressional Budget Office, The Future o f the Navy’s Amphibious and Marine 
Prepositioning Forces (Washington DC: Congress of the United States, 2004); ‘Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future) MPF(F),’ www.GlobalSecurity.org 
systems/ship/mpf-f.htm> (25 February 2007).
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
1087
1088
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 26. 
Ibid., p. 44.
1089 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy o f the United States o f America, p. 7.
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DoD must develop the ability to integrate combat organizations with forces capable of 
responding rapidly to events that occur with little or no warning. These joint forces 
must be scalable and task-organized into modular units to allow the combatant 
commanders to draw on the appropriate forces to deter or defeat an adversary.1090
Several initiatives that contribute to this goal are mentioned throughout the QDRn)91 
The army, for example, was to accelerate its reorganization into Brigade Combat 
Teams, 1092 which with their increased integrated support elements make it easier to 
deploy forces of a smaller size than a division. 1093 Command, control and 
communications systems were to be developed in a way that forces could “immediately 
‘plug’ into the joint battlefield operating systems (command and control, intelligence, 
fire support, logistics, etc.)”, which should be joint, combined and extend to other 
agencies. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters with standardized command, control 
and ISR architecture would be established with each of the regional combatant 
commands. 1094 In addition, the existing Global Naval Forces Presence Policy and the 
Global Military Force Policy, used to manage low-density high-demand assets, were to 
be expanded into a Joint Presence Policy, 1095 which would cover most conventional 
units and thus facilitate the global generation of forces to meet regional commander’s 
requests.
With regards to transformation, the QDR discusses new, task-derived capabilities as 
additions to the existing base force:
Creating substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military 
competition (e.g., power projection, space, and information) will require developing 
and sustaining a portfolio of key military capabilities to prevail over current challenges 
and to hedge against and dissuade future threats. Building upon the current superiority 
of U.S. conventional forces, this portfolio will include capabilities for conducting 
information operations, ensuring U.S. access to distant theaters, defending against 
threats to the United States and allied territory, and protecting U.S. assets in space.1096
But since these capabilities relate to tasks required for meeting threats on which 
relatively little precise information is available, the Review does not contain definite
1090 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 32.
1091 Richard Kugler mentions that flexibility and modularity are two main tenants of the 2001 QDR. See 
Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a New Era, pp. 268-269.
1092 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 27.
1093 There is however criticism that the new brigades, with two four-company maneuvre battalions each, 
are too small and without sufficient reserves, and that in addition flexibility is lost if divisions loose much 
of their own firepower. See Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods For a 
New Era, pp. 337-339.
1094 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 33-34, 40,46.
1095 Ibid., pp. 35, 59. In 2004, Joint Forces Command was designated Joint Force Provider. It is now 
responsible for developing a sourcing solution for most of the requests by regional commanders for 
conventional forces, replacing a decentralized and more informal system to exchange forces between 
force providing commands (Joint, European and Pacific Command). See Michael Ferriter and Jay 
Burdon, ‘The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Force Providing,’ Joint Forces Quarterly, 
no. 44 (1st Quarter 2007), pp. 45-46.
1096 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 15.
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guidance regarding timelines or the quantity of systems or capability to be acquired. 
For example, it writes that US space surveillance systems should “evolve ... from a 
cataloguing and tracking capability to a system providing space situational 
awareness”,1097 without however making any clear statement as to the space control 
capability such a program might lead to. The QDR's approach also had significant 
consequences for the transition from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation to 
MDA. The former managed an R&D program that was to lead into the procurement of 
a predefined missile defence architecture. The latter, however, is to provide operational 
capability within the scope of an R&D program conducted through two-year blocks, 
without a pre-determined end state. Traditional procurement processes are only used 
for elements that prove sufficiently mature over time.1098
In addition, the need for a program of experiments and field exercises also causes 
specific resource requirements and programs mentioned in the QDR. The Joint Forces 
Command would possibly establish a space test range as well as a Joint National 
Training Centre and a joint opposing force for major exercises.1099 One major joint 
transformation exercise is planned every other year, with Service exercises in the 
intervening years.1100 In general, the need to test new capabilities requires a program to 
modernize existing ranges and manage encroachment of urban development.1101
In summary, the risk pattern in the 2001 QDR showed significant similarities with Un- 
Order, as the Review did not place high confidence in its ability to correctly anticipate 
either the identity of enemies, or their theories of victory. The theory of victory was 
thus not specified in much detail, and emphasized the need to be adaptive and generate 
new knowledge, through experimentation in particular. Requirements were abductively 
inferred and concentrated on giving US forces the ability to fulfil basic tasks or 
“operational goals”. Force structure changes are limited, but emphasize the need for 
flexibility. The Review is largely silent on industry policy considerations, as well as 
desired general traits of new platforms beyond an emphasis on networked warfare. 
Overall, however, the QDR demonstrates most of the defining traits of Rearmament 
Planning.
9.2 New Zealand—The 1991 Defence o f  New Zealand White Paper
New Zealand tried to apply a methodology not unlike that of the 1987 Defence of 
Australia White Paper in its own, 1987 Defence o f New Zealand document.1102 
However, its defence policy did not develop a similarly consistent focus after Vietnam, 
and came to be dominated by the implications of the nuclear ship dispute and the
1097 Ibid., p. 45.
1098 This structure of the program is still used by the time of writing. The reasoning behind it was 
outlined in some detail at the time in, for example, Ronald T. Kadish, Testimony on the FY 03 Missile 
Defense Budget before the Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee, 17 April 2002. The 
QDR only hinted at the details o f these changes in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (2001), p. 42.
1099 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 36-37, 62.
1100 Ibid., p. 37.
1101 Ibid., p. 41.
1102 New Zealand Government, Defence o f New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy (Wellington: V.R. 
Ward Government Printer, 1987).
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suspension of US cooperation.1103 In this context, the new National centre-right 
government published a defence White Paper in 1991 that sought to arrest what may be 
called “strategic drift”.1104 It tried to reconcile, in the context of the end of the Cold 
War, the country’s traditional internationalist outlook with the recently suspended US 
alliance relations and a shrinking defence resource base.1105 In doing so, the White 
Paper settled on a definition of defence interests and a way of meeting them that, in 
combination, resulted in a risk pattern very close to the ideal case of Un-Order. 
Consequently, the defence planning framework of the 1991 White Paper bore 
remarkable resemblance, in the overall context of New Zealand’s strategic 
circumstances, to the concept of Task-based Planning. '106
9.2.1 Risks a “tous azimuths ”
Not surprisingly given New Zealand’s benign strategic location, the White Paper judges 
that “there are no direct threats to our security.”1107 The country is “distant from the 
major sources of international conflict,”1108 only very few states possess the significant 
capabilities necessary to mount a direct threat,1109 and it “is reasonable to assume that 
there would be a considerable warning time for an event of such magnitude”1110 as an 
armed invasion. In a similar vein as Australia did in the 1987 Defence o f Australia 
White Paper, the New Zealand 1991 Paper notes that
There are a number of ways in which pressure could be brought to bear on New  
Zealand short of direct attack. ... A threatening presence could be demonstrated by air 
or naval patrols in our waters, or terrorist attacks or covert raids could be mounted 
against New Zealand targets. Our geography and economy make us especially 
vulnerable to submarine or mining activity around our harbours and shipping lanes.1111
But unlike in the case of Australia, it was difficult to relate these possibilities of direct 
threat to regional capabilities and local strategic geography. Soviet and Libyan activity 
were clearly on the decline and the Pacific island states
1103 See Ian McGibbon, ‘New Zealand Defence Policy from Vietnam to the Gulf,’ in New Zealand in 
World Affairs III 1972-1990, ed. Bruce Brown (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1999), pp. 111- 
142.
1104 Robert Ayson, ‘Australasian Security Policy: Old Agenda Divergence, New Agenda Convergence?’, 
in Australian Security After 9/11, eds. Derek McDougall and Peter Shearman (London: Ashgate, 2006), p. 
165.
1105 For a discussion of the relationship between defence reviews and defence white papers in New  
Zealand, see James Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study o f Structures, Processes and Relationships 
(Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University, 1993), pp. 61-76.
1106 A very similar concept was proposed, but never adopted, for Australia: See Alan Hinge, Australian 
Defence Preparedness (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000).
1107 New Zealand Ministry o f Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1991), p. 28.
1108 Ibid., p. 17.
1109 Ibid., pp. 18,28.
1110 Ibid., p. 58.
1111 Ibid., p. 59.
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lie at considerable distances from another, are of little strategic interest to larger 
powers, have few resources and limited infrastructures of airports, harbours and 
resupply stocks.1112
With regards to major direct threats to New Zealand, the country thus relies on strategic 
warning: “In the South Pacific as in New Zealand, no direct external threat can be seen 
for the foreseeable future,”1113 and “[m]ajor threats to New Zealand’s security interests 
are more likely to arise beyond the South Pacific.”1114
However, the White Paper acknowledges that New Zealand has explicit defence 
commitments to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and implicit ones to Western 
Samoa.1115 It states that the “relative proximity of the island states to New Zealand 
means that their security and stability is of particular concern to us.”1116 New Zealand’s 
regional defence interests also lie in the security of Australia, which shields the country 
from threats emanating in mainland as well as archipelagic Asia. Therefore, “[i]t has 
always been assumed that in such circumstances [of threats to the either country], both
1117nations would act in concert.”
The White Paper states that “[d]espite or perhaps because of our geographical 
remoteness New Zealand pursues a large number of diverse and distant interests.” 1118 It 
explicitly mentions the free passage of international shipping, which directly relates to 
New Zealand’s security, as the country’s economy heavily depends on international 
trade, has supply lines of a significant length, and strongly depends on access to 
overseas supplies in the event of conflict.1119 The White Paper therefore judges that
a major disruption in the Pacific would threaten the fabric of New Zealand life as surely 
as any direct threat. ... as global citizens and traders, international peace and stability 
must be our concern.1120
This meshes with the country’s internationalist tradition, as New Zealanders “have 
traditionally aimed to be good international citizens and have consciously taken the 
larger view.” " 21
In this global regard, New Zealand has not only to deal with the general condition that 
“military force remains for the foreseeable future the final arbiter of relations among 
states.” The preceding years had seen significant regional and global developments,
11,2 Ibid., p. 21.
1113 Ibid., p. 51.
1114 Ibid., p. 21.
1115 Ibid., p. 33.
1116 Ibid., p. 20.
1117 Ibid., p. 19.
1118 Ibid., p. 21.
1119 Ibid., pp. 18,33.
1120 Ibid., p. 28.
1,21 Ibid., p. 22.
1122 Ibid., p. 17.
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so that the White Paper fell “in a time of greater fluidity in international 
relationships.” Since its predecessor in 1987, “in the South Pacific internal security 
issues have emerged as a major concern,” and New Zealand had participated the first 
Gulf War against Iraq.1124 Although “it is still too early to predict the military 
consequences of the end of the Cold War,” it would in time lead to “the emergence
1 1 9 Aof other major powers” in Asia. Continued and unabated American engagement
1127 _could not be taken for granted, but “no comprehensive framework has developed for
1 1 9 8managing” security relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Consequently,
“[perceptions of a declining American security role ... may encourage some of the 
larger regional states to experiment with more ambitious strategic agendas of their 
own,”1129
at a time when “increasingly the proliferation of advanced conventional if not nuclear 
weapons will endow small states with disproportionate military influence.” Overall, 
“the possibility of regional conflicts may have increased,”1130 and “[opportunities will
1191emerge for other states to establish local hegemonies.”
The White Paper does not include a prioritisation between risks close or far afield. It 
writes that “the threat of invasion, a lodgement or even a serious raid, while never to be 
overlooked, is not the main determinant of a New Zealand defence strategy.” Unlike 
its 1987 predecessor, the 1991 White Paper also rejects a primary focus on threats and 
interests in the South Pacific region as both deleterious to the professionalism of the 
New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and not warranted given the risks to New Zealand 
interests elsewhere. These “are likely if anything to increase the importance of 
strategic stability in the region and of our need to make an appropriate contribution,”1134 
especially since “[t]he Americans will look to the Asia/Pacific states to do more to 
support the region’s continued stability.”1135
1123 Ibid., p. 22. Gerald Hensley wrote at the time that “[w]e now face doubts, rather than threats.” Gerald 
Hensley, ‘New Zealand’s defence in the 1990s,’ New Zealand International Review, vol. 17, no. 3 
(May/June 1992), p. 3.
1124 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 14.
1125 Ibid., p. 23.
1126 Ibid., p. 14.
1127 Ibid., p. 23.
1128 Ibid., p. 25.
1129 Ibid., p. 26.
1130 Ibid., p. 23.
1131 Ibid., p. 24.
1132 Ibid., p. 48.
1133 Ibid., pp. 27, 50.
1134 Ibid., p. 16.
1135 Ibid., p. 26.
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Thus, no strategic risk stood out overall, as the severity of actual and conceivable 
threats to New Zealand was inversely correlated with the intensity of New Zealand's 
interests involved.1136 The White Paper acknowledged as much when it states that
Defence planning has therefore been less concerned with New Zealand’s security needs 
... than with New Zealand’s security interests. ... They are both broad and general, 
more diffuse and therefore more difficult to grasp than direct threats.1137
These security interests to be safeguarded included the protection of territory and 
sovereignty, of off-shore resources, nationals, and economic interests, as well as 
constitutional obligations and other regional ties, treaty and other security arrangements, 
shared values, and, in general, an orderly conduct of world affairs. “The need to 
support our defence interests, including those shared with Australia and other friends, is 
what in practice shapes our policy,”1139 the White Paper writes.
New Zealand defence policy has to cover both an extensive home environment where 
the threat is low but the tasks demanding and an even more diffuse need to support our 
economic and other interests at great distances.1140
In addition, “[t]hese security interests are not only increasingly diverse, but they are 
developing within an international setting that is changing rapidly.”1141 Overall, the 
1991 White Paper thus does not so much establish a clear pattern of strategic risks to be 
treated than concludes the absence of a pattern as such—in the words of Gerald 
Hensley, New Zealand’s strategy was to be “tous azimuths”.1142 It does not, however, 
leave the NZDF without guidance as to what type of risks to treat—unlike the other 
example cases discussed so far, however, this guidance is contained in the theory of 
victory as much as in the risk pattern itself.
9.2.2 Theory o f Victory
Given the variety of defence interests and threats that the White Paper sees as relevant 
to New Zealand’s defence effort, it is not surprising that it does not define only one, but 
several theories of victory for different types of risk. Not unlike Australia’s approach to 
the defence of the continent and global risks, respectively, New Zealand distinguishes 
two main ways of reducing strategic risks (with that applied to the South Pacific falling 
roughly in between):
1136 Cathy Downes points out that the Australian and New Zealand militaries are peculiar in that new 
‘internationalist’ missions have been added to the more traditional task of territorial defence and alliance 
support, but not replaced them (yet) as in many other countries. Downes, ‘Australia and New Zealand: 
Contingent and Concordant Militaries,’ p. 189.
1137 New Zealand Ministry o f Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 28; see also pp. 16, 18, 61.
1138 Ibid., pp. 31-36.
1139 Ibid., p. 49.
1140 Ibid., p. 16.
1141 Ibid., p. 28.
1142 Gerald Hensley, The Development of the 1991 Defence White Paper, I/DEF/MOD/29B, 23 June 1992, 
p. 5. This was perhaps a somewhat unlucky choice o f words, as not even in the French case it was clear 
what this should mean in practice.
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New Zealand has the prime responsibility for direct national tasks . . . .  [But tjhere are 
also broader security concerns which we share with other countries ... These concerns 
can only be pursued by collective effort in which New Zealand’s aims are meshed with 
those of other and for the most part larger countries.1143
While the White Paper states that “[t]he core of this task [of protecting territorial 
integrity and sovereignty] ... is the retention by New Zealand of a minimum capability 
for offensive action,”1144 the unlikelihood and remoteness in time of any major threat to 
New Zealand means that the NZDF only has to take limited precautionary measures, 
such as in the areas of mine countermeasures and anti-submarine surveillance.1145 Even 
the retention of the air combat capability is not judged to be warranted on the basis of 
the defence of New Zealand alone.1146 Should a threat emerge, the White Paper 
(implicitly) relies on allied assistance coming fore: “New Zealand ... needs to make a 
credible minimum contribution to its own defence if it is to expect others to come to its 
assistance in times of crisis.”1147 But
The more likely challenges to our territorial integrity are less grave but must still be 
blocked or controlled, ultimately if necessary by the use of the defence forces. They 
include violation of our customs or immigration laws, ... and terrorist attacks on targets 
in New Zealand, its off-shore installations or associated island countries.1148
These tasks already foreshadow the New Zealand emphasis on inter-agency cooperation 
that was to become much more prominent towards the end of the decade, when it drove, 
for example, the design of a new maritime patrol and transport capability in Project 
Protector, or upgrades to the P-3K Orion fleet.1149 Although they are relatively limited 
in the intensity of military operations involved, they require New Zealand to carry more 
‘strategic weight’ than any other mission—unless the NZDF is dealing with these low- 
level threats, no one else will. Overall, however, the White Paper acknowledges that 
given the country’s benign circumstances, “the task of protection becomes primarily on 
of ensuring that no such threat emerges.”1150
The White Paper states that “New Zealand’s major contribution to regional security is to 
maintain capabilities which signal our commitment to respond to threats to this 
security”.1151 To this end,
1143 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 31; see also p. 54; Hensley, ‘New Zealand’s defence in the 1990s,’ p. 6.
1144 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 72.
1145 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
1146 Ibid., p. 98.
1147 Ibid., p. 72.
1148 Ibid., p. 59.
1149 See Derek Quigley, ‘The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy,’ Security Challenges, vol. 2, no. 
3 (October 2006), esp. pp. 55-62.
1150 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 58.
1151 Ibid., p. 64.
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New Zealand should have an independent capability to deploy a national force to carry 
out certain low-level tasks in and around New Zealand waters and in the South 
Pacific.1152
In addition, New Zealand provides defence assistance to enhance the capabilities of the 
states of the region. However, dealing with external threats to the region “for 
political and practical realities would always be undertaken in company with 
Australia,”1154 and “[i]t is tacitly understood that the defence capabilities of the two 
countries help deter outside interference or adventurism.” 1155 Therefore, “inter­
operability with Australia [is] a fundamental objective of our defence planning.” 1156 
Already within the South Pacific, “[ejconomically-sensible self-reliance seems a
1 i c n
reasonable goal but in practice has been beyond our abilities to fund.” New Zealand 
still carries strategic weight in its neighbourhood, but it only does so in conjunction with 
(larger) Australian capabilities.1158
With regards to the security interests beyond the region, the Government took the 
decision to increase the NZDF’s deployments overseas to “re-eam [New Zealand’s] 
stripes internationally.”1159 One of the country’s explicit defence policy goals was thus 
“to work to re-establish an effective defence relationship with New Zealand’s other 
traditional partners, especially the United States and the United Kingdom,”1160 and the 
1991 White Paper in general takes a remarkably realist perspective on the use of 
military force:1161
New Zealand’s security interests are inseparable from our foreign policy. Defence is 
one of the instruments, along with diplomacy, trade, aid and others, by which New 
Zealand seeks to influence the external world in ways favourable to our interests.1162
But increased international military engagement is also seen as a way of reducing 
(geographically) more distant threats to New Zealand interests:
1152 Ibid., p. 53.
1153 Ibid., p. 64.
1154 Ibid., p. 50.
1155 Ibid., p. 21.
1156 Ibid., p. 53.
1157 Ibid., p. 50; see also p. 45.
1158 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
1159 Letter by then-Foreign Minister Don McKinnon to Derek Quigley, dated 9 February 2000, quoted in 
Quigley, ‘The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy,’ p. 50.
1160 New Zealand Ministry o f Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 45.
1161 See also Gerald Hensley, ‘The Relationship Between Defence and Foreign Policy,’ in Fifty Years of 
New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, ed. Ann Trotter (Dunedin: University o f Otago Press, 1993), esp. 
136-142.
1162 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 29.
266
Task-based Planning
If we want to ensure that account is taken of our economic and security interests we 
have to respond to the economic and security concerns of others. We have to be willing 
to play our proper part in the Asia/Pacific region and beyond.1163
The White Paper goes on to state that, for almost fifty years, “[o]ur defence has been 
indirect, pursued through external policies and in company with other nations,” 1164 and 
outside the South Pacific, “the mismatch between our size and our far-flung interests 
make wider partnerships the most effective method of pursuing our defence aims.” 1165 
These can take the form of collective security—the White Paper mentions it several 
times as a particular New Zealand tradition, 1166 and voices “staunch support for the 
United Nations.” Or they can take the form of collective defence, with Australia 
as mentioned above, through the FPDA,1169or through “[t]he group efforts of like- 
minded countries.” 1170 In general, New Zealand did not have to expect to carry strategic 
weight in these operations. However,
supporting national independence and interests within the coalition means being able to 
bring to the grouping a demonstrably sufficient capability which helps meet the joint 
goals.1171
The NZDF thus had to be able to implement two different, very broad theories of 
victory with limited resources—national self-reliance in very limited situations, and 
cooperation as a minor ally in operations across the globe. Political guidance did not 
place any geographical or functional limits on what might be demanded of the armed 
forces. What was thus needed was an approach to defence that
links the need for self-reliance in handling immediate national tasks with broader 
interests shared in partnership with Australia, the South Pacific and countries beyond, 
without attempting to predict the likelihood of any particular contingency.1172
In its ‘strategy’ of ‘Self-Reliance in Partnership,’ the White Paper took account of 
this
by avoiding two separate and uneasily-matched categories, the South Pacific and 
Beyond, and replacing them simply with the view looking outward from New Zealand.
1163 Ibid., p. 33.
1164 Ibid., p. 28.
1165 Ibid., p. 53.
1166 Ibid., pp. 67,37.
1167 Ibid., pp. 14,36,38.
1168 The White Paper only makes this distinction implicitly. See for example the use of the term 
‘collective security’ instead of the correct ‘collective defence’ in: “Other, smaller groupings may come 
together to support their collective security or other interests.” Ibid., p. 38.
1169 Ibid., pp. 21,45.
1170 Ibid., p. 36; see also p. 38.
1171 Ibid., p. 39.
1172 Ibid., p. 54.
1173 ‘Policy’ is a more accurate term.
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Defence planning becomes the task of devising appropriate responses to a spectrum of 
interests, starting with the capability to deal with low-level threats to New Zealand, our 
territorial waters and EEZ, moving out to New Zealand’s maritime environment, 
common interests with Australia and with our South Pacific neighbours, to our more 
distant but not less important interests in South East and North East Asia, the Northern 
Hemisphere and global peace and security.1174
What is noteworthy here is that, with the exception of low-level contingencies, the focus 
remains on interests, not threats. Given the wide scope and global range of risks that 
the government wished the NZDF to respond to, the identity as well as way of war of 
future enemies was de facto unknown in advance. By explicitly directing the NZDF 
not to prepare for Pacific and other missions separately, the 1991 White Paper thus 
deliberately defines a risk pattern of Un-Order.
In order to treat this pattern,’ it prescribes a
task-oriented approach. This means deducing from our national circumstances the 
broad tasks which are likely to be asked of our defence forces, and the capabilities 
which will be needed to carry them out. This approach does not lessen the need to cater 
for uncertainty, but it does offer a systematic means of reducing the problem to a more 
manageable size.1176
Eight such ‘defence tasks’ are defined:
a) protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of New Zealand, and those countries 
for which it has constitutional responsibilities
b) provide defence advice
c) provide intelligence
d) maintain a force-in-reserve
e) provide ancillary services
f) contribute to regional security
g) participate in defence alliances
h) contribute to collective security1177
It is easy to misread such a list of “things-to-do’ for a portfolio framework. However, 
the above is not an enumeration of separate theories of victory to be implemented to 
meet separate risks. Neither is it a list of missions that directly derive from such a list of
1174 Emphasis added. New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f 
New Zealand 1991, p. 53.
1175 The NZDF deployed a company group to Bosnia from 1994-1996, for example.
1176 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991,p. 55.
1177 Ibid., p. 58.
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theories of victory to meet specific threats, which could be used to, for example, make 
decisions about required capability levels and concurrency issues. Instead, it contains 
different missions that still need to be combined into such a theory of victory at a later 
stage, once more clarity has been gained about a threat that may need to be met. 
Protecting the territorial integrity of New Zealand, for example—the ‘task’ that with its 
geographic and political aspects most closely resembles those of portfolio planning 
frameworks—requires at a minimum the provision of intelligence and reserve forces as 
well. In the absence of information about a specific threat, sufficient force levels also 
cannot be determined. Nevertheless, combinations of "defence tasks’ define the broad 
array of theories of victory that political guidance requires the NZDF to be able to 
implement, and link the risk pattern of Un-Order with the definition of requirements.
9.2.3 Codification o f Requirements
New Zealand can rely on strategic warning of the emergence of major risks. However, 
in line with Task-based Planning, it does not see much scope for tactical warning: 
“History suggests there may be very little warning time of a crisis,” and “[f]or small 
and medium-sized states like New Zealand and Australia an ability to react quickly to 
conflict will be an important factor in regional security.”1179 Operational readiness is 
thus at a premium.
In the words of the White Paper, history “suggests, not that we must acquire better 
foresight, but that we must accept the uncertainty of where our forces may be 
committed and structure them with this in mind.”1180 Given the scarcity of information 
on risks to be met, it writes that scenario analysis cannot be used to plan for the degree 
of uncertainty the country is faced with. Defining capabilities therefore “is not a
1 1 o  1
straightforward deductive task.”
As a first step towards the definition of requirements, the White Paper breaks down the
defence tasks that define the elements of future theories of victory into more detailed
sub-tasks. The first task, for example—the defence of New Zealand itself—is divided
into: Deterrence of threats, expansion capability, surface monitoring, interception of
vessels, demonstration of presence in the maritime approaches, sub-surface surveillance,
hydrographic surveys, mine clearance, counterterrorism, disaster relief and assistance to
civil authorities. (Some of these sub-tasks, such as deterrence and regional defence
1182assistance, are however not directly considered in terms of capability decisions). 
Task eight—the contribution to collective security—is only divided into the
1 1 o->
contribution to peacekeeping and warfighting forces. That task one is defined in
1178 Ibid., p. 37. See also p. 29.
1179 Ibid., p. 29.
1180 Ibid., p. 52.
1181 Ibid., p. 55. It does, however, acknowledge that “[i]n particular reviews, however, it may be useful to 
apply other tests. For example, Net Assessment may have a value in reviewing our anti-submarine 
warfare capability, by estimating the degree to which any power may be able to mount a submarine threat 
to New Zealand’s interests over the next ten years. Or Scenario Analysis may help in judging the level of 
a capability that might reasonably be required.” Ibid., pp. 97-98.
1182 See for example: Ibid., pp. 64, 72.
1183 Ibid., pp. 108-110. The White Paper uses the term ‘collective security’ as opposed to peacekeeping 
forces.
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more detail than task eight is a consequence of the fact that New Zealand does not have 
to carry strategic weight in international operations. Also, more information is available 
about New Zealand’s national tasks: “Because defence planning is long-term, it takes 
as its starting point more the permanent features that shape our strategic environment 
than the current international scene.” 1184
These detailed defence tasks were also to become the basis of a new defence accounting 
system—similar, at first glance, to the output categories of the PPBS. However, the 
costing system in the New Zealand case was arranged around defence tasks that 
ultimately flowed from considerations regarding threats and theories of victory—not 
around the force categories themselves, which are to fulfil these tasks:
Each of the tasks/outputs will have to be costed. ... Changing to task-based costings 
shifts the emphasis away from the force structure. It means allocating the costs of each 
force element... across all the tasks to which it contributes.1186
The White Paper hopes that once the new system is introduced,
the Government will be able to cost what the NZDF is doing, and not what it is. ... 
Concentrating on tasks as outputs means that proposals for a new platform will be 
examined for the contributions it can make, rather than being seen as a “replacement” 
for what is being phased out.1187
The implicit assumption here—that the cost of defence activities should have a larger 
implication for balancing between tasks—is consistent with a framework of Task-based 
Planning: As information about the threats themselves is scarce, the confidence with 
which the strategic effectiveness of one’s own forces can be determined in advance of 
actual operations is even less than in other situations, and considerations such as cost 
gain in relative importance. In the words of the White Paper, “three-quarters of the 
capability for a low fee may be more realistic than meeting the high costs of specialised
I 1 X Xassets which are not fully used.”
The main difficulty, however, lies in matching capabilities to the defence tasks:
The tasks themselves are generic. They will not change much over time, though as 
circumstances alter so will the mix of capabilities and force elements required to carry 
them out.1189
1184 Ibid., p. 54. See also p. 17.
1185 Ibid., pp. 86-90.
1186 Ibid., p. 87.
1187 Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 87. The term ‘doing’ is perhaps misleading here since it refers to 
wartime roles as much as peacetime activities.
1188 Ibid., p. 91. Nonetheless, history would prove that the 1991 force structure was still too ambitious for 
the budget provided to defence over the following years. For the influence of the drive for fiscal 
efficiency on New Zealand strategy, see Derek Quigley, ‘The War Against Defence Restructuring: A 
Case Study on Changes Leading to The Current Structure o f New Zealand Defence,’ Canberra Paper, no. 
166 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2006).
1189 New Zealand Ministry o f Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 86.
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The White Paper goes on to explain that
The level or amount of capability required for each task must be considered: a
capability for maritime surveillance is obvious for New Zealand, but specifying the 
distance to be covered and the detail of the coverage will have huge consequences for 
the equipment needed. Putting tasks, planning concepts and levels together to define 
capabilities and force structure is complex. It rests in part on interlocking assumptions 
about the probability and magnitude of the risks to New Zealand’s interests and the 
reaction of allies. If any of these assumptions change, so does the analysis.1190
Although any defence planning decision relates to the future and thus must depend on 
assumptions of some kind, it is noticeable that the White Paper speaks only of 
assumptions here and not of observable facts: As it is faced with a risk pattern of Un- 
Order, the importance of even observable threat characteristics cannot be directly 
ascertained—in contrast to, for example, the role of regional military capabilities in the 
1987 Australian White Paper:
We can make sensible judgements about local strategic conditions that should remain 
valid over the next decade or more. But the impact of political and social influences 
elsewhere, and the way in which they might reflect back on New Zealand’s broader 
security interests, are more uncertain. There are important adjustments underway in the 
defence capabilities and doctrines of the major powers. The next decade will be a 
period of significant transition in strategic terms.1191
This does, however, still leave the question of how to evaluate and match capabilities to 
the eight defence tasks. In evaluating a specific capability, one main factor is, of 
course, in how far it can contribute to one or several of these tasks, and in particular to 
national as well as collective security purposes.1192 The contribution to Australia’s 
security is also explicitly mentioned.'193
These criteria cannot, however, as of themselves be used to decide on, for example, the 
sophistication, size or types of capabilities required. As New Zealand’s theory of 
victory does not require it to carry strategic weight abroad, the concept it uses for 
evaluations of this kind is that of
a credible minimum defence force. It should be the minimum that can be fiscally 
sustained in the current economic realities. It should also be the minimum needed to 
meet our essential security interests and to reassure our neighbours and allies that we 
have the resolve and the capability to do so.1194
“[T]he other members of the grouping are the judges of what is sufficient and 
useful,” 1195 the White Paper acknowledges. In line with Task-based Planning, the
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., pp. 58; 97.
Ibid., p. 97.
Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 30. See also p. 52. 
Ibid., p. 39.
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White Paper derives basic requirements of military effectiveness from considerations 
about the general nature of warfare to evaluate capabilities, such as:
• good military skills. Since alliances by their nature deal with threats which are 
beyond national resources, participation in them means maintaining some ability to 
assist at the higher levels of conventional conflict at which the alliance would be 
invoked.
• unit size. We must maintain force elements of a minimum functional size. ...
• interoperability. ...
• capability for self-defence. Force elements may need to be able to contribute to the 
land, air or sea defence of an allied force. Naval combatants which do not have 
basic protection against submarine or missile attack may have to restrict their span 
of operations. In a combined force they might have to be protected by others and 
could become a liability. Similarly, land forces without biological or chemical 
protection, low-level air defence and anti-tank capabilities might also be a 
liability.1196
Considerations regarding the types of capabilities required can also, to some extent, be 
based on primarily military considerations. The White Paper mentions New Zealand’s 
desire to maintain a balanced force; the need for a high standard of national command 
and military professionalism; the influence of a capability under consideration on the 
effectiveness of other capabilities; as well as warning- and lead-time considerations.1197
However, while considerations of this type can be used to decide qualitative 
requirements, quantitative requirements are even more difficult to pinpoint without 
information about enemies likely to be encountered. In New Zealand’s case, this 
difficulty is significantly lessened by the fact that the country does not, in most cases, 
need to carry strategic weight—therefore, the credible minimum force. It cannot, 
however, completely avoid making judgements regarding capability sizes. As threats to 
New Zealand itself are very limited, this concerns primarily operations by the NZDF in 
the region. Using commercial stand-by arrangements for surge air- and sealift 
capability, for example
means looking at:
• the likely destinations, their physical features and access facilities;
• the size of the force to be deployed;
• the likely length of time of a deployment, and the amount of support and 
reinforcement needed;1198
1196 Ibid., pp. 66-67. See also the discussion of self-defence on p. 41.
1197 Ibid., pp. 37, 44, 58, 96. Interestingly, it defines a balanced force as “a proper mix of war-fighting 
capabilities and support” (p. 37).
1198 Ibid., p. 102.
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The White Paper therefore makes explicit judgements that can be used as guidance for 
the development of quantitative requirements.1199 With regards to deployments into the 
South Pacific, for example, it writes that
An acceptable level of risk has to be set. The desired capability is therefore defined as 
the ability to deploy in force into those islands which have seats of government or 
significant centres of population.1200
To some extent, the impact of these judgements is cushioned by the fact that the NZDF 
is expected to operate in conjunction with Australian forces. But as political guidance 
explicitly did not define a hierarchy of risks to be met, the White Paper is also clear 
about the fact that New Zealand’s capability in terms of size and sustainability might 
not always be up to specific tasks. For example,
a major influence on New Zealand’s force structure has been the need to be configured 
and equipped as a force-in-being to deal with “Low-level contingencies” affecting New 
Zealand and its neighbourhood . . . .  This term is ambiguous. It could involve a large 
effort over a lengthy period, as in counter-insurgency or irregular warfare, which could 
be beyond New Zealand’s logistic and manpower capacities.1201
The confidence that can be placed in one’s ability to be strategically effective in Task- 
based Planning is generally smaller than in other situations, since threats are often 
unknown and forces cannot be tailored to strategic risks. But the only very 
circumscribed need for New Zealand to carry strategic weight meant that it was not 
necessary to compensate for this fact by, for example, the retention of different 
capabilities for the same task, or a significant strategic reserve. Also, the risk pattern of 
Un-Order was primarily a consequence of the theory of victory, and only indirectly of 
epistemic uncertainty about threats to be faced. New information gained from actual 
operations was therefore only of limited value to refine capability requirements, and the 
concept of Task-based Planning could be expected to have a much longer life-span than
1 90 9presumed under the ideal version, and not show its ‘adaptive’ character.
1199 In a similar vein, its 1997 successor concludes a demand for six P-3C LRMP aircraft, since these 
could maintain a presence over a point 700 nautical miles from their base for 72 hours, enough time for 
surface vessels to relieve them. New Zealand Government, The Shape o f New Zealand’s Defence 
(Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1997), p. 48. Also, the number of frigates and similar sized 
vessels required in the force structure was determined by the requirement to be able to keep one on 
international operations overseas for up to one year, while still having one ship available for operations in 
the South Pacific. See Derek Quigley, Review o f the Lease o f F-16 Aircraft for the Royal New Zealand 
Air Force (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2000), section 4.3.
1200 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, p. 65. Incidentally, these islands would be those which can be expected to have C-130 capable 
airfields.
1201 Ibid., p. 43.
1202 Experience over the 1990s did, however, lead to a gradual shift in the perception of the risk pattern 
back to a focus on the South Pacific. See Robert Ayson, ‘New Zealand: armed to make a difference?’ in 
Forces for good: Cosmopolitan militaries in the twenty-first century, eds. Lorraine Elliot and Graeme 
Cheeseman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 252-255.
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9.2.4 Force Structure Concept
Since New Zealand was faced with a risk pattern o f Un-Order and requirements were 
defined in a framework of Task-based Planning on the basis of generic defence tasks, 
the resulting force structure concept in the 1991 White Paper does not make significant 
use o f hedges—the one exception being the retention of Special Air Service 
counterterrorism teams to deal with terrorist incidents in New Zealand and the 
region.1203 As a major threat to New Zealand was very remote, and other requirements 
were concentrated in the present (due to the unreliability of tactical warning), the use of 
options was similarly rare: The maintenance of a basic mine countermeasures
capability and sub-surface surveillance, as well as naval control o f shipping and 
brigade-level operations by the reserves—the latter to be reviewed— are mentioned by 
the White Paper.1204
Since political guidance explicitly does not establish a hierarchy between risks and 
instructs the NZDF to prepare for a pattern of Un-Order, it is not surprising that several 
tasks that may otherwise have been hedged are ruled out as the foundation of force 
structure planning—the White Paper mentions the defence of New Zealand, low-level 
contingencies in the South Pacific, collective action as well as peacekeeping.1205 
Instead, it ascertains that “[a] force structured for inter-operability with Australia and 
our other allies will also be able to handle most South Pacific tasks. This is not true in 
reverse,” 1206 and that “[t]he range of our security interests and the nature and duration of 
modem conflict make flexibility of response essential.” It goes on to explain that
This is not a matter of being able to meet all or even most conceivable contingencies. It 
would be impossible to do so. ... The need is to make available to governments a 
reasonable range of options against an uncertain future. Flexibility becomes an 
important determinant of our force structure. Our armed forces should not become 
limited by over-specialisation in equipment or roles. We cannot plausibly guess ... 
what we will be asked to do next. ... they should provide a selection of deployment 
choices on a graduated scale, giving the government the freedom to decide what is the 
appropriate response in each case.1208
Given New Zealand’s small population base, “[gjeneral purpose units, emphasising 
individual initiative, are necessarily favoured over larger or more specialised 
formations.” 1209 The White Paper also judges that
[i]n emphasising such obvious needs as flexibility and the ability to act at long 
distances [the ‘strategy’ of Self-Reliance in Partnership] should enable New Zealand to 
cope with ancillary tasks.1210
1203 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
199 f  p. 60.
1204 Ibid., pp. 60, 73,77, 99-100.
1205 Ibid., pp. 51, 53, 72, 84.
1206 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
1207 Ibid., p. 29.
1208 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
1209 Ibid., p. 19.
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However, the White Paper is clear that “total flexibility would be total
1911shapelessness,” and that “[f]or a small force, the price of flexibility in roles is a
1919certain inflexibility in responding simultaneously to the demands of other tasks.”
In order to fulfil the defence tasks, the NZDF thus requires
general-purpose capabilities and force structures with a long reach and a broad base of 
training and equipment. A small force with a wide range of possible tasks will favour 
equipment that supports more than one role.1213
The Ready Reaction Force is deliberately structured to operate in various 
configurations:
The maximum force available, at graduated degrees of readiness, is an infantry battalion 
group of up to 2000 personnel, including mortars, light artillery, armoured 
reconnaissance vehicles, engineers and logistic support. The force can be configured in 
various ways. These range from a small group of lightly-armed soldiers (for example, 
manning vehicle checkpoints) to a battalion-sized group capable of low-level 
counterinsurgency operations, either independently or as part of an allied force.1214
The White Paper thus demands flexibility in functional terms through its emphasis on 
general purpose forces; in configurational terms by being able to mix general purpose 
force elements for specific missions in general, and for the Ready Reaction Force in 
particular; in geographic terms through its emphasis on generally long reach without 
geographic specialization; as well as with regards to equipment that supports several 
roles.
The White Paper does not show the spiral development and evolutionary acquisition in 
the procurement process that are part of Task-based Planning—a difference that can be 
attributed to the fact that New Zealand does not have to carry strategic weight against 
any technologically demanding threat. As the White Paper remarks, there is no strategic 
basis for preferring advanced systems over others that are more basic but perhaps 
cheaper and easier to maintain:
It will wherever possible avoid the risks of advanced technology which elsewhere 
consumes huge amounts of defence spending. Infantry training and equipment or long- 
range air transport, to give two examples, do not need the high-cost and rapidly 
changing technologies which characterise air defence fighters or missile batteries. New 
Zealand’s comparative advantage lies in the use of proven technologies. Some of these 
over time can be adapted to New Zealand’s needs and improved at a low cost.1215
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., p. 42. The multi-role nature of units is also mentioned on p. 69. 
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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Based on the considerations so far, the White Paper then determines those capabilities 
most valuable for each defence task—for example, for meeting serious and lesser 
challenges to New Zealand sovereignty; surveillance and operations in the region; 
assisting in the defence of Australia; collective action; or peacekeeping. Given the 
uncertainty as to which task has to be met, and under which conditions, the White Paper 
places particular emphasis on those weapons systems, platforms or units that can 
contribute to most, if not all of them.
With regards to the air force, transport planes are of course essential to maintain 
geographic flexibility within acceptable timelines. While the Skyhawks were seen to 
contribute to the defence of Australia, alliance exercises and collective action, it is not 
surprising given other possible ways for the NZDF to contribute to these tasks that they 
were a vulnerable capability in 1991 already. The P-3K Orion LRMP on the other 
hand contribute to regional security as well as the maintenance of New Zealand’s 
territorial integrity and the defence of Australia.1217 In all these tasks they operate in 
conjunction with the frigates, which are also explicitly named as a possible contribution 
to collective security operations. Infantry is seen as having a role in the defence of 
New Zealand as well as regional security, the defence of Australia, collective action and 
peacekeeping. Armoured units (the NZDF operated Ml 13 transport as well as Scorpion 
reconnaissance vehicles) and artillery are seen as particularly relevant to the defence of 
Australia and collective action.1219 Utility helicopters and logistics and engineering 
units are explicitly mentioned with regards to the defence of Australia, as well as 
collective action and peacekeeping tasks. The reserves are assigned an explicit role 
in the defence of New Zealand (in their function as an expansion base).1221 But given 
the priority of capability available in the present, the White Paper also notes the need to 
re-evaluate the balance between the expansion function and the reserve’s role as a part 
of a total force, with more emphasis than in the past to be placed on the latter.1222
In summary, the risk pattern in the 1991 White Paper was one of Un-Order, as the 
Government explicitly did not give any priority to particular risks. The theory of 
victory was thus not specific to any particular risk or class of risk, but defined basic 
military tasks. Requirements were inferred on the basis of elementary considerations 
regarding military effectiveness. The force structure was designed to provide 
flexibility, and the procurement or retention of specialized platforms were explicitly 
discouraged. Given New Zealand’s particular circumstances, industrial considerations 
and the need for adaptivity were not part of its defence planning framework, but overall 
the 1991 White Paper shows most of the defining traits of Rearmament Planning.
1216 Ibid., p. 98. In fact, the Strategos Review of 1988 had already mentioned that a replacement of the 
Skyhawks with a similar capability may not be warranted: Strategos, New Zealand Defence Resource 
Management Review 1988 (Wellington: Strategos Consulting Ltd., 1988), p. 62.
1217 New Zealand Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, The Defence o f New Zealand 
1991, pp. 72,76, 81.
1218 Ibid., p. 85.
1219 Ibid., pp. 67, 72-73, 79, 81, 85.
1220 Ibid., pp. 81,84-85.
1221 Ibid., pp. 72.
1222 See ibid., pp. 37, 63, 77, 99-100.
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CHAPTER 10:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF DEFENCE PLANNING
It is probably no coincidence that the two examples chosen for this thesis, the United 
States and Australia/New Zealand, are maritime nations. The security of such countries 
depends, to a large degree, on the control of the sea, which can be contested by a large 
number of potential enemies. If it is assured (or in the hands of a friendly power), 
however, maritime powers are ‘free’ to involve themselves in military adventures 
throughout the globe. It is thus no surprise that, over time, there should be a greater 
variability in the risk pattern facing maritime powers than in that facing land powers, 
who will always have to devote first priority to meet or prevent a threat from their 
immediate neighbours. But this does not mean that the theory developed in Part I 
should be any less relevant for them, as land powers also have to maintain a 
configurational fit between political guidance, the codification of requirements, and 
force structure concepts.
Nevertheless, the description in Part II of quite significant change in defence planning 
may seem exaggerated to some—especially in the Australian context, where shifts in 
the risk pattern were more subtle than in the case of the United States, and primarily 
related to the evaluation rather than assessment of strategic risk. In addition, the order 
of battle of the ADF has not changed that much over the years. However, approaching 
defence planning by skimming the Military Balance is highly misleading, as it cannot 
capture the rationale behind a capability (which, in any case, is more than a piece of 
equipment as doctrine, readiness, sustainability and deployability must also be taken 
into account). For example, over the whole period under consideration here, the ADF 
has operated Leopard tanks. Originally a modernization program for an Armoured 
Regiment accustomed to long-term combat deployment in Vietnam, they were reduced 
in role and number to being part of the expansion base in the mid-1970s. Thus put 
through their paces in preparation for, ultimately, brigade-level mechanized operations, 
they were then to defeat small-scale lodgements and low-level threats in the 1987 White 
Paper’s framework. Although having thus found a more focused operational purpose in 
the defence of the North, they were at the same time only left in the force structure in 
preparation for an ever-more unlikely massive invasion. Studying the value of 
individual weapons systems can thus be fiendishly difficult, and it helps to explicitly 
relate them back to the overarching principles of Rearmament Planning, Threat-based 
Planning, Multi-Threat Planning, or Task-based Planning.
Throughout the case studies, considerations regarding the number of major naval 
combatants showed a particularly close relationship to these overarching principles. In 
the Rearmament Planning case, they were not a prominent issue for Australia at the
1223 Given the unusual geostrategic conditions in which the Australian Army has to operate, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the Abrams tanks might well continue their predecessors’ uneasy relationship with the 
hermeneutics o f strategic guidance.
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time. In the United States, however, the preference for capital ships over smaller 
vessels flowed directly from the expectation of strategic warning, and interwar carriers 
were dedicated to the development of new materiel and doctrine. In both Threat-based 
Planning examples, the number of required naval vessels was determined directly by 
the threat, and the naval strategy to meet it. The US example of Multi-Threat Planning 
explicitly derived the number of carriers from concurrency judgements regarding 
missions directly related to the theory of victory and known adversaries (The Australian 
White Paper, having to contend with an implicit government decision on the matter, was 
silent on the issue). In its Task-based Planning approach, New Zealand decided on the 
number of required frigates through a concurrency judgement regarding generic 
tasks.1224 The QDR is silent on the issue, because it does not see itself in a position yet 
to make judgements regarding quantitative changes to the existing force structure.
Similar observations can be made regarding the role of the reserves. In both 
Rearmament Planning examples, their purpose lay in preparing an expansion of military 
forces to meet a yet unspecified, future risk—hence, cadred units and long training 
times were acceptable. In both Threat-based Planning examples, the reserves and 
regulars were part of a Total Force. But since that force was to meet just one specific 
risk, each part could be assigned specific roles—in particular, the reserves were to 
reinforce and replace the regulars in a way that was well specified in advance. In 
situations of Multi-Threat and Task-based Planning, however, present challenges are so 
numerous (and/or uncertain) that there is a tendency for integrated operations from the 
outset, for example by keeping specific capabilities predominately in the reserves. 
Behind a seemingly constant order of battle, a move from one concept to the other will 
thus have quite significant consequences.
The two case studies on Rearmament Planning in particular demonstrate the importance 
of political guidance. In the American example, formal guidance was largely absent, 
but the Joint Board assumed that responsibility itself when it decided on the scenarios to 
be examined in the form of Colour Plans. The often negative comments in the literature 
on the Colour War Plans as ‘disconnected from political reality’ do not prove to be 
justified. Instead, a close connection between defence planning and contingency 
planning prevented the former from becoming stalled in futile efforts at predicting 
geopolitical shifts that would lead to future threats. Planning focused on those issues 
that could be predicted—such as the logistical and operational challenges brought up by 
War Pan ORANGE that, unlike the Australian studies in 1976, at least developed the 
outline of a military strategy in advance.
Like the Australian defence planners who contemplated future Soviet lodgements in 
South East Asia, US planners in the interwar period were confronted with a particularly 
substantial uncertainty regarding possible future threats from Europe. No enemy 
constellation imaginable seemed particularly credible, so they based their planning on 
the worst case of a war against Great Britain. War Plan RED was not an unrealistic 
waste of effort, but a sincere attempt to avoid the paralysis that might otherwise have 
been the consequence of the impossibility of predicting a particular threat from Europe. 
In contrast, the Australian 1976 White Paper paid lip service to the fact that scenarios 
were not meant to predict future risks, but allowed itself to fall into indecisiveness and 
never drew up an equivalent of the Colour Plans. It took more than a decade after the 
1976 White Paper before the ADF began to seriously address the prospect of having to
1224 See footnote 1200.
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operate under the conditions of Northern Australia. In contrast, the United States ended 
the interwar years with all the necessary building blocs to create an answer to the Axis 
threat once it arose—which is all that could be expected of a framework of Rearmament 
Planning.
As mentioned above, the shifts in the risk patterns facing Australia between 1976 and 
2000 were much more subtle than those facing the United States between the 1920s and 
2001. Therefore, it is not directly intuitive why Australia’s defence planning should 
have undergone the significant changes that it did. In the light of the material discussed 
in this thesis, the main fault has to be placed at the incomplete concepts behind the 1976 
White Paper. Instead of not deciding on any scenario, prudence should have dictated 
to plan for a worst case—arguably, a future Soviet-controlled Indonesia along the lines 
of that power’s relationship with Cuba. In hindsight, it is clear that a profound 
confusion between the purpose of operational contingency plans and scenarios for 
defence planning purposes was one of the main problems of the time, since a ‘Core 
Force’ oriented towards such a scenario would still have provided ample options to 
adjust the defence planning effort when new and more precisely understood risks 
emerged. However, it would have meant that the rather obvious operational 
requirements flowing from any risk pattern that includes the defence of Australia—such 
as the Northern air bases, the Darwin-Alice Springs railway, and Army’s move north— 
could not have been put off indefinitely.
By 1986, the political situation within Defence was probably such that no compromise 
could be found that did not end the ‘Core Force’ construct and at the same time 
presented a clear threat around which to re-build the ADF. The risk pattern defined in 
the 1987 White Paper was defensible, but given the lack of any indication of either 
present or future threat, so were others. In the end, the move to the peculiar Threat- 
based Planning construct of the 1987 White Paper finally brought about the realignment 
of the ADF along the lines mentioned above, but arguably at the price of 
overemphasizing one particular (hypothetical) risk. Although the threat to Australia of 
Tow and escalated low-level conflict’ with Indonesia was only abductively postulated, 
the same net-assessment methods that were used to evaluate the situation in Europe 
were applied. In both cases, Threat-based Planning led to a force structure hedge 
whose very detailed specifications flowed straight from the military strategy used to 
meet the threat, and thus made the task of defence planners conveniently simple (at least 
in retrospect). However, it is often forgotten how specialized a force structure hedging 
a single risk will inevitably become, and how small the resulting ability is to deal with 
tasks not considered in advance. The convenience of using Threat-based Planning 
cannot be had without the Clear and Present Danger that, by presenting a challenge of 
overwhelming priority, eliminates much of the uncertainty of other risk patterns. 
However, unlike most cases of a Clear and Present Danger, these other risk patterns
by definition lack an obvious existential threat, and are thus usually (but not always) of 
a comparatively benign nature in the overall scheme of things.
Thus, the Cold War Central Front in many respects represents the reference case for 
defence planning, as huge resources were devoted to understanding and hedging one
1225 Which, however, were a symptom o f already existing tensions within Defence.
1226 The benign nature of the threat to Australia in the 1980s was, o f course, largely due to its favourable 
geostrategic position.
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single threat. Although the potential consequences of the residual uncertainty were 
arguably greater than in all the other cases discussed in this thesis, the problem facing 
US planners was clear and straightforward. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact 
that the US force structure at the time contained no elements worth speaking of that did 
not derive their primary justification from a role in a potential superpower conflict. 
Unlike that very particular case, nearly every other defence planning case in reality will 
show at least a hint of a Multi-Threat Planning framework, as there is hardly ever really 
only one distinct risk to be taken into account. In the examples discussed here, both 
the US military during the interwar years and the ADF in the late 1970s had to address 
present tasks that were limited, but generated not insignificant requirements. Expansion 
base planning was distinctly secondary, but which still an element of the 1987 White 
Paper. And a framework of Task-based Planning will always blend with Multi-Threat 
Planning, as the tasks are usually derived from a collection of risks that are not well 
understood, but nevertheless distinct.
Unlike these cases, however, the BUR and the Defence 2000 White Paper demonstrate 
how the need to integrate a range of different missions in one force structure is central 
to Multi-Threat Planning. Both documents made clear concurrency judgements to deal 
with the quantitative implications of this integration. The Defence 2000 White Paper 
was more successful in dealing with the qualitative consequences, as it was able to 
assign the treatment of specific risks to specific services. The BUR de-facto ignored the 
qualitative requirements of risks that did not involve counteroffensives on a traditional 
battlefield. Overall, however, that document proves to be much better than its 
reputation. In particular, a risk pattern that focused on meeting regional aggression was 
intrinsically linked with the strategy of ‘engagement and enlargement’, and the two 
MRC standard outlived the Clinton administration. But the geostrategic realignments 
following the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, began to be accommodated 
in new international structures throughout the 1990s, and new economic, social, and 
geopolitical developments in the Middle East and Asia became more prominent. The 
(in retrospect) relatively high certainty o f assessment on which the BUR had been based 
was thus reduced, and the 2001 QDR shifted planning towards a framework of Task- 
based Planning.
In general, elements of Task-based Planning were present not only in the last two case 
studies, but also when future risk had to be treated in situations with particularly low 
amounts of information about likely enemies: In the absence of clear guidance, the 
Australian ‘Core Force’ of the late 1970s, for example, largely degenerated into a 
collection of disparate force elements that preserved a wide range of capabilities without 
a clear and overarching ordering principle. Both the United States in the interwar years, 
and Australia after the 1987 White Paper, preserved an elementary capability of 
armoured operations with only a very tentative logical basis in war plans.
Task-based Planning can be very attractive, since it is the framework with the longest 
logical link between capabilities in the defence force and strategic risk. Seemingly, this 
reduces the need for sound reasoning in capability decisions, but provides a justification 
for funnelling money to any services’ pet project. However, it is no coincidence that 
both of the last two case studies primarily shed light on one particular aspect of that
1227 One could even argue that, at some level, every force structure will always be a portfolio, however 
lopsided—even if the secondary function with force structure implications does not involve the treatment 
of strategic risk, but the provision o f a ceremonial unit such as the Garde Republicaine.
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elusive planning model. New Zealand carries hardly any strategic weight, and thus does 
not have to pay particular attention to whether its efforts could actually force its will on 
an enemy. Thus, the 1991 Defence o f New Zealand White Paper demonstrates the 
‘pleasant’ side of Task-based Planning, which reduces the definition of requirements to 
the assembly of elementary force structure building blocs. The authors of the QDR, 
however, knew that the United States still had to maintain the ability to carry strategic 
weight against a number of enemies (and, thanks to a number of countries displaying 
open or thinly veiled hostility, were closer to a framework of Multi-Threat Planning). 
Therefore, the central feature of the QDR is the imperative to generate new information, 
in order to move toward a situation in which the defence effort could be more closely 
aligned with distinct strategic risks—the results of which began to show in the 2006 
QDR.'22*
Ever since the end of the Vietnam War, the question of whether to move to Task-based 
Planning presented a significant challenge for Australia. Given its small size, the 
country cannot expect to carry strategic weight globally. The Australian Army has a 
long and honoured tradition of fighting in overseas wars without making any difference 
whatsoever to the overall outcome. This is, of course, a legitimate way of 
approaching defence policy for small countries, but more so than New Zealand, 
Australia must address the question of where to draw the line between those situations 
in which it does want to carry strategic weight, and those where it cannot or does not 
want to do so.
The 1976 ‘Core Force’ arguably preserved flexibility in this regard. The 1987 White 
Paper reduced ambitions to the defence of Australia and did not accord contributions to 
other missions any role in the definition of requirements. The 2000 White Paper, in 
turn, expanded ambitions quite significantly, in that Australia expects to be able to carry 
strategic weight certainly in the defence of Australia and its immediate neighbourhood, 
but also to a limited degree within island South East Asia—hence, the need to use a 
Multi-Threat Planning framework. Following that White Paper (and after the material 
covered in this thesis), Australia has however moved closer and closer to New 
Zealand’s Task-based Planning framework of the 1991 White Paper. The risk pattern 
to be treated is more and more ‘spread across the globe’, while new capabilities are 
more and more justified on their own tactical merits, rather than by their role in a 
coherent national military strategy able to generate strategic weight.1230
Overall, the case studies have demonstrated that the theory of this thesis relates, in a 
quite detailed manner, to the development of defence planning frameworks in practice. 
As the case studies and the preceding discussion show, Rearmament Planning, Threat- 
based Planning, Multi-Threat Planning, and Task-based Planning cannot provide a 
recipe for successful defence planning. Even their constituent elements, relating to risk
'228 o f f lce Qf  s ecretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), pp. 19-40. Whether 
that document did indeed identify the correct risks is, o f course, an altogether different matter. See Colin 
S. Gray, ‘The Quadrennisal Defense Review (2006) and the Perils o f the 21st Century,’ in American 
National Security Policy: Essays in Honor of William R. Van Cleave, ed. Bradley A. Thayer (Fairfax, 
VA: National Institute Press, 2007), pp. 70-76.
1229 Arguably, with the exception of the Kokoda campaign in WWII.
1230 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003 (Canberra: 
Commonwealth o f Australia, 2003), Department of Defence, Australia ’s National Security: A Defence 
Update 2005.
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and uncertainty, strategy and codification, inferential methods and force structure 
concepts, are suited to inform rather than direct practical efforts. However, the purpose 
of the thesis has been achieved if these concepts and four frameworks do indeed, ‘'give 
the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave 
it free to rise into the higher realms of action.” Three broad practical points in 
particular stand out in this regard:
First, this thesis has clarified the way in which capability programs should relate to 
political guidance. It is always easy to make the case for a new capability on tactical or 
even operational grounds. It is also easy to conjure up scenarios with a more or less 
direct relation to political guidance that seemingly demonstrate how such a capability 
would directly contribute to achieving the leadership’s intent. However, such an 
approach is only fully justified in a framework of Threat-based Planning, where there is 
no great uncertainty as to the operational and even tactical challenges ahead. The 
uncertainty and variability of operational and strategic challenges that might flow from 
political guidance must always be taken into account, which is the purpose of the 
‘intermediary’ concepts of hedges, options, portfolio, and flexibility. It is, therefore, to 
these concepts, within the parameters established by strategic guidance, that a capability 
program should primarily relate. More often than not, such an approach will lead to 
force structures that are not optimised for a particular scenario—but given that strategic 
risk is the problem, only ex-ante optimality over the full range of possible futures is 
relevant for a capability decision. In addition, concentrating on hedges, options, 
portfolios or flexibility also highlights the importance of capability elements other than 
mere force structure, such as the variability of roles considered in training and doctrine, 
or deployability and logistic wherewithal.
Second, this thesis has provided a much more sophisticated framework of thinking 
about strategic risk and uncertainty than was available in the literature before. It has 
demonstrated that strategic risk must be conceived of as a multi-dimensional concept 
that has both a strategic and risk-related nature. Strategic risk is inseparable from 
potential enemies and their theories of victory. It is also inseparable from uncertainties 
that relate not only to the question of whether a particular enemy will attack or not, but 
also who the enemy might be, what he might do, and, especially, how certain we are 
about our answers to these questions. Describing such different levels of uncertainty is 
not easy, but it is impossible if they are not made explicit. It also requires making a 
judgment regarding risk categories that by definition go beyond the decisionmakers’ 
current state of knowledge, and leads them to assess indeterminacy as well as 
ignorance. In this context, it is important to maintain a clear separation between the 
roles of risk assessment and risk evaluation, even though both cannot always be done 
consecutively. Furthermore, the framework outlined in this thesis demonstrates the 
limitations of thinking in terms of threats, rather than risks. Like ‘risk’, ‘threat’ refers to 
possible rather than realized harm. However, it does not say anything about how likely 
that harm is, or how well understood, and is thus only meaningful as one of the 
constituent elements of strategic risk. Only the multi-dimensional nature of strategic 
risk can, for example, capture the difference in the confidence of assessment regarding 
threats that are deductively inferred on the basis of observed developments, and those 
that are only abductively postulated on the basis of the vulnerabilities in one’s own 
posture.
1231 Clausewitz, On War, p. 698.
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Third, the thesis provides a general framework of defence planning that can serve to 
draw parallels between countries in different times and different strategic locations. 
Many of the similarities highlighted in the case studies in this thesis are not immediately 
obvious, since they are based on variations in the ‘subjective’ risk pattern facing 
countries, rather than the (relatively) immutable ‘objective’ factors, such as geography, 
power or strategic culture, from which theories of strategy, geopolitics or international 
relations draw their main conclusions. Authors tasked to write a new White Paper or 
Defence Review do not need to reinvent the wheel each time their risk perceptions 
change: The framework developed herein demonstrates the existence of a much larger 
number of parallel historical situations than could be inferred on the basis of the 
objective, immutable factors alone. As such a framework can demonstrate the bounds 
within which more detailed analytical methods are applicable, it also becomes easier to 
determine which of these concepts are, and which are not, transferable to the problem at 
hand. Finally such a framework can be used to manage the expectations in the 
defence planning process, as strategic risk implies uncertainty, and uncertainty implies a 
difference between what is best ex-ante and ex-post. Conveying to politicians and 
public alike what defence planning can, and what it cannot, be expected to do to reduce 
that difference would perhaps be the most important contribution of this thesis to the 
practice of defence planning.
1232 Indeed, it would probably not be wrong to suggest that the archives of the RAND Corporation, for 
example, might contain a number of works that, if taken out o f their specific American context, could also 
benefit non-American defence planners to a larger extent than is currently the case.
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A b d u c tio n In feren tia l m ethod  that co n c lu d es from  a ru le  and a resu lt to  a 
p o ssib le  p reco n d itio n  that m ay  h av e  caused  the  resu lt. A b d u c tio n  
o n ly  in fers  possib ilities .
C e r ta in ty  o f  
A s s e s s m e n t
T he re liab ility  o f  the  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  p ro b ab ility  and conseq u en ces 
du rin g  R is k  A s s e s s m e n t.  In m ath em atica l term s, the  e rro r co rrido rs 
o f  an estim ated  p ro b ab ility  o r d am ag e  function .
C o d ific a tio n T ran sfo rm atio n  o f  a le a d e rsh ip 's  in ten t in to  d e ta iled  m eth o d o lo g ies , 
defined  analy tica l ca teg o ries , p ro ced u res  and  dec is io n  c riteria  that 
can be  used  to g u id e  (b u reau cra tic ) im p lem en ta tio n .
D e d u c tio n In feren tia l m ethod  that con c lu d es from  a p reco n d itio n  and a ru le  to 
the  resu lt that m u st fo llow . D ed u c tio n  in fers  n ecessities .
E p is te m ic
U n c e r ta in ty
U n certa in ty  caused  by  in su ffic ien t k n o w led g e  abou t a p a rticu la r 
m atter, o r b y  th e  m eth o d s o f  a cq u irin g  it. (S ee  also  O n to lo g ic a l  
U n c e r ta in ty ) .
F le x ib il i ty T he ab ility  to adap t in stan tly  and  w ith o u t w arn in g  to s itua tions that 
have  n o t been  ex p lic itly  co n sid ered  in advance .
H e d g e R ed u c tio n  o f  a v e ry  sp ecific  risk , w h o se  costs fu lly  h av e  to be  paid  
up -fron t (e.g. insurance).
Ig n o ra n c e T he co m p le te  ab sen ce  o f  k n o w led g e  o f  b o th  the  p o ssib le  
conseq u en ces and th e ir  p ro b ab ility  o f  o ccu rrence .
In c e r t i tu d e T he general fact that any  R is k  A s s e s s m e n t  is u n certa in , and canno t b e  
used  to m ake  a d e te rm in is tic  fo recast o f  even ts.
In d e te r m in a c y A situ a tio n  in w h ich  p o ssib le  co n seq u en ces are  la rg e ly  k now n , b u t 
no re liab le  s ta tem en t can  be  m ad e  reg a rd in g  p ro b ab ilitie s  (o r v ice  
versa).
In d u c tio n In feren tia l m eth o d  that co n c lu d es from  a p reco n d itio n  and  a resu lt to 
a genera l ru le. U n d erly in g  b o th  sta tis tic s  and ex perience , in duction  
in fers p ro bab ilities .
In s t i tu t io n a l
R is k
R eflex iv e  risk , i.e. risk  a ris in g  from  an in su ffic ien t co n sid era tio n  o f  
o n e ’s lim ited  sta te  o f  k n o w led g e , in an in stitu tio n a l con tex t.
M o b iliz a tio n
R e a d in e s s
T h e  deg ree  to w h ich  p rep a ra tio n s  h av e  b een  m ad e  to  tran sfo rm  the  
m ilita ry  po ten tia l o f  a n a tio n  in to  actual capab ility .
O b je c tiv e  R is k A n ideal concep t, w h ose  m ate ria liza tio n  can  o n ly  b e  ascerta ined  ex ­
post. O b jec tive  risk  is u su a lly  u n k n o w n  in rea lity , and  R is k  refers  to
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Ontological
Uncertainty
Option
Operational
Readiness
Political
Guidance
Portfolio o f 
Forces
Precautionary
Principle
Readiness
Risk
Risk Assessment 
Risk
Characterization 
Risk Evaluation
Risk Treatment
upper and lower bounds within which it is believed to fall.
Uncertainty caused by the nature of, and being an inherent quality 
of, a particular matter. (See also Epistemic Uncertainty).
Two-stage risk treatment, where the first-stage investment buys the 
opportunity to make a second-stage investment later. Within the 
bounds established by the first stage, the second stage can make use 
of new information.
The difference between the full combat potential of existing military 
units and their current potential.
Consists of the pattern of Strategic Risk that a nation’s leadership 
wants to be treated, as well as the general Theory o f Victory that is to 
be used to do so. (See also Strategic Guidance).
Force structure designed to be able to treat several different and 
distinct risks, often through the generation of various sub-sets of 
forces.
Decisionmaking principle that, if there are indications that a grave 
Risk may exist, (scientific) uncertainty should not preclude measures 
from being taken to reduce the risk. Precaution should be 
distinguished from prudence, which relates to making risk-averse 
(conservative) assumptions in the Risk Assessment stage.
Relates to the trade-off between military capability and time, due to 
the fact that the opportunity cost of maintaining capability is a 
reduction in the ability to generate (more) capability later. (See also 
Operational Structural and Mobilization Readiness).
The combination of uncertainty, threat, and vulnerability giving rise 
to a possibility of harm that can, however, be influenced ex-ante (if 
not, it is fate). In a limited sense (and contrasted with Indeterminacy 
and Ignorance), the mathematical combination of known probability 
and consequences.
Generation, summary, and presentation of (objective) quantitative 
and qualitative data on a Risk.
Combination of Risk Assessment and Risk Evaluation.
Comparison of a Risk against a decisionmaker’s preferences, with 
the aim of making a judgement about the acceptability of the risk, or 
the establishment of a (subjective) hierarchy of importance.
Measures that are taken before the realization of a Risk to raise its 
acceptability, by reducing the probability, abating the consequences, 
or reducing uncertainty.
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Statistical
Uncertainty
Strategic
Guidance
Strategic
Pyramid
Strategic Risk
Strategic
Warning
Strategic Weight
Strategy
Structural
Readiness
Tactical
Warning
Theory o f 
Victory
The situation in which the Certainty o f Assessment can be quantified 
by a statistical technique, for example a confidence interval.
Codified form of Political Guidance that comprises detailed 
instructions on how to implement it. (See also Codification).
The fact that the achievement of political goals through the use of 
force rests on a hierarchy of levels of Strategy, from the generation 
of capabilities, to tactics, to operations, to politics.
The Risk that political goals may not be achieved against the 
deliberate opposition of an adversary.
Notice of the emergence of a new, or a change in an existing, 
Strategic Risk. (See also Tactical Warning).
Extent to which a country’s military effort influences the outcome of 
a conflict through its direct effect on the adversary. A country that 
does not carry strategic weight can still use its armed forces to give 
political support to the effort of allies who do carry strategic weight.
The relationship between political goals and military force. 
Specifically, it is understood here as the system of cause-effect 
relationships that underlies the Strategic Pyramid.
The extent to which the military potential inherent in a nation’s 
population and economy has been transformed into military units, 
regardless of their state of Operational Readiness.
Advance notice of impending enemy action, i.e. of the realization of 
a Strategic Risk. (See also Strategic Warning).
Ex-ante conception of how political goals may be achieved by the 
use of force, and thus combining the instrumental and experimental 
nature of Strategy.
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